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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The thesis originates in an unresolved phenomenon associated with moving into a 
nursing home and concerns the reports of emotional distress, depression and 
increased risk of morbidity and mortality associated with the move; shedding-life is 
used to capture the broad character of this phenomenon.  Shedding-life has been 
the subject of scientific inquiry for seventy years and yet the phenomenon is still not 
understood and, possibly because of this, there appears to be no generally accepted 
approaches to ameliorate this harm.  This thesis inquiries into the genesis of 
shedding life and presents a theory to account for it. 
The failure of existing research to account for shedding-life indicated an alternative 
approach was required.  As shedding-life arises in the context of a significant 
change in a person’s living-environment it was surmised that the phenomenon 
involves the relationship between the person and the changing environment in which 
they live.  Based on this, the approach taken was to use the philosophical research 
of Martin Heidegger concerning the structural relationship between the person and 
their living environment, an approach not previously explored. 
Heidegger’s research, undertaken within the empiricist tradition, identifies and 
describes the structural processes by which the person is both constituted by its 
formative socio-cultural environment and bound to it as the locus and source of its 
ongoing existence.  This means that who the individual human person becomes is 
both contingent and dependent upon the living environment into which it is born and 
raised, where the concept of living environment is understood in terms of 
possibilities for a meaningful life.  On this account if a person’s access to their living-
environment is materially disrupted they are at risk of experiencing a decline in the 
meaningfulness of their existence.  As this is a naturalistic account, founded on the 
biological processes of the body, the loss of an appropriate living environment is 
reflected in psychological distress which in turn is frequently manifested in bodily 
morbidities; this is the basis of shedding life, a structural rather than a psychological 
phenomenon.   
This contingent account of the person is in stark contrast to the materialist approach 
that posits the person as essentially the biological body, independent of its 
environment.  The materialist view informs the design and running of nursing homes 
resulting in a significant disruption to a person’s life-environment contributing to 
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rather than ameliorating shedding-life, as such nursing homes are iatrogenic, i.e. 
cause harm.  Left unaddressed nursing home environments will continue to cause 
harm and fail to assist older people live a meaningful life in their remaining years. 
While the thesis commenced from a concern about nursing homes, the 
phenomenon of shedding-life is a much broader phenomenon.  The Theory of Life-
Environment Disruption, derived from the structure of being a person, provides an 
account of shedding-life by identifying the essential relationship between the person 
and their life-environment.  The theory predicts that whenever there is a material 
disruption to a person’s life-environment they are at risk of shedding life and as such 







I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award 
of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary 
institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material 
previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has 
been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, 
be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any 
university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of 
Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-
award of this degree.  
I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the 
web, via the University’s digital research repository, the Library Search and also 
through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University 
to restrict access for a period of time.  
I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of 
an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship 
 
Stephen Richards 









This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Marion Miller, Mary Guy and the 
countless number of wonderful people I have met over the years living and 







There are many people who have been supportive in the long process involved with 
production of this thesis. 
Professor Alan Pearson who provided the space, support, and confidence in me to 
undertake this thesis. 
Peter Willis who provided a friendly sounding board on numerous occasions as I 
struggled to make sense of Heidegger’s work. 
To various senior academics around the world who readily responded to my emailed 
questions seeking clarification of their published work. To dtSearch Software for 
donating a license for their document search software to help with the thesis. To the 
editors and publishers of Seven Dying Australians for permission to include in the 
thesis Marion Miller’s story “You Just Shed Life”. 
To my family, especially my wife Anne, for their ongoing support, tolerance, and 






REFERENCING AND TRANSLATIONS 
The APA referencing system is primarily used in the thesis.  A number of texts 
referenced are published on the Kindle platform and in these cases often a Kindle 
location rather than a page number is provided. In these instances where quotations 
are referenced the Kindle location is indicated by “k.” in the citation. Thus (k, 2350-
56) refers to the Kindle location 2350 to 2356 in the Kindle edition of the text. 
In the thesis, particularly in Chapter 6, there are a number of quotations from the 
works of Aristotle.  In keeping with accepted practice, in addition to the APA 
reference I have included referencing to the Greek text.  The references relate to 
the edition of the Greek text of Aristotle prepared by Immanuel Bekker and published 
in 1831. The reference is in the form “(1033b15)” and refers to a page number 
(1033), column letter (b) and the nearest line number, provided at 5 line intervals 
(15).  
Texts authored by Martin Heidegger are excluded from the APA referencing 
approach and are not contained in the reference list.  The approach taken is to 
provide an abbreviation to the relevant text together, where appropriate, a page 
number. A list of texts authored by Heidegger referenced in the thesis, together with 
the abbreviation used is provided below. These references are provided in square 
brackets, e.g. [BT].  The primary translation of Being and Time used in the thesis is 
the Macquarrie and Robinson translation.  A reference to a quotation from this text 
will include the text abbreviation, a reference to the page in the English translation 
and in keeping with accepted practice, a reference to the page of the German 
translation, e.g. [BT 29/9].  Occasionally reference is made to a section number 
within the text, this is indicated by §, e.g. Section 14 is refenced as §14. In all other 
texts reference is made only to the English translation page number. 
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For the most part the English translations provided in the texts have been used.  In 
some instances, alternative translations were investigated and adopted where I 
believed the English translation did not reflect the intent of the German and may 
hinder an understanding of the text.  
Before adapting an alternative translation, consideration was given to the context of 
the passage and the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing.  The relevant 
German word was identified in the German version of Being and Time [BTg] and 
then alternative English translations of the German were then considered.  The 
endeavour was made to use an English word that both reflected the German word 
and the phenomenon.  My interpretative position was that Heidegger typically 
sought words the meaning of which reflected the phenomenon. 
The main source used for translation was the Beolingus German-English online 
dictionary (https://dict.tu-chemnitz.de) published by the Chemnitz Technical 
University, Germany. This was supplemented by translations from the German-
English online dictionary dict.cc (https://www.dict.cc/) published by Paul 
Hemetsberger. On various occasions, I explore the meaning of English words to 
gain a better understanding of their meaning.  For the most part I use the Online 
Etymology Dictionary (OEA) (http://www.etymonline.com/) which is compiled and 
 
17 
published by Douglas Harper.   
An example of this is the German word Zeugganzheit which the translators of Being 
and Time translate as “a totality of equipment” [BT 97/68-9].  The relevant word 
segment ganz is typically used in the German to refer to a whole or unity and 
accordingly I translate this as “a unity of equipment”. This may sound like a minor 
change but in the context of my interpretation of Heidegger’s approach it is a crucial 
difference. Important changes in translation are accompanied by a discussion, and 
the change to Zeugganzheit is discussed in Chapter 14. The following translations 
changes are made as a matter of course when quoting passages and no further 
comment is made:  
Sein: This is translated in BT as Being.  In German all nouns are capitalised and 
there is no reason to capitalise Being, just as there is no reason to capitalise Entity.  
Accordingly, I translate Sein as being. 
Woraufhin: This is typically translated in the text as “upon-which” which is misleading 
and has connotations of an entity.  Heidegger generally uses the term to refer to 
something as being ‘based on’ some aspect of the ontological structure.  My 
preferred translation is therefore “on the basis of which”. 
Das Man: This is translated in the text as ‘the They’.  The term is used in reference 
to the average everydayness of the culture in which Dasein lives. This translation is 
misleading as it suggests a separation of the individual from the culture whereas 
Heidegger is arguing the individual is part of the culture.  I follow Dreyfus and 
translate this as the ‘One’ (Dreyfus, 1991). 
Seinkönnen: This is translated in the text as “potentiality-for-being” and refers to 
Dasein.  The German word können is more typically associated with being able or 
ability.  In the thesis I develop the concept of a reciprocal relationship and apply it in 
a number of situations.  I translate Seinkönnen as ability-to-be which is an aspect of 
Dasein’s structure which has a reciprocal relationship with its environment which 
offers ‘possibilities-for-being’. The reciprocal relationship is thus, (Dasein’s ability) 





This is the account of shedding life written by Marion Miller that inspired the title and 
theme of the thesis. It is from a piece she wrote simply called You Just Shed Life1 
concerning her experience of moving into living in a nursing home. 
I am indebted to Prof Pearson for the suggestion of including a small piece that 
describes the phenomenon this thesis addresses from a older person’s perspective. 
YOU JUST SHED LIFE 
By Marion Miller 
My name is Marion Miller. I’m eighty-seven. I worked all my life in publishing, public 
relations, and I was a municipal councillor after I re  tired. I had a husband 
who died about twelve years ago. And I have two clever daughters, five 
grandchildren and two great-grandchildren.  I have been at this nursing home for 
nearly a year. I came to be here because I had to face the fact that I couldn’t live 
alone any more. And my daughters are both career women. They have no time. 
Anyway it’s a burden to them that neither I nor they would have enjoyed! But it was 
a hard decision. 
My world closed in gradually. In the last few years that I was at home I could still 
walk, but the distances gradually shrank. First I had to give up the park. Then I had 
to give up going to the end of the road. And by two years before I came into the 
nursing home I could only go out to my letterbox. I had a home help who came to 
shop once a week. I didn’t go with her but she knew what I wanted and took a list. 
She had been with me a long time. And I had someone to come in and clean the 
house for me, too. I did all my own cooking at that time, although I realised at the 
end I wasn’t doing such good cooking. And people were very kindly bringing in food 
for the microwave. But I was still living alone. But then the day came of course when 
I had a fall. 
Walking from my chair in the back room to the chair in the front room – which is not 
a great distance – I knew I wasn’t going to get there. But there was nothing I could 
do. And I crashed over with my walking frame on top of me. Don’t ask me how. But 
ten years ago I fitted an alarm system which I wore around my neck – I never had 
to use it. By pressing a button on that alarm, people at the central control area would 
                                            
1 The story appears in a collection of short stories called Seven Dying Australians published in 2003(Kellehear 
& Ritchie, 2003). Marion’s story appears with permission of the authors and the publishers. 
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alert people close by and they would come and check on me immediately. I had to 
have four people in my immediate vicinity who would come to me if I called. But I 
never had to press it in all that time. Once or twice I have accidentally pressed it. I 
had a thing that I had to press once a day as well, and after that immediately a voice 
coming from an intercom system would call out, ‘Are you alright, Mrs Miller?’ 
Anyway, on this awful day I crashed over. So all the while I was on the floor – well, 
not quite on the floor, I got as far as the chair… had my face on the chair – I was 
able to reach and press it. And immediately I heard someone saying, ‘Are you 
alright, Mrs Miller?’ And all I could say was, ‘Help, help.’ In no time a neighbour from 
a few doors away arrived, and quite by chance my daughter arrived as well and they 
couldn’t get me out. So they had to get a man – another neighbour – and they got 
me into my chair. Well, the rot set in from there, really.  
I battled on a big longer. I had a chair put in halfway in between my front chair and 
the kitchen one. And I spent a lot of time on the chair in the front and so on. Not long 
after that incident I went into St Vincent’s Private Hospital. The prosthesis in one hip 
had gone right through the pelvic bone. 
In St Vincent’s Private Hospital I met one of the nuns there who was a retired nun, 
and who was also a counsellor. It was a great help to me because I could talk frankly 
to her where I couldn’t with my children. So I told my children that I knew I had to go 
to a home. They didn’t push me to come here – an experience some people have. 
And so the hunt for a suitable nursing home began. My daughters saw ten nursing 
home altogether. You know, more or less in the city – because I lived in the 
Melbourne suburb of Clifton Hill. At a lot of homes the smell was so bad they need 
not have bothered to have gone past the door. But this nursing home was, without 
a doubt, the best. So they applied and I got in. I was very lucky because it’s very 
good here. 
I couldn’t walk any more, and Dr Perry, who advises about people in my situation, 
said that I was not mobile enough for a hostel so it had to be a nursing home. 
This is largely because my hips were collapsing and in the end I couldn’t walk very 
far any more. I am now basically confined to a wheelchair. And that’s terrible. I mean 
I’ve always been a very self-sufficient, independent person. I left home at eighteen 
and came out to Australia from England when I was twenty-three. 
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Now the only thing that I still can do is wipe my bottom! That’s my one little 
independence. They even need to put me on the loo. 
When I worked in publishing I worked mainly in the production department, because 
in those days production tasks didn’t go through outside agencies. They did 
everything inside, in-house. We had to do the dust-jacket designs, do the publishing 
blurbs, everything, really. And it was a very exciting time to be in London. It was in 
the 1930s, and I met some very interesting people. 
I came out with some of my Australian friends. Angus and Robertson were the only 
publishers, but they had nothing to offer me. So I went from job to job for a while 
and that puts you off after a few years. Well, I mean I had no idea how publishing in 
Australia was, you see? It is quite different now, over fifty years later. 
I began life travelling on an English passport. I went overseas with my husband once 
and I had to hang about while he got through customs, you know. When I hoped the 
Republicans would win during the recent referendum I thought that I’d better apply 
for citizenship before they deported me! So I rang them up, and they asked me when 
did I come to Australia. So I told them I was here in 1936. They said if you were 
English you would have automatically become an Australian citizen. I think I was 
made a citizen in 1946 when everyone from the UK was automatically given 
nationality. I had voted from the time of my arrival. Anyway, I felt more secure if I 
had a bit of paper, so I requested a certificate for proof. So I got a certificate that 
cost me $50 and I showed it to my home help, who’s Sri Lankan, and she said, ‘Oh, 
it is not as big and as good as mine.’ We both laughed. 
Since coming to the nursing home my life has changed completely. As long as I 
lived at home – I lived there for thirty years, was a councillor for eight years – so 
many people I knew dropped in, or rang me up to consult me. I was also writing 
letters to the papers all the time. And leading a normal life where you can come and 
go as you please. You know what I mean? 
There is much less social life here. My friends are very good about coming to see 
me but I get very tired after a while. Another change in my life since coming here is 
my diet. I was a vegetarian all my life – always. But they have no idea what 
vegetarians eat, here. I mean, they have tried. And I find that I have put on so much 
weight so I had to stop eating all the uninspired vegies. 
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They shut the doors to the public at six o’clock here, so people who can only come 
in the evening I don’t see as much of. But thankfully, most people I know can get 
around to see me during the day. And I get tired. I’m up at seven, at my request, 
you see. I think I’m probably gradually getting more tired. I wonder whether it is 
psychological. I mean, I’m quite happy to get into bed at six pm. Well, partly because 
I’ve been sitting all day, you see. I listen to the ABC – try to stay awake for Philip 
Adams at ten. 
When I lived at home I had a dear little garden, but in the end I couldn’t look after it 
myself. But I had a lovely girl with whom I became great friends and I always had a 
cat. Fortunately Buffy, my last cat, died before I had to come in. 
Every day I hope that I won’t wake up in the morning. I want to die. Sorry, but I do. 
This will be the end. And I don’t expect anything beyond ‘the end’ either. I’m not 
religious. They have a very nice woman here, not Church of England, which I was 
brought up in, of course. It’s Uniting Church. She comes to check on me and have 
a bit of conversation, but I have convinced her that it’s too late but she still comes 
to see me for a general chat. But my views about death have not changed. Let me 
give you an example. 
The nursing home has this monthly discussion group called the ‘Chattery’. It’s often 
boring. But they say to me, ‘Oh, you are such a contributor’, because I’ve got the 
gift of the gab, you know. The topic of the discussion was: What would you do if you 
won a million dollars? Anyway, I was twelfth person in the group one day and we 
went round the table. One lady, she’ll go to the Begonia Festival in Ballarat. Another 
person was going to give a large dinner party. And this with a million dollars! I mean. 
‘Well, I wouldn’t give the money to my grandchildren. I don’t believe in them having 
a lot of money,’ said another. 
So when they got to me I said that if I had a million dollars I’d get a ticket and go to 
Amsterdam. And I’d pay to have euthanasia. Well! That went down like a lead 
balloon. It just did. Well, of course I had enough of this and so I got myself out 
straight after this in my pump-handle wheelchair. Anyway not long after this incident 
they bring the minutes of the meeting for me to see. And when you read about my 
suggestion (no names appeared for anyone), it simply read: one lady said that she 
would take a trip to Holland! So I mean they couldn’t even put it on paper! That 
happened last month. 
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The main lesson in life that I have learnt in the last nine months is: I’ve learnt to try 
and be patient. ‘Try’ is the word. 
You know that my nun friend gave me the prayer that I think people at Alcoholics 
Anonymous have learnt: ‘We should have the serenity to accept what we cannot 
change and have the courage to alter what we can.’ I think that that’s awfully true. I 
hope I have learnt a lot of tolerance. I realise now that in my adult life I lived in my 
own world. I suppose we all do. I mean if you were a footballer, you mixed with that 
kind of crowd. I’ve always been interested in politics and literature, and because I 
married a journalist, we always knew a lot of journalists who are good people for 
arguments. And although I met people from all walks of life as a councillor I brushed 
them off. Most women of my age are only interested in their grandchildren. I think 
that’s extraordinary. They seem to have no other interests. I have always been 
interested in books. But here I’ve learnt a lot of PR and… being a bit of a bullshitter, 
that’s very useful here, because it’s extraordinary the people who live here. 
There are some things that I feel I just can’t tolerate and so I complain. I’m sorry. 
But I just complain. I write complaints. And they are very good and they listen to me. 
But… I just have to learn to be very patient. It’s the hardest thing, patience. I still 
write pertinent letters. 
For example, when I go back to my room I may have to wait quite a while before 
someone can come and put me into my other chair. You know, that sort of thing. 
Seems small, but I’m more comfortable in the armchair. 
Two other things have also happened. One, I have an eye condition so I can only 
read big print now. Which means I can’t read a lot of current books, so to speak. 
That’s one thing that has happened. And another is my hearing is not as good as it 
was. My daughters had been telling me for years that it was deteriorating. I didn’t 
believe them. But now I do. Those are rather isolating things now. And the rooms! 
Well, all I have got is a wardrobe and a chest of drawers where I can put things on 
top. Of course there are four of us in the room – and the room is so cramped. I 
brought my own chair with me. They have given me a little thing on wheels, you 
know, which I have beside my chair, on which I keep my things I really need. I got 
my box of writing stuff, and brandy and lots of odds and ends and I get furious if 




I used to collect lustre china. But I have given that all away. But fortunately I have 
grandchildren who are just starting out in life. And they went through a lot of my 
possessions and I said anything that they didn’t want, get rid of them to the 
Brotherhood or Salvation Army. Because that was a different life. And there is no 
good hankering over it, is it? No, it is not. Because I know I’ll never get back. I don’t 
believe in miracles – I’m here for life. I’m here till I die, which I hope won’t be long in 
coming. 
Well, the nursing home experience is all new. I have never been to boarding school 
or anything. They were very nice to me. They have always been nice to me, but 
particularly very nice to me at the start. They spent extra time with me, I realise now. 
And of course, my wonderful daughters are very supportive. So I think the nursing 
home experience has been largely what I expected it to be. 
But I’ve lost privacy. Good God, you’ve got no privacy, although they put curtains 
around you before they do anything. Then I’ve got nowhere to keep anything. So I 
got rid of all my treasures, all my presents. Fortunately, I got grandsons setting up 
a house and a granddaughter. You know kids. I gave away all my books and my 
pink lustre china. I gave that all away. You just shed life, you do. 
People should know that if you find yourself in a place like this that they should not 
brood about it. Wait till it comes – and then just face it as best as you can. What else 
can you tell them? It’s no good thinking about it ahead. 
I mean, in my case, I was old. I mean I’ve been old quite a while – when I came here 
I was eighty-six. But I hadn’t felt old. When I close my eye, I’m twenty. That’s what I 
feel inside – twenty! And I’ve obviously kept my younger attitudes because the kids 
here talk to me about things. And I’m always interested in politics – all the things 
that I’ve always been interested in.   
Nothing has changed inside. It’s only the outside. 
I never thought this would happen to me. If I’d known in time I would have done 
something about it. I hate to think beyond each day. And though there are worse 
places, the fact is that when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. 





When the Caring Response Over-Reaches: Responding to the 
Iatrogenic Effect of Nursing Homes 
Communities of people throughout history have developed ways of caring for others 
in their community who are injured, sick or frail.  Regardless of whether this caring 
response is based on herbs and potions, bloodletting, driving out evil spirits, or the 
latest in chemo-therapy, across cultures and over time it has typically been based 
on the best available understanding of what works.  This basic humanitarian concern 
is reflected in today’s medical, nursing and allied health professions and the basic 
approach taken continues to reflect the desire to apply the best understanding of 
what works.  Over the course of the last hundred years, the medical sciences have 
made advances that would be unimaginable to peoples of earlier times concerning 
the understanding and application of knowledge of what works to an increasing 
range of illnesses and severity of injuries.  What we can now do is truly remarkable. 
What if, however, the ‘best understanding’ results in harm that is as significant or 
greater than what is being addressed by the act of caring, i.e. the act of caring is 
iatrogenic2?  The concept of risk is well known in medicine, identifying and managing 
risk does not mean that the actions are iatrogenic, even if someone dies.  Surgery, 
for example, has inherent risks but, on balance, the potential benefits outweigh the 
risk of adverse consequences and as part of this approach the risks are generally 
identified and ameliorated.  
However, this is not always the situation. For example, Hoffman and Welch report 
on the incidents of surgical interventions for kidney cancers identified following CT 
scans for other purposes.  They found that the risks of the surgery were significant 
with death rates of 1:50 within a month following surgery, and yet the type of cancers 
involved were typically not life-threatening(Welch, Skinner, Schroeck, Zhou, & 
Black, 2018). It is clear that from an objective perspective, that here the benefit/risk 
characteristic of surgery does not outweigh the benefits being sought.  Their findings 
are part of a growing body of literature raising significant concerns that people are 
being “overdosed, overtreated and overdiagnosed” as the rapid increase in the 
                                            




sensitivity of screening tools are detecting anomalies that will never cause the 
person to “experience symptoms or early death.” (Moynihan, Doust, & Henry, 2012, 
p. 1).  This is when the caring response shifts to being iatrogenic, when the desire 
to apply the best understanding of what works overreaches and harm results. 
There is another field within health services where there is significant concern that 
the caring response is iatrogenic.  However, it is one that does not have the same 
profile as overdiagnosis and overtreatment and largely flies below the radar.  It is 
the use of nursing homes for the provision of care to older people who, due to a 
chronic illness or age-related frailty, are deemed to be at risk when living at home. 
There is now a significant body of literature, extending back over seventy years, that 
entering a nursing home is associated with an increased risk of premature 
morbidities and mortalities, emotional distress and depression, even when 
accounting for the health status of the person.  The difficulty is that unlike 
overdiagnosis, which is understood, at least conceptually, the view of researchers 
concerning this phenomenon, often called by such names as relocation trauma, or 
similar, is not understood(Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah, Ibrahim, Kipsaina, 
& Bugeja, 2018; Lieberman, 1969).  It is, possibly, this lack of understanding that 
contributes to there being no evidence of any generally accepted and applied 
formalised interventions designed to prevent, ameliorate or manage the risk 
associated with this phenomenon of shedding life associated with nursing home 
care.  In the absence of an understanding of the phenomenon and of appropriate 
risk management, that the research findings indicate moving into a nursing home 
increases the risk of premature morbidity and mortality for the person, then, in their 
current form, nursing homes are iatrogenic.  
This thesis does not present a detailed review of the literature associated with 
premature morbidity and mortality associated with moving into a nursing home as 
this has now been undertaken many times over the decades (Coffman, 1983; 
Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah et al., 2018; Holder & Jolley, 2012; Kasl, 1972; 
Lee, Woo, & Mackenzie, 2002; Lieberman, 1969; Richards, 2011; Sullivan & 
Williams, 2017).  What is provided is a brief overview to ensure the character of the 
phenomenon (which I term ‘shedding-life’) is brought into view; this is provided in 
Chapter 1. 
That the phenomenon is still not understood, (Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah 
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et al., 2018) despite decades of research has been attributed not to the lack of 
research but the absence of a theoretical framework within which to understand the 
phenomenon (Danermark & Ekström, 1990).  This thesis is a response to that call.  
The primary aim of the thesis is to develop a theory that can account for the 
phenomenon and provide a basis for progressing the research, such that we can 
significantly improve our understanding of what works for older people and do so in 
a way that minimises the risk of harm.  
Given that there has been no material breakthrough in the research for over seventy 
years, the approach was to re-think the basic relationship between the human 
person and their environment.  The person-environment relationship as a starting 
point was my best intuitive sense of where a solution was to be found based on my 
experience of working in the aged-care health sector for almost thirty years.  It was 
also suggested by the characteristics of relocation itself, understood as a move from 
one environment to another.  The approach to investigating this relationship was 
based on the philosophical research of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, 
who had published his findings concerning the ontological structure of the person in 
1927 in his seminal book, Being and Time.  
Heidegger’s work disclosed an inherent structural relationship between the human 
person and their living environment, such that what this environment provides in 
terms of meaningful activities is of critical importance to the person in sustaining 
their wellbeing, or sense of self.  This structure indicates that a radical adverse 
change in the person’s life-environment increases the risk of adverse consequences 
to the wellbeing of the person.  This structural phenomenon is universal, it applies 
to all people, all the time and it has a profound effect on the lives of people.  The 
implication is that adverse or inappropriate life-environments can inhibit or prevent 
a person from continuing to live a meaningful life, which in turn is manifested in 
various psychological conditions and other serious health consequences.  If this is 
indeed the case, then the nursing home would be one such example of an 
inappropriate life-environment for many people. 
The result of the thesis work is the articulation of this structural phenomenon in the 
form of a Theory of Life-Environment Disruption which argues that the phenomenon 
of ‘shedding life’ is a universal phenomenon, not one confined to a move into a 
nursing home.  It is part of a broader phenomenon that is related to the very 
character of being human.  In that the design and running of the nursing home 
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largely ignores the necessity of a living-environment appropriate for the ongoing life 
(meaningful existence) of an older person, the caring response becomes iatrogenic, 
it causes harm.  The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption states that if a person’s 
access to the active involvements which constitute their meaningful existence is 
disrupted then they are at increased risk of psychological and somatic illness and 
death.  The source, character and duration of the disruption will have differing 
impacts on the risk for each individual person contingent on what constitutes a 
meaningful life for the person. 
The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption is grounded in the ontological structure 
of the person which is its fundamental strength.  In terms of its applicability as a 
theory within the human sciences its general structure satisfies the basic criteria for 
a theory:  it has explanatory power, it has logical consistency with observed 
empirical observations, it has general predictive powers, it provides a means to 
identify factors which can be controlled to influence outcomes, and it is 
verifiable/testable.  In its current form, it is a high-level theory, and further work 
needs to be done to refine it for specific research, policy and practice applications.  
However, to demonstrate its usefulness, one possible method which can be used 
immediately within nursing homes has been developed and demonstrated in the 
thesis (Chapter 21). 
In summary, it is recognised that the development and running of nursing homes is 
motivated by the compassion to implement a caring response based on the best 
understanding of what works.  However, from time to time, such understanding over-
reaches or is blind to the consequences, and when this occurs harm may result, the 
caring response becomes iatrogenic (harmful).  It is argued that this is the case with 
nursing homes which have, by and large, failed to adequately consider the necessity 
of living a meaningful life.  The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption has been 
developed to provide a framework by which the phenomenon of shedding life can 
be better understood with the hope that nursing homes are transformed such that 
older people entering them have the possibility of living a meaningful life, and the 
risk of premature morbidity and mortality is reduced.  
More generally, while the thesis commenced from a concern about nursing homes, 
the phenomenon of shedding-life is a much broader phenomenon.  The Theory of 
Life-Environment Disruption, derived from the structure of being a person, provides 
an account of shedding-life by identifying the essential relationship between the 
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person and their life-environment.  The theory predicts that whenever there is a 
material disruption to a person’s life-environment they are at risk of shedding life 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: THE THESIS PROJECT 
This chapter introduces the thesis project and provides the context for the project, 
the strategic approach taken and the research structure of the thesis.  Because of 
the character of the thesis project, Chapter 2 is presented as both a descriptive 
overview of the thesis findings and an introduction to the thesis content.  This 
approach has been taken to provide an understanding of the thesis as a whole as 
soon as possible to establish a contextual framework for the work presented in the 
thesis chapters. 
A Brief Account of the Thesis Project 
The thesis originated from a desire to understand what was happening with people 
such that a move to a nursing home, for many of them, resulted in a decline in quality 
of life, and in some instances premature morbidity and mortality. 
I have worked in the aged care sector as a senior executive for almost thirty years, 
and Marion's account, presented at the beginning of the thesis, has become my 
paradigm case for the phenomenon of shedding life.  The term ‘shedding life’ 
captures the essence of much of what I have observed, and reflects, in part, what 
can be easily found in the research literature, that relocation to a nursing home risks 
a range of adverse outcomes, including premature morbidity and mortality.  At this 
stage ‘shedding life’ was a specific phenomenon related to nursing homes. 
There is a significant body of research literature, quantitative and qualitative 
addressing with the problems arising out of relocating into a nursing home and I had 
explored this as part of earlier research(Richards, 2011).  While there is now a 
general view, albeit by no means a universal consensus, that there is a problem, 
there is no theoretical explanation to account for problems, and no indication of a 
systematic response to address it.  This project aimed to come to an understanding 
of what is occurring to people as a result of the relocation, to identify if it accounts 
for ‘shedding life’ and if so propose a theory to account for it. 
I had naïvely chosen the early philosophical work of the German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) as the basis of my research.  It was naïve because the 
choice was made based on accounts given in a few social science 
phenomenological research papers I had read.  From these brief encounters I 
picked up the notion that Heidegger’s work provides an account of our relationship 
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with the world and the initial idea was that if I could learn about Heidegger’s work 
then, perhaps, I could identify some characteristic of that relationship that 
contributes to ‘shedding life’.  In that a relocation into a nursing home is a significant 
change in world, this seemed a reasonable approach.  Virtually all the underlying 
presuppositions I held concerning that choice were wrong. 
As I came to understand Heidegger’s work as ontological research I recognised that 
‘shedding life’ was grounded in the person’s ontological structure, i.e. what 
constitutes the person, and as such it must, of necessity, be a more general 
phenomenon and relocation to a nursing home is just one instance.  If this is the 
case then understanding the ontological structure of the person should have 
applicability more generally, and the phenomenon of ‘shedding life’ should be 
evident in other instances of a significant adverse change of world, or disruptions to 
the life-environment as I have come to name the phenomenon.  By way of a 
preliminary ‘proof of concept,’ I explored both these aspects and confirmed both the 
broader applicability of the structural model and other instances of life-environment 
disruption leading to ‘shedding life’.   I report on this in Chapters 20 and 21 and cite 
evidence associated with unemployment, imprisonment of refugees into detention 
centres, and concentration camps.  All these situations share the same basic 
structure as the relocation to a nursing home and share the same broad range of 
adverse outcomes.  This recognition was a change in understanding concerning the 
phenomenon and shifted the nursing home relocation to the status of an exemplar 
case, rather than the primary phenomenon.  I readily acknowledge that more 
research will be required concerning these other cases; however, on the face of it, 
the basic structure of the phenomenon is applicable and fits the life-environment 
disruption theory.  For the thesis, the nursing home relocation remains the primary 
example. 
In the research literature associated with nursing home relocation, the phenomenon 
of premature morbidity/mortality has a range of different names.  Relocation stress, 
relocation syndrome, relocation trauma, translocation syndrome, translocation 
trauma, transplantation shock, transition shock, transition trauma, transition stress, 
transfer trauma, etc. have all been used (Barnhouse, Brugler, & Harkulich, 1992; 
Booth, Simons, & Booth, 1989; Choi, Wyllie, & Ransom, 2009; Coffman, 1981; 
Hodgson, Freedman, Granger, & Erno, 2004; Stones & Gullifer, 2016; Walker, 
Curry, & Hogstel, 2008). These names all have the same elements; firstly, a move 
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(relocation, translocation, transition, transfer) and secondly, an adverse 
consequence associated with the move (trauma, stress, shock, syndrome).  While I 
had no difficulties with these terms when I considered them against the broader 
phenomenon they did not quite fit.  When I researched the qualitative research 
literature(Richards, 2011), there was clear evidence of a greater range of adverse 
outcomes than is covered by trauma, stress, shock, etc. and it is for this reason I 
chose the term ‘shedding life’, inspired by Marion Miller’s description.  
Initially, I used ‘shedding life’ as a ‘working title’ for the entire phenomenon of the 
move and the adverse consequences and still do at times.  More recently I have 
introduced the term, ‘life-environment disruption’ and when I use it with ‘shedding 
life’, the latter specifically covers only the adverse consequences that may arise 
from such a disruption.   
In that the concept of life-environment disruption is ontologically based, I would 
expect it to apply to any situation where there is a significant disruption to one’s life-
environment.  For example, I would hypothesise, that ‘shedding life’ will be observed 
among elite athletes who have dedicated their lives to a sport then suddenly it’s 
over,  as well as among people who are forced out of their chosen career or life path 
as a result of a sudden traumatic illness or accident.  The concept of a ‘disruption to 
life-environment’ is meant to cover all these types instances, i.e. it is not limited to 
relocations.  This does not mean that all people who experience a life-environment 
disruption will experience ‘shedding life’, nor does it suggest that when experienced 
it is permanent or necessarily severe or fatal.  Variability will occur based on the 
extent of the disruption, and the importance of what is disrupted, the capacity to 
access alternatives (e.g. a new job in the same field), capacity to respond to a new 
life-environment, ability to project beyond the current situation, and so on.  
Understanding what contributes to this variability will help map out the determinants 
of ‘shedding life’, and the ameliorating factors and enable it to be applied more 
generally; this is a post-doctoral research program. 
Why a Theory is Needed 
In 2015 there were approximately 7,000,000 older people in nursing homes in 
OECD countries (OECD.Stat, 2018; Wilson, Brow, & Playfair, 2017) and with the 
ageing of the world population expected to continue for many decades (United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division , 2015) the 
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demand for nursing home care is anticipated to steadily increase (World Health 
Organisation , 2011).  Perhaps surprisingly, for over seventy years there has been 
a consistent stream of research reporting on the harm associated with a move into 
a nursing home and yet despite this plethora of research this phenomenon of harm 
remains unexplained.  Kant famously commented that the situation in which we must 
accept the existence of things outside of ourselves on the basis of belief rather than 
proof is  “a scandal to philosophy”3.  What I ponder is how much more 
scandalous that tens of millions4 of older people pass through nursing homes and 
yet we have failed to address the issue of harm that nursing homes may be causing.   
Over forty years ago, in 1969 Lieberman, published(Lieberman, 1969) one of the 
first literature reviews, covering over 50 papers from the 1950s and 1960s, on the 
effects of institutionalization on older people and noted that the ; 
effects of institutionalization on the psychological well-being and physical integrity of aged 
adults had been a question of humanitarian interest since the late nineteenth century and of 
scientific inquiry for 30 years” (Lieberman, 1969, p. 330)(my underlining).   
Leiberman’s work was motivated by the results of a number of research studies 
which suggested that mortality rates following a move to a nursing home were higher 
than expected for older people (Aldrich & Mendkoff, 1963; Camargo & Preston, 
1945; Kay, Norris, & Post., 1956; Whittier & Williams, 1956).  Perhaps the first of 
these studies, that by Camargo and Preston published in 1945 (Camargo & Preston, 
1945), reported mortality rates 2½ to 11½ times the rate in the general population 
for people aged over 65 during the year following admission to 'mental hospitals' 
while Aldrich and Mendkoff (Aldrich & Mendkoff, 1963) reported that the “social and 
psychologic effect” from relocation can be “lethal”(p192). 
Lieberman observed that the common-sense view that institutions had adverse 
effects on the psychological well-being and survival of people appears to be 
supported. He reached this conclusion citing a number of studies indicating that 
older people in nursing homes shared a range of characteristics such as;  
• poor adjustment 
• depression and unhappiness 
                                            
3 The comment appears in a footnote within the Preface of the Second Edition of Critique of Pure Reason. 
(Kant, 1998,  k. 2887) 
4 Will the current number of places is around 7,000,000 (excluding all non-OECD countries), this is a snapshot 
and does not account for the ‘turn-over’ or older people entering and dying in nursing homes over the years. 
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• negative self-image 
• feelings of personal insignificance 
Further, he reported, the people tended to  
• be docile and submissive 
• show a low range of interests and activities 
• to live in the past rather than the future 
• show signs of increased anxiety which at times focuses on feelings of death.  
Drawing from the research literature Lieberman states that it was clearly 
demonstrated that older people living in a range of institutional settings were not 
only worse off psychologically but likely to die sooner than older people living in the 
community.  He adds, however, that "without additional information, all of this 
research is worthless ... in determining whether life in the institutions induces such 
effects." (p. 332) Lieberman noted that in the research concerning this phenomenon 
that there was a range of methodological challenges to overcome before any 
conclusions could be reached, including the need for more longitudinal studies, 
consistent use of more sensitive assessment instruments, more comparative 
analysis between institutions and so on.  One of the summary findings he made 
heralded a new focus in studies as he noted that there  
… appears to be considerably more destructive effects associated with radical environmental 
change (entrance into institutions) than the residence in an institution. (p. 336).  
The interesting thing to note was the emphasis on the radical change in 
environments.  This was the first time that it is suggested that the change to (or 
disruption) from the home environment itself is what does the damage.   Lieberman 
indicated that if you survive this change without any adverse impact on your health 
and wellbeing, you may be all right.  However, as this thesis highlights, this is a 
significant barrier to pass through, and the risks are extremely high, with, perhaps, 
the vast majority failing to pass safely.  
In 1990, twenty years after the Lieberman review, Danermark and Ekström 
published a review(Danermark & Ekström, 1990) of the health effects on the elderly 
associated with the relocation into, within and between nursing homes and to 
another community-based home. In the intervening period since the Lieberman 
review, they found research reports publishing inconsistent findings as to the 
adverse effects of relocation.  In studies identified as having a good methodological 
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quality, they identified reports of increased mortality and adverse health outcomes 
while in others no such effects were noted.  Danermark and Ekström observed that, 
in the main, due to differences in methodological approaches and a lack of a 
common, if any, theoretical basis, it was not possible to draw any general 
conclusion. They did conclude, however, that  
... there is good reason for assuming that relocation under certain circumstances and for 
certain groups does lead to ill health and to an increase in mortality. (p. 44). (my bolding) 
Since this review there continues to be a steady stream of research findings 
reporting various adverse effects arising from the relocation of older people into 
nursing homes. The variety of negative consequences include  depression, 
increased sense of loneliness and alienation, decrease in functional competence, 
cognitive decline, decline in general condition, increases in falls, injuries, 
behavioural problems and premature morbidity (Aneshensel, Pearlin, Levy-Storms, 
& Schuler, 2000; Castle, 2001; Ferrah et al., 2018; Mantey et al., 2012; Mezuk, 
Rock, Lohman, & Choi, 2014; Scocco, Fantoni, Rapattoni, De Girolamo, & Pavan, 
2009; Scocco, Rapattoni, & Fantoni, 2006; Tuckett, 2007). 
In 2011, some forty years after the Lieberman’s study, I completed a literature review 
of the quantitative research literature(Richards, 2011) on the effects of relocation 
into a nursing home and the results were similar to those of Danermark and Ekström.  
The literature review was part of the preparatory stage for a systematic review of 
the qualitative research literature reporting on the experiences of older people 
relocating into nursing homes.  The main research approach in the field has been 
the use of quantitative research methodologies, however commencing in the 1980s 
there have been a small, but gradually increasing number of research projects using 
a qualitative approach, and it was on this body of research that the systematic review 
was focussed.  While there are sufficient inconsistencies in the quantitative research 
to prevent any conclusive findings concerning the adverse outcome of relocation to 
a nursing home, the results of the systematic review focusing on people’s reported 
experiences were unequivocal as to the significant psychological and emotional 
harm,  
While the clinical and personal care aspects of the services in nursing homes5 appear 
satisfactory there is a failure to recognise the significant psychological and emotional issues 
                                            
5 The abbreviation LTCF was in the quoted passage standing for long term care facility.  This has been changed 
to nursing home for consistency. 
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faced by older people as they relocate and struggle to adapt to new environments, develop 
new relationships, learn a new set of rules to survive, create a sense of place, establish new 
identities and create new meaning for their lives. The review indicates there is little in the way 
of support for these life transition processes and many people fail to make a successful 
transition. (Richards, 2011, p. 4) 
That review was the first of its kind and incorporated 14 studies, covering a period 
of 25 years and 6 different countries. The accounts of the significant emotional and 
psychological harm echoed consistently from these reports, regardless of the date 
or place of the study.  These reports were of the 'shedding life' phenomenon and 
are perhaps best summed up by the comments of a participant in a 2006 study 
contained in the review: 
Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was 
like for her to be at the facility. She cried out, “They don’t know the meaning of me! They 
don’t know the meaning of me.” Her comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new 
neighborhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38) 
The experiences reported are not those of everybody entering a nursing home, and 
I have known people who have thrived. However, those that do well and whose 
quality of life improves on entering a nursing home are a minority.  There are many 
who seem to accept the inevitability of it, resign themselves to their fate and 
begrudgingly put up with it, while another significant group simply withdraw.  Marion 
Miller is a rarity, not in terms of her experience, but in terms of ability to articulate 
what was happening to her and her preparedness to write down those experiences 
with such clarity.  This is why her account is the one I use as my paradigm case.  
The above is far from an adequate historical review of the research, that is not the 
intent.  The purpose is simply to highlight that from the time of the first reported 
research findings by Camargo and Preston published in 1945 (Camargo & Preston, 
1945) there has been an ongoing stream of research focusing on the harm 
associated with a relocation into a nursing home, that continues through to today. 
For example a systematic review of this literature was published early this year 
(2018). T he review reported mortality rates within the first six months of moving into 
a nursing home of up to 34% and that while some of this was accounted for by 
existing morbidities, the report concluded that “mortality in the immediate period 
following admission may not simply be due to an individual’s health status” (Ferrah 
et al., 2018, p. 584).  
However, despite seven decades of inquiry researchers are still acknowledging that 
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the phenomenon of premature morbidity and mortality remains not well understood 
(Ferrah et al., 2018; Sullivan & Williams, 2017).  Repeatedly over the decades, this 
lack of consensus in the research literature has been attributed to the diversity of 
methodologies and various methodological problems(Coffman, 1981; Danermark & 
Ekström, 1990; Ferrah et al., 2018; Gutman & Herbert, 1976; Thorson & Davis, 
2000).  As if to underscore this Ferrah et al. recently noted that in this field, “[b]etter 
empirical evidence is required, to determine how and to what extent the process of 
transition into long-term care influences subsequent mortality.”  (Ferrah et al., 2018, 
p. 598)  To be very clear, they are saying that notwithstanding more than seventy 
years of empirical research that even in 2018 we don’t have sufficient empirical 
evidence to understand what is going on and we need more research!  Yet older 
people are still entering nursing homes and still experiencing unexplained deaths 
and illnesses.   
In 1990 Danermark and Ekström(Danermark & Ekström, 1990) noted that a 
significant majority of the empirical research, which has only grown in volume since 
1990, has been atheoretical, and mainly of an exploratory character.  They 
concluded that it is the lack of theory that stands in the way of developing the 
necessary common methodologies and approaches necessary for the development 
of a cohesive body of knowledge in the field necessary for understanding and 
subsequent action.  Arguing against the recent call by Ferrah, et al. (Ferrah et al., 
2018) for more research, in 1990 Danermark and Ekström noted;  
Our survey of more than three decades of research in this field demonstrates with great clarity 
that there is very little new knowledge to be acquired from a continued atheoretical gathering 
of data with the aid of quantitative methods.  (Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 36) (my 
underlining) 
Their prediction, made over a quarter of a century ago, that “very little new 
knowledge” will be acquired by ongoing “atheoretical” quantitative methods has 
proven to be correct6.   
                                            
6 I am referring specifically to a theory that accounts for the ‘shedding of life’ phenomenon.  There have been 
studies that have used a theory as part of their research.  By way of example, McKenna used the concept of 
the social construct of ageism in relation to an older person’s self-perception (McKenna & Staniforth, 2017), in 
a review of the literature Holder and Jolley make reference to Social Selection Theory, i.e. essentially people 
with poorer health move into nursing homes therefore are at higher risk of mortality (Holder & Jolley, 2012), 
Meleis’ transition has been applied within the literature but more by way of classification of the stages of 
transition (Sullivan & Williams, 2017) and the Moos & Shaefer’s model of life crisis and transition has also been 
used (Komatsu, Hamahata, & Magilvy, 2007).  The latter two tend to normalise adverse effects of transition and 
flagging a need for nurses to monitor and provide interventions to assist the transition.   None of the theories 
used that I have identified attempt to provide a theory as to why the adverse outcomes occur and/or they are 
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Unlike the quantitative empirical research, there is almost a unanimous consensus 
in the qualitative literature that relocation to nursing homes is associated with 
significant adverse emotional and psychological experiences as two recent reviews 
of this literature report(Richards, 2011; Sullivan & Williams, 2017). However, this 
body of work is typically descriptive and not theoretically based.  While useful in 
understanding the qualitative characteristics of the phenomenon, it typically does 
not drive change in policy or practice, notwithstanding it is strongly suggestive that 
something is indeed seriously wrong.  
In that change can is typically driven more readily by quantitative research, in this 
instance, there is a problem. Such research needs to identify a theoretical 
framework for understanding the problem, to be able to identify contributing factors 
and offer ways of mitigation and so on.  Unfortunately, the empirical, qualitative 
research in this field ended in a cul-de-sac long ago having failed to propose a 
satisfactory theoretical framework.  As Danermark and Ekström noted decades ago, 
we don’t need more research we need a theory.  This thesis is a response to this 
call, motivated, to misquote Leiberman, by humanitarian concern. 
The Structure of the Phenomenon 
The term 'shedding life7' is adapted from the autobiographical account by Marion 
Miller she titled You Just Shed Life(Miller, 2003). In it, Marion describes the impact 
on her life of increased frailty which eventually resulted in a fall, broken hip, and a 
move to a nursing home.  The term 'shedding life' comes from the following passage 
of Marion's account; 
I think the nursing home experience has been largely what I expected it to be. 
But I've lost privacy. Good God, you've got no privacy, although they put curtains around you 
before they do anything. Then I've got nowhere to keep anything.  So I got rid of all my 
treasures, all my presents. … I gave away all my books and my pink lustre china. I gave that 
all away. You just shed life, you do. ...  
I mean, in my case, I was old. I mean I've been old quite a while – when I came here I was 
eighty-six. But I hadn’t felt old. When I close my eye, I’m twenty. That’s what I feel inside – 
twenty! …Nothing has changed inside. It's only the outside. 
… I hate to think beyond each day. … there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes 
to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place.  (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7) (my 
                                            
aged care specific whereas I am arguing that it is a more general phenomenon. 
7 The reference to loss and shedding is typically used in aged care with reference to the various possessions 




Three key observations can be made concerning Marion’s account.  First is the 
linking of the loss of important things to shedding life.  I take it that it is not the loss 
of the physical objects themselves that is the shedding, it Marion’s life.  In some 
way, her life was connected to these objects and when they went so did the 
possibilities of her living a life that involved them.  Marion is not using the term life 
in the sense that a biologist would use the term, e.g. in referring to all the forms of 
life on earth.  She is referring to life in the sense of something she lives; the same 
sense Frank Sinatra famously sang in the Paul Anka song My Way(Anka, 1968); 
I've lived a life that's full 
I travelled each and ev'ry highway 
And more, much more than this, I did it my way  
For Marion, living a life occurred along the ‘highway’ associated with books, as a 
collector of pink lustre China and as a social activist; then all these possibilities 
vanished.  Nothing meaningful to Marion, in term of her life, has replaced them, and 
she was left with very few ‘roads’ to travel that hold an interest for her; her life has 
shed.   
The second point of note is Marion’s reference to two distinct aspects of herself.  
The inside, which I take to be Marion’s reference to herself as a person and the 
outside which is a reference to her body.  Notwithstanding the chronological age of 
her body being in the late 80s, her experienced self is 20.  This difference in 
chronological age and experienced age has been widely observed and commented 
on in the literature(Chopik, Bremner, Johnson, & Giasson, 2018). Interestingly, the 
almost seventy-year difference Marion speaks of is significantly larger than the 20% 
younger than chronological age that has been reported(Rubin & Berntsen, 2006).  
However, it is not the age difference per se I am interested in, it is the phenomenon 
of the self as a distinct, even if related, phenomenon to the body; this is the aspect 
with which I am interested. This in no way indicates support for some metaphysical 
understanding of the self, and it accepts that there is a relationship between self and 
body, just a complex one that science has yet to uncover.  This concept of the self 
as being a separate entity capable of being investigated in its own right is crucial to 
the thesis.  It is this entity that I take Heidegger to be researching, and it is this entity 
that the project seeks to clarify as to its ontological structure and the relationship 
with its life-environment.   
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The third point is the obvious distress Marion experiences in living in the nursing 
home; she hates to think beyond each day, and she would rather be dead.  I take 
this distress as one way in which shedding life is experienced.  As indicated, I apply 
the term not just to this type of distress but also to premature morbidity and mortality 
generally when it is associated with a life-environment disruption.   
In understanding Marion’s’ life-environment it can be seen in terms of the tangible 
assets and people that have meaning for her. However, it can also be understood 
in terms of the unique set of possibilities for expressing her existence, for allowing 
Marion to be Marion.   The loss of books and pink lustre china cut off one set of 
possibilities, the loss of access to her friends and contacts cut off another set of 
possibilities. It is the loss of the possibilities that prevents Marion doing the things 
that relate to being Marion; this is the shedding of life that is then manifested in 
distress.  One can almost hear Marion saying, “I no longer have the possibility to be 
who I am, and there is never going to be such a possibility in this place … there is 
no longer anything for me to look forward to as Marion.”  Put another way Marion 
sees her life is over.  The distress that is evident in Marion’s account does not reflect 
the distress of the body, albeit it can manifest signs of the distress, it is Marion 
herself who is distressed.   
Marion’s account does not mean that her bodily frailty did not contribute to a decline 
in possibilities within her life-environment, I suspect it did, but the final blow was the 
nursing home, which literally left Marion wishing for a coup de grâce.  There appears 
to be a disruption arising from the initial frailty at home and then a second disruption 
arising from the move to the nursing home.  However, Marion’s account suggests 
that she was able to adapt to many of the initial losses and that until the moment 
she moved from her home there appeared to be some residual core of possibilities 
that sustain and nourished who Marion was.  It was this core that vanished on the 
move to the nursing home which is why I suspect she targets the nursing home as 
delivering the final, and mortal, blow to her life. 
By way of note, to date, I have found nothing in the research literature that 
addresses the changing nature of life-environment possibilities and associated 
adaption strategies related to sustaining a sense of self as an older person moves 
from fit and active at home to frail in a nursing home.  This is in part, I suspect, a 
product of ‘naming’ the phenomenon as ‘relocation stress’, etc., which focuses the 
research on the relocation itself, something the ‘disruption’ theory overcomes.  
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Researching this phenomenon and understanding what constitutes ‘core’ life-
environment possibilities and how to recognise them is essential if supportive 
strategies are going to be implemented to care for the ‘person’ as the body ages 
and becomes frailer.   This will be a post-doctoral research project, and one that I 
suspect will also assist in better understanding the characteristics that are 
associated with person-centred care. 
Based on the Marion Miller case we can thus tentatively identify that the 
phenomenon of shedding life is one that is primarily associated with the self, and 
the relationship between self and possibilities for being oneself that are accessible 
in the environment.  Even though the phenomenon is associated with the self, it may 
manifest in the body, and this needs to be addressed.   
The basic structure of the phenomenon8 that this thesis is addressing in terms of 
the life-environment disruption theory is as follows: 
A disruption to accessing possibilities for involvements in meaningful activities in 
one’s life-environment such that being one’s self, in whole or in part is no longer 
possible, resulting in a range of adverse consequences (i.e. shedding life). 
The challenge then is to find a theory that has the following elements; 
• takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,  
• that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way, 
such that, 
• a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a 
disruption to the self; and finally  
• posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the 
life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both 
psychologically and somatically.  
 
I would add that when first mapping this out, my notion of the self was vague and ill-
defined as was any sense of the relationship between self and body and more 
importantly self and life-environment.   While I had no idea how to conceive of any 
of this, it was my starting point, a rough outline of the project.  
There is nothing profound in any of this; there is no ground-breaking insight.  I 
                                            
8 While not in these precise words or with this clarity the view that the environment matters in terms of a sense 
of wellbeing and quality of life is one that I have held and based my practice on for many years; this can be seen 
from the briefly account of my aged care background (refer Appendix 1). 
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suspect that most people would accept points 1,3 and 4 and when I have spoken 
with indigenous Australians and people born and raised on the land in rural areas 
they seem to articulate a resonance with 2.   
By and large, the health sciences, inform the understanding of the basic design and 
running of nursing homes works, and the health sciences typically operate within 
the materialist paradigm9.  Under this paradigm, the self is typically associated with 
conscious awareness and psychological characteristics such as emotions, and so 
forth.  This aspect of being human is not the primary concern of health sciences as 
their remit is primarily concerned with tending to the body.  This doesn’t mean that 
‘feelings’ and experiences are unimportant, just that they don’t count in providing 
explanatory accounts behind such things as morbidity and mortality, which are seen 
primarily as bodily concerns.  Consequently, there is, I suspect, a deep-seated 
reluctance to be open to the possibility that phenomena as a relocation to a new 
environment can be having these adverse effects.  Even for felt experience and 
conscious awareness, there is a belief that these have a neuronal basis and will 
eventually be explained by understanding the neuronal activity of the brain10.  The 
idea of taking the self seriously as causally linked to the phenomenon of shedding 
life, while possibly having some broader cultural support runs contrary to currently 
accepted thinking.  
This doesn’t mean that I wasn’t a materialist in the general understanding of the 
term, I was.  However, based on my own experiences and my shared sense of the 
‘humanitarian’ imperative to better understand the phenomenon of ‘shedding life’ I 
couldn’t so readily ignore the experiential aspect of the phenomenon.  I just had a 
dogged intuitive view11 that we are somehow missing something, that there must be 
a way of accounting for the phenomenon that takes into account both the material 
                                            
9 I will discuss this in more detail below. 
10 .  That this is a view still prevalent in science is reflected in the comments of the contemporary neuroscientist 
Susan Greenfield (1950 - ), who, in a recent lecture tour of Australia, commented that neuroscience research 
into consciousness is still looked upon with suspicion and is still regarded as a “career limiting move” 
(Huntington, 2012).  This perspective is also held by the Christof Koch (1956 - ) who recounts that his colleagues 
thought he was “crazy” when he mentioned he was going to research consciousness with Francis Crick(1916-
2004) (Burkeman, 2015)and that even a “few years ago one could not use the word 'consciousness' in a paper, 
for, say, Nature or Science, nor in a grant application”; albeit Koch believes this is slowly changing(Koch, 2004, 
p. xiii-xiv). 
11 I now recognise that my pathway into this research helps to explain this ‘doggedness’. My initial education 
and professional experience is outside the world of science, so I lacked the inculcated ‘scientific’ world-view that 
the experiences expressed in the above points could form part of any theoretical causal account involving the 
material.  I was, in a sense, free to think otherwise. 
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and the experiential.   
It is the structure of the phenomenon and the indicative characteristics of a theory 
to explain it that suggested the strategic approach for the research.  
Strategic Approach Taken 
Arising out of the structure of the phenomenon the strategic position adopted for the 
thesis research was to accept that the evidence from both the quantitative and 
qualitative research were both presenting different aspects of the same ‘truth’ 
concerning what was occurring in relocations to a nursing home.  When I 
commenced, I held the view that pursuing one of these perspectives could lead to 
an understanding of what was happening, (a view that has since changed12).  Based 
on my background and the strength and characteristics of the evidence from the 
qualitative literature this was the path I chose.  Perhaps more pragmatically, the 
approach was also informed by my lack of the necessary detailed understanding of 
human physiology to pursue the alternative path.  There was, as such, a historical 
bias to my choice. 
However, to be clear, I did not rely on the qualitative research findings as given but 
surmised that these findings arose out of some fundamental and common 
characteristic of being human that gave rise to those expressed experiences.   In 
other words, the qualitative accounts only indicated the direction that I would pursue, 
i.e. the way not the means; this was the first major decision regarding the strategic 
approach. 
It was an openness to qualitative aspects of the phenomenon that led me to the 
work of Martin Heidegger and his research into the ontological structure of Dasein, 
his name for the person.  This was the second major decision and determined the 
strategic approach to ‘means’.  It was in the implementation of this second strategic 
decision concerning the use of Heidegger’s research that led to the research taking 
                                            
12 This view that either path would lead to an understanding I now believe to be mistaken.  I think it is highly 
dubious that I would have reached an understanding of the ontological structure of the person via a path 
suggested by the quantitative research.  This does not mean that another theoretical explanation was precluded 
by this means, nor that ‘a solution’ was unobtainable along this route.  All that is required is a sufficient large-
scale investment of funds into the appropriate research using various cohort research approaches, longitudinal 
studies, etc.  Just as this type of approach has disclosed the social determinants of health, I am highly optimistic 
that appropriate research would disclose the relevant determinants of premature morbidity and mortality.  Why 
such funding for research has not been provided is itself and interesting topic for research. 
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the direction it did.  
While both challenging and demanding of perseverance, coming to understand 
Heidegger’s body of research proved fruitful both in accounting for the experiences 
reported in the qualitative research and in providing a link to explain the 
physiological basis of the adverse effects of relocation.  However, this came at a 
cost, and the major emphasis of the thesis now concerns this encounter with 
Heidegger’s work, making it intelligible and ensuring its applicability.   This requires 
a few remarks to clarify the nature of the challenge.  
Starting out researching information on Heidegger it doesn’t take long to find that he 
is regarded as one of the major philosophical figures in the twentieth century.   
Dreyfus and Wrathall comment that his work has “been appropriated by scholars in 
fields as diverse as philosophy, classics, psychology, literature, history, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, religious studies, and cultural studies” (Dreyfus & 
Wrathall, 2005, p. 1).  This information provided some comfort, seeming to confirm 
my choice.  The picture this initially painted supported the notion that there would 
be ample material from which to, relatively easily, ‘learn’ the necessary ontological 
structure of Dasein and, from there, explore its implications to the life-environment 
and the relationship to ‘shedding life’; this did not happen.  As I delved into the 
literature, I quickly learned that ‘appropriating’ Heidegger’s work often meant being 
influenced by an interpretation of some of his concepts, rather an appropriation 
based on a deep engagement with his philosophical research and findings.  In the 
field I was interested in, nursing research, there is still an unresolved controversy in 
this literature, over the very legitimacy of it as ‘Heideggerian’(Crotty, 1996; Paley, 
1998; Petrovskaya, 2014b).  In the field of philosophy, I discovered that most 
“philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition seem to think that Heidegger was an 
obscurantist muddlehead at best” (Searle, 2000), largely I take it, due to Heidegger’s 
approach, writing style and subject matter.  But worse than this, there are 
Heideggerian scholars with an even more worrying view in the context of my work.  
Sheehan, for example, remarks that often Heideggerian scholars continuing to use 
Heidegger’s language in an uninterpreted way and in so doing are engaged in 
“narcissistic babbling”, that it is simply “Heideggergegacker (Heidegger cackling)”13 
(Sheehan, 2015, kl 239).  Others note that his work is such that there is little 
                                            
13 He was endorsing comments by one of Heidegger’s contemporaries, Karl Jaspers. 
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consensus among Heideggerian scholars on many aspects of his work, or how to 
deal with it(Faulconer & Wrathall, 2000).  Perhaps, given this, it is not surprising that 
I failed to find an accessible account and explanation of Heidegger’s work, as a 
basis for ‘learning’ about the structure of Dasein in either the social science literature 
or the philosophical literature.  I provide a more detailed account of this is in 
Appendix 3, Finding Heidegger. 
Given the research approach I had chosen, my only alternative was to engage with 
Heidegger’s work directly, which, as indicated by the above comments, presented 
its own problems.  Even among professional philosopher’s Heidegger's Being and 
Time is viewed as a notoriously difficult book to understand(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 
2005; Gorner, 2007). Kisiel notes that the difficulty of comprehending it is 
legendary(Kisiel, 1995) and Guignon observes that its accessibility is not assisted 
by its  “heavy Teutonic tone and tortuous style” (Guignon, 1986, p. 4).  Even without 
this, like all technical books written within a scholarly discipline, it contains 
specialised philosophical terminology that needed to be decoded, and an 
assumption of a reasonable level of understanding of philosophy and the history of 
Western thought (Polt, 1999).   Having now spent a couple of years focused on 
understanding Heidegger’s work, I can only concur with these observations. Being 
and Time is a difficult book and it was the necessity to engage with it directly, to 
wrench from it Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s structure that directly accounts for 
a substantial part of the thesis.  Rather than a few chapters presenting the structure 
of Dasein and it's interrelationship with world, gleaned from sources presenting a 
common view, and simply confirming this with Being and Time, I had to work through 
and carve out my interpretation.    Heidegger's work is neither speculative or 
theoretically based, it is empirically based philosophical research, and as such 
Being and Time is his research report, presenting his findings from an inquiry into 
Dasein’s ontological structure. It was the allure of understanding this structure as 
something ‘real’, that appealed and provided the motivation to continue.  This was 
a long and laborious task as I struggled to make sense of what Heidegger was 
presenting, and accounts to a large degree, why the engagement with Heidegger's 
work came to dominate the thesis.  Had I been aware of the time and cost involved 
at the beginning of the project I doubt I would have pursued this course.   
While Heidegger uses a phenomenological methodology in his research, I take his 
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research approach to fit within the larger family of empirically14 based approaches 
(addressed in Chapter 10).  While difficult, Heidegger’s approach can be summed 
up relatively simply; he makes observations at the entity level, classifies them 
according to basic common characteristics, extracting their defining characteristics 
(this is the ontological step) and then based on logical analysis, orders them, 
typically in a sequential (hence time) relationship.   The difficulty arises in 
understanding what it is he is observing and how he is applying his logical analysis.   
He never makes any of this clear, and his descriptions, naming practices of the 
different classifications of observations, the language issues and so on, all work 
together to make his approach seem rather opaque.  However, once I understood 
his work as empirically based it meant that I should be able to observe what he is 
observing, and this became one of my key strategies, to earn by doing.  Often once 
I could ‘see’ the phenomenon I was then better able to understand his account.  
Perhaps the best example of this is given in Chapter 13 when I present a series of 
mini-experiments aimed at demonstrating that when we see something, the 
understanding of what it is, is not in the ‘physical’ appearance of it.   
The shift from trying to understand Heidegger’s work as a difficult topic in a 
theoretical sense, to one based on observations of ‘real’ world phenomena was 
critical in eventually understanding his work.  This also shifted the research from 
simply commencing with learning a plausible theoretical account of being a person, 
to actively being engaged in confirming Heidegger’s observations and logical 
analysis.  Having claimed my own experiential based understanding of the structure 
of Dasein, I would be in a far better position to apply it.   
In summary, the strategic approach for my inquiry shifted slightly, from reaching an 
understanding of Heidegger’s work to using this work as a way to obtain a direct 
understanding of the structure of the person.  As part of this, I would carry out some 
basic exercises to ‘test’ the understanding.  I left open the possibility that I may not 
gain a sufficient understanding to complete the task, or that I could not support 
Heidegger’s account, in which case the attempt to establish a life-disruption theory 
grounded on the structure of the person fails on this attempt. 
                                            
14 While I claim Heidegger’s, work is empirically based this should not be confused with the theory of knowledge 
known as empiricism, as for example, reflected in the work of the British empiricists, which has inherent in it 
presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and mind which Heidegger rejects. My account of 
Heidegger’s empirical approach is addressed in Chapter 10. 
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Basic Structure of the Research Approach 
Following the strategic approach, the basic structure of work followed;  
 
• Identify the ontological structure of Dasein guided, primarily, by Heidegger’s 
research findings presented in Being and Time with a particular emphasis on the 
self-world relationship. 
• Interrogate the structure to determine in what way, if any, a breakdown in the 
self-world relationship may adversely impact on Dasein’s (the person’s) life.  If 
there is such an adverse impact then, 
• Articulate a theory of life environment disruption.  
 
As discussed above, Heidegger’s work presented in Being and Time is abstract and 
philosophical, but one of its appeals is that it is based on real’ world observable 
phenomenon of people going about their average daily activity.  Given that this is 
his approach, I was determined, at least to a sufficient degree, to ensure my 
understanding was not based on a convincing theoretical account but grounded in 
my observations and analysis.   In many instances, the observational part is 
relatively straightforward, for example, at one point in talking about a room he simply 
lists everything. “ ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, 
windows, doors, room.” [BT 97/68].  Where the challenge comes is what he says 
about these observations, for example, this list was given to illustrate the point that 
“Equipment - in accordance with its equipmentality - always is in terms of its 
belonging to other equipment.” He then goes on 
These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add 
up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as 
something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between 
four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 
'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. 
[BT 97-8/68] 
Initially, as hard as I tried, I could not ‘see’ what he was describing. For several years 
the pen, paper, desk and so forth showed themselves as individual objects in 
themselves. Sure, I knew the pen writes on the paper, and the paper is on the desk, 
etc. but this is not the arrangement Heidegger is talking about.  It is essentially a 
relational network that exists between the way of being of these entities that forms 
a unified space in which we reside, in this case, a study.  I provide an introductory 
account of this concept in Chapter 2.  In other words, Heidegger is giving a 
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descriptive account of what he is ‘seeing’ but what he is ‘seeing’ is not the physical 
aspect of the entity, it is their being. This is the reduction aspect of his 
phenomenological method which I also discuss in Chapter 2.   I eventually 
understood that Heidegger rejects the materialist account of things, which started to 
make room for an alternative account of what things are. 
I would suspect that the passage and my comments are incomprehensible to 
anyone first reading them or without a grounding in Heidegger’s phenomenology.  
The point I am illustrating is that although his approach can be simply stated, the 
difficulty arises in what he is doing, it is not observing in the way we would typically 
understand.   However, in Being and Time, Heidegger never makes any attempt to 
set out in an intelligible way what he is doing.  Passages like the one above are 
presented without any further explanation or guidance.  For me, it took a long time 
gathering pieces from different parts of Heidegger's work and then re-reading 
passages such as the one above till I had a coherent understanding of what he is 
describing.  So when I talk about attempting to observe the phenomena he is 
describing it is not that straightforward.  
I mentioned that Heidegger moves from observation to describing ontological 
structures, and I want to give a simple example to illustrate this.  An ontological 
structure refers to the essential defining characteristics applicable to all individual 
things (entities) of the same type.  A very simple example relates to a circle; its 
ontological structure can be described as a figure on a plane, such that all the points 
on its boundary are equidistant from a fixed point.  To arrive at this many different 
circles can be observed as to their characteristics, and from this, the ontological 
structure identified from the observations and applying some basic analysis.  It 
works because all circles must have this defining characteristic as part of their 
structure to be a circle. 
Heidegger is attempting to find the ontological structure that determines what it is to 
be a person.   To be a person, everyone must have the same essential structure 
and so, just as in the case of the circle, Heidegger gets to the ontological structure 
by first making observations at the individual level and then analysing them.  There 
is a catch.  A circle is a mathematical object, a geometric shape, and for this class 
of entities, I don’t think Heidegger has difficulty in using observations based on 
measurements of the entity itself.  However, this would be akin to trying to measure, 
or describe the characteristics of the human body, Heidegger rejects this.  The 
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essential characteristics of the person have nothing to do with the body.  The way 
of being human, for Heidegger, is found, primarily, in the character of our 
relationships with other people and our relationships with the things we put to use 
in our lives.   It is the characteristics of these relationships he observes, and the 
analyses to determine the necessary basis by which they can occur.  By way of a 
simple example, to be able to use a hammer (an observation of a type of 
relationship), we must first know-how (a category of understanding); part of the 
structure for being human therefore must be associated with the capacity to know-
how, to use tools.   As mentioned, this is a very simple example, and the complexity 
of Heidegger’s observations and analysis rapidly increases. 
My approach then, was on the view that if I was able to follow his work through to 
the ontological level, and if my analysis was correct I should be able to apply it to a 
range of research inquiries concerning Dasein.  It follows naturally from the fact that 
an ontological structure is universally applicable to any human person. The idea was 
to undertake a ‘proof of concept’ by applying my analysis to several different areas, 
and I present this in Chapter 20.  The idea for this comes from Heidegger’s work in 
which he claims that his analysis of Dasein’s structure is an essential precursor for 
a range of scientific endeavours involving Dasein, e.g. biology, psychology, history 
and so on [BT] (discussed further in Chapter 11). 
Having ‘tested’ the structural analysis in a general way the final task would be to 
identify if the structure could be used to account for a disruption in the life-
environment and then apply it to the Marion Miller case; I undertake this is Chapter 
21.  If this proved to be the case, then there would then be a clear link between the 
ontological structure of Dasein and the three-part structure of the life-environment 
disruption problem set out earlier. This would then be sufficient to articulate a theory, 
based on the ontological structure of the person, in such way as to account for the 
phenomenon of shedding life and as the basis for future research.   
In light of the above this then gives the following complete program of work for the 
thesis project;   
• Identify the ontological structure of Dasein guided, primarily, by Heidegger’s 
research findings presented in Being and Time with a particular emphasis on the 
self - life-environment relationship. 
• Ground the claims concerning the various phenomena associated with the 
structure in my own empirical based observations (i.e. my confirming experience 
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of the phenomenon). 
• Undertake a ‘proof of concept’ as to my understanding of Dasein’s structure to 
a small range of ‘academic’ subject of areas in line with Heidegger’s claim of the 
applicability of his analysis. 
• Based on Heidegger’s work reach an understanding of how a disruption in the 
self - life environment relationship can lead to ‘shedding life’.  Present this 
understanding as a theory. 
• Develop a preliminary method to apply the theory as a basis for analysing Marion 
Miller narrative as a case study 
Conceptual Challenge 
In describing aspects of Heidegger’s approach, I gave the impression that it is 
relatively straight-forward once what he is doing becomes clear.  There is substantial 
truth to this.  However, in getting to the point of being ‘clear’ about Heidegger’s 
approach, there is an enormous struggle, as reflected in the comments as by the 
professional philosophers have.  There are difficulties at every turn, not just the ones 
I have mentioned earlier.  To name a few more, there is his use of made up words 
or neologisms, the changes he makes to the meanings of existing words, his use of 
concepts developed in earlier lectures and introduced into Being and Time with little 
explanation,  his lack of consistency, some say sloppiness(Sheehan, 2015, p. 128), 
in the use of key terms, particularly being (Sein), there is the lack of explanation as 
to what methods he is applying and then there is the inconsistency that English 
translators display in translating his technical words from the German.    
On top of these, there is an even bigger challenge. It is a conceptual one that unless 
one is aware of it makes Heidegger's work unintelligible. I mentioned the point 
earlier, it relates to Heidegger’s rejection of the materialist position, a point that is 
easy to miss or gloss over.  The main, but serious, implication is that what he is 
presenting is incommensurable with a materialist account, from start to finish.  I will 
touch on this briefly as I deal with it in more detail in the next chapter.   
Briefly put a materialist position states that if we take any physical entity, it can be 
broken down into simpler less complex entities, we can repeat this until we get to 
the most fundamental entities, currently various sub-atomic particles, that make up 
all other entities.  Human or hammer both are essentially sub-atomic particles, 
differentiated by differing levels of complexity in their arrangement.  In other words, 
to be an entity is to be a combination of other entities.  Even though science does 
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not yet know how inanimate matter becomes living organisms, the answer somehow 
lies in the way the material stuff is combined, a matter for physics, chemistry and 
biology to sort out.  
Heidegger would agree that all the physical stuff can be broken down into more 
basic components. That is not the problem, nor is it what makes a materialist.  The 
materialist claim is that what it is to be an entity, is based on it being a material thing, 
and as such that it must come into being by a combination of other entities.  A 
hammer, for example, is a hammer because it is a material thing that has been made 
(from other material things) into a certain shape having characteristics applicable to 
being a hammer.  While far more infinitely more complex, and a product of nature, 
not human doing, the same applies to a human.  Following on from this is accepted 
that we can recognise what things are based on how they appear to us, i.e. the 
physical characteristics.   This materialist account of what things are is the dominant 
one in the Western tradition both in philosophy and science and has been for 
centuries.   
The term being is used in philosophy in a broad way to refer to this idea of coming 
into being.  So, in the materialist position being always refers to entities, this follows 
from the above example.  It also follows that we understand an entity based on its 
being, i.e. the basis of it coming into being.  Being is a subject area for philosophers, 
and this is called ontology, from the Greek words onto meaning being and logos 
meaning study.  When a philosopher is inquiring into the structure of what it is to be 
something, it is an inquiry into the being of the entity, or its ontological structure.  
Heidegger's work in Being and Time includes an inquiry into the being of Dasein, 
and he presents his findings by way of the ontological structure of Dasein.  Having 
clarified the terminology, we can now move to a critical statement in Being and Time; 
Being – that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are 
understood … [BT 25-6] 
With this Heidegger seems to be agreeing with the materialists as to the dual role 
played by being, ‘determining’ entities and the basis by which we ‘understand’ 
entities.  All seems good.  However, then Heidegger drops a bombshell, 
The being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. [BT 26] 
When reading Being and Time, one is not aware of the technical understanding of 
being the implications of this can be lost.  It certainly caused me grief for a long time.  
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To put the implications simple, Heidegger is rejecting the most fundament premise 
of the materialist position, the position that underpins both philosophy and science.  
He is denying that what accounts for things coming into being (i.e. being) is an entity, 
i.e. it cannot be any form of matter. 
To put this is simple terms if we think that a hammer is a hammer because it is made 
into a certain form by bringing together different materials, then we are in radical 
disagreement with Heidegger and will never understand his work.  His claim that 
being is not an entity is a universal one it applies to every entity, including what it is 
to be a human person. 
The implications for the thesis are dramatic.  What Heidegger is claiming is that the 
way an individual human person comes into being is not on the basis of material 
entities. What Heidegger is claiming is that what it is to be a human is not on the 
basis of the material.  What Heidegger is claiming is that the ontological structure of 
the person is not material.  The same thing applies to even the humble hammer!  
Heidegger does not deny that the material aspects that we see are required for an 
entity to become manifest, it’s just that the material is not to be confused with what 
the entity is. 
Part of the difficulty is that if we let go of the material account what replaces it?  The 
answer to this is not easy to grasp from Heidegger's work.  It was not until towards 
the end that I started to piece together an alternative account of how to depict his 
ontological position and have come to frame it within the broad camp of emergence, 
and I discuss this is Chapter 19 and Chapter 22.  Materialism is also associated with 
reductionism, for obvious reasons, and the methodologies associated with 
reductionism have accounted for much of the advances of science.  However 
advances in understanding from a scientific perspective do not automatically 
translate to an understanding of being, how things come into being and hence what 
things are,  this is Heidegger’s point.  In the decades leading up to the time that 
Heidegger wrote Being and Time, there were various other philosophers seeking 
alternative accounts to the materialists, for example, Alfred North Whitehead and 
his process philosophy (Whitehead, 1978), and the British Emergentists (O'Connor 
& Wong, 2015).  Over the last couple of decades as science delves deeper and 
deeper into nature, they are increasingly finding that the reductionist account does 
not work, that there are properties of complex systems that cannot be explained by 
recourse to the constituent parts.  This has given rise to the sciences of complexity 
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and includes subjects such as “chaos theory, network theory, nonlinear systems, 
and self-organizing systems.”  (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xi) and they have some 
‘family resemblance’ to what the philosophers were attempting to get at a century 
earlier.  One of the core ideas is the concept of emergence; that it is the relationships 
of underlying complexity that gives rise to new arrangements of things exhibiting 
properties that cannot be otherwise be explained except by reference to the complex 
relationships themselves (Clayton & Davies, 2006).  The basic ideas behind 
complexity have a remarkable similarity to the ideas underlying Heidegger’s work.  
However, it was not until I had managed to gain a sufficient grasp of Heidegger’s 
work that I started to see the ‘family resemblance’ between his work, that of the 
complexity sciences.  This is why it does not surface until the very end of the thesis, 
and even then, only in a preliminary way.  I might add that the scientists that adhere 
to what is called a strong view of complexity, i.e. that it accounts for the being of 
some entities, is still a small number, but it is growing (Clayton & Davies, 2006).    
When Heidegger rejects the materialist account of being this then needs to be heard 
carefully.  He is not rejecting the obvious fact that both the hammer and the human 
person have a material form, that would be absurd.  He is rejecting the view that 
they can be understood as coming to be a hammer or a human person by reference 
to the material. The other take away point is that there is now a small but growing 
number of scientists working in the area of complexity sciences that agree with the 
concept, that at least in some areas of nature, things cannot be understood as a 
mere composition of underlying matter, that it is the character of the complex 
underlying relationships themselves that is determinate.  A future project is to apply 
complexity theory to Heidegger’s account of Dasein, world and the ready-to-hand; 
based on my current understanding I think there will be a remarkable fit! 
Notwithstanding the above comments on complexity, Heidegger’s rejection of the 
materialist position regarding being is the biggest conceptual challenge associated 
with the thesis.  In that the Western intellectual tradition holds, almost universally, 
the materialist position, or some version of it, then most people on first encountering 
Heidegger’s work will also hold this view; the same applies when encountering this 
thesis.  It was responding to this challenge that resulted in the final structuring of the 
opening introductory two chapters.  This one focusing on setting out the project itself 
and its structure, and the second introduction, Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
summary of Heidegger’s account of the structure of Dasein, world and what he calls 
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the ready-to-hand, the useful things we use such as hammers, and their inter-
relationship.   The aim, having ruled out the materialist account, is to provide a 
preliminary account of Heidegger's alternative to provide an overarching context for 
the remainder of the thesis.  This is particularly important as the thesis unfolds 
tackling one subject after another relating to Heidegger’s work and does not come 
together as unified account of the various structures until late in the thesis. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced the thesis project, presented an account of the 
phenomenon of life-environment disruption and shedding life,  established the 
criteria for a theory to account for the phenomena, explained the basis for the 
strategic approach for the thesis and the schedule of work undertaken.  I have also 
introduced the basic concept associated with the project, that of being, which 
reflects the field of scholarship in which Heidegger is working.  Finally, I have 
identified perhaps the biggest conceptual challenge in understanding Heidegger’s 
work, his rejection of a materialist ontology. 
Discussing the ontological structure of Dasein and the implications of Heidegger's 
rejection of a materialist ontology seems a long way removed from the realities that 
Marion Miller faced in a nursing home.   The two, however, are closely linked.  The 
situation that faced Marion, and faces all people entering a nursing home is one of 
wrong ontology, and this, to a large extent explains the significant emphasis on the 
care of the body in nursing homes, and, at the same time the neglect of the person.   
Accordingly, the emphasis of this thesis is not nursing homes, nor a greater 
understanding of ‘shedding life’ as such.  It is the grafting out of an alternative 
ontological understanding of what it is to be a human person, one that can provide 
an explanatory account based on what is inherent in the structure of the human 
person that gives rise to the phenomenon in the first place.  The result of the thesis 
work is to identify such an alternative account, and this is expressed in the theory of 
life-environment disruption.  
Based on this theory nursing homes create the circumstance for a radical disruption 
to the life-environment for people such as Marion, denying them the possibility of 
being who they are, which in turn leads to shedding life.  Shedding life, which 
presents in many forms including pre-mature morbidities and mortalities, is thus a 
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phenomenon that arises out of the very structure of being a human person.  It is not 
a psychological problem situated in the person, something to be diagnosed and 
addressed as yet another medical problem. 
Until the wrong ontology is rectified, either formally or informally, current practices 
will continue and the phenomenon of ‘shedding life’ which has bee recognised for 
more than a hundred years, subject to inconclusive research for over sixty, will 
continue.  This is why this thesis spends so much time on ‘getting at’ this alternative 
ontology of the person that seems so deeply buried in Heidegger’s dense and 
opaque writing; it is a matter of humanitarian concern. 
Thesis Chapter Summary 
The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption is grounded in Heidegger’s analysis of 
the basic structure of a person.  While there was an intuitive sense of a connection 
between the person and their environment, the structural relationship did not 
emerge until the towards the very end of the thesis work.  The work involved a 
steady and persistent series of tasks as Heidegger’s work was gradually understood 
as a logical and coherent whole.   The thesis is structured as a research report 
detailing the series of tasks undertaken.   
Because the theory does not emerge until the end of the thesis, there may be an 
initial challenge in situating the individual chapters of the thesis as part of the theory.  
To avoid this the decision was made to place a detailed descriptive summary of the 
key interpretive findings of Heidegger’s work at the front of the thesis, this is 
presented in Chapter 2.  This chapter forms both a descriptive conclusion of the 
thesis (which is not repeated at the end), as well as an introductory summary.  The 
objective is to provide a sense of the whole, against which the chapter structure and 
content gains its intelligibility.   
The remaining chapters can be understood as falling within different phases of the 
work as follows: 
Phase 1 Working out a methodology congruent with the project. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
Phase 2 Resolving the problem of being and Dasein. 
While reading Heidegger’s work, it becomes evident that there are certain 
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conceptual challenges in understanding Dasein, and a need to clarify the various 
ways in which the term being is applied.  This phase explored Heidegger’s use of 
these concepts. In relation to being, it was necessary and useful to go back and 
understand how being was used by the Greeks philosophers and Heidegger's 
engagement with them; 
Chapter 4: The Problem of Being and Dasein 
Chapter 5: Being - Heidegger’s Project 
Chapter Six: Stepping Back into The Tradition 
Chapter 7: Heidegger, The Greeks And Being 
Chapter 8: Clarifying Dasein The Entity 
Chapter 9: How to Conceptualise and Investigate Dasein 
Phase 3 Heidegger’s Empiricism and Links to Science 
The aim of the thesis was not to engage in Heidegger’s work purely as philosophy.  
This phase establishes a link between his work and the work of the sciences.  If the 
Dasein analytic could not be applied in the sciences it would be pointless. 
Chapter 10: Heidegger's Empirical Approach 
Chapter 11: Heidegger's Work – The Link to Science 
Phase 4 Essential earlier Work that Leads to Being and Time 
In reading Heidegger's lectures around the period Being and Time was written in is 
evident there are important concepts he has worked through and applied but which 
are not readily evident in Being and Time.  For example, the concept of intentionality 
if barely mentioned in Being and Time, however in Heidegger’s lecture courses 
around the time the book was written it is clear intentionality is an important concept 
that has influenced his thinking.  Heidegger adapts the structure of intentionality and 
applies it at both the ontological and individual Dasein level.  Understanding the 
structure of intentionality provides important insights into the concept of existence 
as lived experience, and of the relationship between Dasein’s structure of 
understanding and receptivity.  Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s understanding of 
things is based on the underlying structures of being and not their visual appearance 
has its initial origin in Husserl’s work on categorial intuition. Exploring categorial 
intuition helps to clarify and affirm Heidegger’s claim.  
Chapter 12: Intentionality: The Structure of Lived Experience 
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Chapter 13: Husserl, Heidegger & Understanding  
Phase 5 Understanding the Dasein Analytic 
Building on the work done in the preceding chapters, this phase follows Heidegger 
work in Being and Time, progressively developing a coherent interpretation of 
Heidegger’s descriptive account of the analysis of Dasein’s structure. 
Chapter 14: The Worlding of the World  
Chapter 15: The Worldhood of The World  
Chapter 16: Culture and Being-With 
Chapter 17: Being-In: Receptivity and Understanding 
Chapter 18: Care: The Being of Dasein  
Phase 6 Does Heidegger’s Account Make Sense  
Heidegger claims that his descriptive analysis is an account of the ontological 
structure of Dasein and has applicability to the sciences.  It should then be possible 
to make sense of the work when considered against the work of scholars in other 
fields.  Heidegger’s claims of the wide applicability of his work was explored and 
found to be relevant in the diverse fields of history, and cultural understanding, in 
childhood development associated with impoverished environments and the impact 
of radical changes in life-environments on the health and wellbeing of people.  In all 
cases, there was a congruence between the model and the phenomena explored.  
Chapter 19: Interpreting Heidegger Within an Emergentists & Complex 
Systems Framework  
Chapter 20: Application and Relevance of Dasein Analytic. 
Phase 6 Shedding Life and Final Chapter 
Having secured an understanding of the structure of Dasein and satisfied that it had 
the general applicability one would expect of an account of Dasein’s ontological 
structure the next step was to develop an understanding of how shedding life and 
how this related to the structure of Dasein.  This was undertaken based on an inquiry 
into Heidegger’s account of anxiety/depression and demise and death.  The next 
step was to articulate the relationship of shedding life and the structure in the form 
of the Theory of Life-Environment Disruption, develop a preliminary method for its 
application, and then apply it with respect to the Marion Miller case study.  The final 




Chapter 21: Shedding Life 





CHAPTER 2: SECOND INTRODUCTION: THESIS SUMMARY  
Introduction 
A Preliminary, Non-Technical Account of Shedding Life 
The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption states that if a person’s access to the 
activities which constitute their meaningful existence is disrupted then, they are at 
risk of increased psychological and somatic illness and death.  The source, 
character and duration of the disruption will have differing impacts on the risk for 
each individual person contingent on what constitutes a meaningful life for the 
person. 
The theory is based on the ontological structure of the person researched and 
described by Martin Heidegger and presented in his book Being and Time.  The 
structural model is a dynamic one and describes the essential characteristics of 
what it is to be a person.  Put more starkly, if the structural elements described in 
the model are not present, then there is no person as would be commonly 
understood.  Heidegger’s name for the person is Dasein, and the rationale behind 
the name is discussed in Chapter 8. 
Dasein’s ontological structure constitutes the individual Dasein in a process that 
binds it relationally to the world into which it is born and raised, typically understood 
as inculturation.  While Dasein may understand the wider world in a broad sense, 
the binding is only to those entities and associated activities which are significant 
for Dasein.  It is the ongoing involvement in those bound activities the gives rise to 
Dasein’s lived experience or existence, that reflects the self-understanding of who 
Dasein is.  This binding thus mutually defines both the individual person and the 
person’s unique life-environment.  In this model, Dasein’s life is not understood as 
something biological but rather as the flow of lived experience emerging from its 
significant involvements.   
The full spectrum of the lived experiences arising from the significant involvements 
is Dasein’s experience of living a meaningful life.  Over time Dasein typically drops 
some existing significant involvements, and take up new ones, resulting in changes 
in its life-environment and of the life experienced by Dasein.  Due to the sustaining 
nature of the relationship between Dasein and its life-environment, a disruption to 
the possibility of engagement in the significant involvements constitutes a threat to 
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the sustainability of Dasein’s existence.  Collectively, the activities of all Daseins that 
arise from their individual significant involvements creates the socio-cultural world 
in which Dasein lives.  This process establishes a reciprocal, constitutive and 
mutually dependent relationship between the structure of world and the structure of 
Dasein.  
Heidegger’s approach to the description of the structure of Dasein is a naturalistic 
account.  While he does not attempt to explain the mechanisms, he does assume 
that there is a biological structure that is essential at the individual level that supports 
Dasein’s structure.  However, the biology itself should not be confused with the 
structural processes that constitute Dasein. By way of analogy, there is a 
fundamental difference between a bunch of electronic parts used to make a 
television, the processes that emerge from those parts appropriately assembled 
when electricity is turned on and finally a difference between the processes and the 
television picture that emerges.  Similarly, there is a need for a properly functioning 
biological system, and damage to this system is reflected in damage to the structure 
of Dasein, and in turn, to the Dasein’s capacity to live its life.  This is what happens 
with brain injuries and dementia.  Conversely, a removal of possibilities for 
significant involvements from the life-environment is manifested as an increased risk 
of psychological and somatic illness and death, there is an impact at the biological 
level; this is the basis for the theory of life-environment disruption as an explanatory 
account for shedding life. 
The above descriptive account is intelligible at a non-technical level but provides no 
concrete information concerning the specifics of Dasein’s structure, what Heidegger 
calls being-in-the-world or care [BT].  What this thesis presents is a technical 
understanding of the phenomena.  The validity of the theory is not that it provides a 
descriptive account that accords with the observed phenomena but rather that it is 
grounded in the ontological structure of Dasein derived from empirical observation 
and logical analysis.  The implication of this is that the issues of emotional distress, 
morbidity and mortality do not arise out of a psychological problem that Dasein has, 
but rather it is a structural issue.  A psychological perspective, even if one accepts 
a psycho-somatic link, suggests that ‘shedding life’ could simply be attributed to 
‘wrong thinking’ or ‘wrong attitude’, and fixed “If only Mum would change her 
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attitude!15”.  This account is rejected.  To repeat shedding life arises because of the 
very structure of Dasein itself; it is not a psychological issue. 
The Conceptual Challenge 
Presenting an account of Dasein’s structure is a challenge in that the intellectual 
framework which situates it is so radically different from what is the norm; this 
associated with Heidegger’s rejection of the materialist account of being.  In 
responding to this challenge, there is the risk of failure in articulating the work in an 
intelligible manner.  This problem is well known and reflected in Kuhn’s problem of 
incommensurability(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012)and Gadamer’s 
fusion of horizons(Gadamer, 1989).  The intellectual framework, or the network of 
related understandings, that we possess is the basis on which ideas and concepts 
within the framework are comprehensible.  While we are typically unaware of it, this 
framework is mainly acquired from the cultural environment into which we are born 
and raised.  For those in the West, it accounts for the fact that when asked to 
describe how something comes into being, we would usually refer to the material 
origin of things. This is the materialist position used to explain something as simple 
as water, or a hammer, or something unimaginably complex such as the human 
person.   Water (H2O), for example, is the combining of hydrogen and oxygen in the 
ratio of 2:1.   
Within the materialist account, also called reductionism, one of the tasks of science 
is to probe each different type of thing (entity), understand what ‘makes it up’ and 
how it relates to other entities.  Notwithstanding the level of complexity, within the 
health sciences, this is the standard model that applies to the human person; it is 
the intellectual framework within which all else is to be understood and accounted.  
The work of Martin Heidegger, the basis for this thesis, rejects this model, describing 
a different framework within which things are understood, as such there is a problem 
of incommensurability at the most fundamental level, and why there is a challenge 
in setting out this thesis. 
Ontology and Being 
This thesis argues that Heidegger's descriptive account of the ontological structure 
                                            
15 This view that the problems of adjusting to a new environment is simply a matter of attitude is not uncommon.  
Over the years I have heard this spoken in various forms by both concerned family and concerned staff as an 
older person clearly struggles with life in a nursing home.   It places the responsibility for adjustment to a new 
environment onto the person. 
 
61 
of Dasein is presenting an emergentist ontology. This will be addressed later in the 
chapter.  Ontology16 is the subdiscipline in philosophy that studies being and being 
is the name given to the whatever is responsible for the coming into being of an 
entity.   For the materialist, the being of an entity is simply another, less complex 
entity, i.e. something material.  For the emergentist, the being of an entity is 
something unseen, not material, from which it emerges.  What defines a specific 
type of entity as the entity it is, is typically called an ontological description or 
ontological structure.  For the materialist, this relates to the characteristic properties 
associated with the material structure that gives the entity its observable form.  For 
Heidegger, the structure will be based dynamic processes that account for the 
observable ways of being as well as the material form.     
Heidegger uses the language of ontology and the name on Heidegger's seminal 
text, Being and Time, uses being in the sense just explained.  As the focus of this 
thesis is working to clarify Heidegger’s account of the ontological structure of 
Dasein, it is dealing with issues of ontology.  While Heidegger is working in a well-
known and accepted field and using language familiar to that field, because he 
rejects the standard account, what he means by these terms is significantly different.  
It is therefore important to clarify the traditional account, at least in its elementary 
form, so it is clear what he is rejecting.   
Rationale for the Second Introduction 
As the thesis work progressed the full implications of Heidegger’s claim that “being 
is not an entity”17 [BT 25/6] made early in Being and Time, was not readily evident 
and the identification of Heidegger as describing ontological structures within an 
emergentist ontology arose only late in the thesis.  It is not that it wasn’t present in 
the work I undertook in developing an interpretation of Heidegger's work and of 
Dasein, it was.  I just didn’t see it straight away.  How is this possible?  It is a bit like 
a blind person encountering a large woolly mammoth for the first time not previously 
being aware of its existence.  First one bit is encountered by feeling one’s way 
around it and then described, then another and so on.  Each aspect has a ‘correct’ 
descriptive account, the woolly mammoth is there, but how the separate pieces work 
together as a unity such that the woolly mammoth itself is disclosed does not occur 
                                            
16 From the Greek onto meaning being and logos meaning an account or study.  




until all the essential parts are described.   In that, it is a strange ‘beast’ not 
previously encountered it is not possible to intuit an understanding on only a few 
pieces.  So, it is with the structure of Dasein. 
The chapters of the thesis are a report of the research work undertaken presented 
in a logical sequence.  However, while each chapter reveals an essential piece of 
the puzzle, on first encountering them, placing the chapter structure and content in 
the context of the whole thesis is problematic, a little like the woolly mammoth 
problem.  This is made more challenging because of the emergentist ontology.  In 
thinking through this problem, I was of the view that one way to resolve this was to 
provide a ‘sense of the whole’ from the start; to describe the ‘woolly mammoth’ in 
enough detail so that the parts are recognisable as they are encountered.  There 
are two parts to this, having a firm grasp of the concepts of being and what 
Heidegger is rejecting and secondly providing an account of the structure of Dasein.  
I have already provided a very cursory introduction to these components in the 
opening paragraphs. In the following sections, I go over these in more detail.  Firstly, 
an account of being from the materialist account to be very clear what Heidegger is 
rejecting followed by a stripped back descriptive account of Dasein's structural 
model based on Heidegger’s research.  In this there is no attempt to present 
Heidegger’s difficult technical language or supporting evidence, that work is present 
in the following chapters.  The aim is to provide a ’sense of the whole’ and its primary 
structural components.   
The Standard View of What Things Are: The Materialist Ontology 
In this section, I set out an account of the standard view of what things are, to 
introduce the terms but more importantly to identify what it is that Heidegger is 
rejecting. 
The typically held understanding in Western thought is that all the various types of 
entities that we encounter in the world, whether inanimate or biological18 are various 
assemblages of other less complex material entities.  If any entity is broken down 
into its less complex parts, then these broken down and so on, we find the common 
                                            
18 In the thesis I am addressing entities of the type we typically encounter in our average everyday activities 
dealing with things.  In is accepted that numbers and imaginary creatures can be understood and explored as 
entities, however these are not the topic of this thesis. 
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stuff from which everything is made; everything is stardust19.  Even if science does 
not yet know how inanimate matter comes together to form biological life, or how 
biological systems somehow produce ‘experiences’ the fundamental position is that 
the answer is somewhere in the complex arrangement of inanimate matter.   
Under this model, to know what something is, is to know the material and structure 
of the assemblage.  For example, in the case of an everyday item such as a 
hammer, what it is to be a hammer is found in the physical structure of the hammer 
itself, the arrangement of suitable material constructed into a certain shape.  The 
constituting process of the human body is extremely complex, in that it is biological 
and evolved over millions of years, and yet the hammer and the human share the 
commonality of being an assemblage of matter.  Should one hold that a person is a 
soul in a body, the basic model is the same.  A composition of entities, the body 
which has its origins in stardust and the soul, made, one presumes, by a god; the 
soul is just a different type of entity.  
In this view there can be identified four key concepts concerning all entities;  
1. what it is to be an entity originates in the basic material stuff of the 
universe;   
2. individual entities come into being (produced or made) by assembling 
less complex material (entities) into more complex entities;  
3. entities require nothing more than what constitutes them, to be the 
entities they are, i.e. entities are independent, self-sufficient things; and 
4. in that what constitutes entities is of a material nature, there is a certain 
stability in the structure. 
 
These four points get us from stardust to humans and all things in between, and the 
grand project of science is to account for how this occurs for all the various types of 
entities.  Implicit in the above points is that there is only one class of being, the 
material, and everything else is a sub-classification of this one class; including the 
most basic classification of inanimate entities from living entities. 
Granted this is a simplified description of the what constitutes entities, but it will 
suffice, and it does reflect the almost universally accepted explanation of what things 
are in science, philosophy and Western culture more generally.  It is the view I held 
                                            
19 The term stardust is used to represent the smallest possible entities from which all things are compiled.  
These are, to the best of current scientific understanding, various forms of subatomic particles such as protons, 
muons, neutrinos, electrons, quarks and so on.  The term stardust captures all of these.  
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when I commenced this project; it will be the view of most people when first 
encountering this thesis; it is the view that is rejected by this thesis.  
Heidegger Accepts Same ‘Role’ for Being: Rejects Meaning 
Martin Heidegger’s rejection of the standard account is stated quite simply, and 
without fanfare in Being and Time; 
The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 26/6] 
Heidegger does not reject the understanding that when we reach out to pick up a 
hammer that it is a physical hand, made of material stuff, reaching out to a physical 
thing also made of material stuff; he accepts this.  His rejection relates to the account 
of how entities come into being.   If we take a materialist account, then the structure 
of an entity relates to its physical characteristics.  However, by rejecting the 
materialist account, the structure of the entity must be based on something else, 
and the material aspects are secondary.  One of the challenges of the thesis is to 
come to terms with a new way of thinking about structures and how the material fits 
in.  
In philosophical language “that which determines entities as entities” [BT 25/6] is 
referred to as the being of that entity.  This quote comes from Heidegger and it 
accords with the tradition.  In the standard account, this can be understood as being 
an entity is to be a certain assemblage of various less complex material entities, or 
more fundamentally, being an entity means to have originated in stardust.  In this 
account, the being of any entity is determined solely by the character and 
arrangement of other entities; this is what Heidegger rejects.  He thus agrees with 
the tradition as to the ‘role’ of being, his rejection of its means; he rejects the 
meaning of being held by the tradition. 
However, what being specifically means from Heidegger’s perspective is not easy 
to answer.  One way of gaining an insight into a possible understanding is to ponder 
the question: “Out of the chaotic motion of entities, what is it that gathers it together 
in one form and not another?”  Whatever the answer to this question it satisfies the 
broad definition of being mentioned above, but it specifically rejects being as an 
entity, thus satisfying Heidegger’s only restriction as to what being can be.  However, 
all I have done is substitute ‘determines’ with ‘gathers’, based on Heidegger's use 
of the term in various texts [e.g. IM, CPE, AM].  However, even this simple switch in 
terms gives us a sense that there is a dynamic element to Heidegger’s account, 
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even if we do not initially know what it is that gathers.   
Heidegger's claim is a universal one covering all entities.  The first point to note is 
that he identifies that there is more than one way for an entity to come into being, 
what I call classes or domains of entities, each reflecting a distinctive mode of being.  
In Being and Time, he addresses in detail only three domains of entities; the human 
person (referred to as Dasein), the world in which Dasein lives (referred to as world, 
and Dasein’s domestic environment) and the things Dasein puts to use in its world 
(referred to as the ready-to-hand).  Focusing primarily on the person (Dasein) was 
my initial approach, and it failed because I had not initially recognised the inter-
related and mutually determining character of these three entities.  I ended up 
following Heidegger’s layout in Being and Time in unpacking the complex 
relationship that binds these three entities together; first understanding the ready-
to-hand, then world and then Dasein.  The theory of life-environment disruption ‘falls 
out’ of the inter-relational structure of these three entities.  
Being 
A Little More on the Concept of Being 
The topic of being in Heidegger’s work is discussed in a couple of early chapters.  
The aim of this section is to provide an introductory account of being and how we 
use it in everyday life, even though it may not be known by name.  This is followed 
by a potted history of being, tracing it from the early Greek through today.  The 
history highlights the puzzle of being for the Greeks, how this was lost, which in turn 
is Heidegger’s point of entry for his research. 
When we look around at things, there is a certain constancy. We can recognise a 
person, a tree, a house, a coffee cup and so on despite the significant variability 
between members of each of these types of entities.  There seems to be a constancy 
within the variability that lets us know what things are, e.g. a coffee cup.  It is this 
relative stability of what things are that enables life as we know it to happen, the 
basis for the world’s intelligible.  Whatever is responsible for this stability is being. 
In that there is a certain variability between individual things of the same type and 
yet a constancy as to what they are, it has long been held that the constancy comes 
from common physical characteristics shared by all members of the same type of 
entities.    Because of the variability, it is also accepted that there can be a certain 
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range within which those properties can appear, and the entity still be the same type 
of entity.  Because of this, we can recognise a table as a table even though we may 
never have encountered one of a certain shape, material. colour and so on; we have 
learnt the defining characteristics that a table must have to be a table and the leeway 
in which the properties may appear.   
By and large, in our everyday activities, we do not go around defining the ontological 
structures that define each type of entity, it is something we learn informally.  
However, within science, there is a need to formalise this process to assist in 
identification, classification communication and so on.  When this occurs scientists 
develop taxonomies, schemes for systematically classifying things.  Perhaps the 
best known is that associated with biology which classifies things into a hierarchy 
that includes kingdoms, classes, families, genus and species.  Whether we are 
talking about such things as tables and hammers or classifying a bird as a Rainbow 
Lorikeet, we are engaged in activities concerning the being of things, i.e. what things 
are.  In the traditional account, we understand what these things are by the observed 
characteristics of the physical form of the entity, which in turn relates to the material 
origins of the being of the entity.  
At a highly abstracted level, Heidegger holds the same understanding of being as 
does the tradition, that it determines entities, that it is the basis of our understanding, 
that it is associated with ontological structures and so on. I therefore use the 
familiarity of the traditional account to introduce the concepts by way of concrete 
example, then kick away the example, hoping that only the hollowed out abstract 
concept remains.  The idea is to eventually fill in these concepts with Heidegger’s 
understanding of them. 
A Quick and Selective Account History of Being 
The account that I present below has the aim of providing a sense of the flow in the 
history of the study being from the Greeks to today.  It is written in the style of a 
popular historical account, presenting a broad overview only, but hopefully sufficient 
to give the ‘sense of flow’ of the history of being I am after.   
The role of this section is threefold.  Firstly, it gives a context for Heidegger’s 
research presented in Being and Time, this assists in understanding what he is 
doing and why.  Secondly, it provides an account of why the contemporary Western 
tradition has a materialist world-view and in so doing presents the challenge that 
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this may be mistaken, opening a space for alternatives.  Thirdly, following on from 
the first two, this thesis, in providing an alternative view of what it is to be a human 
person moves in the space opened up by the possibility that the current normative 
account is mistaken, and that movement follows Heidegger. 
The Greeks 
The investigation into being stands at the very beginning of the Western intellectual 
tradition when Thales (circa 624-546 BCE) rejects the accounts of mythology as to 
the origin of all things.  Thales hypothesised that there was a unity in nature based 
on a single originating principle, that everything is made from some single, 
fundamental type of matter and, for Thales that was water.  In Western scholarship, 
this is the first time that the attention is shifted from the gods to nature itself as the 
domain of inquiry to understand the world.  Over the next several centuries there 
were debates as to the nature of the most fundamental material, whether it was of 
one type or many, the characteristics and so on; these were debates about being 
and within a materialist ontology. 
The debates moved from a focus on the fundamental material things (entities) were 
made from, to how the fundamental material becomes the various entities we see 
around us; these were debates about becoming.  These debates challenged the 
simplistic notion that entities could be understood as matter coming together.  The 
main puzzle for the Greeks was the source of constancy that is observed all around 
us, what it is that is behind the material coming together such a constant manner.  
These debates were, for the most part, highly abstract, as generations of 
philosophers variously applied both observations of what they saw in the world and 
rational argument to work through the various concepts.  The pinnacle of these 
inquiries was the work of Plato (circa 428-423 BCE) and his most famous student 
Aristotle (384-322 BCE).  Plato argued there was a world of Forms, in which existed 
the perfect form, or template, for every type of entity on earth; these forms were real 
but non-physical and accounted for the constancy.  The Earth was always in a state 
of becoming, of change, with individual entities coming into and out of existence 
whereas the world of Forms represents being or constancy.  Aristotle rejected 
Plato’s world of Forms but did argue that when accounting for an individual physical 
entity, that there was more happening than just the material stuff coming together, 
there is some organising principle involved.  Aristotle argues that the material used 
in making an entity could have been made into many different things, what the entity 
  
68 
is must be associated with an organising principle used to assemble the material; 
this is the source of constancy.  The nuances and complexity of these debates 
commenced long before Plato and were driven by a common theme, what entities 
are cannot be determined by the material stuff that creates them, something else is 
accountable for this organisation and whatever it is, is being.  I give an account of 
some of these ideas in Chapter 6, as the thinking of some of these early 
philosophers influenced Heidegger. 
The Question of Being Remains an Issue 
What the Greek philosophers were troubled by was the phenomenon pointed out 
earlier, that individual thing can both change and remain the same, and this led to 
the conundrum of how to understand the being of things (the constancy) as well as 
the change (the coming into and out of being).  In Heidegger’s view, they never 
completely resolved this issue, but the critical thing is that they were bothered by it 
and yet we’re not.  This very point is what Heidegger chose to make in the opening 
paragraphs of Being and Time; 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? 
Not at all. So, it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of being. But 
are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'being'? Not 
at all. [BT 19/1] 
This one passage sets our Heidegger’s research agenda and what has provoked it.   
Unless we can, at least in the first instance, read Heidegger’s work sympathetically, 
to be open to the possibility we are part of a tradition that has not only forgotten the 
question of being but thinks, mistakenly, that it ‘knows’ what things are, then 
Heidegger’s work will remain inaccessible.  Next, I continue the ‘quick and selective 
history of being’ tracing how the rise of Christendom returns the West to a materialist 
account of being, a position that modern secular science has yet to free itself. 
The Emergence of Christendom and Shutting Off the Question of Being 
After Aristotle, philosophical inquiry into the nature of things declined in Athens, the 
centre of Greek philosophy.  There is conflict, first with the Macedonians and then 
the Romans and within two centuries of Aristotle’s death, Athens is under Roman 
control.  The Romans were not just empire builders, they were great engineers and 
administrators, essential for running a vast Empire, but there is little evidence of any 
serious inquiry into nature of the type undertaken by the Greek philosophers.  In the 
centuries that follow, the Roman Empire continues to expand, breaks into two 
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halves, and slowly Christianity becomes a significant religious influence.  In 380CE 
Theodosius I (347-395CE), the last emperor to rule over both the western and 
eastern halves of the Roman Empire made Christianity the official State religion of 
the Empire and the era of Christendom had formally commenced.  By the end of 
Theodosius’ rule, the Western half of the Empire was already in decline, having lost 
significant territory to several different ‘barbarian’ invaders and within another 
hundred years, the Western Roman Empire ceased to exist in any meaningful way.  
The Eastern half of the Roman Empire (the Byzantine Empire) continued for another 
thousand years. 
After the fall, Christendom provided a significant defining motif shaping many critical 
aspects of life in the ‘West’ and the Church became both a controlling authority for 
religious belief and practice as well a major player in secular politics.  Importantly 
the Church was also the place were scholarship occurred.  There were no other 
independent places for learning, and this shaped the understanding of the world and 
everything in it as part of God’s creation, i.e. a theological determine understanding.  
Under this view, the world was the way it is because that’s the way God made it.  
The thinking about what things are had come full circle, and returned to a mythic 
explanation, the very position from which Thales and the early Greeks had struggled 
to free themselves.  The source of the order in the world originates in God.  God is 
the fundamental entity from which all else arises; God is the fundamental being. 
Under Christendom God is the maker of all things.  Over the centuries this has taken 
various forms, for example, God as the creator of the Universe and all things in it 
(creationism), or God who creates the Universe and the set of ‘rules’ by which it 
operates in a constant, regular way (watchmaker or intelligent design).  This is an 
oversimplified account, but the idea is clear enough.  What these accounts do is get 
rid of the Greek mystery concerning being and becoming.  God is the being of all 
things (the most fundamental origin), and God is responsible for entities becoming 
what they are.  The Nicene Creed, the defining statement of Christian core beliefs, 
states this very clearly, with the affirmation of a belief in “one God …. maker of 
heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible.”  The concept of maker is very 
important, as it posits an intelligence and deliberateness in the making of the world 
as we see and experience it.  The world and its creatures can thus not be the product 
of chance events, for example, it could not have arisen out of the chaos of ’atomic’ 
particles in constant motion as the Greek philosopher Democritus (circa 490 BCE) 
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argued.   
While the Greek philosophers typically had a conception of a deity, they did not 
assign to it the role of benevolent designer-maker, who constructs a world for 
humans; humans are understood as part of nature itself.  This approach opens the 
possibility of alternative ways of thinking about being and becoming, as is evident in 
the differing accounts of Plato and Aristotle, but this possibility is something 
removed by the Christian approach.  Because of the historical events associated 
with the Western Roman Empire and its fall, much of the work of the Greek 
philosophers was lost for many centuries, only slowly finding its way back from the 
East almost a thousand years later, in 12th and 13th centuries.  Interestingly this was 
after the fall of the Eastern Empire to the Islamic Empire, and the transmission was 
facilitated, primarily, by Arabic scholars.  From this time onwards, the works of 
Aristotle became extremely influential in Western scholarship.  His system of logic 
and his method of inquiry into the natural world, together with his ‘research’ findings 
dominate Western scholarship for most of the next millennium.  However, his 
account of being and becoming does not accord with Christian theology and all his 
works initially teetered on the edge of being banned as heretical.  It is Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), a Dominican Friar who sees the value of Aristotle's work and 
sets about interpreting it and developing a synthesis between Aristotle and Church 
theology, which transforms an understanding of Aristotle’s account in a way that 
conforms with the Christian world-view.  While not immediately accepted, this work, 
among others, eventually elevated Aquinas to the status of a church Father and 
recognition as one of the Church’s greatest theologians and philosophers.  
Aristotle's legacy becomes entrenched in the West, but at a cost, his puzzlement 
over being and becoming is written over.  This was the period of the Late Middle 
Ages (circa 1300-1500) and the period of scholarship known as scholasticism (circa 
1100 – 1700), a method of critical thought and inquiry, which dominates Church 
scholarship.  While there are no material developments in the inquiry into being and 
becoming, slowly the inquiries in the natural world are expanding, albeit within a 
Christian framework; we fast forward to the beginning of the modern era. 
The Scientific Revolution:  Scientific Progress Within a Christian Concept of Being 
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) published his book, On the Revolution 
of the Celestial Spheres, setting out, with observational and mathematical support, 
that the Sun and not the Earth is the centre of the universe.  This precipitates the 
 
71 
period now known as the Scientific Revolution (1543-1700) which saw 
unprecedented discoveries by natural philosophers20 and lays the foundation for 
modern science as we know it.  Not unsurprisingly this also sets in train a struggle 
to explore the world free from the constraints imposed by Church teaching.  This is 
seen, for example, in the work of Descartes (1596–1650), one of the seminal figures 
of the Scientific Revolution, who makes significant contributions in philosophy, 
mathematics, physics and the development of scientific methods.   
Descartes put forward a rationale for carving the domain of nature out from theology, 
to free up the natural philosophers to explore the natural world free from Church 
intellectual and political interference.  The personal risks were real, and Descartes 
was aware that Galileo Galilei (1565-1642) was eventually tried and found guilty of 
heresy for publishing a book Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems in 
1632 which defended the Copernican view; Galileo spent the remainder of his life 
under house arrest21. Copernicus had avoided a clash with the Church as the book 
was withheld from publication until just before his death.   
Descartes maintained that while God made the world, it was legitimate for scholars 
to explore the world to ascertain the rules of nature that God had used22.  Descartes 
proposed that the Universe and everything in it, including the human body, was 
made up of small indivisible particles of matter in continuous motion that God formed 
into complex mechanisms.  The task of the natural philosopher was to understand 
how the various mechanisms work, whether it be the human body or the solar 
system; this posits God in the ‘watchmaker’ category.  For the Church and the 
theologians, Descartes formalised the view that the soul was a separate substance 
altogether from that of the material world, having different properties, including that 
it could not be seen, as it had not physical dimensions.  This could not be studied 
by the natural philosophers and was the proper domain of the Church.  The material 
                                            
20 It is not until the nineteenth century that the science formally splits from philosophy.  Until this time, it was the 
discipline of natural philosophy that undertook investigations into nature. 
21 Viewed from the perspective of modern science, the work of Copernicus and Galileo demonstrate that the 
movement of the Earth around the Sun is possible but does not show that it is necessary. It is thus a theory, 
and one that defies the experiences of the average informed observer standing of Earth. His work was far from 
being generally accepted by other mathematicians and astronomers as an account of what ‘really’ happens.  
Galileo runs fowl of the Church not because of the work per se , but that he claims that this is the way the 
universe is.  At the time the Catholic Church was in the midst of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) against, 
mainly Protestant forces, and fighting for its existence. Not a good time to challenge core Church theology!   
22 This was not a completely novel idea.  For example, Adelard of Bath (1080-1152) from the English city of 
Bath, held a similar view, that it was one thing to know God made the things of nature, but it is quite another to 
know what these things are.   
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substance of the world he calls res extensa and the soul substance he calls res 
cogitans23, and both types of entities have their origins in a more fundamental entity, 
God.  His solution for both the ‘material’ world and the ‘spiritual’ world maintained 
their origins in the most fundamental being, God, and as such the structure of being 
and becoming conforms with Church dogma as presented in the Nicene Creed.  
Descartes’ approach, while not universally accepted in its details, is still extremely 
influential as it presents the first formalised structure that allows for the inquiry of the 
world as it is, but in a way that leaves it part of God’s creation. Descartes’ work is a 
significant part of the of the end of the Church monopoly over the control of the study 
of nature.   
However, what is evident is that Descartes is offering a materialist solution to the 
question of being, with the caveat that God is behind it all.  Almost every major figure 
in the Scientific Revolution understood what they were doing as investigating a God 
created Universe.  Even the most recognised and lauded of the natural 
philosophers, whose work is typically taken as defining the end of the Scientific 
Revolution, Isaac Newton (1643-1727), had this view.  The works of these pioneers 
of science were often sprinkled with references to God, as they struggled to hold a 
place for God in an increasingly secularised understanding of nature.   
Modern Science: Still not Free of Christendom’s Account of Being 
Today, while Western science and philosophers have pushed God out of the picture, 
what has remained is the view that everything is material, res extensa.  Rather, than 
God causing the material aspects to form into various entities, we now have theories 
such the Big Bang, the Standard Model of Particle Physics, Evolutionary theories 
and so on; this is equivalent to the concept of becoming.  But we need to note what 
has happened.  The work of modern scientists has continued in an unbroken line 
from the natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution, with improvements in 
methodologies, inventing remarkable new instruments with which to ‘observe’ 
nature in finer and finer detail, and continuing to make startling progress, and so on.  
However, all of this has happened without challenging the inherited concepts of 
being and becoming from these natural philosophers, and these concepts provide 
the broad intellectual framework within which they carry out their work.  What has 
                                            
23 Res extensa is Latin for extended thing, referring to something that has a physical presence in space. Res 




been ignored is that these natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution accepted 
an understanding of being and becoming that had been maintained by more than a 
thousand years of Christendom, and this view was established for theological and 
not scientific reasons.  Arguably it is only during the last century that the lingering 
influence of Christian thought in science is in serious decline, demarking a 
remarkable longevity of influence.  On this basis, it is not unrealistic to be alert to 
any enduring legacy of this influence today, Heidegger's view is that the concepts 
of being and becoming are one such case. 
Why the Potted History is Important? 
This potted history is important.  The thesis is questioning what it is to be a human 
person which falls under the heading of being as a field of inquiry, i.e. what we think 
things are.  To a significant extent, how we think about things is culturally acquired24, 
i.e. inherited from our tradition.  On the account I have provided, today we have only 
recently emerged from a continuous tradition of more than 1,500 years that has held, 
by and large, a materialist25 understanding of what things are.  The question is, 
“What if this is wrong?”  This position was first articulated by Thales at the very 
beginning of Greek philosophy but was understood as being inadequate by later 
Greek philosophers and they started to explore sophisticated alternatives. For the 
Greeks, we needed to answer the question of constancy, to account for the order 
that is evident in the world.  It doesn’t mean they were right concerning their 
solutions, the better question is, were they right to raise the question?   If two of the 
greatest intellects of our tradition, Plato and Aristotle, untainted by the tradition 
established by Christendom, thought there was a problem, something else was at 
play shouldn’t we listen?   
This is the point Heidegger makes. He acknowledges the incredible advances of 
science [BT 127] but when it comes to a fundamental understanding of how things 
come into being he argues that we are no smarter than the Greeks. Indeed, our 
understanding may not be as good.  
From the standpoint of historical reflection, the advanced modern science of nature is not a 
whit more true than the Greek; on the contrary, at most it is more untrue, because it is 
altogether caught in the web of its own methodology, and, notwithstanding all its discoveries, 
                                            
24 This is accepted in many fields of scholarship and is art of our inculturation.  I address this is more detail in 
Chapter 16. 
25 Technically it is known as substance ontology, but provided as common, rather than technical understanding 
of materialist is held, there implications of the argument hold. 
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it lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's 
relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48]. 
The crux of Heidegger’s argument is that we have a wrong understanding of being 
and that this has important implications for understanding our place in nature.  For 
Heidegger, we need to re-open the question as to the meaning of being, and that is 
why he opens Being and Time the way he does. 
Implications of a Wrong Account 
An example of the implications of a wrong understanding of being is reflected in this 
thesis and concerns the way we design and run nursing homes.  This current model, 
whether we appreciate it or not, is based on a materialist ontology.  If it is the case 
as Heidegger argues that the being of the human person is not based on a 
materialist ontology, then life-environments such as nursing homes into which 
vulnerable people are placed run the risk of being inappropriate for human 
habitation, with adverse consequences.  The indisputable facts are that unexplained 
adverse consequences do arise in relation to nursing homes, as attested by more 
than half a century of research.  This research is based on the normative ontology 
and the standard account of what it is to be a human person and has failed in its 
attempts to account for the phenomenon; hence the dead-end in the research.   If 
Heidegger’s account is correct, and at the very least this thesis argues it provides a 
better theoretical framework, then the implications of a wrong account of being have 
a human toll, seen in the decades of premature morbidities and mortalities that are 
continuing to accumulate in nursing homes.  
What Heidegger is arguing is that science is still not coming to grips with the 
question of being, has bought, unquestionably, into a materialist conception and 
sustains this because it has woven a web of beliefs reflected in its practices 
(methodologies).  This argument is essentially the same put forward several 
decades later by Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996).  Kuhn argued that scientists are 
indoctrinated into a way of thinking about things that arise out of their adopted 
methodologies and their paradigm case examples. (Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012)  Put more starkly scientists reify the objects of their 
inquiry, i.e. believed it represents reality.  Heidegger makes this point a number of 
times, for example, is in 1967 as part of the Zollikon Seminars when referring to 
psychology; 
Psychological theories arise under the pressure of tradition because tradition does not know 
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anything else than the character of being as substantiality, objectification, and reification. [ZS 
216] 
Both Heidegger [BT] and Kuhn acknowledge that for the most part science works.  
But they both argue, in different ways, that the progress science makes continually 
reaches limits in solving problems because the theoretical frameworks in which they 
work become inadequate and need to be recast, albeit within the materialist 
framework.  While Kuhn and Heidegger share a common view as to why this 
happens, I do not want to suggest Kuhn shared Heidegger’s ontological perspective; 
he didn’t.  Kuhn understood that the entities that science studied where often hard 
to access in terms of their material structures (the real) and so they put forward 
theoretical constructs to explain the observed phenomena (what was experienced).  
Typically, these constructed theories worked for a certain range of problems, but 
eventually, they reached the limits of their explanatory power at which time the 
theoretical construct needed to be rejected and replaced.  This is the basis of what 
he termed a scientific revolution (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012).  
Perhaps the best-known example is the replacement of the Newtonian account of 
gravity by Einstein’s account.  Kuhn identified that when this occurs scientists 
wedded to the old construct had difficulty changing, partly due to the fact they had 
reified their theories, i.e. as they believed it represented reality it could not be 
abandoned.   
Heidegger had, before Kuhn, understood the problem of reification, but his critique 
goes deeper and identifies the more fundamental issue as the reification of the 
concept of being in terms of a materialist ontology.  Kuhn does not address this.  If 
Heidegger is correct, then his understanding of being has significant implications for 
science.  I provide an example of this is Chapter 20 when I discuss how the 
phenomenon of depression, an important issue in nursing homes, is conceptualised 
and reified as an ‘illness’ or a ‘disease’ in the health sciences.  However, if, as I am 
claiming, the concept of being is reified in terms of the material, and this is 
associated with the broad intellectual framework in which science works, then 
dislodging it will be a formidable task.  
Modes of Being, Classification and Understanding 
Having introduced the basic concept of being and becoming and a little of its history, 
I now want to turn to the concept of modes of being, classification and 
understanding.  All of these occur in the ongoing discussions in this thesis. 
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Modes of Being 
The concept of being can be heard in two ways, as applying to the entity, i.e. the 
being of a hammer, or as that which underlies all the different types of entities.  
When being is investigated in this latter sense, it is referred to as fundamental 
ontology.  Notwithstanding this, in the tradition, there remains only one mode of 
being, the material, and the differences at the entity level are matters of 
classification.  For Heidegger, however, there are multiple modes of being at the 
entity level.  His claim is that the human person, for example, comes into being in a 
different manner to, say, a hammer, i.e. they have different modes of being.  
However, behind the different modes of being at the entity in Being and Time 
Heidegger argues there is one common mode of being, and inquiring into this is, as 
per the tradition, is fundamental ontology.  For Heidegger, this most fundamental 
level of being is connected to time, and it is this level he was attempting to 
substantiate in his research. Understanding the mode of being in relation to three 
types of entities (Dasein, world, and the ready-to-hand) is the main task of this 
thesis.  I will address the traditional approaches first. 
Classification 
To be a house, there must be some common structure, within some acceptable 
leeway in design, that accounts for it being a house.   Within this broad 
understanding of what accounts as being a house, certain essential characteristics 
can be identified that further classify a house as a bungalow, semi-detached, etc.  
This is a basic approach to classification found in all areas of human activity.    
The component parts of the house can also be identified and classified, e.g. we can 
group them into doors, windows, lights, etc.  Just like the houses themselves, 
members of each of these groups can be classified as different types, e.g. the 
windows can be double sashed, fixed, awning, and so on.  In turn, each window can 
then be broken down into parts and each part identified and classified, e.g. window 
panes, sash, jams, sill, etc.  This process can continue until the fundamental level 
is reached, stardust, which is the same for all entities.  In all of these categories of 
entities, from houses to window jams, the material from which they are made can 
differ, the physical sizes can differ, the colours can differ, and so on, but this does 
not change what the things are.  This basic approach can be applied to anything, 
cutlery, books, motor vehicles, and so on.  In biology, it is used to classify all living 
things.  This approach to classifying things underscores the use to which we put the 
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basic ideas of philosophy, in this case, associated with a materialist ontology, into 
everyday use.   
Under this model there is relatively little for the philosopher to do, the work is left to 
science to work out how the fundamental elements come together in every 
increasing complexity to produce (make) all the varieties of inanimate and animate 
entities, including both hammers and the human person.  In this model, if we know 
how something is made, can pull it apart, reassemble it, replace defective or broken 
parts and so on then this ‘proves’ that we have the knowledge of what things ‘truly’ 
are, of how they come into being.  This gets back to the four key concepts underlying 
the contemporary understanding of what entities are as discussed earlier in the 
chapter. It is this approach that leads us to the belief that we have a sufficient 
understanding of what a human person is such, that when old and frail they can be 
placed in a nursing home. 
While classification on the basis of observing physical properties may be a useful 
and productive methodology, the error is confusing a methodology with ontology.  
This is what Heidegger was pointing out in the earlier cited passage. 
Understanding 
By and large, the claim associated with this traditional approach is that we recognise 
and understand what something is by observing its physical characteristics, we can 
simply say something along the lines “I can recognise a table when I see one 
because I know what it looks like.”  In this account, there is a beautiful simplicity that 
applies to all things, a congruence between being, classification and understanding, 
and an unusual agreement between the common-sense view, the view of science 
and the view of philosophy.  While the level of technical level of understanding may 
vary significantly between different groups, the basic uniformity in worldview is clear 
enough. 
Heidegger's Rejection 
I am labouring this point because it is so important to understand the intellectual 
framework in which the modern tradition is based.  Even though we may not 
understand it at a technical level, it is the way we typically try to account for things 
in the world when we want to understand what it is and how it works.  This includes, 
for example, frail older ladies such as Marion Miller and the nursing homes into 
which they are placed.  
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Once we understand the concepts of being and becoming and how they are 
understood in the tradition then we are open to being shocked by the revelation that 
Heidegger rejects this entire approach.  The most dramatic claim is that he denies 
that the physical appearance is the basis of our recognising and understanding of 
what things are; this follows logically from the earlier discussions concerning 
Heidegger’s approach.  If being is that which determines entities and is the basis of 
our understanding of entities, but, and it is a big but, being is not an entity, then the 
conclusion is simple, we cannot understand the entity based on its physical 
appearance; something else is at play, and that something is being!  
Given the powerful evidence that we experience ‘knowing by looking’ I take this as 
a critical issue to address in this thesis as Heidegger’s claim is denying this obvious 
and common experience that we all have.  In many ways, this is the critical 
phenomenon that must be dealt with if the theory of life-environment disruption, 
based on Heidegger’s work, is to be taken seriously.  Investigating this phenomenon 
is the primary focus of Chapter 12.  As mentioned Heidegger also rejects there is 
only one mode or domains of being that determines entities.  While he names 
several different domains of being in Being and Time, the three that he specifically 
addresses are Dasein, the world in which Dasein lives and the entities Dasein puts 
to use, the ready-to-hand.   
In summary, between Heidegger and the tradition, there is agreement on the most 
abstracted conceptual understanding of being, i.e. it determines an entity as the 
entity it is, and it is the basis of understanding entities [BT 25/6], beyond this there 
is a radical difference as to what these means.  This is behind his research question 
“to work out the question of the meaning of being” [BT 19/1] 
Having laid out the basic terminology concerning being, identified the typical 
understanding of the terms in the tradition and highlighted what Heidegger rejects, 
I now turn to a descriptive summary of Heidegger’s account in Being and Time 
Heidegger’s Account of the Structure of Dasein 
Heidegger’s Starting Point 
The Greek philosophers could see and experience the world just as well as we 
could.  From the very beginning, they accepted the concept that there are very small 
fundamental elements that we could not see that make up the complex things we 
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could see.  So conceptually, there is no difference between then and now on this 
point.  That we have more knowledge as to what the character of the ‘invisible’ small 
stuff is, in this regard, is irrelevant. It is only a matter of scale as to how far down we 
can probe the character of the small units of material things.  The Greeks recognised 
that the issue of being and becoming, of change and constancy, were critical issues 
to resolve if they were to understand how nature works.  They accepted that what 
we see does not reflect the being of things, that there is something else that 
accounts for the constancy of the order in the universe.  Something else is going on, 
and they struggled to understand what.   
Because the question of being has largely been ignored since their time, Heidegger 
wants to “raise anew the question of the meaning of being.” [BT 19/1] (italics in the 
original).  He does not necessarily think they arrived at the ‘correct’ answer, but he 
does accept that it was right to ask the question.  From this perspective, it is the 
later Greeks who reject the materialist account and Heidegger is picking up the 
threads of their inquiry.  
As soon as we reify a materialist understanding of the being of things, we ask the 
wrong questions, e.g.  “What is it made from?”, “How is it assembled?”, “How does 
it work?” Heidegger does not reject these as legitimate questions; they are relevant 
to understanding the material aspect of the entity, they just don’t get at the heart of 
the matter concerning what things are.   To properly understand and entity we must 
first understand its mode of being and then how the material aspects relate to this. 
Once we put aside the materialist presumption, we can ask the more pertinent 
question, e.g. “What accounts for this entity coming into being as the entity it is?”  It 
is like the other questions, but it opens the possibility for different responses to the 
question.  For centuries inquiring into entities has been based on them being 
material beings and so if we put aside the presupposition, we must also put aside 
the associated methodologies.  Heidegger recognises this, and his response is the 
methodology of phenomenology; I will address this below. 
Reading Heidegger’s work is difficult.  One way of orientating oneself while reading 
Being and Time is to keep in view the question, “What accounts for this entity coming 
into being as the entity it is?”.  This helps in understanding what Heidegger is doing, 
in the first half of Being and Time as it is here he describes what is happening in 
relation to the three inter-related entities, Dasein, Dasein’s world and the things 
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Dasein uses in going about its activities.  It is the answer to this question for these 
three entities that, in my view, revolutionises our understanding of what it is to be a 
human person, and forms the basis of my Theory of Life-Environment Disruption.  
Heidegger and the Question of Being 
Being and Time is essentially a ‘research in progress’ report concerning Heidegger’s 
inquiries into being, and he continues inquiring into being for the remainder of his 
life.  Heidegger shared with the Greeks the idea that there is some fundamental 
principle that accounts for the constancy we see.  In Being and Time, he thought 
that what underlies all the modes of being was time, hence the title of his book.  This 
is not time as typically understood but time interpreted as a dynamic movement, 
whereby past, present and future cannot be understood as discrete ‘chunks’ of time 
but are aspects of the same temporalizing structure.  This gets complex and 
extremely abstract, however, at a concrete level, it can be glimpsed in contemporary 
thinking.  For example, in evolutionary theories the biological species we see today 
are not discrete and independent of time, they can only be understood from an 
evolutionary (in time) perspective.  Similarly, societies are not discrete entities 
separate from time (understood as history), they are continually evolving out of 
history and are, in a sense constantly moving into history.   
Understood in this way species and societies are the product of a dynamic temporal 
process and what they are (how they come into being) must be linked structurally to 
the past and to the future.  If we view species and biological species as material 
entities, then we have ignored the dynamic structural aspect and are simply getting 
a frozen snapshot.  If we then take this frozen snapshot and view it as an 
assemblage of material entities, then we have failed to see the basis by which they 
come into being.   
For Heidegger, at each moment in time, entities are in a structural relationship with 
other entities forming a complex relational network (this is discussed in detail in the 
next section).  It is the changes in the unified network, arising from the dynamic 
inter-relationships between entities functioning in a temporal structure (i.e. time) that 
accounts for the coming into being of entities.  In a nutshell, the dynamic structural 
unit we call society changes, and there is an adaption to the change in the form of 
new entities coming into being and old ones passing away, reflected in our changing 
practices.  What we have is a spatial dimension, the relationship between things in 
the network, and a temporal dimension, the movement through time, and the two 
 
81 
cannot be ignored if we are to understand how things come into being.  
Understanding the details of the temporal of this is outside the scope of the thesis, 
and so I will not continue further. 
If we can tentatively grasp a sense of a dynamic relationship that holds past, present 
and future, as part of the same structural process, regarding the coming into being 
of things such as societies and biological entities we are starting to be open to the 
possibility of viewing the various phenomena as Heidegger is describing it.  While I 
do not go into the details of Heidegger’s structural analysis of time, the basic idea 
will be important when the details of Dasein’s structure come together later in the 
thesis (Chapter 18). 
In that Heidegger accepted the idea that being, that which gathers and determines 
entities, lies behind all entities, his research strategy in Being and Time is to pick an 
entity, inquire as to its structure, and from there to being.  The entity he chose was 
Dasein, and his work becomes the basis of this thesis. 
Dasein’s Intuitive Understanding of Modes of Being 
As previously discussed Heidegger accepts the basic, abstract, understanding of 
the key concepts such as being, becoming and ontological structures which in all 
cases applies to entities26; it is the specific interpretation as to what these mean that 
he has an issue.    
In that, the being of entity is also the basis of our understanding of the entity the 
implication is that we cannot distinguish between what a rock is (something present-
at-hand), what a hammer is (something ready-to-hand) or what a person is (i.e. 
Dasein) based on the physical appearance.  But, Heidegger argues, that in fact, we 
do understand the difference, that this is evident in the way we relate to these three 
different types of entities; we do not typically treat people like rocks or mere tools27.  
In that we tend to deal with things appropriately, i.e. roughly in accordance with their 
mode of being, Heidegger claims that this reflects an understanding, but a “pre-
ontological understanding” [BT 33/13] of what things are, and we do this naturally.  
By “pre-ontological” Heidegger means a non-formalised understanding, and it is 
                                            
26 The terminology can get a little more confusing because in the English language literature entities are often 
referred to as beings! This results in statements such as “The being of beings is the basis on which beings come 
into being.”  In other languages, e.g. Greek, Latin and German there are different spellings of these differing 
uses of being which assists in the reading.  In this thesis I use the term entities.  
27 This does not mean that we cannot objectify another person and treat them as a non-human commodity. 
Heidegger is not interested in these exceptions, he is exploring the usual and typical mode of being a Dasein. 
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when we formalise out understanding that things go astray.  It is the natural, “pre-
ontological” understanding, revealed in the way we deal with things, i.e. our 
relationship with things, that Heidegger uses to launch his inquiry.   
Heidegger is claiming that if you look at the way we typically go about the world 
using things, then this discloses an innate understanding of what things are.  It is 
when we apply an intellectual analysis to the question of what things are that we 
suddenly stop using it and shift our focus to how things look.  We have shifted focus.  
It is this shift of focus that is key in understanding Heidegger’s way of analyzing 
things. 
Our Average Everyday Way of Being Unlocks Heidegger’s Approach 
Heidegger shifts the focus we typically take in understanding what things are away 
from how they look (i.e. a static and material basis) to a focus on the relational 
interactions between entities, for example how we deal and interact with things (i.e. 
a dynamic relational basis).  The basic relationships that one entity has to another 
may have different characteristics, and it is these characteristics that Heidegger will 
focus on.  For example, ‘involvement’ is a general term referring to the way an entity 
is typically related, e.g. when we use a ‘hammer’, “there is an involvement in 
hammering” [BT 116/84].  Involvements typically have a function or outcome 
associated with them, e.g. “with hammering there is an involvement [with a nail] to 
make something fast.” [BT 116/84]. Heidegger refers to the purpose that something 
is done (e.g. to make fast) an “in-order-to”.   In Being and Time, he does not refer to 
the nail, that was added for clarity, but it emphasises that what Heidegger is doing 
is always focussing on describing the characteristics of the relationships between 
entities, not their physical characteristics.   
Heidegger’s method is to observe, analyse and classify the relationships between 
ready-to-hand entities from different perspectives and from this he identifies that 
there is a larger unified (interconnected and interdependent) dynamic relational 
network within which individual useful things sit.  This relational network is what he 
refers to as world.   It is the ongoing (hence dynamic) character of the relationships 
that are the structure of world, and within world the structure of the individual useful 
things we use.  Heidegger then analysis the nature of the relationship between 
Dasein and useful things (entities) and world to arrive at the structure that defines 
Dasein’s way of relating to the world which he calls being-in-the-world.  Heidegger 
also describes the modes of relationships between Daseins; I am not going to go 
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into this here as the idea of focusing on relationships is the main point I wanted to 
bring out (these relationships are discussed in Chapter 16.)  The three essential 
structural components for Dasein will turn out to be our modes of receptivity, 
responsiveness and understanding. 
In summary, for Heidegger, it is an entity’s characteristic ways of being in 
relationship that indicates what the entity is. The underlying relational structures that 
are the basis for these ways of being in relationship are the entities ontological 
structure, i.e. determine what the entity is.  The physical form we see is a response 
to this structure it does not determine it; this will be discussed later in the thesis.  It 
is the dynamic relational structure of world that accounts for an entity, including 
Dasein, coming into being.  A result of Heidegger’s analysis is that an individual 
Dasein is only intelligible within the context of the relational structure associated with 
its coming into being as the individual Dasein it is; disrupt those relational structures 
and Dasein can no longer function in terms of its relational modes of being.  
The above three paragraphs are a very pithy summary of Heidegger’s approach and 
how he views the world. While he changes his descriptive language over the course 
of his career, this approach and understanding of the dynamic “worlding of the 
world” [TT 178] does not change.  This is the constancy and variability of Heidegger. 
As can be seen Heidegger’s approach is on the one hand radical departure from the 
materialist account of things, but on the other reflects a simple change in focus while 
observing and seeking to understand the same world.   
To ‘flesh out’ this cryptic account, the remainder of this Chapter is the promised 
summarised, descriptive account of his work in Being and Time developed based 
on the work undertaken and presented the succeeding chapters of the thesis. 
Example: Chariots and Togas Through Time 
I want to introduce two concrete examples that can be used to illustrate Heidegger’s 
concepts.  Chariots and togas are two entities commonly understood, and I want to 
explore how the meaning of what they are changes when considered from the 
perspective of two separate periods in time, ancient Rome, say 118CE and Rome in 
2018CE.  In Being and Time, the category of ready-to-hand covers a range of 
entities, all of them in one way or another used by Dasein.  Chariots and togas are 
ready-to-hand of the type called equipment, the product of some manufacturing 
process and used for the purpose for which they were designed.   
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While chariots and togas can be constructed from the same material, look the same 
and even carry the same name in 2018 today as they did in ancient Rome, if we 
were to say they are the same entity, because on these aspects, then we are basing 
this assessment on a materialist account.  If we observe how these things are used, 
it is quickly apparent that while they were useful everyday items of equipment in 
ancient Rome, today they are mere curiosities, items used in re-enactments or as 
fancy-dress props.  In other words, they are understood and used differently.  Today 
an army General is not going to ride in a chariot to review the troops, and a modern 
politician would not dream of wearing a toga to parliament as the standard form of 
dress.  In ancient Rome these things would have appeared natural as familiar, today 
these practices would appear strange and out of place.  The network of relationships 
between politician (Dasein), appropriate clothing to wear (practice or involvement), 
while undertaking parliamentary duties (more involvements) has fundamentally 
changed.  The toga and chariot can still be understood as useful equipment, but 
because of the changes in the underlying relational structure, the type of equipment 
they are has changed.  If togas ceased to be used for any purpose whatsoever then 
would be relegated to an illustration in a history book.  
The underlying relational structures that were the basis of ancient Rome (i.e. the 
world of ancient Rome) is now so radically different than today, that there would be 
relatively few things between the two Romes that have the same structural meaning.   
Again, Heidegger is not arguing that we would not recognise a chariot or toga today, 
there is enough residual structure remaining for this, but he is arguing that we would 
not have access to the full richness of what it means to be a chariot or a toga in 
Roman times.  Similarly, in that the individual Dasein comes into being based on its 
structural relationship to its world to be a Dasein living in the Rome 118 means 
something radically different to being a Dasein in the Rome of 2018.  
In this example, it is the same basic ontological structure that underlies the 
equipment (togas and chariots), world (ancient and modern Rome) and Dasein; it is 
the character of the relationships that have changed. The best way to understand 
this is by way of a very simple example.  A cubed box is one with all sides being a 
square of equal dimensions; this is its basic structure.  However, we can have a 
cubed box with 2cm sides or 6cm sides, one painted white and another red and so 
on.  By maintaining the basic structure (the square sides) but changing the 
dimensions and other non-essential characteristics we have different individual 
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specimens of the same species, cubed box.  This reflects the idea of constancy and 
change but from a materialist perspective.  Now we need to jettison the use of the 
cubed-box example but hang onto the notion that there are ways of describing 
common structures.  For Heidegger in describing the common (ontological) structure 
of the relational network that is world, he uses terms like involvement, and in-order-
to.  These are abstract placeholders (like all sides are squares), that have no specific 
content but does define the necessary structure of the entity.  Just as the term cube 
indicates a particular structural type without saying any more about a specific cube.   
Heidegger’s placeholders though must be understood as relationships.  If we hear 
this in the right way, we can hear the idea of constancy (the same basic relational 
structure) and variability (the individual character of the structure).  
We can now flesh out Heidegger's research method a little more.  If all individual 
entities (what Heidegger refers to as the ontic level) such as Dasein and equipment 
exhibit the same basic ontological structure, just expressed within a certain 
variability then this points to a way of accessing the ontological structure.  All 
Heidegger has to do is identify the sufficient and necessary structural components 
that define the entity at the ontic or individual level and then ‘remove’ the variability 
to abstract the common ontological structure.  To bring back to the cube example:  
we observe ten cubes of various sizes colours and materials and note that in relation 
to each one that regardless of the materials it is still a cube, regardless of colour it 
is still a cube, and regardless of size it is still a cube.  All these are thus jettisoned 
as defining the cube. What we note is that the essential common feature is that in 
every case it is an object with six faces, each face being a square of the same size.  
This provides the defining characteristics or ontological structure of a square.   
This method is one that Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of 
phenomenology, developed (discussed in Chapter 13) and it was from Husserl that 
Heidegger learnt it [MWP].  But Heidegger rejects Husserl’s materialist stance and 
applies it the observed was of being (relational aspects) of entities.   So, while 
understanding Husserl’s method as applied to a material object is useful in grasping 
the concepts of the method, we must never get caught in the trap of confusing the 
material aspect of the entity with what it is.  Put another way, we must remember 
that for Heidegger, being is understood as a verb, not a noun.  As will be seen in the 
following discussion, the focus of Heidegger’s attention will be on the ‘ways of being’ 
that are associated with the relationships between entities. 
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Relational Systems and Networks to Understand World 
In this section, the idea of relational structures is extended to describe world.  
Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that the way in which he uses the term world 
is not as the collection of entities (the ones that are not Dasein), that can be 
encountered “within-the-world but rather as the ‘wherein’” [BT 93/65] that Dasein 
lives its life.  This sounds confusing.  A way to think about this is to imagine a very 
large three-dimensional space with thousands of points randomly scattered in the 
space, then further imagine that these points are variously interconnected, some to 
many other points, some to fewer (Image 1 is an example).  Typically, we will think 
of the dots and lines as something solid and static, i.e. in a materialist manner, 
however, imagine the lines as dynamic relational connections and the points as 
junctions of where various sets of relationships meet.  These relational junctions are 
the points where the ready-to-hand equipment emerge in response to the underlying 
structure.  This network of inter-dependent, inter-connected dynamic relationships 
is a depiction of Heidegger’s world, it maps out a ‘space’ that is the basis of the 
‘wherein’ Dasein lives. 
 




If the chariot in both Romes looks the same, why is it a different type of ready-to-
hand entity?  The answer is in the underlying relational structures associated with 
the chariot, i.e. the junction of all the associated relationships.   For example, there 
are the roads on which the chariot is driven, and the rules associated with driving a 
chariot; the use to which it is put in warfare, games and ceremonies; there are 
stables for the horses and the garaging of the chariot; there is the ‘factory’ in which 
the chariot is made, and the associated tools used in the making and maintain the 
chariot and so on.  For a chariot to make sense in this complex network, all these 
relational links need to be in place, reflecting the interdependent nature of the links.  
Roads are not just used for chariots, but transporting goods in wagons, messengers 
on horseback and people moving around on foot.  The carpenters and the 
blacksmiths don’t just make chariots they make all types of wagons, tools, buildings 
and so on.  The relational network incorporates all connections associated with 
these entities as well.   In other words, we need to incorporate all the relational 
connections for every item every item used in Rome, and only then does this densely 
inter-connected web of relationships provide a specific instance of the world of 
Rome.  Of course, ancient Rome was a diverse trading empire and so the relational 
network associated with, for example, wine, extends to the regions where the grapes 
are grown and processed before being shipped to Rome; In this manner, the world 
of Rome extends out to the Empire itself.  Putting aside the impossibility of capturing 
all of this in some, say, advance computer model, it would be outdated, for there will 
always be relational connections being established and old ones disappearing. 
The chariot then is just one set of inter-connecting relationships within the myriad 
that forms a world.  In imagining this we need to keep in mind that the inter-
connections are a form of relationship, and the entities themselves should be 
understood in terms of what they contribute to or offer the network (i.e. their way of 
being); they should be viewed in terms of their functional contributions and modes 
of relating, not as static material entities.  Heidegger’s name for these entities that 
we use even has this concept built into the name, the ready-to-hand; these entities 
stand ‘at the ready’ to be used. 
Worlds Change 
From the perspective of ancient Rome, over time the character of warfare changes, 
the games in which chariots were used no longer occur, and the ceremonial roles 
fade with the changing of the Empire.  While the roads, workshops and so on remain, 
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the functional relationships associated with the chariot gradually disappear.  This 
disappearing gradually thins out the dynamic set of relationship connections 
associated with chariots from the sourcing of materials, to manufacture and so on; 
until finally only remnants or perhaps nothing at all is left.  As the relational structures 
associated with being a chariot in Rome disappear, so does the structural meaning 
of chariot.   
Carts, wagons, buggies and so on will continue to be made for the next fifteen 
hundred years because they are the best way to move goods and people.  But then 
first the steam engine and then the combustion engine is invented and soon trains, 
and automobiles enter the network.  Factories for one task close (e.g. wheelwrights) 
while factories for other purposes open (e.g. automobile construction), the concept 
of the road is applied to railroads for trains, and even the dirt cart roads, too rough 
for automobiles, become first macadamized28 constructions, then bituminised or 
concrete roadways.  These changes reflect shifting networks of relationships, with 
one part of the public world changing in various ways in response to changes in 
another part.  The world called Rome of 118 has morphed into the unrecognisable 
world called Rome in 2018.  Viewed as a snapshot they now appear as two different 
entities, because of the radical change in structure, but nonetheless connected in 
time29.  An interesting puzzle, not to be addressed in this thesis, is whether they are 
indeed two entities, or two temporal phases of the same entity.   
In summary, Heidegger sees world as the unified interconnection of interdependent 
relationships which must exist prior to and in order for an individual ready-to-hand 
entity to exist.  This is why a computer, even if transported back in time, a computer 
could not exist as an entity ready-to-hand in the early Rome, there is no relational 
network into which it fits; the worlds are different.  The computer would be an entity, 
but what Heidegger calls present-hand, something there but devoid of any functional 
relationship within world, i.e. it serves no purpose.  This is why Heidegger says that 
“Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment” [BT 97/68], i.e. all 
equipment only exists in relationship.  
                                            
28 This is a process of using small, angular and uniformed sized crushed stone, with a binding layer of 
compacted stone dust. 
29 A certain license has been taken in this example and it ignores the forced changes arising from invasions by 
enemies, the rise of the Church and so on, but the idea of an adapting network, based on changes in the 
changing relationships is what I am conveying.  
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What Does it Mean to be Within the World 
Heidegger regularly uses the phrase “ready-to-hand within-the-world” [e.g. BT 
106/76, 109/78, 116/84] and this can now be understood not as some material 
object in another, but literally as ‘in’ the world itself.  A ready-to-hand entity is the 
meeting point of a set of relational structures of world itself.  In that this is the case 
then one would expect that the entity of world has a similar character as the 
‘individual’ entity ready-to-hand, just on a larger scale, and this proves to be the 
case, and while Heidegger tends to skip over this at one point he describes the 
“current world authentically ready-to-hand” [BT 141/106].  
Worlds Within Worlds 
When looking at the network of relationships that encompasses an entire public 
world, it is easy to imagine a small segment that relates to the world of the theatre, 
the world of commerce or the world of the coffee shop within this larger world.  
Further, it is also possible to come down to an even smaller scale, the world of one’s 
home, workplace, workshop or even as a study.   The sense of this first appears 
when Heidegger refers to the larger, all-encompassing network of relationships as 
the “‘public’ we-world” whereas the small aspect with which a person may be familiar 
and ‘within which’ they live, as “one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment” [BT 
93/65].  The latter is the most important for Heidegger’s analysis and I refer to it as 
the ‘living-environment’. 
Essentially each of these is a relational network that has some coherence as offering 
a place for Dasein to dwell, i.e. carry on its life, utilising the ready-to-hand equipment 
that shows up in these ‘spaces’ (worlds).  This can be seen in the following passage; 
Equipment -in accordance with its equipmentality - always is in terms of its belonging to other 
equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, 
room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to 
add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not 
as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between 
four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 
'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself.  
[BT 98/68] 
In this brief passage, we have the idea of the idea of a room as a place for residing, 
i.e. a ‘small world’.  However there are also every other material aspect that has 
been discussed to date; equipment understood in terms of its functionality (called 
equipmentality here); the necessary relationship between equipment;  the rejection 
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of the world (here the room) as a collection of material things; the concept of world 
as a relation ‘space’ for residing, rather than a physical (geometric) space; world as 
equipment (ready-to-hand); things never showing up not on the basis of their 
material appearance and so on.  This passage occurs towards the beginning of 
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s domestic world, its living environment, and while 
Heidegger’s account of the study is an accurate description based on his research, 
it is difficult to see how it is comprehensible when first encountered.   It took several 
readings of Being and Time, each time reading back into passages such as this 
what had been gleaned from prior readings of the book before it became intelligible.  
Summary 
In summary, what it is to be a ready-to-hand entity emerges out of the underlying 
structure of world, and the physical characteristics that make manifest the entity are 
designed and produced in response to a functional requirement which has a 
structural context.  In other words, while the physical appearance may be associated 
with a certain ready-to-hand item, it is the underlying structure that is the basis of it 
being what it is.  As the underlying relational network of world changes, then either 
new ready-to-hand entities come into being or existing ones ‘fade’ away.  Does this 
mean that the ontological structure of world is a composite of the ready-to-hand? 




Heidegger’s account of the ontological structure of Dasein is far more complex than 
world and the ready-to-hand and not as well presented.  Many of the rudimentary 
concepts he identifies as important are familiar to scholarship; Heidegger’s genius 
is applying them differently.  Following on from the previous section, the way to 
understand Dasein is as an entity in a dynamic relationship with its world.    
My reading of Heidegger’s account of Dasein is a naturalistic one, i.e. that what 
Heidegger is describing is the ontological description of a living natural entity in 
terms of its relationship to its living environment.   If we can envisage all the various 
forms of biological organisms as having a certain adaptiveness to their environment, 
and arising out of this, a range of receptive and response capabilities, then we have 
the basic structure of Dasein itself, which after all is just another biological organism!  
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The essential difference is that Dasein has the capacity to understand its world, and 
instigate changes that, within a certain leeway, involves changes to the living 
environment itself, i.e. rather than a slow evolutionary adaption to an environment.  
This is a remarkable adaptive strategy, and the way I read Heidegger, it is one that 
arises from the underlying structures of nature itself. 
In the following, I will sketch out this rudimentary account of the ontological structure 
of Dasein and its connection to world sufficiently to get an insight as to the structural 
basis for the theory of life-environment disruption.  
Historical, Cultural Environmental Determinant of Dasein 
One way to envisage the idea of Heidegger’s Dasein is through a thought 
experiment. 
Imagine that the instant a baby is born it is transported simultaneously into several 
radically different cultures, say a 9th century ‘Viking’ village, 18th century Mississippi, 
USA and 21st century Gaza.  For consistency, further imagine that in each case the 
family in which the baby is projected is a well-off, respected family with an identical 
family structure.  The baby is loved, cared for and raised in a typical everyday way, 
experiencing no material adverse events.  By the time the baby is an adult the 
differences will be immense and seen in such things as; the languages used in both 
speech and thought; the understanding of god or gods and the associated religious 
practices; the culturally acquired likes and dislikes in relation to food, dress, 
entertainments, etc; what it is to be a good member of the society; the appropriate 
roles taken up as part of their day to day activities;  the skills sets acquired in relation 
to the differing tools and equipment employed in the culture; the culturally acquired 
emotional responses to things; how to view and respond to people not part of the 
main community; and so on.  The role that culture plays in determining Dasein is 
discussed in Chapter 16.  The idea of a nascent Dasein being thrown into a world 
and then being constituted by that world in almost every aspect of their experienced 
personhood I think can be gleaned sufficiently well from this thought experiment.  
This account reflects Heidegger’s account of what happens when a Dasein is 
‘thrown’ into a world. 
This idea of ‘inculturation’, essentially what I have outlined above, is not new and 
has been observed and commented on by scholars for centuries.   The seventeenth-
century French polymath Blaise Pascal(1623-1662) had a similar 
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notion(Pascal(Author) & Elliot(Introduction), 2013), and it is a common position with 
scholars in the field of sociology(Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2006; Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013) (Discussed in Chapter 16).  What is different, is what Heidegger does 
with the phenomenon.  Perhaps a contentious point in Heidegger’s descriptive 
account is that our individual affective capacities (e.g. emotions, feelings, etc.) are 
shaped by culture; this is part of the structure of receptivity.  However, even this is 
not as controversial as it seems as there is contemporary research support for this 
view.  This research indicates that not only are our affective responses to the various 
things in our life-environment shaped by culture (what we like, dislike, etc.) but that 
the character of the emotions themselves are shaped (Izard, 2010; Keltner, Oatley, 
& Jenkins, 2014; Lutz, 2011; Nuckolls, 1996; Nussbaum, 2001).   
However, Heidegger goes further and claims in Being and Time that our various 
affectivities play a role not only in how the world shows up for us but what shows up 
as significant for us.  This is reflected in the examples of the music at the party, and 
the person afraid of dogs described earlier.  In effect, he is claiming that our 
emotional capacities direct our cognitive capacities, a seemingly radical claim, but 
here too this is gaining stronger support(Damasio, 2018; Nussbaum, 2001).  The 
linking of our affectivity to how the world shows up for us is a structural aspect of 
Dasein which Heidegger calls receptivity (refer Chapter 17). The connection 
between emotions (receptivity) and behaviour (responsiveness), however, has been 
well researched for almost a hundred years.  Perhaps the best-known example 
being the arousal-response process associated with the fight or flight response first 
developed by Walter Cannon (1871-1945) (Cannon, 1927; Jacobs, 2001).  There is 
nothing new here, except that Heidegger puts these various phenomena together 
as indicative of the very structure of Dasein, not as something possessed by Dasein. 
In summary, while there may be certain sameness associated with the genetics of 
the person, e.g. the physical appearance of the adult baby, and perhaps aspects of 
personality, in almost every other material respect the lives of the person in our 
thought experiment will be radically different.  The very existence that the person 
will experience in thought, word and deed will have been determined by its historical-
cultural setting into which they were thrown.  What Heidegger extracts from this is 
that the modes of understanding, receptivity and response shaped by this cultural 
thrownness are the basic structures that determine Dasein. 
What Makes a Person a Person is Not the Physical Body 
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The question then arises, is this the same person given that the starting ‘genetic 
bundle’ of the baby is the same?  In other words, does the physical aspect of the 
person determine who the person is?  For Heidegger, the answer is no.   
Heidegger argues that the ontological structure of Dasein, what he terms being-in-
the-word, binds to the world in which it is thrown forming a mutually dependent 
relationship, and it is out of this relationship the individual Dasein emerges.  This is 
summed up by his comment that “being-in-the-world is the basic constitution of 
Dasein” [MFL 169]; being-in-the-world is thus the common ontological structure 
applicable to all Daseins.  The individuation of each Dasein occurs with Dasein’s 
thrownness into a world.  This binding that arises is not the thrusting of some 
preformed entity onto some other material entity, like gluing a model together; as 
described above world cannot be understood in this way.  In its thrownness into a 
world Dasein develops an understanding of itself in the context of an understanding 
of the world and in turn this becomes the ‘wherein; Dasein lives or dwells as 
previously indicated.  This is the ‘being-in’ part of the structure of ‘being-in-the-
world’, and the ‘being-in’ must be heard in not as some geometric space such as 
the study, but rather as ‘within-in’ an understanding of a part of the structure of world 
itself, which become the Dasein’s life-environment.  If Dasein is constituted 
relationally then clearly it cannot be understood as simply a specific instance of 
biological material, i.e. the body. 
Understanding as a Structure 
In the section on world, ready-to-hand entities were in terms of what they offered 
(i.e. a form of relationship) the structure.  While Dasein was not specifically 
mentioned, it is self-evident that they are somehow present.  We now move to the 
relationship between ready-to-hand entities and Dasein.   
By way of example, a carpenter can be understood based on their involvements 
(practices) with a set of ready-to-hand items that constitute the functional (in-order-
to) structure of world.  The involvements with that set of ready-to-hand items 
essentially map out the relational structure that constitutes what it means to be a 
carpenter.  A carpenter will be involved with such ready-to-hand items as hammers, 
nails, saws, timber, door frames, house frames and so on.  The similarity between 
understanding a chariot and the role of a carpenter is evident but potentially 
misleading; this will become evident shortly. 
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For each item the carpenter is specifically engaged with, the relational network can 
be viewed from the perspective of various other Daseins engaged with these items, 
e.g. the hardware store clerk, the lumber yard worker, the householder for whom 
the work is done and so on.  The world of the carpenter is thus a shared world with 
other Dasein.  While the world can be understood as a unity of functional (in-order-
to) relationships, it can also be viewed in terms of the collective involvements of all 
the Daseins in the culture.  This perspective Heidegger also calls the “we-world” and 
is the same as the “public-world” [BT 93/65]. 
When a Dasein is thrown into a world, its structure establishes an understanding of 
itself in the context of the world into which it has been thrown.  The Dasein has no 
control over this process, and the quality of the world into which Dasein is thrown is 
irrelevant to the structural process. Whatever the ‘quality’ of ‘appropriateness’ of the 
aspect of world into which Dasein is thrown, this is what is taken up by the structural 
process.   As such a Dasein that emerges from an impoverished environment in the 
first years of its life will develop in such a way that there are lifelong, potentially 
adverse consequences (this is discussed in Chapter 20).  However, in a typical 
situation, the Dasein will acquire a self-understanding from the rich variety of 
possibilities available in the culture.  For example, a person today can become a 
carpenter as this has structural meaning in the cultural world, but they could not 
become a gladiator as understood in Rome; it is not structurally supported.  This 
does not rule out that a person may have a mental illness and understand 
themselves as a gladiator; however, this arises as a breakdown case, not the normal 
functioning of the structure.  There are also different ways a person can take up a 
role, for example, a mother can be a ‘helicopter mum’, a ‘sacrificial mum’, and so 
on, all of which are an expression of the person’s structural relationship to the world 
as reflected in the role of Mum.  Dasein is therefore structurally involved with two 
broad classes of entities the ready-to-hand and other Dasein. These are two distinct 
classes of entities, and thus are understood differently, and this is reflected in the 
character of our relational structure with each entity type. Heidegger refers to the 
relational structure with the ready-to-hand as ‘concern’ (Discussed in Chapter 14 & 
15) and the structure relating to other people ‘solicitude’ (Discussed in Chapter 16). 
In the above case, the Dasein understands themselves as a carpenter, but they 
could also be a soccer coach, poker player and Mum.  In other words, the self-
understanding can be multi-faceted and mark out involvements with different sets 
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of ready-to-hand equipment and other Daseins in differing roles.  All these specific 
involvements which reflect a person’s self-understanding come together in what 
Heidegger calls a person’s domestic world or environment, which in turn are aspects 
of the larger public or we-world.  
In summary, Dasein is constituted (its self-understanding) in the context of the world 
into which it is thrown, and this understanding is reflected in the involvements that 
Dasein takes up.  Returning to the thought experiment, while there is certainly the 
same starting point in terms of the base genetic characteristics, whether it be skin 
colour, sex, basic disposition (perhaps), overall body shape and so on, the individual 
Dasein that emerges from the interaction between its structure and specific cultural 
world is different in each case, and relationally binds them to their life-environment. 
Rejection of the Person ‘inside’ model 
Heidegger is interested in identifying the constitutive structures of the human 
person, i.e. what it is to be a person, and in so doing he rejects presuppositions such 
as the person is a soul, or as some already determined ‘mini-person’ that simply 
grows up, or is a co-ordinating ego, or is the functioning brain or any other entity 
‘inside’ the body [Discussed in Chapter 4 and 8].  All of these are various forms of 
entities, and none of them accounts for the coming into being of an individual 
Dasein.  
Under existing approaches, the experiences acquired from the culture are in some 
way added to the existing Dasein, ‘feeding’ it grows.  Experiences are like water, 
sunlight and nutrients feeding a plant.  In this account, the ontological structure of 
the plant is already complete and self-contained within the plant, and the 
environmental nutrients simply account for the success or otherwise of the growth 
but adds nothing to what it is to be the plant.  This view is also reflected in the view 
that children are ‘resilient’, i.e. they can spring back from adversity in their living 
environment by improving the environment, i.e. their ‘growth’ (development) can be 
brought back on track, but through this what it is to be that individual child remains 
unchanged.  This view is demonstrably wrong and is discussed in Chapter 20.  
Another view is what I call the ‘cultural accoutrement’ approach to explain cultural 
influences on the person; culture is something taken up and worn.  If we take the 
thought experiment, under this approach, the person is really the same person 
‘underneath’ expressing themselves in the acquired cultural ‘accoutrements’.  The 
‘environmental nutrient’ model and the ‘cultural accoutrement’ model’ both posit a 
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‘real person’ already ontological determined and somehow ‘inside’ a body, which in 
turn is a separate entity in a world.  These understandings of the person are utterly 
rejected by Heidegger.  There is no pre-existing individual person inside, just a 
possibility based on the ontological structure being thrown into a world. 
If No Person Entity Inside What is Heidegger Researching? 
Perhaps because of the tradition and its adherence to the material concept of things, 
there is a pull to ‘see’ what we are dealing with, to bring it into view.  This is 
understandable to some extent.  When talking about a hammer, we can bring the 
entire physical entity into view, and there is a strong correlation between the 
appearance of the hammer and what it is to be a hammer.  In the case of the 
hammer, we can be sure we are talking about the same entity and discuss 
Heidegger’s account of its structure compared to tradition’s account and slowly 
identify the differing accounts.  In this way, we can even grasp how Heidegger 
accounts for the physical presence of the hammer, as distinct from its structure.  For 
a hammer, we can envisage the dynamic relationship of world and have some sense 
of how the material aspect arises to provide the functionality (in-order-to) demanded 
of it by its place in the relational network.  In other words, we can grasp the coming 
into being of the hammer as a species of tool at the relational structure level, and 
then we can trace this to the production of an individual hammer.  In so doing we 
have an insight as to the relationship between what it is to be a hammer and the 
material body of the hammer.  This larger picture is missing from Being and Time.  
Heidegger simply says that Dasein’s “’bodily nature’ hides a problematic of its own” 
and will not deal with it in Being and Time [BT 143/108].  The question is that we 
can see the connection between the physical aspect of the hammer and what it 
does, but if there is ultimately a material aspect that responds to and accounts for 
the functioning for the individual Dasein, where is it?  How do we see it?  There is 
no doubt that there is a connection between the body and Dasein, for Heidegger 
simply states, “How else could it be possible to grasp, to form, and to transform 
other animate or inanimate "material" things which are encountered?” [ZS 231]. The 
ontological structure of an entity and the body belong together, Heidegger is very 
clear about that.   
Decades later Heidegger acknowledged that in Being and Time, while Dasein 
cannot be understood as being the body (just as a chariot or a hammer cannot be 
understood as being the material from which they are made) the problem of the 
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relationship between Dasein and its body was just too hard to address[ZS]; but he 
never returned to address the problem.  In Being and Time Heidegger does describe 
how the ‘material body’ of equipment Dasein makes comes into being, and 
conceptually this may be useful in thinking through the Dasein-body problematic; 
however, this is outside the scope of the thesis. 
If the human person is not in the body how is it to be conceptualised for research 
purposes?  Of Dasein Heidegger simply says that the term refers to the “entity which 
each of us is” [BT 27/8] and what he means by this is somewhat opaque.  However, 
based on his work, I take it he means the human person understood as the unified 
phenomenon of everything that it experiences by way of understanding, emotions, 
and various motivations as reflected in the activities (involvements) that the person 
takes up, avoids or simply passes over in various ways; i.e. its receptivity and 
responsiveness to its living environment.   While this occurs through the body, that 
we have a sense that there is a bodily relationship and have a familiarity with the 
body is sufficient, as understanding the body problematic is not required to 
understand the ontological structure of Dasein.  Who Heidegger’s Dasein is, i.e. us, 
is simply conceptualised in terms of the character of our receptivity and response to 
our living environment.  This approach has interesting and very relevant 
implications. 
The way I read Heidegger is that this his is a naturalistic account. The basic structure 
of Dasein, the human person, understood as a living entity that is structurally 
integrated into its environment based on its modes of receptivity and response is 
the same basic structure applicable to any living organism in Nature.  This 
interpretation also helps to make sense of the earlier cited passage when Heidegger 
acknowledges the advances of science but says that it,  
 … lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's 
relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48]. 
Given Heidegger’s ontological position, i.e. as dynamic structures, then this refers 
to the human person not as an object in nature, but as a structural part of nature 
itself.  This is what science is missing.   
Another, related, implication is that Heidegger is claiming that this unified 
phenomenon of structures of receptivity and response refers to what the person is, 
and not characteristics possessed by the person; this is a critical point to understand 
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in Heidegger’s work.  To repeat, Dasein is its mode of receptivity and 
responsiveness to its environment.  There is no Dasein preformed ‘inside’, it is found 
in the structural relationships it has as part of its environment and is why Heidegger 
calls the ontological structure being-in-the-world.  Following the previous point,  
Yet another implication is how we ‘fix’ things.  If we take the hammer example, if the 
head comes loose from the shank it can no longer be used as a hammer, it is no 
longer suitable to offer the functionality of hammering, i.e. to be ready-to-hand.  
When we reattach the head to the shank, we are restoring the material aspect to a 
point where it can again offer the required functionality of being a hammer.  Through 
this repair process, what it is to be a hammer remains unchanged.  Extending this 
to the human person, if the body ‘breaks’, it may lose some of its appropriateness 
for the task of being the individual Dasein it is.  ‘Fixing’ the body restores the 
suitability of it to serve the structural requirements of being that Dasein.  Medical 
science thus does not ‘fix’ Dasein; it can’t, this is a relational structure, it fixes the 
material body in which those relation structures are manifest.  The consequences 
of this ‘division’ are typically not noticed in short-term acute incidents, however in 
chronic conditions, including age-related frailty, dementia and so on, understanding 
the distinction can be crucial. 
Investigating the structure of an entity such as Dasein when the body has been 
removed from the equation at first seemed alien, almost incomprehensible, 
reflecting the pull of the materialist understanding of the world.  However, there are 
other instances of this, for example in the domain of natural science this same 
dilemma arises concerning the research of gravity.  As Peirce notes all that is 
required in the study of gravity is to understand all the effects of gravity that have 
“practical bearing”30 (Peirce, 1955, k. 743)Put another way gravity can be 
understood by focusing on its relationships with other entities, we never need to 
bring gravity itself into view.  This is essentially this approach that Heidegger is 
taking concerning Dasein.  When understood in this light it starts to make sense, all 
that is required to understand what Dasein is, is to focus on the aspects that have 
‘practical bearing’, the way this is supported by the materiality of the body is a later 
problem to be solved (This approach is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9).   
                                            
30 I discuss the how coming across the work of Charles Saunders Peirce helped me to understand 
Heidegger’s approach in Appendix 3.  
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The Interrelatedness of Dasein and World 
So far, the structure of world has been discussed, and some key elements of the 
structure of Dasein have been identified.  In this section, the structural relationship 
between Dasein and world is described. 
The Complex Dynamic Character of the Network of Relationships 
The network diagram is conceptually analogous to the relational unity of world, but 
in a very simplified way, and once the concept of the world as a dynamic complex 
network has been grasped it is best to let it go.  
In a world, the character of the involvement relationships between a Dasein and the 
ready-to-hand in the world is both dynamic a multi-faceted.   Take, for example, a 
pair of handmade shoes. The shoes are something that a cobbler makes, a product 
for sale by the shoe store clerk, a present that someone may buy and something to 
wear for the end user; the same pair of shoes but appearing in the relational network 
of four different people in different ways, reflecting different relational involvements. 
This will be reflected in the domestic world of the cobbler which will have structurally 
different characteristics to that of the shoe store clerk notwithstanding they are both 
structures within the same larger public world.   
The same observation can be made for any useful entity (something ready-to-hand) 
moving through the world, for example, the leather used in the shoes will have a 
different set of relational structures when in the tannery, compared to the cobbler’s 
workshop.  In that, it is the structure in the world that gives something its meaning, 
the same ready-to-hand entity can have different meanings when viewed from the 
perspective of the involvements of different Dasein. The shoes in the cobbler’s 
workshop have a different meaning to the cobbler than the meaning of the shoes to 
the person who wears the shoes; these different meanings reflect the different life-
environments of the people. However, from the perspective of the public world, all 
these meanings (understood as structural), are necessarily in the world to provide 
the ontological structure of the shoes; this refers to the idea mentioned earlier that 
anything ready-to-hand emerges at the junction of relational connections.  (This has 
implications for any form of qualitative research inquiring into the meaning of 
something, understanding the critical meanings (structural) that sustains is, and so 
on. This is not pursued in the thesis.) 
There is no doubt that each person understands what shoes are, in the sense of 
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shoes are for wearing.  However, it is more complex than this as the shoes have 
different involvements with the different people. To understand the differences in 
more detail, we would need to understand such things as the structure of being a 
handmade object, being an item for sale, being a gift for someone, being a gift from 
someone, being a pair of special shoes, and so on.  All of these have their own 
relational structure which gives them the meaning of what they are in a specific 
public world; remembering that every relational structure is already present in the 
world.   
Each Dasein is determining (again, typically not consciously) which aspects of the 
structure are significant for them, and it is the identification of what is significant that 
emphasises one meaning over another, for that Dasein.  The deliberate 
identification of structural relationships in the world that gives something meaning is 
what Heidegger refers to as hermeneutics; i.e. it is a process by which a person 
seeks to reach an interpretation of something in terms of its structural meaning in 
the world, based on its observable ways of being.  This is reflected in Heidegger’s 
strange phrase that phenomenology means to “let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” [BT 58/34].  The 
implication of this is that free-floating interpretations imposed on a world, 
unsupported by reference to the underlying relational structure are rejected as an 
approach for ascertaining the meaning of things.  So, while Heidegger accepts that 
entities have meaning relative to a certain world, he is not a relativist in the sense 
of accepting that everyone has their own ‘truth’ when they articulate what things are; 
their understandings and opinions may be wrong.   
Every ready-to-hand entity has its own complex set of involvements with differing 
Dasein that gives a deep richness to the meaning of what an entity is within the 
context of world and mapping out all the relationships would be an impossibly 
complex task.  However, it should be evident that there must be a necessary and 
sufficient set of structural relationships within a world associated with any given 
entity to bring it into being and sustain it such that it does not pass out of being; this 
is evident in the example of the chariot.  Understanding this minimal set of 
relationships would vary depending on the entity, however exploring this is outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
When considered as unity, of all the complex relational structures with all the ready-
to-hand entities, this entire dynamic relational world is what Heidegger calls the 
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‘public world’, and it is already in place when Dasein is born into it.  Dasein’s 
structure (being-in-the-world) then take up its various understandings and ways of 
responding in its world (its life environment) that gives the Dasein the capacity to be 
a Dasein in its world; this is the basis by which Dasein is constituted as a Viking, 
Southerner etc. 
Dasein assigns itself  
Modern public worlds are too large and complex for any Dasein to have an 
understanding or even an awareness of the richness of meaning of all the ready-to-
hand entities in the world.  A Dasein is typically thrown into a part of the world, will 
gain a certain understanding of itself from that context and then gradually take up 
certain ways of being that reflects that self-understanding; as mentioned this is not 
initially a conscious process.  What are all the biological supported mechanisms by 
which this occurs? No one knows.  Heidegger simply accepts the phenomenon and 
sets about describing the structural basis by which it occurs from the perspective of 
the observable phenomena, i.e. Dasein gets involved with those things that have 
significance for its self-understanding, and the ‘process’ by which this happens 
Heidegger refers to as Dasein assigning itself.     
When Dasein involves itself with things, Heidegger describes this as occurring 
based on Dasein’s understanding of the for-the-sake-which the Dasein exists (lives).  
Put another way, Dasein’s actions understood as a unity, reflect what is most 
significant for expressing its self-understanding of who it is.  That Dasein will assign 
itself to things that have significance and then get involved with them, reflects three 
different relational processes (structures) that describe the basis Daseins’ actions.  
Put another way, if we did not have theses structural processes that supported our 
taking-up activities (involvement) relevant (significance) to who we are (our life) and 
to do this consistently (assigning), we would not be a person as we typically 
understand being a person.  Accordingly, Heidegger names all three as, among 
others, part of Dasein’s constitutive structure, i.e. they are ontological.   
Assignments Large and Small 
While the focus by Heidegger is on the main involvements, the structure applies to 
all our involvements large and small, both positive and negative.  For example, 
imagine a party at a friend’s place; one person may love the music and wants to turn 
it up, while another may dislike the music and wants to turn it down; these reflect 
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different assignments, with different significance resulting in differing possible 
involvements.  In other situations, there may be a preference for blue stone-washed 
jeans rather than corduroy slacks, pasta dishes over rice, and so on.  These are not 
material assignments in and of themselves, and perhaps not critical, however 
collectively they account for who we are.  If they start to drop away and are not 
replaced with other significant assignments, then slowly our life loses its structural 
richness, its defining meaningfulness as to who we are.  Not all things are minor in 
terms of significance.  Some capture an organise a whole complex of other 
significant involvements, for example being a Mum or a teacher.  As such, the 
‘importance’ of what is significant will vary; somethings are minor and are easily 
discarded, while others, define the essential aspects of our life; it is these defining 
aspects that are critical for us to maintain.  If, for example, we are to enter a nursing 
home and remain the same person, we need to understand what significant 
involvements are critical to defining who we are, and seek to maintain them, or risk 
out life losing meaning. 
Not all things having significance are positive, for example, a person afraid of dogs, 
spots one a long way down the street and moves to avoid it, while others barely, if 
at all, notice the dog even when it is a lot closer. The moving away reflects 
involvement as an active avoidance, indicating the way in which the dog is 
significant. 
Whether it be dogs or music, the structure thus picks out things in the world on the 
basis on which they are significant to us, positive or negative, and discloses the 
possible involvement available to us.  In this way, the structure discloses the world 
to us in terms of its significance to us, i.e. its structural-meaning to us.  As such two 
people may walk down a mall together and a completely different set of things will 
show up for them, both in terms of significance and meaning, and conversely a 
different set of things will pass by unnoticed.  The structure thus discloses some 
aspects of world to us while keeping other aspects, in a sense, hidden.  
Just because Dasein deliberately assigns itself to a certain set of involvements, e.g. 
being a nurse, doesn’t mean the right decision was made in terms of self-
understanding.  Having graduated as a Registered Nurse a Dasein may find that 
working as a nurse is not for them, and they may choose to either put up with it for 
the sake of other aspects of their life, e.g. being a parent, being a mortgage owner, 
etc. or they change their assignments to another set of involvements.  Alternatively, 
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the assignment may have been made on a wrong understanding of what being a 
nurse means, or Dasein’s self-understanding changed and being a nurse is no 
longer significant.  This changing in significance reflects a certain range of 
possibilities in which the dynamic nature of individual Dasein’s structure changes 
and adapts with respect to its life environment 
The unity of all the things to which Dasein has assigned itself Heidegger calls 
worldhood.   While we may have a ‘rough’ understanding of the wider public-world 
most of it will not be significant to us, and it is only to that part of the world to which 
Dasein assigns itself Heidegger calls Dasein’s ‘own’ or domestic environment [BT 
93/65], our living environment.  Worldhood is not only a structural aspect of Dasein 
but because of the resultant relational involvements, it also forms the ontological 
structure of world.  This needs some explaining.  
Dasein’s Worldhood and the Structure of World 
The individual adult Dasein will typically know-how to navigate around the world in 
general and will take up specific involvements in activities which have significance 
for its own existence.  As indicated, today it could be associated with being a 
carpenter, nurse, lawyer, sports coach, chess player, mother, and so on.  Each of 
these ‘roles’ reflects a separate set of activities (significant involvements) with 
entities in different parts of the public world.  It is the engagement in those activities 
(or cultural practices) by individual Daseins that sustain the ontological structure of 
those entities.  This was seen in the case of the chariot, where it slowly disappears 
as something meaningful as understood in ancient Rome.   
However, one person cannot sustain a structure on their own.  A hospital, for 
example, is the relational junction that links many people engaged in different but 
related significant involvements associated with what it is to be a hospital.  But, it is 
each individual person’s worldhood that is the structure that determines the 
significance of their involvement with the hospital.  It is thus the collective worldhood 
of all Dasein that is the basis for the dynamic ontological structure of world.  World 
as such is a dynamic relational network or system that emerges from the collective 
action of all the Daseins in the world.  At the ontological level, Dasein and world are 
structurally linked, at the ontic (individual entity level), Dasein takes up its self-
understanding from world, but then by its assignments, sustains the very world 
necessary to provide its existence.   
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The implication of this is that as things in the world ‘lose’ their significance for a 
growing number of Dasein and they assign themselves to new involvements, the 
world structures gradually changes and adapts. The even greater implication is that 
collectively, Dasein has the power to determine its world because ultimately world 
reflects the self-understanding of the collective Dasein.   
Worldhood and Structure of World Related but Not the Same 
Ontically Worldhood and the Structure of World are Related but not the Same 
Dasein’s worldhood is based on Dasein’s understanding of what it means to be 
something the ready-to-hand in the world, and what involvements it has to offer the 
Dasein.  Meaning belongs to world and understanding belongs to Dasein.  As was 
seen in the case of the nurse, this understanding of what something means could 
be wrong.  
As discussed earlier, the structure of world is the basis by which the ready-to-hand 
gets it meaning, i.e. meaning is in the world.  What the individual Daseins have is 
an understanding of what things mean; understanding and meaning are different.   
By and large the understanding Dasein has of the world is right, especially in those 
areas in which it has already assigned itself and is involved.  By way of example, a 
carpenter who has a wrong understanding of a hammer, exhibited in how it is used, 
would soon be put straight; this is part of the socialisation process.  This is true in 
almost every aspect of our life from driving a car, to ordering a meal at a restaurant, 
to how a surgeon learns their craft.  By and large, if our know-how was materially 
out of kilter with how the world ‘works’ we get feedback, there is as such a self-
correcting mechanism in the world, that aligns our understanding (i.e. our 
understanding of know-how, i.e. the capacity to be involved).  This is not 
unexpected; if the human Dasein could not gain and maintain an understanding of 
‘what works’ it would not have survived as a species.   
Different Modes of Understanding: Know-How and Know-What 
However, if the carpenter walked into an electrical engineering workshop the level 
of understanding of what things mean, may be minimal with few of the entities 
(pieces of equipment) showing up as usable, a prerequisite for an involvement.   It 
is also very possible that there may even be wrong understandings where the 
carpenter believes equipment x does one thing when in fact it does something 
completely different.   
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Roughly speaking we have several different elements at play; the structural working 
of the world and its meaning structure, Dasein’s know-how understanding of how 
the world works (practical involvements) and Dasein’s theoretical understanding 
providing an account of the working of the world.  In that know-how is a practical 
understanding based on active involvement in the world this is the aspect that is of 
prime importance and which feedback mechanisms guide. By way of extreme 
example, if eating a red berry from a certain bush results in illness or death, then 
others don’t repeat the mistake; we don’t need any theoretical explanation, albeit 
one can be fabricated.  
Priority of Know-How over Know-What in Constitution World and Dasein. 
Heidegger points out that there are differences in the way we understand things, 
this is reflected in the above discussion.  We can have an understanding that simply 
indicates we know-what something is, i.e. a basic theoretical understanding what 
something is and how it works.  We also have a know-how understanding, i.e. be 
able to use something and put it use.  Know-how is essential if we are to be involved, 
however, know-what does not necessarily lead to know-how.   Crucially, without 
know-how, there are no involvements and hence no world, and there is no Dasein, 
i.e. no human person as we understand it.  There is a clear priority in Heidegger’s 
work for know-how over know-what, and this even applies to universities and his 
own profession of philosophy. Heidegger was highly critical of philosophy courses 
that focussed on discussing and debating the ideas of earlier philosophers as the 
primary content (i.e. know-what) over the teaching of doing philosophy (know-
how)31.  
We can thus have a know-how understanding of what works and yet our theoretical 
understanding expressed as an explanation of why it works is wrong.  For example, 
the Ptolemaic explanation of the workings of an earth-centric universe was wrong, 
and yet the mathematical tools to describe and predict the movement of the stars 
and planets as observed from earth were remarkably accurate.   This was reflected 
in the know-how of preparing calendars, predictions of movements of ‘heavenly’ 
bodies and navigation, all of which worked sufficiently well pragmatically.  In other 
words, there was a discrepancy between the know-how of doing things that worked 
                                            
31 For example, in his course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (BCAP) presented in 1926, the same year 
he finalises Being and Time, where he comments that the view held of philosophy as something universally 
edifying and of general cultural value rather that a discipline that is difficult and rigorous is “truly appalling” [p. 2] 
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and a theoretical understanding that was wrong.  This is not uncommon.  By and 
large, in the sciences we strive for explanations (know-what understanding), and 
typically express this as a hypothesis and use evidence derived from the hypothesis 
predicting what-works to validate our theoretical accounts of the explanation.  This 
is a well-known formal logical fallacy called affirming the consequent32. and even 
though, for example, scientific methods try to overcome it, it is not that easy.  This 
is a fundamental aspect of Kuhn’s theory of paradigms accounting for why scientists 
tend to reify the objects of their theories.  They become convinced that the theories 
are describing the world as it is based on correlations between theoretical prediction 
and evidence from what-works.  As Kuhn points out this reification often occurs 
among many of the scientists, and I would add practitioners, working in a field.  A 
more recent example of the collective know-what of understanding being wrong, and 
yet having a practical understanding of what works concerns diseases.   
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, some diseases were thought to be 
spread by bad air, a theory called miasma, and practices were developed, based on 
this understanding of how to deal with miasma.  The understanding persisted 
because there was both a certain level of efficacy in the practices, i.e. a logical 
coherence, and the understanding of this was passed on by the inculturation 
process of the health discipline(Halliday, 2001; Vandenbroucke, Rooda, & Beukers, 
1991).  Miasma as such did not exist but that there was sufficient coherence 
between know-how (involvements) and wrong know-what (theory) for the belief in 
its existence to be sustained.  While Miasma was a plausible theory, the problem 
was that the idea became reified, i.e. to a belief that it was an entity in the world and 
this lead to significant difficulty in changing practices associated with this 
understanding.  When it was proposed that cholera was spread by contaminated 
water, for example, the idea was initially rejected by many influential people, 
including Florence Nightingale, as they believed in the existence of miasma.  
Consequently, there was slow acceptance of the transmission of cholera by 
                                            
32 In science when an experiment based on a theory produces results predicted by the theory, the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent, refers to the belief that the results (i.e. the consequent) affirms the ‘truth’ of the theory.  
The fallacy also applies to disciplines such as medicine where actions taken are often based on an 
understanding of what it is that is being treated. Often the ‘what is being treated’ is not held as something 
theoretical and possibly wrongly, but is reified as something definite, this then becomes a barrier to new 
practices based on significantly different understandings of ‘what is being dealt with’.  Miasma is one example, 
the more recent challenges in changing the practice in the treatment of peptic ulcers (discussed in Chapter 16) 
is another and the current ongoing debate over the nature of depression and even more pressing example 
(discussed in Chapters 18 and 20.) 
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contaminated water, and practices to address polluted water were initially impeded, 
as wrong thinking (Halliday, 2001).  Another more recent example concerns the 
difficulty in changing practice associated with peptic ulcers after the discovery of the 
bacterium Helicobacter pylori as a primary cause of ulcers (Discussed in Chapter 
16) and the debates over the nature of depression (Discussed in Chapter 20.).  
These three cases all involve a reification of a theoretical object.  One of the 
arguments in this thesis is that the concepts of what it is to be a human had been 
reified (i.e. the materialist account) and this is standing in the way of change in our 
design and running of nursing homes.  If this is the case, then a wrong theoretical 
understanding is standing in the way of changes in practice that may result in better 
outcomes for people.   In all these cases it is the worldhood of the person imposed 
upon the world that is that is the source of the reification.  
As can be seen, the relationship between Dasein’s understanding and worldhood 
and the structure of world and meaning is complex and made more so by the 
different modes of understanding Dasein has.  Regardless of whether a ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ understanding of what something is, when the understanding takes hold, 
this is the basis by which something shows up; it is what is ‘seen’.  This phenomenon 
is associated with the structure of understanding as projection which is address 
next.    
Understanding as Projection 
Once we have assigned ourselves to certain involvements based on their 
significance to us, how do we know when there is a possibility to be involved?  
Heidegger’s account is that the structure of understanding projects out onto the 
entities in the world which in turn show up for us in terms of possibilities to be 
involved.   If we recall the example of the person afraid of dogs, this is an example 
of our understanding projecting out into the world and showing up ‘a dog’, but a dog 
(understanding of what something is) about which we are afraid (significance) and 
which we must avoid (nature of involvement). 
In that we have taken up an understanding of our self (assigned) that is reflected in 
the things that are important for us (significance) to be involved with (involvements) 
these involvements will typically be in our living environment.  But as discussed, this 
living environment is one perspective of the rich structures that abound in the public 
world.   From all the possible involvements that are in the public world what is the 
basis by which those relevant to us are identified and show up for us; recall the 
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example of walking down the mall, some things show up as offering possible 
involvements, most things we pass over.  We don’t have to look at everything single 
thing in the world around us from multiple perspectives and sort through those which 
are significant for us from the majority which are irrelevant.  So, what is happening 
in this phenomenon? 
Heidegger’s account is that our structure of understanding projects out onto the 
world and from this possibilities for involvements show up for us.  Projection needs 
to be heard more as the overlaying of a blueprint for Dasein’s possible involvements 
on the world, not the projecting of some image on a blank canvass.   That blueprint 
is our worldhood (the structure of our understanding of the world based on 
significant involvements) and the projecting or casting out acts to highlight for our 
attention those things that are significant for us, while others remain in the dimness 
of the background.  Put another way this is an account of the process that is the 
basis of our selective attention, except we do not do it, the process belongs to our 
structure.   
The basis for projecting onto possibilities is thus a combination of an understanding 
of self, and an understanding of things in the world that are significant to that self-
understanding.   If, however, those possibilities necessary for Dasein’s continued 
existence are not present in the world then there is nothing for the projection to 
highlight, indicating that there is nothing of significance in the world for Dasein.  
There is then a disjunct between Dasein’s worldhood and world, and the flow of 
significant involvements that are the lived experience of Dasein’s life is disrupted; 
Dasein’s life has lost meaningfulness, understood both structurally and as 
experienced.  This may occur with a sudden and significant change in a person’s 
life-environment, such as being placed in an immigration detention centre for an 
indeterminate time, or a move into a nursing home.  In other cases, it is unlikely that 
all the possibilities significant for a Dasein will suddenly be removed from an 
environment, there may be a gradual demise.  This concept of a structural disjunct 
between Dasein’s worldhood and world is the basis of shedding-life. 
Summary 
What has been outlined is that Dasein’s dynamic structure is thrown into a world, 
and it then develops an understanding of itself in the context of its understanding of 
that world.  That aspect of the world that Dasein both understands and takes up 
(assigns) as an expression of its self-understanding Heidegger calls worldhood.  
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Based on worldhood, Dasein’s understanding structure projects into the world to 
disclose for Dasein those possible involvements with entities that are significant for 
its existence as the Dasein it understands itself to be.  Dasein’s meaningful 
existence thus takes place inside the relational structure of its life-environment, 
which is disclosed by the projection of its worldhood.  Late in Being and Time 
Heidegger sums this up in a brief passage as follows: 
In existing, [Dasein] has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over 
to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is-namely, for the sake of itself. In so 
far as Dasein exists … it understands itself in the way its "for-the-sake-of-itself" is thus 
connected with some current "in-order-to". That inside which existing Dasein understands 
itself, is 'there' along with its … existence. That inside which one primarily understands 
oneself has Dasein's kind of being. Dasein is its world existingly. [BT 416/364] 
The Heideggerian terminology in the passage has been described earlier in more 
accessible terms. The concept of being is tied to the ontological structure, and the 
concept of coming into being of the individual entity is tied to the notion of ‘something 
thrown’ and ‘delivered over to entities’.    
The major point of departure between Heidegger’s account and traditional 
philosophy and science is not that we have a material body or that hammers, 
chariots and houses are constructed from material things, Heidegger accepts all 
this.  The difference is that Heidegger argues that the material aspect of these 
entities arises as a response to the dynamic character of a network of 
interdependent and interconnected relationships.  As such entities are not self-
sufficient, independent things understood based on the material form.  
Heidegger is providing a naturalistic account of Dasein and its world.  On the 
phenomenological description that he provides, an individual Dasein comes into 
being structurally linked to its life-environment, notwithstanding a certain leeway in 
which Dasein’s self-understanding changes over time, with some assignments 
dropping off and new ones taken-up; this simply reflects the dynamic nature of the 
structures.  At all times, however, once the self-understanding has been taken up 
the Dasein requires its world.  This is the ‘wherein’ the possibilities for significant 
ongoing involvements show up based on the projection of its worldhood.  However, 
what if Dasein finds itself in an alien environment, one devoid of the possibility of 
meaningful involvements?  In this case, the understanding protection fails to 
disclose the significance of the world; this is the basis for disruption of the life-
environment which is discussed below. 
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Support for Heidegger’s Work  
There are three separate streams of scholarly work that can be interpreted as 
supporting the approach taken by Heidegger; they are research findings confirming 
the phenomena he draws upon, other philosophical attempts to overturn the 
materialist account of being, and the relatively new field of complexity and chaos 
theory.  The latter is the most compelling, so I will only briefly touch on the first two 
and then introduce complexity theory in a way that the connections can be seen. 
The existence of research findings supporting the observed phenomenon that 
Heidegger draws upon is not unexpected and I have already referred to some of 
these, e.g. in relation culture and emotions.  This merely confirms the view that 
Heidegger is using empirical observations as his starting point.  Numerous instances 
of this type of confirmation are presented in the thesis and so I am not going to dwell 
on this point.  That Heidegger’s work is demonstrably empirically based, supports 
the claim that his account of Dasein’s ontological structure is a naturalistic one.  The 
basic structure Heidegger describes is one of receptivity and responsiveness to the 
environment, the same basic structure that is accepted as applying to all living 
organisms and is one of the key concepts of evolutionary theory.  
Philosophically Heidegger’s work did not appear in a vacuum, and other attempts to 
overthrow the strict materialist account of what things are can be found in the work 
of Georg Hegel (1770-1831) and Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854). Heidegger was 
very familiar with the works of these German philosophers presenting lecture 
courses on the work of both these philosophers [HPS, STHF].  In Heidegger’s era 
there was also the work of the philosophers known as the British emergentists 
(Clayton, 2006; O'Connor & Wong, 2015) and most notably the process philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead(Whitehead, 1978).  The common thread running through 
the work of all these philosophers was that the entities we see emerge (are 
accounted for) based on some underlying structure that we don’t see.  Apart from 
Heidegger, these various philosophers put forward various theoretical accounts to 
support their view.  There are two aspects that mark out Heidegger’s work.  Firstly, 
that he is the only one that grounds his work in a strict empiricist methodology, 
relying on a descriptive approach combined with logical analysis, eschewing 
theoretical suppositions.  Secondly, and more importantly, he abandoned the 
connection between the individual entity itself and a self-contained ontological 
structure. Exploring, these other philosophical accounts is not very productive in 
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understanding Heidegger, and so I do not go down this path in the thesis. 
The final, and perhaps, major source of support for Heidegger’s account comes from 
an unexpected source, the relatively new discipline associated with complexity, 
emergence and chaos theory.  It was reading accounts of complexity and 
emergence that assisted in bringing what Heidegger was describing into some 
cohesive and intelligible order.  This did not happen until the very end stages of the 
thesis when I had a sufficient grasp of Heidegger’s work to start to see the 
similarities.  The discussion of Heidegger’s work within the context of emergence 
and complex systems framework is presented in Chapter 19, albeit the discussions 
are still only in its early stages33.  The concepts of complexity and emergence have 
been used primarily as an interpretive device and a detailed investigation of the field 
and subsequent reading back into Heidegger's work is for a later project.  The 
following few paragraphs are just to indicate some aspects of this new scientific field 
that opened the interpretive approach I have taken.   
The terms complexity and chaos are both used to describe the field and both refer 
to the idea of the apparent randomness or chaotic behaviour of dynamic complex 
systems. The information is accessible from any number of the introductory 
accounts in the field and I have drawn the following from a cursory reading of only 
a few (Gleick, 1990, 1996; Hall, 1992; Holland, 1995; Mitchell, 2011; Smith, 2007; 
Strogatz, 2004).  The field is diverse and I am not going to attempt to discuss it in 
any detail.  The approach I take is to provide a very simplified account of key 
concepts and then point out how they appear to be reflective of what Heidegger is 
describing in Being and Time.  
The main view in science has been that the universe is deterministic, conforming to 
fixed laws of nature, with the principal aim of science being to ‘discover’ those laws.  
In science this is understood in terms of some antecedent event or state that 
together with the applicable law of nature will result in a predictable outcome.  In 
other words, there is a cause and then an effect that can be determined because of 
the regularity of nature’s laws.  Inherent in this view is the concept of the ‘clockwork’ 
universe and the outstanding exponent of this approach is Isaac Newton and his 
discovery of the laws of motion and gravitation with which he was able to very 
                                            
33 This Chapter was written after the completion of Chapter 19.  In the intervening period my thinking, while 
consistent, has progressed.  This chapter reflects, a little of this development in thinking.  
  
112 
accurately describe and predict the motion of the planets.  The laws of nature are 
presented using mathematical formula, typically differential equations, which 
described the relationship between entities such as to derive a rate of change of 
some attribute of the entities, e.g. motion, rate of heat exchange and so on.   The 
belief was that all natural systems behave in a constant manner and if there was a 
difficulty in determining the law (as a mathematical description) it was as a result of 
the limitations of accessing and measuring the components parts, the availability of 
mathematical techniques and so on.  This view has been shattered by the discovery 
of chaos. 
The concept of chaos refers to the phenomena of some dynamic systems, which 
although comprising determinant parts, reaches a point of complex interactions such 
that that the behaviour of the system is no longer predictable. i.e. it appears chaotic.  
This unpredictability is not related to the difficulty of developing the mathematical 
equations, but rather it relates to the very behaviour of the system itself.  On this 
account, there is the emergence of apparent chaotic, or random, behaviour 
emerging from a deterministic system without an external cause fo the random 
behaviour.   
In modern science, the phenomenon was first described by the French polymath 
Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) when attempting to develop the mathematical functions 
to describe the motion of three bodies in space moving in relation to each other.  
Poincaré failed in his attempts and it was only later that it was recognised that he 
had stumbled on the problem of chaos.  The phenomenon of chaotic behaviour in 
complex systems was first identified and described in contemporary times by 
Edward Lorenz (1917-2008) in the late 1960s when he was researching weather 
prediction methodologies.   
While the behaviour of complex systems appears chaotic and the detailed behaviour 
of such systems cannot be predicted subsequent research has discovered order 
hidden in the chaos, and it is here that the similarities with Heidegger’s descriptions 
of world are, at least superficially, evident.  This hidden order includes such things 
as self-organization, feedback mechanisms, fractal structures and strange 
attractors.  Example of complex dynamic systems exhibiting chaotic behaviour and 
yet containing ordering principles have been found in almost every field of science 
including meteorology, computer science, mathematics, biology, ecology, physics, 
chemistry, art, etc.   
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What is clear is that self-organizing complex systems that exhibit chaotic behaviour 
are ubiquitous in nature.  Based on this, if it is accepted that humans are a species 
that have emerged as part of the dynamics of nature itself is it not conceivable then 
that their behaviour reflects at least some of the characteristics of self-organising 
complex systems found elsewhere in nature?   It was this line of thinking that arose 
out of the fusion of engaging with Heidegger’s work and complexity.  Interestingly 
the interactions between Dasein within a world has similar characteristics to what 
would be expected of a complex chaotic systems, I will touch on these below.  
Heidegger explicitly regarded what he was describing as a system of relations, not 
in a deterministic sense, but rather as something that would “resist any sort of 
mathematical functionalization”[BT 122/88] because of its dynamic character.  In 
that Heidegger was a competent mathematician, I suspect he understood the 
unpredictable nature of the system he was describing.  In that Heidegger’s method 
is one of strict empirical description at the ‘systems’ level rather than at the individual 
agent level, then his approach must result in a descriptions of the various features 
of complex systems, even if he was unable to recognise what it was he was 
describing; recall the case of the woolly mammoth. I want to touch on several of the 
key similarities between Heidegger's account and complex systems. 
Self-organisation refers to the phenomena whereby order arises from the interaction 
between individual entities without the need of an external influence.  This is 
sometimes referred to as bottom-up self-organisation as opposed to top-down 
ordering. Self-organization has been observed in animal swarming, biological neural 
networks, geology, etc.   The variety of ways in which human societies exhibit this 
self-organization is self-evident.  
Fractals are a structural phenomenon that have now been identified in many areas 
of nature. This phenomenon is found in geology (e.g. rock formations, river systems, 
mountain range structures), biology (e.g. lichen formation, the structure of 
Romanesco broccoli, structure of circulatory systems, etc.), mathematics (e.g. 
Mandelbrot sets) and so on.  A fractal structure occurs when the structure of a larger 
entity can be repeatedly split into parts, where each part has a structure that is 
similar to the whole.  This reflects Heidegger’s description of world, where the very 
same structure is present in the larger public world, a workshop or a study.   The 
structure of each of these entities emerges from the character of the relations 
between the entities.  A glimpse of this is evident in the discussions on the relational 
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network of world and Image 1. 
Emergence is the name given to phenomena whereby a property emerges from the 
dynamics of a system whereby that property cannot be attributed to, or predicted 
from the properties of any component part of the system. Common examples are of 
life emerging from complex, non-living entities, conscious awareness emerging from 
neural networks, hurricanes emerging out of certain weather pattern, ant colonies, 
and common salt34.  From Heidegger's work the ready-to-hand are emergent 
entities that arise from dynamic functioning of the world system.  On my reading, the 
individual Dasein is also an emergent entity that arises out of the interplay between 
the biological structures of the nascent Dasein and its world.  The bi-directional 
nature of the feedback systems between Dasein and its world are evident from the 
earlier descriptions. These feedback systems order Dasein within the context of its 
world and then order the world on the basis fo the collective actions of Dasein. 
Within complex systems it has been observed that certain patterns emerge based 
on what has been termed strange attractors.  The name derives from the fact that, 
at least at the moment, no-one knows what they are.  The term strange attractors is 
given to this mysterious phenomenon that appears to ‘attract’ the entities moving in 
a chaotic system to form complex patterns (structures) discernible, but still not 
predictable, within the chaotic behaviour.  The phenomenon is the least understood 
phenomenon associated with complex systems.  While the leap is, at this stage, a 
large one, I suspect that ultimately Heidegger’s concept of being as it applies to the 
ordering of human cultures, relates to this concept of strange attractors, i.e. it is an 
organising principle that is ultimately responsible for how the structure of a human 
society self-orders.  For example, when Christendom emerged, the concept of being 
was as of things produced or made, with God as paradigm creator or maker.  From 
this then flows the various actions that structure the human society in a particular 
way, different to the preceding way of the Romans or Greeks.  In other words there 
are the same basic relational (structural) components, but they get ‘attracted’ into a 
different configuration by the being of the culture (i.e. the strange attractor).   The 
West has long since drifted from the attractor of the creator God, the question is 
what is it that is influencing (strange attractor) the current structure of Western 
                                            
34 Common table salt (NaCl) is produced from the chemical bonding of a sodium (Na), metal that explodes on 
contact with water, and chlorine (Cl), a poisonous gas.  The properties of the compound (table salt) are not 
predictable based on the properties of the components.  
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societies?  It is not possible to address this question in this thesis, but the idea is 
enticing. (I touch on the topic a little more in chapters 11 and 14).  The idea of being 
as an attractor should not be confined to the level of human societies, this just 
happened to be Heidegger’s area of interest.  If the concept has merit, then it also 
relevant at ‘lower’ levels within a world.  In that being is a one way of describing a 
mutual held understanding in a group such that it ‘silently’ filters judgement and 
directs actions, then the materialist account fo the human person is possibly another 
example.  The ordering of the activities within the health sciences on the basis of 
this understanding of being is no more evident than in the construction and running 
of nursing homes.   This line of thinking about being is a radical interpretation of 
Heidegger's work and I do not pursue it further in the thesis.  However, it should be 
able to be investigated from a research perspective through paradigm cases such 
as the nursing home; again this is a post-doctoral project. 
A final concept I want to raise is the concept of downward causality, specifically 
within biological systems.  This concept refers to the phenomenon whereby an entity 
that emerges from a complex system can act causally on the very system from which 
it emerges(Campbell, 1974; Davies, 2006b; Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006).  
The relevance to Heidegger’s work is clear enough, the individual DAein emerges 
from a certain world, but later its actions can shape that world; a ready-to-hand entity 
can also emerge from with the world, and in turn, the relationships with the entity 
reshape the world.   
While the labelling of these ideas under the heading of complexity theory is relatively 
new as is the formal discovery of such things as chaos and strange attractors, the 
concept of emergence is not, and this has a long history within philosophy, a point I 
mentioned above.  A brief account of this history is provided in a book co-edited by 
the physicist Paul Davies, The Re-Emergence of Emergence (Clayton & Davies, 
2006).  In its strong version, the emergentist account of new phenomena is rejecting 
a materialist ontology and claiming that it is the interaction dynamics of the system 
itself that is giving rise to the new phenomena (entities) (Clayton, 2006; Davies, 
2006a). As Davies indicates, the numbers of scientists adopting complexity theory 
and emergence as a plausible account of reality are still relatively small but 
growing(Davies, 2006a), suggesting that there may be a Kuhnian revolution 




Heidegger did not have access to the ideas recently developed in relation to chaos, 
fractals,strange attractors and so on, for when he was writing Being and Time the 
concepts of complexity theory had not be developed, and would not be for another 
fifty years.   On my reading, what Heidegger is struggling to do is describe Dasein 
and its world as a naturally occurring, dynamic, complex and self-organising system 
moving through time, whereby the unity of the system (public world), is 
characterised by interacting and interdependent aspects (worlds within worlds, 
down to the level of workshops and studies) similarly structured to the larger unity.  
The driving agent in all of this is Dasein, and it is from the interactions of Dasein as 
a collective, based on its structure of receptivity and responsiveness, that emerges 
the structure of world.  It is into this ‘worlding world’ travelling through time, that an 
individual Dasein is thrown,  becomes part of, for a while, then leaves.  The ‘worlding 
world’ moves through time, morphing from one form to another sustained by the 
relational invovlements of succeeding generations; first hundreds, then thousands 
and now millions of Daseins, each of whom only appear for a brief moment, each 
generatation contributing to the increasing complexity of the large public world   
From a philosophical background, and struggling to find the language to describe 
what he was seeing that was untainted by old understandings, it is no wonder that 
Heidegger first used his ‘invented’ language evident in Being and Time, and later 
shifted to using a more poetic language, abandoning the constraints of metaphysics. 
To the best of my knowledge, the naturalistic reading I am applying to Heidegger 
with a relational systems approach is outside the mainstream of Heideggerian 
interpretations.  I am not making any definitive claims about the specifics of what is 
being discovered in the sciences of complexity, chaos and emergence and 
Heidegger's work.   My main aim in presenting the above is to outline the ‘inspiration’ 
of my current interpretive account of Heidegger.  Additionally, it is offered as a 
tentative, but plausible interpretive theory, given that Heidegger’s empirical and 
naturalistic stance of inquiring into the Dasein's structure, understood as a part of 
nature. The very same approach of the new generation of scientists inquiring into 
the structures of chaos, complexity and emergence as a broader natural 
phenomena.  There is, however, a lot more work to be done. 
Life-Environment Disruption 
My theory of life-environment disruption virtually falls out of an understanding of the 
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dynamic structure of Dasein.  In that we are concerned about the life of the individual 
Dasein (i.e. at the ontic level), that life has meaning as reflected in the significant 
involvements to which Dasein has assigned itself.  The possibility of accessing those 
involvements are only available in a life-environment appropriate to the Dasein.  If 
Dasein is separated from an appropriate life-environment, then there is the 
possibility of anxiety/depression (discussed in Chapter 18) and even the death of 
Dasein (Chapter 21).  Heidegger discusses both these phenomena and in so doing 
the crucial relationship between Dasein and its world are highlighted. 
Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of depression/anxiety to demonstrate the 
relationship between Dasein and world by way of a breakdown case.  By doing this, 
the critical necessity of having the possibility of significant involvements show-up in 
one’s life-environment is illustrated.  This is summarised by Heidegger when he says 
that in the experience of depression/anxiety “the totality of involvements of the 
ready-to-hand … discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it 
collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking 
meaningfulness” [BT 231/186] (my underlining).  The word “discovered” indicates 
the initial understanding of the meaning of the entities in terms of their involvements.  
In anxiety/depression, these involvements have no consequence, i.e. devoid of 
significance, to Dasein.  The world itself is still intelligible, however, the structure 
between Dasein and world has broken down, it no longer holds meaningfulness for 
Dasein.  There is no basis for Dasein to be involved, a phenomenon characteristic 
of depression.  Heidegger does not explore the phenomenon of anxiety/depression 
in detail, he simply uses it to illustrate the existence of Dasein’s structure. 
The second phenomenon that highlights the structural relationship between Dasein 
and world is death.  Not unsurprisingly Heidegger rules out death as referring to the 
biological aspect of Dasein, he refers to this as perishing, and as such Dasein “never 
perishes” [BT 291/247].   That which occurs to Dasein at the time of the body 
perishing Heidegger calls demise, indicating there are two related phenomenon that 
must be held distinct; the biological aspect of the perishing of the body which is 
attended to from a medical perspective and there is the ‘demising’ of Dasein.   It is, 
therefore, possible for a person to be sick and indeed ‘dying’ from a biological 
perspective but not demising as a Dasein, but then when the body ceases 
functioning there is also the demise of Dasein; the end comes abruptly so to speak.  
This interpretation only makes sense if we understand Dasein as an entity that is in 
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some way distinct from the biology of the body.  On my interpretation, this Dasein is 
a relational entity and as such, providing the underpinning organic aspects that 
facilitate the structural processes are intact, other aspects of the body may be in 
decline, but Dasein itself continues.  This points to a need for a radical change in 
understanding and the care that is on offer for those terminally ill, or those facing 
demise in a nursing home.   The challenge is to support the ongoing existence of 
Dasein in the face of perishing 
There is another twist in Heidegger’s analysis and is highlighted by his observation 
that while demise as an event is “empirically certain” this is not “decisive as to the 
certainty of death” [BT 301/257].  He is not denying that the death of Dasein as 
something that accompanies perishing and demise, but that there is another aspect 
to the phenomenon of death, and this is the one of prime interest.  There are several 
indications as to the character of death but they all point to it as a possibility of the 
impossibility of being Dasein [BT 241/250]. While this has its grounding in the 
structure of Dasein, it is a phenomenon concerning the individual Dasein (what 
Heidegger terms an existentiell possibility [BT 311/266].  For the individual Dasein, 
that is structurally bound to a life-environment (world), death occurs when, firstly, 
there are no more possibilities for involvements, and secondly, there will never be 
such possibilities again.  Heidegger frequently refers to Dasein’s world as the 
wherein or as the ‘there’, which is the relational concept described above, and as 
such we can understand death as the possibility of Dasein “no-longer-being-able-
to-be-there.” [BT 241/251] or as the “the possibility which is non-relational.” [BT 
354/307]   
It is then possible to experience death without demise.  If the world of a Dasein 
collapses completely with respect to all necessary meaningful aspects, then with 
that collapse goes the relational structure that constituted the individual Dasein.  
There is no more world upon which its understanding projection can occur, and with 
this, no more ‘there’, the wherein the Dasein can be the Dasein it understands itself 
to be. There is no more possibility of possibilities for involvement with things that 
give Dasein its meaning.  When Dasein ceases to be the individual Dasein it is, it 
has, essentially, died.  Is this really a possibility?  In Chapter 21 the case of world 
collapse of the Crow Indian is discussed, a situation that arose when the Crow lost 
the battle against the invading Europeans, exiled from their lands and confined to a 
reservation.  Denied access to the Great Plains and the vast buffalo herds they were 
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cut off from the defining practices (involvements) that constituted them as Crow.  In 
recounting the story of the Crow up until this point of their history the last Crow chief, 
Plenty Coup, refused to talk about what followed;  
… when the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not 
lift them up again.  After this nothing happened. (Lear, 2006, p. 2) 
“Nothing happened”, if we hear this literally, as I think we should, we have the end 
of the Crow world, there was no longer a place, a ‘there’ in which it was possible for 
things to happen as a Crow people.   
The account of Marion Miller is not a collapse of world of entire people, but it is an 
account of the collapse of world for her. Even though frail, while she was at home 
she had the possibility of meaningful involvements, all this went when she entered 
the nursing home. As Marion summed up, “You just shed life, you do. … though 
there are worse places, when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place, 
No good place” (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7). 
The question that arises from Marion's situation is whether there is a plausible link 
between feeling that one is experiencing shedding life and actual illness.  Many 
aspects of Dasein’s structure appears to relate to what we would term mind or 
consciousness.  That science does not yet know the character of the relationship 
between our conscious awareness, brain functioning, and other bodily processes is 
no reason to discount there is such a relationship and that there is downward 
causality.   The disease model of illness is still evident in medicine and 
accompanying this is the denial that something experienced can have a causal 
attribution to illness (Hyman, 1994).   This view is reflected in the rejection of psycho-
somatic medicine, i.e. the view that physical illness can have its origins in the 
psychological aspects of a person (Fava, Belaise, & Sonino, 2010).  From a complex 
systems perspective this relationship between Dasein and the body can be 
accounted for by the concept of downwards causality.  Additionally, there is now a 
growing acceptance that stress, for example, is both related to our awareness of 
what is happening in the world (how things show up) and to a raft of adverse 
morbidities and even mortality35 (This is discussed in Chapter 19 and 20).  Similarly, 
there is a view held within social psychiatry that depression should not be 
understood as a disease but as something that arises out of the interactions 
                                            
35 A detailed account of the relationship between stress and illness is provided by Robert Sapolsky in his book 
Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers (Sapolsky, 2004). 
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between the person and their social environment (Discussed in Chapter 20).  In the 
field of early childhood development, research findings support the view that a 
young child’s experienced of an adverse social environment has a permanent 
impact on the development of the child’s brain, with lifelong consequences for child’s 
life (Chapter 20).  This suggests that not only is the material aspect of the body 
involved in the structural dynamics from which Dasein emerges, but that functioning 
of these processes, which we experience as Dasein, has a downward causality on 
the material aspects of associated with the structure.  This can manifest as stress 
and depression, both of which have been linked to a range of morbidities and 
mortalities.   
The concept of shedding life is discussed in more detail in Chapter 21 but the sense 
of the relationship between shedding life and one’s life-environment is evident in 
these examples, and it is grounded in the ontological structure of Dasein.   
Despite Heidegger’s difficult language, given that I read Heidegger’s work within the 
broad camp of emergence and complexity theory, there is strong conceptual support 
for the descriptive account of the emergent character of Dasein, its world and the 
useful things Dasein develops and employs.   This is the basis for the Theory of Life-
Environment Disruption and the associated phenomenon of shedding life, and it 
satisfies the criteria for the theory set out in Chapter 1 in that it has the following 
elements; 
• takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,
• that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way,
such that,
• a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a
disruption to the self; and finally
• posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the
life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both
psychologically and somatically.




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the methodology I have adopted for this thesis project, 
which I have termed a Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry. It is a methodology that 
evolved out of my engagement with Heidegger’s work and after considering the 
nature of methodologies and methods in research. I first address the relationship 
between ontology, methodology, and methods and then apply this to Heidegger’s 
concept of phenomenology. Following this, I discuss my meaning of a Discursive 
Inquiry and how this then developed as a Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry by 
incorporating Heidegger’s formal structure of inquiry. 
The Relationship of Ontology, Methodology, and Methods 
Getting a precise handle on what is meant by a research methodology is not easy. 
There is a view that there is no consensus as to a definition (Sarantakos, 1998; 
Somekh & Lewin, 2005) and it is variously referred to as; simply the choices made 
covering the differing aspects of the research from planning, to methods of data 
collection and analysis, what cases to focus and so on (Silverman, 2005; Somekh 
& Lewin, 2005), as a system of principles, theories and values that underpin an 
approach to research (Somekh & Lewin, 2005), as the science or theory of methods 
(Sarantakos, 1998), a research model (Blaikie, 2000; Sarantakos, 1998) and as the 
principles of research entailed in a paradigm (Sarantakos, 1998). Typically, there is 
an accepted view that methods refer to the specific instruments used in data 
collection, the specific way data is categorised and analysed and so on (Blaikie, 
2000; Sarantakos, 1998; Silverman, 2005; Somekh & Lewin, 2005), i.e. the various 
tools and procedures actually used in research. Putting aside the understanding of 
methodology as simply a collection of methods, which seems unhelpful, the other 
approaches all indicate that in some way the determination of the methodology will 
influence the choice of methods.  
A research project has the same basic structure as any project and as such a 
practical example outside of research helps to clarify the relationship between 
methodologies and methods. If I am to build a house, I must decide on the basic 
approach I am going to take, e.g. rammed earth, timber or steel frame construction, 
concrete tilt slab, solid brick, brick veneer, etc. These basic approaches are the 
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various methodologies for house building, and the choice will constrain the choice 
of materials, the construction techniques, the tools used and so on. All these basic 
decisions that are required to be made within the framework of the chosen 
methodology can be designated as the various methods that relate to the actual 
process of construction. However, this does not mean that there is an exclusive one-
to-one relationship between methods and methodology as some methods may be 
incorporated within more than one methodology, e.g. a concrete slab floor can be 
used in a solid brick construction or a rammed earth construction. The choice of 
which methodology to use in constructing a house will be based on many factors 
such as energy efficiency, aesthetics, cost, time to build, legal encumbrances to do 
with building design in certain places and so forth. There is a sense then that a 
methodology is not something that is prescriptive in all aspects of the project but 
rather defines the essential, defining characteristics of the approach. A methodology 
for building a house cannot be based on a rammed earth construction if the 
methodology has been determined as a tilt slab construction. Both construction 
methodologies will have, however, electrical and plumbing but the methods of 
installation will differ because of the characteristics of a tilt slab versus a rammed 
earth construction.  
Reflecting on this example, it is easy to see how methodology can be described in 
the different ways in the research methods texts. I take methodology to define the 
essential defining characteristics that determine the basic framework of decision that 
shapes the conduct of the project. A house may have a basic methodological 
framework based on a rammed earth construction, but then a subset of 
methodologies such as energy efficiency, affordability and so on. The designation 
‘energy efficient’ does not specify an approach as clearly as ‘rammed earth’ but it 
does designate an overall approach that constrains and gives direction to the 
methods associated with such activities as heating and cooling choices, the 
orientation of the house to the sun, window design and so on. It is, for this reason, 
it falls within the ambit of the overall methodological framework. A decision to a build 
house using a rammed earth methodology is thus sufficient to define the basic 
structure but is insufficient to determine the methodological framework with sufficient 
detail to ensure the outcome desired. Ensuring the adequacy of the decisions 
around methodology are thus essential in determining the conduct of the inquiry. 
Each methodology for house building has, however, one thing in common. They all 
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contain the same assumption as to what a house ‘is’. The ontology of the house, 
what it is to be a house, is already assumed and is probably never clarified in any 
discussions with the architect or builder, and perhaps never needs to be. Heidegger 
recognises, for example, that within a culture we will typically have a common 
understanding of what things are without making that understanding explicit, i.e. 
defining what we mean.[BT33/13] So if I go to an architect or builder and say I want 
to build a house I do not need to define a house (make it explicit as to what I 
understand by a house), rather what I do is articulate what 'house' characteristics I 
want in the one I am seeking to have built. All the different house building 
methodologies work because there is an underlying relationship of the ontology to 
methodology and the methodology to methods, it is just that the outcome or ‘style’ 
and characteristics of the house will be different, depending on the choices. 
Methodologies and/or methods that would fail to build a house (the outcome) are 
typically not ruled out of contention deliberately as they are not considered in the 
first place.  
We can represent this as follows (Figure 1) 
What is clear from this is that the project requires a sufficient understanding of the 
outcome of the project even before it commences. While there may be changes in 
decisions along the way from what was originally envisaged what cannot change is 
the understanding of ‘house’.  
The same basic project relationship can be applied to project concerning research 
or inquiry (Figure 2);  
In undertaking any form of inquiry, we are typically asking about some characteristic 
of some-thing, an entity. It may relate to a characteristic of the entity, behaviour 
under certain circumstances, a judgment of a person concerning a situation, and so 
 
































on. Even in relation to historical inquiries we are, in effect, putting certain questions 
to a document, artefact and so on. What changes is the nature of the entity 
investigated and in turn the type of inquiry that can be made concerning the entity. 
It is not possible to ask a piece of carbon its view of the current climate debate for 
example. There must be a logical coherence in the structure of any inquiry. 
Linking to Heidegger’s Approach 
That there is a relationship between the task, subject matter and the methodology 
is specifically addressed by Heidegger.  He comments in the History of the Concept 
of Time that in relation to methodology that philosophy should 
... proceed ... as the natural sciences do in their field - with a fundamental regard for the 
character of the subject matters in question. [HCT 20] 
By 'the character of the subject matter', he is referring to an understanding of what 
it is, i.e. its ontology. In other words, in the natural sciences, they proceed (methods) 
based on the nature of the subject matter, i.e. the entity as already given.  In other 
words, the understanding of what the entity is determines how the sciences proceed.  
However, Heidegger argues that the task of philosophy (and he is referring 
specifically to metaphysics) is the study of being, i.e. to research what entities are; 
... being of the entities which constitutes the object of philosophy. [OHF 60] 
In other words, he is arguing that there is first a philosophical research task to 
establish the being of an entity which implies that this task must occur before the 
tasks undertaken by science. 
He then makes the assertion that the only method applicable for this philosophical 
research is phenomenology (as he understands it); 
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way 
of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. [BT 60/35] 
There is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but 
phenomenology. [HCT 72] 
This may suggest that the basic structure of inquiry is somehow changed, not so. 
The reason is that; 
Being is always the being of an entity. [BT 29/9] 
However, there is a problem that quickly arises in understanding this, as contrary to 
the tradition, discussed earlier,  
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The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity36. [BT 25/6] 
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to 
every entity. [BT 62/38] 
The essential relationship between being and entities is given by Heidegger as 
follows; 
Being - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are 
already understood. [BT 25-6/6] 
To make matters even more difficult from an understanding and research 
perspective, while we can typically see entities, we cannot see the being of entities. 
It is something that remains hidden; 
Manifestly, it is something [being of the entity] that proximally and for the most part does not 
show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for 
the most part does show itself [the entity itself]; but at the same time it is something that 
belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its 
meaning and its ground. [BT 59/35] (my gloss) 
I have already mentioned that the phenomenon of Heidegger’s phenomenology 
relates to the being of the entity and not the entity itself. It thus refers to what is 
hidden, and phenomenology is about disclosing this hiddenness, to disclose being. 
We know then that being is not another entity and as such is not a ‘thing’ that stands 
behind, or is the foundation, or some other ‘smaller’ entity from which it is comprised. 
In this following passage Heidegger is as clear as he ever gets about the nature of 
the phenomenon he is pursuing in phenomenology; 
Phenomenology … never has anything to do with appearances and even less with mere 
appearances. It is phenomenologically absurd to speak of the phenomenon as if it were 
something behind which there would be something else of which it would be a phenomenon 
in the sense of the appearance which represents and expresses [this something else]. A 
phenomenon is nothing behind which there would be something else. More accurately stated, 
one cannot ask for something behind the phenomenon at all, since what the phenomenon 
gives is precisely that something in itself. [HCT 86] 
As Heidegger regularly does, in this statement he is ruling out ways we may 
conceptualise the phenomenon, he is telling us what it is not.  He then goes on to 
describe the type of phenomenon he is looking for,  
The term 'phenomenon' however says nothing about the being of the objects under study, 
but refers only to the way they are encountered. The phenomenal is accordingly everything 
                                            
36 The reason Heidegger places ‘is’ in quotes is that the word is part of the verb to be, which always refers to 
an entity. Being is a ‘non-entity’ but there is no other word in the language with which to refer to ‘non-entities’, 
so Heidegger uses ‘is’. 
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which becomes visible in this kind of encounter and belongs in this structural context of 
intentionality. We therefore speak of 'phenomenal structures' as of what is seen, specified 
and examined in this kind of research. Phenomenological signifies everything that belongs 
to such a way of exhibiting phenomena and phenomenal structures, everything that becomes 
thematic in this kind of research. The unphenomenological would be everything that does not 
satisfy this kind of research, its conceptuality and its methods of demonstration. [HCT 86] 
(my underlining) 
I did not realise the significance of this passage until recently when I ‘rediscovered’ 
it. In the passage, Heidegger is giving us one of his key ‘methods’, albeit in a general 
way, and that is to observe the way in which entities are encountered. The encounter 
occurs as part of the intentional structure associated with Dasein. I am not going to 
describe the intentional structure here; I will do that in Chapter 12. The importance 
of this passage is not just that it points to a method but also to the way in which he 
deals with entities. Later I will discuss a statement by Heidegger in which he states 
that he makes no claim about the entity of Dasein itself. This claim startled me at 
the time37, but it fits with the above statement that he is not dealing “with 
appearances” and his emphasis on how entities are encountered rather than the 
entities themselves. This will prove to be an important clue in how to understand 
Heidegger’s work.  
I am aware that this possibly sounds obscure, but it will become clearer as the thesis 
develops. When Heidegger talks about ‘exhibiting’ structures or ‘seeing’ structures 
he is talking metaphorically as in “I see what you mean”. By way of analogy, we can 
‘exhibit’ the grammatical structure of language, verbs, nouns, and so on, through 
observing words in the language, not by looking at their physical presentation, but 
by observing and analysing what they do and then bringing them into thematic 
groups based on that analysis. For example, the words cat, dog and tree are all 
naming things, and words that do this we call nouns. We can’t see ‘noun’, but we 
understand it as a structure of language.  
The encounters with an entity that Heidegger has in mind are quite diverse, but in 
each case, they are always dealing with an entity as it is normally understood and 
used.  An encounter with a hammer, not as a random object, but as an entity that is 
typically used for pounding in nails, i.e. for hammering. Similarly, when encountering 
a house in planning its construction, we would have in mind the structure in which 
we will dwell, in which the family will live, i.e. a house as understood in the culture.  




This gives a general idea, and I will come back to it in greater detail later.   
Given that being is always the being of an entity and that his ‘method’ is to observe 
encounters with entities it follows that Heidegger must specifically designate an 
entity to be the focus of his research inquiries. This is what he does, and the entity 
that he selects in Being and Time is Dasein, his name for us, and the first half of 
Being and Time, Division I, is an account of his inquiries concerning the structure of 
Dasein. As mentioned, conceptualising what Heidegger means by Dasein is 
problematic, and I deal with this in Chapter 8, Clarifying Dasein, and Chapter 9, How 
to Investigate Dasein. 
Heidegger discusses his phenomenological method with a little more clarity in the 
Basic Problems with Phenomenology,   
... three basic components of phenomenological method – reduction, construction, 
destruction - belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual 
pertinence. [BPP 23] 
In the lecture course he expands on this. By reduction, he means nothing akin to 
the Husserlian reductions, he uses an older understanding of the word as meaning 
a turning back, and he applies it to mean a turning from the entity as the object of 
the inquiry to the being of the entity.  As per the above discussion, the subject matter 
of the inquiry is thus not the physical appearance that presents itself but that which 
gives the entity its meaning.  Destruction refers to the identification of the accepted 
ways of understanding ‘being’ in the tradition which are wrong, having been derived 
from theory, or accepted in an unquestioning way from the tradition. The idea is to 
critique these positions and show how they are not grounded in the phenomenon 
itself thus clearing the way for a new understanding of being.  Destruction is thus 
not a negative process, but a way by which new understandings can be established, 
this is the construction phase.  One of the approaches that Heidegger takes 
throughout Being and Time is to clearly rule out common ways of understanding 
something that he believes are wrong and will get in the way of a proper 
understanding of the concept; I take this as part of his method of destruction.  I have 
learnt that it is important to pay careful attention to these ‘ruling outs’, as when taken 
seriously they cause a disruption in our way of understanding and force us to seek 
and construct alternatives.  The most obvious example of this is the number of ‘ruling 
outs’ as ways of understanding Dasein that Heidegger includes in Being and Time, 
e.g. biological life [BT 75/50], the aggregation of body, soul and spirit [BT 74/47]. I 
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discuss this in relation to Dasein in more detail in Chapter 4 and 8.  Construction, is 
the primary task, the identification and description of the ontological structures and 
the interpretation of being. 
To summarise, for Heidegger, the research task of philosophy is the being of 
entities, and this is Heidegger’s declared project in Being and Time as set out on 
the first page; 
Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to 
do so concretely. [BT 19/1] 
… and his declared methodology is phenomenology.   
Heidegger’s project can be structured as follows (Figure 3);  
Unlike building and research where there may be differing methodologies, 
Heidegger tells us that to investigate being there is only one methodology, 
phenomenology. There is an important difference that is not readily evident in the 
structure of Heidegger’s project compared to others; it is to do with the subject 
matter. In the non-philosophical examples, the ontology, what it is to be an entity, is 
assumed, but in Heidegger’s philosophical research, it is the ontology itself that is 
the task of the inquiry. In that Heidegger believes we have a wrong understanding 
of the being entities (ontology) he also holds that this philosophical research into 
being must precede the research carried out by science, especially when it comes 
to Dasein.  This thesis is based on this very point, i.e. the clarifying being of Dasein. 
I discuss the link between ontology and science in Chapter 10, Heidegger’s 
Empiricism and Chapter 11, Heidegger’s Work and the Link to Science. 
Another difference in the structure is that whereas the entity determines the 
methodologies of the natural science, philosophical research is not so constrained. 
Philosophy investigates the being of entities and not the entity themselves, and as 
such phenomenology, the methodology does "not characterize the what of the 
objects of philosophical research as subject-matter".[BT 50/27] For Heidegger 
phenomenology "signifies primarily a methodological conception and he suggests 
that this "determines the principles on which [phenomenology] is to be conducted" 
 



















which is "rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves", [BT 
50/27], i.e. by our mode of encounter with them. Phenomenology then, as Heidegger 
understands and applies it, is a universal methodology concerning the investigations 
into being.  As he succinctly puts it, 
There is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but 
phenomenology.  [HCT 72] 
I mentioned above that Heidegger's project is to work out the "question of the 
meaning of being" [BT 19/1] and that he believes this project is essential because 
within the philosophical tradition,  
... idea and constitution of the subject and what philosophy itself has hitherto defined 
ontologically in an utterly deficient way and left in the dark. [BPP 65] 
This is a significant claim with radical implications, and I enter this thesis project 
starting from the premise that his claim should be accepted at face value and tested 
on its merits. My conclusion is that his claim has merit and not only helps in the 
understanding of ‘shedding life’ but has important implications for the construction 
and administration of nursing homes, and the human and biological science more 
generally. However, this is for later in the thesis. 
Before continuing, Heidegger’s project needs to be clarified a little further, as 
Heidegger does not resolve the question of the meaning of being either in Being 
and Time or his other works, albeit his inquiries into different aspects of being 
remains the central focus throughout his career. It is his work in Being and Time, 
however, that opens up a radically new way of understanding the being of entities, 
including Dasein, and it this aspect of his work that has relevance to this thesis and 
I will briefly outline the connection between Heidegger's main project and his work 
on Dasein. 
Within the tradition and our culture more generally the normative view is that there 
is only one mode of being, understood philosophically as substance ontology, the 
idea that every entity is constituted from other entities.  The science equivalent of 
this is can be thought of as materialism.  I will briefly explain this as it is the primary 
position that Heidegger is attacking. 
The standard account in scholarship is that being of entities, literally what things are 
in terms of what constitutes them, are other entities. For example, the most 
fundamental entities in the universe are generally taken as various types of sub-
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atomic particles, and everything else in the Universe is constituted from these. While 
there is no agreement as to how these fundamental particles formed, i.e. what 
constituted them, physicists believe that this puzzle will be eventually resolved and 
a ‘natural’ explanation will be found38.  The general idea is that biology can be 
explained by chemistry, chemistry can be explained by standard physics and 
standard physics can be explained by quantum physics.  This is a reductionist view 
associated with materialism.  An alternative view, one held throughout most of the 
Christian era, is that it is God who constituted everything, a view known as 
Creationism. While many Christians no longer hold this extreme view, it is still a 
common belief that God is, in some way, responsible for the creation of the 
Universe, e.g. the fundamental particles and the laws of nature from which all else 
is created.  Regardless of which view is taken the accounts posit the being of all 
individual entities as other entities. In other words, the ultimate source behind all 
entities, the most fundamental being, is still an entity.  In addition, whereas physicists 
view all entities as being comprised mass and energy, various theologies allow for 
entities made of other ‘spiritual’, non-worldly substances. Both views can be brought 
together under what is called a substance ontology, i.e. all entities are made of some 
form of substance.  In one form or another, the substance ontology approach to the 
being of entities is the overwhelmingly dominant view in Western culture, the almost 
exclusive view in Western science and the one I held before and during most of this 
thesis project39.  
It is critical to understanding Heidegger’s work that one recognises that Heidegger 
rejects this normative account of substance ontology. The corollary to this is that if 
one is undertaking a Heideggerian inquiry, Heidegger’s account of being must be 
what is in focus and cannot be ignored. This is what I finally accepted just a few 
                                            
38 For the majority physicists, everything starts with the Big Bang followed by an exponential expansion of the 
universe that happened during the inflationary epoch that lasts from 10-36 seconds after the Big Bang to around 
10-32 seconds after which the Universe expands at a less rapid rate. Once scientist understanding how the Big 
Bang itself occurred they have found the source of all matter in the universe, the source from which all things 
that are, arise. Under this model everything we see around us, including us, is made up of the material of the 
Universe  
 
Cosmologist Stephen Hawking has theorized(Hawking, 2003, 2011) that there was a spontaneous separation 
of matter and antimatter (known as M-Theory) and the mathematics behind the theory, to the extent it has been 
developed, is in accord with much of existing theories in physics. This explanation solves the problem of the 
initial cause, removes the need for God and still stays within the materialist account given that it accounts for all 
matter (including anti-matter) and the various forces that bind them. The ultimate source of being is thus 
grounded within a materialist or entity based framework, and we understand things based on the characteristics 




months ago, and that resulted in a re-writing of the thesis!  However, to put this very 
bluntly, what it is ‘to be’ a Dasein is not ‘flesh and blood’! Already this starts to bring 
into question the premises on which nursing homes are established and run. 
Heidegger believes that the normative account is wrong on two accounts, firstly that 
there is more than one way in which an entity can be constituted and secondly, more 
devastating, that being is not an entity.  
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to 
every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of being lie 
beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. [BT 62/38]  
Being is something that not only does not belong to entities, but it is also something 
that comes before (higher), and further, it is something that does not typically reveal 
itself [BT 59/35].  How this can be the case will be shown in the later chapter on 
being and then towards the end of the thesis in the discussion on emergence.  
Heidegger’s project was not simply to go around identifying the modes of being of 
different classes of entities, what is called regional ontology. What he was after was 
the meaning of being that pertains to all the different modes of entities, i.e. 
fundamental ontology. To explain; different classes of entities have different modes 
of being, for example, if there is a class of entities x such that it has the mode of 
being x, a class of entities y with the mode of being y and a class of entities z with 
the mode of being z. What Heidegger’s project, as stated in Being and Time, was 
about is to ascertain the meaning of being as it applies to x, y, and z.  It is this final 
step that is his primary project, and he believes that somehow the meaning of being 
is to be found in temporality. I will not be following Heidegger this far as it is 
unnecessary for this thesis, but it is important to understand the structure of his 
inquiry in Being and Time. 
In Being and Time, his research strategy is to begin with the entity he calls Dasein. 
One reason he starts with Dasein, i.e. us, is that we have an un-thematised 
understanding of what things are, which is reflected in our appropriate use of things, 
e.g. we know what a coffee cup is, we drink from it; we know what a hammer is, we 
use it to drive in nails, and so on.  For Heidegger it is this obvious, everyday 
proficiency we have of things in our everyday life that provides the evidence of our 
intuitive understanding of what things are, i.e. their being.  Heidegger believes that 
because of this he can analyse how we engage (encounter) things in terms of what 
they are (their being) and from this develop a thematised understanding of their 
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being. i.e. understand the structure of being.  Most of Division One of Being and 
Time is taken up with an analysis of the structure of the being of Dasein, which he 
calls being-in-the-world, and this leads him to an account of the being of Dasein 
which he calls Care.  
Heidegger's preliminary project concerning Dasein can be structured as follows 
(Figure 4): 
As part of this project, Heidegger not only investigates the being of Dasein but also 
of the being of Dasein’s world and of the entities with which Dasein engages in 
pursuing the activities of living its life, what Heidegger terms the ready-to-hand. 
World and ready-to-hand are technical terms in Heidegger’s lexicon and do not lend 
themselves to a ready understanding; I will discuss them at length later in the thesis. 
In the above, I have discussed Heidegger’s research project in general terms and 
placed it within the structure of a research project.  Also identified are the differences 
in the structures between a typical project in science or an applied discipline and a 
Heideggerian philosophical project. The difference being that the former necessarily 
assumes the nature of an entity, its being, as the subject of the inquiry, whereas, for 
the latter, determining the being of the entity is the task of the inquiry. I also 
discussed the nature of Heidegger’s methodology, what he terms phenomenology 
and identified some of his methods. I now want to discuss the development of my 
methodology and how it has been informed by Heidegger’s technical structure of 
inquiry.  
Introduction to the Thesis Methodology 
As discussed in the introductory chapter this thesis is not within the genre of a 
natural or social science research project, what Kuhn calls normal 
science(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012). It is a project deliberately 
aimed at identifying a new theoretical framework to be applied within the sciences, 
albeit one based on the philosophical research of Martin Heidegger. The project 
involves two steps; the first is to gain an understanding of Heidegger’s work, and 
 


















the second is to apply that understanding in a way that meets the thesis goal, 
understanding the meaning of shedding life. The first step is by far the most 
challenging and once completed the second follows in a relatively simple and 
straightforward manner. Most of the thesis, then, is an account of my interpretation 
of Heidegger’s account of his research into the structure of Dasein.  
As Kuhn has pointed out(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) there is no 
guaranteed way for a person to gain a radically new understanding of a situation. 
There is no defined set of steps that if followed will ensure the shifting from 
understanding a situation under one paradigm to understanding it from another. This 
does not mean that in attempting to gain an understanding of something new that 
there is an absence of approach. I initially named the approach I took as Goal-
Directed Discursive Inquiry, which I subsequently deemed a tautology and renamed 
it a Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry.  
The section is divided into two sections. The first deals with how I intend the term 
Discursive Inquiry to be used and the second discusses Heidegger’s structure of 
inquiry and how I apply it to this thesis. 
Discursive Inquiry 
In a broad sense, the methodology that I am using can be best described as a 
Discursive Inquiry, and in this section, I discuss what I mean by this term. The 
approach I take is to first look at the concepts of ‘discursive’ and ‘inquiry’ separately 
and then to summarise the term as a unity.  
Inquiry comes from the Latin inquerere40 meaning 'to seek after, search for or 
examine' and derives from the Latin in- meaning 'into' and quaerere 'ask or seek'. 
The way I mean the term is to reflect the notion of an 'asking about' which implies 
that there is both something sought and a direction in which the seeking takes place. 
What is sought is the phenomenon of interest that guides the inquiry which in this 
case is the meaning of ‘shedding life’ and the direction is indicated by the 
philosophical research findings concerning the Dasein analytic published by Martin 
                                            
40 The primary source I use for all English language etymologies in this thesis are provided by the Online 
Etymology Dictionary (OED) compiled and published by Douglas Harper. It is accessible at 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php. I regularly check alternative sources and rarely find any dispute. 
Wherever I refer to an English language etymology it should be assumed that the OED is the source and I 




Inherent in the idea of seeking is that what is sought after is somehow hidden and 
must be disclosed. The seeking out also indicates that what is sought is not readily 
accessible, it involves an effort in the discovery process and the disclosing. As in all 
seeking, there is the risk of failure and so inquiry, as used in this thesis, is not a 
methodology for puzzle solving, where the notion of a puzzle is something for which 
there is a solution if the right methods are used and the puzzle solver clever enough. 
This form of ‘puzzle solving’ relates to normal science (Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012) and not to project of the type being undertaken in this 
thesis.  
The understanding that arises in the disclosing belongs to the inquirer, and as such 
the path taken on the journey of seeking and disclosing must also relate to the 
inquirer. However, the phenomenon of interest must be such that it remains 
accessible to any other who seeks. Accordingly, in a discursive inquiry, the account 
of the seeking, disclosure and what has been disclosed should provide an intelligible 
account of that seeking and disclosure. The account should also provide for those 
who have made the disclosure beforehand sufficient grounds for affirming that 
indeed the same phenomenon has been disclosed. The account may also act as an 
exemplar guide for others to repeat the journey in their way, albeit hopefully with 
greater ease. In the case of this project, I take Heidegger’s Being and Time as such 
a guide.  
The 'scientific' merit of such inquiries is the possibility of a shared and mutually 
agreed understanding of the disclosed phenomenon which then forms the basis for 
collective action concerning the phenomenon, whether that be by further research, 
changes in policy and practice or some other action or deliberate non-action. This 
understanding of inquiry flows through to the way I am using discursive.  
I am using discursive as the adverbial form of the verb discourse which derives from 
the Latin discursus, dis-, 'apart' and currere 'to run'. Run can be used in a number 
of ways, but here it denotes a sense of moving past specific things, as in the path 
of the Heysen trail runs past our house. It thus denotes a movement in the sense of 
a journey.  
Discursus in Latin came to mean 'conversation' in English, and discourse has a 
related sense in that it typically refers to the discussion, conversation or debate 
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about something in particular. However, in going back to the origins of the word 
discourse can mean to "take apart" as in to discuss the topic via the parts. Discourse 
as I am intending it has the sense of a dialogue concerning the focus of the inquiry 
in which views are exchanged, questions put and answered and so forth about 
differing aspects or parts of the topic. A discourse aims to ensure an exploration of 
all key aspects of the topic, to bring it fully into view.  
The topic, or the phenomenon that is the focus of a discourse, thus constrains the 
scope of the discourse. The exchanges that form the discourse can occur in person, 
with what a person has presented in writing, in dialogue with oneself or between the 
inquirer and the phenomenon that is the focus of the inquiry. Of primary importance 
in these exchanges is what is disclosed about the phenomenon to the inquirer, the 
understanding of others relating to the phenomenon is relevant only in so much as 
it leads to such disclosures.  
For the inquirer, the phenomenon of interest must always be present in the 
discourse. What is exchanged does not gain its validity or value by sitting in a 
framework of rational argument and much less by persuasive rhetoric but rather in 
its usefulness in disclosing the phenomenon itself, as it is in itself. The aim of 
engaging in discourse as part of an inquiry is to assist in the pointing out of the 
phenomenon, which leads to understanding by the inquirer. Such pointing out is 
reflected in the idiomatic use of phrases, such as "I see". There is always the risk 
that what appears as a disclosure of some aspect of the phenomenon has been 
'viewed' as something that it is not, i.e. misunderstood and thus misinterpreted. 
Aspects already disclosed are therefore always subject to further inquiry, and must 
be checked against the unity of the phenomenon as progressively disclosed and 
understood. This points to the iterative nature of such a discursive approach. 
A discursive inquiry is one that identifies an area of interest and attempts to disclose 
something unknown, which becomes the focus or phenomenon of interest to the 
inquiry. The process is a progressive revealing, aspect by aspect, until that which 
was hidden comes sufficiently into view as to be understood as a unity. The seeking 
of a discursive inquiry thus proceeds, guided by what is to be disclosed in the 
seeking, from what has been so far disclosed to the inquirer and to where the 
inquirer next seeks. While the inquirer always remains focused on the phenomenon, 
the nature of discourse is that they may often be guided by others who assist by 
way of a pointing out.  
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This is a general description of what I mean by a discursive inquiry. I make no claims 
to originality, and this basic structure is present in other methodologies. My aim is 
simply to ensure I have made clear how I am using the term discursive inquiry. An 
important claim of the approach is that there exist phenomena capable of 
investigation by different inquirers, such that the understanding of the phenomenon 
arises from the phenomenon itself and not 'hearsay' or 'authority' and that this is the 
basis of a shared understanding of the phenomenon. I take ‘shedding life’ to be such 
a phenomenon. 
As I have described it, discursive inquiry covers a broad range of inquiries and may 
equally apply to a detective seeking the identity of an unknown suspect in a crime, 
to the asking of directions to a particular location or as in this case to the nature of 
a phenomenon appearing to be affecting many people, the shedding of life. The 
specific methods of the discursive inquiry will thus vary based on the nature of the 
phenomenon that is the focus of the inquiry.  
A thesis is a narrative account and summary of the discursive inquiry and does not 
try to recount all aspects of the journey. It is in the nature of a discursive inquiry, 
however, that the writing of the thesis itself, forms part of the discourse and may 
lead to further disclosures of the phenomenon to the inquirer. This has occurred 
many times in the process of writing this thesis. Initially, this would result in 
significant changes in understanding requiring a radical reappraisal of all that had 
gone before. Eventually, new disclosures left the basic unity substantially intact and 
aided in understanding the finer details of the parts. Having said that it was just eight 
months ago, when I had nearly completed the writing of the thesis, that a major 
change occurred in my understanding of ‘being’ that resulted in a complete re-write. 
It changed how I understood the unity of the phenomenon. This led to a new section, 
on the Greeks, and to the insights concerning emergence which I discuss later in 
the thesis. I am also conscious that there are new aspects which have revealed 
themselves since that time but, thankfully, they are at the level of detail of the parts 
and do not change the understanding of the unity itself.  Even so, these new 
disclosures would, if I was starting afresh, result in some restructuring of the thesis, 
this, of course, is impractical. While I have ‘tinkered’ around the edges, the thesis 
has been left ‘as is’ which I think does give the sense of both the iterative and 
progressive nature of discloser of a project such as this based on discursive inquiry.  
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Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry 
The methodology as I am presenting it here is not that which was envisaged in the 
research proposal and original research topic. The changes came about as a result 
of the engagement with Heidegger's work. The original thesis title was 
Towards the development of a 'living environmental stress' theory to describe how 
the environment of a residential aged care facility may be toxic, resulting in an 
increased risk of premature morbidities and mortality in older people. 
which shifted to, 
A Heideggerian Inquiry into the Meaning of Shedding Life 
 before finally settling on the current title.  The change in titles reflected my 
increasing absorption in Heidegger’s work before pulling back with a greater sense 
of clarity vis-a-vis the thesis aim. While I do not address the progressive nature of 
the change, I have written about the source of the concept of shedding life, and the 
relevance of a Heideggerian understanding of Dasein will become apparent as the 
thesis unfolds. In the original research proposal, I had indicated I would be using a 
Gadamerian methodology, but as I delved deeper into Heidegger's work, Gadamer 
fell by the wayside. To be frank, it was difficult enough to come to an understanding 
Heidegger’s work without adding the complexity of Gadamer. The decision was 
reinforced as I recognised that Gadamer was heavily influenced by Heidegger’s 
philosophy(Gadamer(Author) & Schmidt(Introduction), 1994).  
There has been an ongoing development of my methodology that reflects the 
changes in understanding of Heidegger’s work and what is presented in this section 
is my current position. Initially, I had envisaged ‘going after’ the meaning of 
‘shedding of life’ directly whereas now, while this remains the goal, the path is via 
an understanding of the nature of the person (Dasein) and the conditions for the 
possibility of living a life, what Heidegger terms our existence. It was only once those 
‘conditions’ were understood that the nature of ‘shedding of life’ could be disclosed 
in terms of a breakdown of those conditions.  
The approach to structuring this inquiry comes from Heidegger, and he introduces 
his discussion on the structure of his inquiry in Being and Time (§2) as follows;  
Every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry 
is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its 
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being as it is. This cognizant seeking can take the form of 'investigating', in which one lays 
bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character.[BT 24/5] 
Reading carefully, we note that the comments "Every seeking gets guided 
beforehand by what is sought." and "with regard to the fact that it is ...". Here 
Heidegger is making the self-evident claim that, no matter how empty, that there 
must be some pre-existing understanding of something before an inquiry can 
commence41. To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, one cannot inquire into unknown 
unknowns! Note also that an inquiry is "a seeking" which reflects a certain 
disposition towards what is being inquired into. If there is no disposition to seek, 
then the inquiry cannot even be conceived, and any understanding that may arise 
from the seeking thus remains hidden. My disposition to seek was outlined in 
Chapter 2 which outlined my background and motivation. This notion of a disposition 
will be discussed later under the heading of affective-attunement, one of the two key 
aspects, along with understanding, that holds open our world.  
Heidegger identifies three parts to his structure of inquiry, Befragtes or the object of 
inquiry, Gefragtes, that which is asked of the object and Erfragtes, a preliminary 
indication of what is to be found in the asking. I will briefly discuss these concepts, 
show how they relate to Heidegger’s inquiry and then how I have applied them to 
this thesis.  
Befragtes - this is the object of the inquiry, the entity or thing placed under 
investigation, "that which is to be interrogated."[BT 24/5] In German42, Befragtes 
literally means respondent, answerer or the object of an interrogation, i.e. that which 
is understood to hold the answer. One of the important aspects of this part of an 
inquiry is to make sure that the "what" of the inquiry has been appropriately clarified. 
Clarifying the “what” does not mean that it is already understood. In the case of 
inquiring into what a shadow on a dark night ‘is’ simply means holding the 
‘perceptual image’ (the ‘what’) of the shadow in view such that this becomes the 
                                            
41 While I do not discuss Heidegger’s work in relation to the structure of understanding in this thesis, it was one 
of the topics that had to be dropped due to space constraints, this idea relates to the notion of the fore-structure 
of understanding. Refer Being and Time 146/155 ff. 
42 While I generally stay with the standard English translations of Being and Time I have often found it useful to 
explore other sources concerning German translations. My primary source is the German<> English translations 
provided by the website Beolingus (http://dict.tu-chemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en;service=) which is published 
and maintained by the University of Chemnitz. The main secondary source against which I check translations 
is dict.cc (http://www.dict.cc/), which also uses the Chemnitz word base but is also supplemented, via a user 
forum. Additionally, I occasionally use the Wikipedia project which provides translations and information on 




focus of the inquiry, putting aside any unfounded interpretations, i.e. ‘it is the shadow 
of a man’. Another example relates to the scientific investigations into heat in the 
eighteenth century. Heidegger’s approach would mean focusing on the 
phenomenon of ‘heat’ itself and not positing, as was the case, unsubstantiated 
metaphysical entities such as phlogiston or caloric fluid, both of which were 
subsequently found to be non-existent. This last example will become relevant in 
the investigation of Dasein, in that Heidegger makes no claim about the physical or 
perceptual characteristics of Dasein! The question that arises from this is: How can 
he then, hold Dasein in view as the object to be interrogated? I deal with this 
question in the following chapters. 
Gefragtes - this is what is asked about or more literally what is sought after from the 
object of inquiry. We can think of this as the nature of the information that we are 
looking for in an interrogation or inquiry. The Gefragtes thus frames the inquiry 
concerning the entity and sets the bounds for the questions that are asked. For 
example, I may want to know about the education of a group of people employed in 
certain roles within an organisation. The Befragtes or what of the inquiry is the 
specific group of people, the Gefragtes, what is asked about, is education attainment 
of the members of the group, which may have a broad or narrow focus, which in turn 
determines the nature of the questions concerning education. This aspect of the 
structure frames the direction of the inquiry. In Heidegger’s work, the Befragtes is 
an entity, and the Gefragtes is the being of the entity. 
Erfragtes - is the preliminary designation of "what is to be found out by the asking; 
this is what is really intended"[BT 24/5]. This refers to the information we expect to 
obtain from the inquiry. Heidegger rightly points out that there must be some way of 
determining if the information we gain from the inquiry answers the question. If we 
have no way of ascertaining the appropriateness of the results of an inquiry, the 
inquiry is pointless. In most cases this is straight forward, e.g. in looking as to what 
is causing the shadow on a dark night, we know that it must be an object within a 
certain size range and be in the vicinity of the shadow itself. To use an extreme 
contra example, the answer will not be the sound of a melody drifting across the 
paddock, it must be something that accounts for the phenomenon of the shadow.  
By way of example the structure of inquiry looks something like this when put 
together: 
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I am in Adelaide going to the Arts Theatre, but I do not know where the theatre(Befragtes) 
is located(Gefragtes). I ask someone (also a Befragtes), and an appropriate response will 
be one that gets me from where I am standing to the location of the theatre(Erfragtes). If 
the response is "There is a great Thai restaurant on Gouger St you go ...." or " Port Power 
is the best football team in South Australia" I know from the answer that it does not belong 
to my inquiry.  
If the response is "It's on Exhibition St, continue down Lonsdale St and turn right at the 
next set of lights after Russell St.", then the answer has the right structure. However, these 
are directions that relate to a different city, Melbourne, not Adelaide. If I did not know this, 
I would say “thank you”, and walk in the direction indicated, but I would have been led 
astray. To confirm the answer to my inquiry I seek confirmation that I am on Lonsdale 
Street, either by looking at street signs or asking another person. I would soon establish 
that there was a problem with the answer I had received. I had put the inquiry to the wrong 
person, and so I would try again.  
In this example, the Befragtes (the theatre) cannot, initially, be interrogated directly. There 
is a secondary inquiry; we inquire of a person (also a Befragtes) and what we ask about 
concerns their knowledge of how to get to the theatre (Gefrates). However, the primary 
focus is always the location of the theatre itself, and this is confirmed should we reach the 
destination at which point the entity itself discloses its location. This is the final 
confirmation. I now have an understanding derived directly from my first-hand encounter 
with the entity. 
In an inquiry then we may be reliant on others, or other entities (e.g. a street sign) 
to point us in the right direction and as such part of the process is to clarify our 
progress, but this is no guarantee. There are always other factors that can influence 
any of the steps in this process. The final confirmation comes, ultimately from the 
entity itself. 
I will now present Heidegger’s inquiry concerning being in terms of Heidegger’s 
formal structure of inquiry.  
Applying Heidegger’s Structure of inquiry to Heidegger's work 
Heidegger's project in terms of his structure of inquiry can be set out in tabular form 
(Table 1). Note that it is a two-part structure, and this follows the explanation of his 
project that I provided in the preceding section. The English terminology substituted 
for the German terms for the structural components follow Sheehan’s43 account as 
43 I have found Thomas Sheehan’s discussion on Heidegger’s structure of inquiry in his book Making Senses




I see no value in adding to the diversity of translations unnecessarily.  
The structure of the inquiry is a relatively straight forward as I demonstrated in the 
example on asking directions. The complexity arises in more difficult scholarly 
inquiries where there is a lack of clarity around the constitutive aspects of the inquiry, 
particularly in the lack of clarity around the entity. It is for this reasons that Heidegger 
notes;  
When one makes an inquiry one may do so 'just casually' or one may formulate the question 
explicitly. The latter case is peculiar in that the inquiry does not become transparent to itself 
until all these constitutive factors of the question have themselves become transparent. [BT 
24-5/5] 
The asking for directions was an example of a casual inquiry. We engage in these 
forms of inquiry every day, and the three parts typically operate in a concealed 
manner. However, we do seem to proceed on some vague understating of this 
structure without acknowledgement or a thematic understating that this is what is 
guiding us.   
More formal inquiries are typically more complex, and the constitutive aspects may 
not be clearly defined or are based on presuppositions that may not have been 
properly supported. We must bring to the surface, or make transparent, each aspect 
of the inquiry structure to be guided in the right manner44 or risk the inquiry going 
astray. In laying out the structure of an inquiry and then specifying the necessity of 
                                            
44 Heidegger talks about entering the 'circle' of inquiry the right way[BT 195/154] and it is this establishing of 
the structure of inquiry and clarifying its components to which he is referring. As is generally the case when 
reading Heidegger, however, one has to be careful of this notion of 'circle' as he uses it to designate more of an 
iterative movement rather than the geometric concept of a closed loop.  
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the steps for clarifying the various components of the structure Heidegger is, even 
if rather scantily, outlining details of a basic method. I will follow Heidegger through 
the first few steps of his 'method', and in so doing, this sheds further light on the 
project of Being and Time.  
Firstly, he addresses the 'what' of the inquiry, being, and he formally indicates45 
what he means by being; 
In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is being that which determines 
entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we 
may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 25-6/6] 
The 'what is asked about' (Gefragtes) is clear enough; it is 'being'. What Heidegger 
is also doing is specifying the Erfragtes of the inquiry, which he specifies with two 
characteristics that being must satisfy to ‘be’ being, i.e. it is whatever "determines 
entities as the entities" and secondly it is whatever "that on the basis of which entities 
are already understood".  
I will not discuss this further as the content of the table is consistent with what I have 
discussed in the previous section. 
Excursus 
Heidegger’s inquiry into the meaning of being seems to be addressing an esoteric 
philosophical issue of little concern to everyday life and in the process engaging in 
a debate with other philosophers. For me, I didn't even know there was a problem 
concerning the meaning of being46, and nor did others I have asked since becoming 
aware of the issue!  Initially, I didn’t even understand what he meant by being! 
Technical questions concerning being are not the sort of problem that is going to be 
an obvious intrusion into our lives, albeit I will argue later that it is more of a problem 
than we think. As Heidegger acknowledges, for the most part, we all have an 
unthematized understanding of what things are, whether we recognised it or not. It 
is the basis by which we get on with our life, that societies developed, science 
discoveries are made, and so on.  
The difficulty arises in the relatively uncommon case when there is a 'breakdown', 
                                            
45 Formal indication in a technical term in Heidegger referring to way he specifies phenomenon about which we 
have an unthematised but not conceptually clarified understanding. It is part of his method and an innovative 
technique that enables discussion to take place around otherwise undefined concepts. I will expand on this on 




and our unthematized understanding is either insufficient or wrongly grounded. 
When this occurs, and we have, unknowingly, a wrong understanding of being, there 
is the risk of getting the solution wrong! One of the classic examples of this in 
Western history is the witch-hunt. People believed they knew that witches existed 
and how to identify them. One of the most well-known cases was the Salem, 
Massachusetts witch trials in 1692. This was not just a simple matter of mass 
hysteria. When men and women were charged with witchcraft, they appeared before 
a court presided over by Chief Justice William Stoughton, an eminent jurist and legal 
scholar. The trials ended up with thirteen women and five men hanged as witches 
before the court was disbanded on the order of the Governor (Schiff, 2015).  Even 
today the United Nations Human Rights Commission reports that throughout many 
parts of the world people are killed, brutalised and imprisoned on the basis that they 
are ‘witches’. (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009)  The issue 
of ‘being’ is not some esoteric philosophical issue to these victims it is of critical, life 
determining importance. My argument in this thesis is that this is also the case for 
many older people confined to nursing homes. 
For most issues resulting in a visit to a health professional, what matters is that they 
‘fix’ what’s wrong. That they may have a wrong understanding of the being of the 
person doesn’t generally matter. Of concern is that they understand the body and 
know how to fix it. However, when we think we know what a person is, and on this 
basis, we construct and run nursing homes to meet the needs of older frailer people, 
then it does matter that the understanding of what it is to be a person, a Dasein, is 
appropriately established. One way to understand this thesis is as an inquiry as to 
whether that understanding is correct. For the hundreds of thousands of older 
people around the world currently living in nursing homes, being matters! This is 
why the focus on being and why Heidegger is important, for he is challenging the 
traditional, normative view. If he is right, then, we have made an incredibly serious 
mistake that is harming the most vulnerable. I now return to applying Heidegger’s 






Application of Heidegger's Structure of Inquiry to The Thesis 
Question 
Having established the basic structure of a Heideggerian inquiry, it is a relatively 
easy process to apply this to the thesis project, and this is provided in Table 2.  
The structure is straight forward and similar to the example I provided in relation to 
finding directions. The initial project is to understand the structure of the being of 
Dasein. This work has already been done and reported on by Martin Heidegger. My 
objective is not to gain an understanding of Heidegger’s work as such; rather it is to 
gain an understanding of the structure of the being of Dasein via Heidegger’s work 
and do so by using Heidegger’s work as part of my Discursive Inquiry. Using the 
previous example, I want to get to the Arts Theatre, and so ask someone that I 
believe to have that knowledge. However, I do not want to accept the directions and 
do nothing with them; I want to walk to the theatre and will, therefore, test the 
knowledge along the way until I am standing before the theatre. Similarly, I will 
‘listen’ to what Heidegger is saying, and then apply this as I focus on the task 
associated with the disclosure of the being of Dasein. I will continue to do so until 
there has been a sufficient disclosure of the being of Dasein that I feel comfortable 
standing alongside Heidegger looking at the same shared phenomenon he is 
pointing out! This is why in the tabular column with the heading of ‘Initial Project’, 
there are two streams occurring. Having understood the being of Dasein, this 
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clarifies the structure of the entity of Dasein, and from this, the conditions leading 
towards an understanding of the shedding of life can be disclosed. This is what is 
described in the column labelled ‘Project Goal’. 
In that this is a Heideggerian inquiry, there are key aspects I have incorporated into 
my approach.  Firstly, there must be a focus on the way of being of Dasein, what 
Heidegger refers to as the reduction, a move from the entity to the being of the entity. 
This is the ‘phenomenon’ of a Heideggerian phenomenological inquiry, and in 
designating being and not the entity itself, it is a radical departure from, for example, 
the phenomenology of Husserl. Understanding what this entails was quite a late 
development in my work as I found it difficult to grasp, primarily, I suspect because 
Heidegger’s understanding of being is so radically different to other scholars and 
what I had taken for granted as part of the culture. Heidegger’s concept of 
destruction is primarily aimed at investigating key moments in the tradition where 
the work of influential philosophers failed to recognise the true nature of being and 
as a result posited misleading concepts. The basic idea is that Heidegger not only 
presents his understanding but points out where the tradition has gone wrong and 
why. This is a remarkably robust way of approaching his work, albeit there is little 
evidence in the scholarly literature that philosophers have taken up the challenge in 
any serious way to refute his work. This is the second aspect of his phenomenology 
and can be undertaken at two levels. Firstly, to identify previously taken for granted 
ways of understanding that I need to be challenged when considered in the light of 
what Heidegger is proposing.  As previously indicated, I have used the ɸ mark to 
denote areas in which there have been material changes in understanding as a 
result of this process. The second level is to identify in the medical/health 
professions the origins of a focus on life as a biological rather than an existential 
phenomenon and to provide a critique of this position. While I have commenced 
work on this aspect, it is outside the scope of the thesis and not included in any 
material way. It is a project that needs to be addressed in detail at some future time. 
The final aspect of Heidegger’s phenomenology is construction, the development of 
an understanding based on the inquiry. In this thesis, construction refers to the 
development of an understanding of the meaning of shedding life. 
My methodology then is not just a discursive inquiry; it is a discursive Heideggerian 




CHAPTER 4: THE PROBLEM OF BEING AND DASEIN  
Introduction 
Central to Heidegger’s work and hence the thesis project are two concepts, being 
and Dasein and these were, oddly enough, the last two key concepts I managed to 
grasp fully.  How Heidegger conceptualises being and the nature of Dasein the entity 
is problematic and yet if Heidegger's work is to be understood these key concepts 
need to be clarified.   
It is the nature of some journeys towards understanding that we must learn to hold 
things in our grasp only tenuously and often with ambiguity, to trust that as we 
proceed the understanding is somehow fleshed out and clarified. It is this approach 
I took with the concept of being. However, I became so used to doing this that a 
feeling of familiarity, of being at home with the term developed and there descended 
a forgetfulness, that I did not understand being at all. I had always intended to write 
a section on being for this thesis, and I was jolted out of my complacency when I 
attempted the section.  What Heidegger meant by ‘being’ continually eluded me. His 
formal indication of being is so broad as to allow for the materialist account of being, 
except he specifically rules this out by saying that it is not an entity. He also seems 
to change the way the term is used, and I struggled to hold these different uses 
together in any sense of cohesive intelligibly. I was forced back towards Heidegger’s 
work in this area, to wrestle with him once more, to prise out of his work what it is 
he ‘saw’ and I was missing.  
In the case of Dasein, again there was a sense of familiarity, in that I ‘knew’ what 
Dasein was, it referred to me.  Whereas in the case of being I became familiar with 
my ‘not knowing’, in the case of Dasein I became familiar with my ‘wrong knowing’. 
Although I had read and ‘understood’ all the injunctions Heidegger gives about how 
not to regard Dasein, I had not quite dispelled them all. The reason, I suspect, is 
that I hadn’t understood in what way Heidegger was dealing with Dasein as an entity, 
and as such, I had nothing to replace what Heidegger has ruled out! I alluded to this 
in the last chapter. I was jolted into confronting my ignorance when I read in 
Heidegger’s Summer 1928 lecture series, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 
the last given at the University of Marburg.  
… the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation 
of its factual existence; I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, 
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nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169] (my 
bolding) 
The first thing that crossed my mind when I read this, something he wrote almost 
immediately after the publication of Being and Time, was something along the lines 
of “Aaagghhh … What? Is he for real? Is it all speculative? What does this do to my 
thesis?”  However, reading Heidegger is never straight forward. This unexpected 
encounter sent me off to explore the ‘Dasein’ problem and I subsequently 
‘discovered’ a new way to understand Dasein which had implications as to how to 
explore Dasein.  
This chapter focuses on bringing the problem of Dasein and being clearly into view, 
for even understanding the problem can be a problem. Chapter 5 discusses the 
concept of being in terms of Heidegger’s project and the different ways in which he 
uses the term which leads to a deeper puzzle over being. In Chapter 6 I take a step 
back and explore the concept of being within the Greek tradition to provide some 
background context for Heidegger’s work. This discussion uncovers similarities in 
approach between the Greeks and Heidegger and aids in bringing some conceptual 
clarity.  With the aid of the work completed in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 completes the 
discussion on being by examining aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Greeks which provides the missing aspects of his concept that prove key to solving 
the puzzle of being.  Chapter 8 clarifies how to understand Dasein the entity in the 
context of Heidegger’s work even though he makes no claims concerning the entity. 
Chapter 9 extends that discussion by examining the way Dasein is investigated in 
Being and Time.  
The Problem of Being 
In reading a research report from the sciences, it would be unusual not to have a 
clear setting out of the methodology and the methods used. It is accepted that a 
reader needs to know how the researcher went about their work to be able to form 
a view as to the quality of the research, e.g. to be able to form an assessment as to 
whether the stated methods were appropriate for the nature of the inquiry and 
subject matter. (Silverman, 2005) This consistency between inquiry topic, ontology, 
methodology, and methods was discussed in the previous chapter.  
Granted a philosophical research report is somewhat different to a science-based 
report.  However, it is still typically possible to ascertain the nature of the 
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philosophical inquiry.  By way of example, in the book Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions the philosopher Martha Nussbaum lays out an argument 
that we have not properly understood the role of emotions in our lives.  She does so 
by making specific points supporting her argument and illustrating them with 
examples from her own experience and the work from other scholars, both ancient 
and modern. (Nussbaum, 2001) This approach is laid out in her introduction. In 
Nussbaum’s work, she is not engaged in an exploration of the nature of what it is ‘to 
be’ an emotion or ‘to be’ a person. This level of understanding is taken for granted 
and seems consistent with anyone would typically understand these entities. This 
makes her work relatively easy to access. 
When reading Heidegger’s description of what he is doing it initially sounds 
reasonable and gives some suggestion that it should be, like Nussbaum’s work, 
accessible, even if with a little more work.  This is the case even though Heidegger 
is engaging in a different type of philosophical inquiry to that of Nussbaum, and this 
is captured in the following,  
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way 
of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the 
phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows 
itself is the being of entities, its meaning, its modifications, and derivatives. [BT 60/35] 
Any sense of the accessibility of Heidegger’s work, however, quickly vanishes. Part 
of the problem is that, unlike Nussbaum, what Heidegger means by his basic 
concepts cannot be assumed. I have already discussed Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, and I do not want to cover that ground again unnecessarily. 
However, some discussion, from a slightly different perspective, will prove helpful, 
in illustrating the problem about being. 
In the BT §7, he indicates that part of the methodology is to focus on "the things 
themselves" [BT 58/34]. Despite this suggesting that the inquiry will be investigating 
an entity, a “thing”, this should not be taken literally. In Basic Problems, he makes it 
clear that this is part of the reduction aspect of the phenomenological method, meant 
as a turning away from the entity towards the being of the entity.  
We call this basic component of phenomenological method-the leading back or re-duction of 
investigative vision from a naively apprehended entity to being-phenomenological reduction. 
We are thus adopting a central term of Husserl's phenomenology in its literal wording though 
not in its substantive intent. [BPP 21] 
As a side note, the reference to Husserl is interesting in itself as it highlights 
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Heidegger’s usurping of the term “phenomenological reduction” from Husserl, he 
gutting its original meaning (“substantive intent”), filling it with his own.  This points 
to the fact that Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenology are two different 
creatures. Something that is hard to tell when reading overviews in some texts on 
phenomenology.  
The focus of the inquiry is however bound to entities in that the 'phenomenon' that 
is focused on, as mentioned above is  
...  that which shows itself is the being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and 
derivatives. [BT 60/35] (my underlining) 
However, the phenomenon, being, is "something that lies hidden". [BT 50/35]   What 
"lies hidden" is not like the object in a game of hide-and-seek, where a thing is 
concealed behind, under or in another thing.  This would make what is concealed 
an entity and ‘being’ is never an entity.  How then are we to understand the concept 
of being as something that “shows itself” in phenomenology?  As I thought deeper, 
everything I ‘see’ is in some way an entity, and yet, being is not an entity. This was 
the puzzle. 
Heidegger notes that while the term 'descriptive phenomenology' is used it is “at 
bottom tautological” [BT 59/35] because the method of phenomenology is 
descriptive.  However, the concept of description is not like that which we would find 
in a "botanical morphology"[BT 59/35] because this approach to description focuses 
on the characteristics of how the entity itself presents to us.  In that being is not an 
entity, the concept of description must be different when used in phenomenology.  
Later in the section Heidegger states,  
the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. [BT 61/37] 
The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, 
where it designates this business of interpreting. [BT 62/37] 
Heidegger goes on to say that as the being of an entity is exhibited by way of an 
interpretive description, the interpretative approach must be,  
… opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking 
over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those 
pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems', often for generations at a time. 
[BT 50/28] 
In other words, there must be no assumptions made concerning what is exhibited 
and no untested interpretive tendencies applied to the observations, regardless of 
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the source.  The interpretations must be derived solely on the basis of what has 
been exhibited or on the basis previously completed philosophical research. 
As I read these and other statements concerning being and phenomenology some 
seemed straight forward, others a bit puzzling, but overall, I just kept reading, 
ploughing on.  When I initially sat down to write the section on being, I drew up a list 
of characteristics from my considerations of his phenomenological approach and his 
definition of being.  My understanding of Heidegger’s account of being was47;  
• that it is something hidden but can be disclosed,  
• when disclosed it is not by way of an appearance, as in the case of an entity, but 
by an interpretative description,  
• it is not an entity but belongs to the entity in such a way that it both determines 
and makes intelligible the entity to which it belongs.   
I had written other sections concerning Being and Time, and overall, I thought I had 
reached an understanding of being, such that the summarised list made sense.  
However, as I pondered the list and tried to give an account of being by way 
explanation and illustration of what was on the list, I found that I couldn’t.  While 
many of the pieces of his work seemed to have come together, I recognised that I 
had assembled those pieces in such a way that excluded a proper understanding of 
being!  My conclusion was simple, if I could not give an adequate account of being 
then I did not have an adequate understanding of the subject matter of Heidegger’s 
project.  If that was the case then the way the understanding of Heidegger’s work 
had been ‘pieced together’ was in jeopardy of being wrong. The more I pondered 
the list, the more it seemed like some impenetrable riddle. 
By way of example, if I went into a laboratory and inquired of a scientist what she 
was doing, and was told "decombulating the ionized structural elements of the 
retrotransposons" I would still have no idea, despite the description. To know what 
she is doing I would need some understanding of the subject matter (the ionized 
structural elements of the retrotransposons) and the nature of the task 
(decombulating). I could listen to her. I could even see the equipment. I could 
understand that some form of activity was going on. However, that is the extent of 
my understanding. In this case, the sentence is a piece of nonsense, I have made 
                                            
47 These points were identified before I had developed my view that ‘Dasein’ is an emergent entity and its 
dynamic structure is described as being-in-the-world (i.e. its being).  This account fits with these three key 
characteristics of being. 
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up. However, the point is I think clear. Unless I could make sense of ‘Heidegger’s 
list’ concerning the characteristics of being, then there is no sure ground to the 
thesis. 
Being - against the tradition 
Outlining the contemporary, normative account of being. 
Heidegger's field of philosophical research is ontology which has, as its primary 
theme, the question of what it is to be something, what is called 'being'. The standard 
account of ‘being’ or what constitutes an entity as the entity it is has remained 
essentially unchanged since Aristotle’s time48, and today this is a physicalist account 
of what things are and is the normative view in science, including the medical 
sciences. (Gillett, 2002; O'Connor & Churchill, 2010; Stoljar, 2016)  
To use a simple example: The ruler (entity) on my desk is made from plastic (entity) 
with paint marks (entity) printed on it to indicate centimetres and millimetres. The 
plastic and paint are constituted from molecules (entities), and the molecules are a 
chemical bond formed from atoms(entities) and so on. I understand what a ruler is 
by reference to its shape, markings, how the ruler is positioned on objects to be 
measured, and so on.  I understand the ruler by reference to its physical 
characteristics and learning how to apply them to the task of measuring.  
In the case of a person, the biological and medical sciences, for the most part, 
understands the person as being the physical body.  The body is a biological 
mechanism comprising various organs (brain, heart, kidneys, legs, etc.), arranged 
into different functional systems (nervous, digestive, respiratory, etc.), with the 
organs and other ‘parts’ comprised of cells, and below that molecules, atoms, etc.  
Just as the ruler has a function of ‘measuring’, the parts of the body have a wide 
variety of functions, including complex tasks such as perception, thinking and so on.  
In these accounts what is to be a body organ is determined by the assemblage of 
the physical matter arranged so as to provide the function, even if it is very complex.  
A human is, then, a particular assemblage and integration of these complex organs.  
This is the physicalist account of what it is ‘to be’ a human which pervades the 
medical sciences.  This is the account that Heidegger rejects. 
A standard approach in science, when faced with complexity, is to break something 
                                            
48 Aristotle (384-322BCE) 
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down into its component parts or by function and then ‘assign’ different science 
disciplines or sub-disciplines to study the parts.  The idea is that when we ‘reduce’ 
a thing to its parts, understand the parts and then we eventually understand the 
complexity of the whole because we know how all the parts work.  The whole is no 
more than the sum of the parts and is constituted by the assemblage of those parts. 
Again, the understanding implicit in this approach is rejected by Heidegger. 
That this account is held within the medical sciences is readily demonstrated. For 
example, one text book, Neuroscience (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007) declares 
that due to the complexity of all the mechanisms associated with the functioning of 
the brain the field of neuroscience takes “a reductionist approach” and carries out 
its investigations based on different “levels of analysis” (p. 13): 
1. Molecular neuroscience - study of different molecules, how they function and 
their role. 
2. Cellular neuroscience - how the molecular network works together to form 
neurons, the functioning and the interaction between neurons 
3. Systems neuroscience – studies how the constellations of neurons form 
systems, e.g. vision system, motor system, and how the systems receive, 
process and response to information, etc.  
4. Behavioural neuroscience – studies how systems work together to produce 
integrated behaviour, e.g. how memory and moods work and result in various 
behaviours, what accounts for gender-specific behaviour, etc. 
5. Cognitive neuroscience – studies how we get to higher levels of cognition such 
as self-awareness, mental imagery & language.  
The eventual aim in such an approach is to be able to explain higher order levels in 
terms of the lower order. i.e. eventually to be able to move smoothly from level one 
through five. 
In summary, from the view point of science what it is to be an entity is a combination 
and arrangement of other entities.  It is the job of the natural sciences to discover 
how these parts(entities) variously combine, interact behave and so on, to solve the 
puzzles associated with each scientific discipline. The various natural science 
disciplines are, primarily, formed based on the entities they research (e.g. biology, 
herpetology, geology, seismology, meteorology, enzymology, astrology, virology, 
ethology, psychology, neurology, etc.), with each discipline further divided into sub-
disciplines as in the case of neuroscience.  
 
153 
The nature of the entities which a field of science studies, in turn, determines the 
mode of investigation. Inquiring into the makeup and movements of tectonic plates 
requires a different body of knowledge, different approaches, different instruments, 
etc. to investigating subatomic particles, viruses, the human body or mycelium49. All 
the objects of study in these fields, however, have the same thing in common, they 
are entities understood in terms of a physicalist account, i.e. ultimately everything is 
comprised of the same fundamental particles held together in the same four 
standard fields of force disclosed by physics50.  
During the twentieth century a view, not surprisingly, called reductionism, held that 
eventually, all sciences would reduce down to down to physics.  That that would be 
a sufficient understanding of the interaction of atomic and sub-atomic particles to 
explain chemistry, and that a sufficient understanding of chemistry will explain 
molecular biology, which in turn explains biological life, and so on. This project has 
ostensibly failed, and the failure has typically been put down to complexity rather 
than the actual validity of the concept.  (van Riel & Van Gulick, 2016)  
Running through all this is the understanding that there is only one way for an entity 
to be constituted as the entity it is.  All entities are constituted by commencing with 
the most fundamental elements of the universe then building them up in ever 
increasing complex combinations and arrangements.  If being is understood as that 
which constitutes an entity, then being is an entity.  Under this approach a person 
is, essentially, just matter in motion combined and arranged in a particular complex 
manner; there is nothing else! 
Heidegger’s Claim – Against the Normative Account 
I want to make Heidegger's claim as explicit as I can. Heidegger's claim is that 
notwithstanding that being is always the being of an entity, an entity and its being 
are separate. This is what Heidegger calls the "ontological difference" [e.g. BT, BPP, 
HCT]. This also leads Heidegger to make a remarkable claim about science in Basic 
Questions of Philosophy,  
From the standpoint of historical reflection, the advanced modern science of nature is not a 
whit more true than the Greek; on the contrary, at most it is more untrue, because it is 
altogether caught in the web of its own methodology, and, notwithstanding all its discoveries, 
                                            
49 Mycelium is the name given to the fine thread like structures which connect the root systems of plants. 
50 There are only four fundamental forces in physics: gravitational, electromagnetic and the strong and weak 
magnetic force.  
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it lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's 
relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48] (my underlining) 
This is a remarkable claim as it is saying that despite all the new knowledge, the 
discoveries and so on modern science had not moved closer to discovering the 
‘truth’ of nature but has, in fact, moved further from the ‘truth’.  From Heidegger’s 
perspective, this is because of modern sciences’ failure to understand being, 
reducing everything to ‘being’ simply the material. At the risk of over simplification, I 
take the claim to mean that in that science does not understand the proper character 
of being it is not adequately addressing the way entities come into being51.  This is 
certainly the case in relation to the entities discussed in this thesis, Dasein, the 
ready-to-hand and world.  The claim also requires an understanding of Heidegger’s 
concept of truth, as a revealing, which is not discussed in any detail in the thesis. 
This physicalist account of being is the view that Heidegger is 'attacking'.  His life-
long body of work can be seen as a battle to overcome this view (destruction) and 
to put in place what he claims is an alternative and more accurate understanding 
(construction) based on his approach of focusing on the being of entities and not the 
entities themselves(reduction). [BPP 23] 
Heidegger's claim concerning the separation of entities and being, and the 
associated claim that being is not an entity, is stunning and audacious, as is the 
implication, over two thousand years of scholarship is wrong!  
Puzzling 
However, this just brings us back to the puzzle, what is being? If the tradition has 
been so wrong for so long, there must be some complex puzzle that Heidegger has 
discovered and solved. This is the sense given in ‘the riddle’ like list of qualities 
about being that I provided above.  
However, no, this does not seem to be the case.  As if in direct contradiction to 
earlier remarks about ‘hiddenness’ Heidegger says,  
Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport 
ourselves in any way, is being. [BT 26/7] 
How can being both be hidden and be that which we have in view all the time? How 
can the tradition be so wrong about something that is so common-place and in plain 
                                            




Elsewhere Heidegger states that while science does "examine entities as entities" 
that they do so already operating with "an understanding of being"[BT 31/11] and 
that this understanding is a defining characteristic of Dasein in general. [BT 33/13] 
But this simply raises another puzzle how can science both operate within an 
understanding of being, which Heidegger indicates is correct and yet science also 
has a wrong understanding of being?  
I am sure that if I push hard enough, I could name other puzzles relating to 
Heidegger’s comments on being, but I think that I have identified enough, to make 
the point. To me, the more I thought about it, the more mysterious being sounded 
and was certainly outside any understating that I had at the time. However, 
Heidegger is very grounded.  He insists that being is not "supersensible" or 
"metaphysical" [BCAP] and strongly indicates that his work must precede and is 
essential to that of the sciences [BT 714/5]. I discuss this aspect in a later chapter.   
Why the Question is Relevant 
If we take the physicalist approach, Marion Miller is simply a mind-boggling, complex 
arrangement and functioning of cells, not just those associated with neuroscience 
but incorporating all the other aspects of the body.  There is no question that 
Marion’s body is failing and in need of care, but if the physicalist account is correct, 
then to treat Marion’s body is the same as treating Marion.  However, if Heidegger 
is right, then Marion should not be understood in terms of her body.  If this is the 
case then what is it to be a person, a Dasein?  Heidegger, as I will argue, does not 
deny that the body is a required aspect for Marion to exist, to be a person. What I 
will need to address is in what way the body is required, but also explain how this 
can be the case such that the body, i.e. an entity, is not the being of, say, Marion. 
This all sounds reasonable, but it first requires a sound grasp of what Heidegger 
means by being.  
What is Dasein the entity 
The main task in Division I of Being and Time is the undertaking of what Heidegger 
refers to as the analysis of Dasein with the goal of disclosing the being of Dasein. 




This entity which each of us is … we shall denote by the term "Dasein". [BT 27/7] 
Dasein is not only close to us … we are it, each of us, we ourselves. [BT 36/15] 
In that Dasein is the object of Heidegger’s inquiry it is important that we clarify our 
understanding of Dasein. In that, by and large, our understanding of things arises 
out of our cultural context, then just as it is for being, the understanding we have of 
Dasein, what it is to be a person, will in some way be grounded in the culture.   
While I have identified that in the sciences there has been a reductionist account of 
the person, this is not the case in the culture at large. In this section, I provide some 
background as to how what it is to be human has been conceived by philosophers 
throughout the Western tradition, introduce Heidegger's concept of Dasein and then 
raise a fundamental problem in thinking about Dasein from a Heideggerian 
perspective.  
A (Very) Brief Survey of the Tradition 
In many ways, a human is indistinguishable from other animals. It is therefore not 
surprising that identifying precisely what unique characteristics separates us from 
other animals has been considered by the great philosophers in our tradition. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics(Aristotle, 2004) Aristotle identifies both the main similarities 
and differences between human and other living things. Humans, Aristotle tells us, 
have a "life of nourishment and growth" shared with plants, and "some sort of 
sentient life" (pg12/1098a) shared with animals. What uniquely reflects human life 
is our reason or a rational capacity with which to conduct our lives, so for Aristotle 
we are "zoon logon echon", or as typically translated 'rational animal'52.  
                                            
52 In Being and Time [BT 47/25] Heidegger refers to this: 
"In both ordinary and philosophical usage, Dasein, man's Being, is 'defined' as the ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχων (zoon logon 
echon)-- as that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse. "  (my gloss 
of the Greek). 
 
He translates λόγοϛ (logos) as discourse which is an alternative translation, refer note 3 on BT 47. In later 
chapters of Being and Time Heidegger translates λόγοϛ (logos) to the German Rede which is translated into 
English as discourse or talk.     
This emphasis by Heidegger on logos as 'talk' rather than 'reason' is crucial to his conception of the being of 
Dasein. Talk is not an isolated attribute or skill, it is based on an understanding of the being of things, which in 
turn means it is related to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world.  Heidegger thought that Aristotle was closer 
to his understanding of the meaning of the being of Dasein than as understood by the tradition and logos as talk 
is thus a better interpretation of Aristotle's understanding. This is approached by Heidegger can be seen in the 
following from Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (§ 6). When Heidegger is discussing the meaning of 
λόγοϛ (logos) he incorporates his own terminology to explain Aristotle: 
 
“Self-expressing as speaking about . . . is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, of being-in-a-world. Where 




In early Christianity, the idea of the human as an animal is replaced by the 
understanding that we are constituted in the image of God, 'imago Dei'. This concept 
can be traced back to the first chapter of Genesis, "Then, God said. 'Let’s make man 
in our image, in our likeness ..." (Gen 1:26). This approach was taken by Augustine 
of Hippo(354-453CE)  (McGrath, 2013) and in so doing jettisons the notion of animal 
while retaining the link to reason.  
As God is not of the flesh but is understood as the Trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit), 
Augustine interprets ‘imago Dei’ as the Trinity being instantiated in us as memory, 
intellect, and will. (Sepper, 2002) This is largely a Platonic approach and centuries 
later it caused difficulties when the works of Aristotle were re-discovered by Western 
scholars.  
Throughout the Scholastic period (1100-1700) Aristotelian and not Platonic 
concepts came to dominate scholarship, based not only on his metaphysics but his 
writing on logic and in the natural sciences. Aristotle rejects Plato’s account of being 
which was based on ideal forms and the concept of a separate perfect world of 
forms, which was part of the appeal to the early church.  Scholarship was church-
based, and the embracing of Aristotle’s ideas leads to the need to reconcile Aristotle 
with church theology a task undertaken by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and 
presented in his highly influential work Summa Theologica(Aquinas(Saint) , 1972).  
Aquinas shifts from attempting to align the Trinity with the constitutive elements of 
being human and argues that 'imago Dei' existed in the very nature of a person's 
reason and it is this that distinguishes humans from other creatures. (Kenny, 2004) 
In his theology, he also ‘brings back’ the body as an important aspect and discusses 
the emotions. He regarded the passions as 'lower powers' separate to the body and 
that both the passions and body, rebelled against reason leading to our fall; 
Man's mind by sin abandoned subordination to God, with a consequence that now his lower 
powers were no longer wholly responsive to his reason; and such was the rebellion of the 
flesh against reason that the body as well was no more wholly responsive to the soul: hence 
death and other bodily defects. (Aquinas(Saint) , 1972, p. 167) 
In Aquinas account, we see the clear separation of the passions from reason, the 
formulation of reason as the seat of the ‘true -self’ and the need to place the 
passions under the control of reasons.  With the re-discovery of Aristotle and the 
work of Aquinas, the concept of human as 'rational animal’ instead of ‘Imago Dei’ 
makes a regular appearance in Scholastic writing.  (Kenny, 2004; McGrath, 2013)  
  
158 
The last of the main reformulations was by Descartes, who in the second of his 
Meditations on First Philosophy53 (Descartes, 2012) rejects the notion of the person 
as a rational animal, 
What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say ‘a rational animal’? 
No; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one 
question would lead me down the slope to other harder ones, and I do not now have the time 
to waste on subtleties of this kind.  (Descartes, 2012) (p. 17) 
It is in the Meditation that Descartes introduces the notion that we are a soul, made 
of an ethereal, non-worldly, substance he calls res cogitans, literally thinking thing, 
which he identifies with all our various cognitive abilities (e.g. thinking as well as the 
capacity for awareness of sensations, etc.). The body is made of the same 
substance as all the rest of the universe, it is inanimate, physical matter, what he 
calls res extensa, literally things that have extension54, which he often translated as 
corporeal thing. The soul is neither in the body nor in the world; it is a completely 
separate entity. 
The definition of human as linked to our mental attributes remains, and Descartes 
resolves the problem of how a non-material soul substance (res cogitans) can have 
two-way communication with inanimate, material substances (res extensa) by 
identifying the pineal gland, situated in the brain, as the link.  (Descartes, 2004; 
Shapiro, 2011) It is from Descartes that we have, in its modern understanding, the 
notion of substance dualism and closely associated with this the duality of subject - 
object.  
What all the philosophers appear to be doing, at least in part, is taking the everyday 
experiences of real phenomena associated with our various modes of cognition and 
conscious awareness, and attempting to make sense of them by placing the 
experiences within the context of a broader understanding of the world as they 
understood it. Throughout the Christian era, the understanding that framed 
everything else was that God was the creator of the Universe and all it contained. 
While Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes all had different formulations concerning 
what it is to be human, they all provided accounts that fitted within the dominant 
Christian theological framework of God the creator.  
                                            
53 Descartes’ Meditations of First Philosophy was first published in 1641. 
54 Roughly put, the idea is that things that have extension, i.e. length, breadth, depth, take up space and must 
therefore be comprised of some 'solid' material. 
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While modern scholarship has rejected many of Descartes' ideas, especially that of 
the separate soul-substance, the phenomenon he was describing, which is taken as 
the consciousness or mind, and the questions that arise out of his work form the 
basis of much of contemporary philosophy. These questions include: How does a 
'mind' 'inside' the physical body gain access to information of the 'outside' world that 
is 'true'? How does the 'mind' not only get information about the 'physical' body in 
which it resides but how does it 'direct' the body? How does the 'mind' inside one 
body know there are 'minds' in other bodies? If the 'mind' is not physical, it is 
essentially our thoughts, experiences of sensations, memories and so forth how 
does it arise from the physical body? These and other problems exist regardless 
whether one thinks of us as soul or a mind and they form part of the main problems 
addressed as part of the sub-discipline of Philosophy of Mind.  (Chalmers, 1996; J. 
Kim, 2011; Searle, 2004)  
In terms of how the mind works, perhaps the most significant development following 
Descartes was by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In The Critique of Pure 
Reason(Kant, 1998), Kant argued that the mind is not a passive recipient of 'sense 
data' from the outside world but actively arranges and constructs the data into the 
experiences of the perceptions of the world that we have. For Kant, we do not have 
access to the actual real-world as it is, rather we have access only to the 
experiences of the world as presented to us as part of the innate processes of the 
mind. In one form or another, this basic Kantian idea that the mind is active in 
forming our experiences of the world is the normative view today.  It underlies 
representational theories of consciousness(Lycan, 2015) and of the constructivist 
theories which assert that scientific knowledge is 'socially constructed' and not 
knowledge of the real world(Applefield, Huber, & Moallem, 2000).  
Kant restricts knowledge to what can be experienced, which includes the possibility 
of gaining knowledge of the natural world but excludes knowledge of God and the 
soul which he viewed as beyond our experience.  He, therefore, puts out of play as 
legitimate subjects of inquiry for the sciences any speculation as to the nature of the 
soul and God. Kant does address the 'self' of which he argues we do have 
experience. The consciousness of oneself, the "I of reflection", occurs through what 
he calls acts of apperception, which relate to the unification of our experiences. 
(Brook, 2016) This move helps to push aside the need to address the soul when 
considering how the mind 'works' but does leave open that there is 'something' 
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working to unify our experiences, some I or self. Edmund Husserl introduces a 
similar concept to account for the apparent unity of the various experiences we have 
that form the unified stream of our conscious life; he refers to it as the ego. (Husserl, 
1989)  
As Descartes identified, the concept that we are a mind or consciousness ‘inside’ 
the body accessing objects in the ‘outside’ world raises the problem of how we 
determine we have ‘true’ knowledge of the ‘outside’ world. Simply put, how can we, 
the subject, who only receive experiences via our senses from the outside world be 
sure that those experiences are accurate? How can we be sure that the very 
processes by which the sense data are received, transmitted, and interpreted are 
accurate? This problem splits philosophy, broadly speaking, into two camps, the 
Rationalists and the Empiricist. The Rationalists, the contemporary founder being 
Descartes, believe that reason is the primary source and basis for judging 
knowledge.  Descartes argued that we can’t trust the senses and that everything 
must be founded on ‘rationally’ derived positions and from these we can then make 
judgements about our experiences of the world.  The Empiricists, the contemporary 
founders being John Locke(1632-1704), Bishop George Berkeley(1685-1753) and 
David Hume (1711-1776), argued that our primary source of knowledge are our 
experiences of the world and to these, we must then develop and apply logical and 
rational processes in developing that knowledge. While the rationalist and 
empiricists approach both put forward various ways to address the problem of 
ensuring ‘true’ knowledge of the world no satisfactory solution to the problem has 
yet been found.  (Steup, 2016)  Both these groups hold the view that we are 
somehow ‘minds’ inside the head, separate from the world and this is the 
fundamental source the ‘true’ knowledge problem.  
This very brief overview of the philosophical tradition identifies some of the key ideas 
in the tradition that Heidegger is arguing against. As part of his work he engages 
with those he regards as the most important philosophers associated with these 
various positions throughout his career, for example Aristotle [BCAP, BCArP, PS, 
AM, FCM, IPR], Aquinas [FCM, IPR, BPP, MFL], Descartes [IPR, N(3 & 4), HCT, 
BT, MFL] and Kant [PIKC, KPM, LQT, BPP, WT, BT, EHF]. By way of example, in 
the case of the knowledge problem, he argues that it is not a problem at all but rather 
a case of having the wrong ontological understanding.  He argues that far from being 
an isolated entity locked inside our head, separated from the world our basic 
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constitution is as ‘being-in-the-world' and as such already in the world.[BT] His 
account of Dasein dissolves one of the fundamental problems that has plagued 
philosophy since Descartes.  His solution, however, raises the problem concerning 
how we understand the entity Dasein as being “already in a world”[BT 144/109] as 
part of Dasein’s constituting structure (i.e. Dasein’s ontology). My existing view was 
that my brain is in my head, this is the source of my consciousness, and this seems 
to align with the normative view55.  How is it possible to conceive of myself in such 
a way that ‘I’ am already in the world in such a way that this is constitutive of who I 
am?  This was for me one of the fundamental puzzles of being a Dasein. 
Heidegger never engages in a detailed and direct critique of Husserl’s philosophy 
as it relates to Husserl’s ontological position, probably because Heidegger 
recognises that Husserl is not a major player philosophically in this area. However, 
in Heidegger’s view, Husserl’s phenomenology is underpinned by his embrace of 
Descartes’ subject-object ontological position, and as such Husserl’s philosophy is 
a target for critique. As Philipse notes, Heidegger’s Being and Time,  
... may be read as an implicit polemic against Husserl, as many commentators have 
observed. When Heidegger attacks Descartes, he always has Husserl in mind as well, 
because Husserl explicitly situated his work within the Cartesian tradition. (Philipse, 1998, p. 
404) 
Heidegger himself was quite clear that he was attacking Husserl. In a letter to Karl 
Jaspers written on the 26th December 1926 while Being and Time was still in the 
final stages of preparation he writes that,  
If the treatise is written ‘against’ anyone, it’s against Husserl … (Carman, 2003) (p. 59) 
Excursus – the problem of knowledge and the outside world 
The problem of knowledge and the outside world has been accepted as a 
fundamental problem in modern philosophy since the time of Descartes (Searle, 
2004). This is an important issue to understand as Heidegger sees his work as not 
just attacking this problem, but dissolving it as a non-problem[BT].  Understanding 
the issue helps to understand Heidegger’s position in Being and Time and I will 
outline it briefly before continuing. 
The problem can be described as follows: that there is an independent and self-
sufficient entity we call the subject or person, and there are other self-sufficient and 




independent entities in the world we call objects. The problem is how the subject, 
confined ‘inside’ gains knowledge of the ‘objects’ outside in the world.  We may 
conceive of the subject as a self, ego, I, consciousness, mind, soul or even a 
function of the brain, but regardless of what we propose as the nature of the entity 
that constitutes the subject we still have the same problem. How does an 
independent and self-sufficient subject (entity) gain knowledge of independent, and 
self-sufficient objects (also entities)?  
As soon as the problem is put in this form, it can be seen that there are fundamental 
assumptions being made about the entity that is the subject and the entities that are 
the objects. We are assuming that in each case they are separate and independent 
things. To put this more starkly, the view holds that the subject (who we are) is not 
dependent on the entities in the world in order ‘to be’ a subject. Similarly, the entities 
in the world, the objects, are not dependent on ‘being’ the objects they are on the 
subject.  In each case ‘being’ what they are is independent of each other. This is the 
fundamental ontological position that underlies the knowledge or epistemological 
position. This is the view that I held56, and is the dominant position in our culture. It 
is a view that follows logically once a substance ontology is adopted. 
On Heidegger’s account, there is no knowledge problem because the assumed 
ontology is wrong! In Being and Time, Heidegger notes Kant’s view that it is a 
“scandal of philosophy and human reason in general” [BT 247/203] that the 
problems of knowledge of things ‘outside’ had not been resolved. The comment 
concerns an extreme form of the knowledge problem, known as scepticism, which 
questions if we can even prove the existence of the world and what it contains, in 
that all we have are experiences and cannot prove the origins of those experiences.  
The empiricist, Bishop Berkeley took this view to its logical conclusion and argues 
that the physical world does not exist and that all experiences of the world are in 
fact experiences arising from God.   
Heidegger’s response is to attack the source of the problem, the ontology, 
The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are 
expected and attempted again and again. Such expectation, aims, and demands arise from 
an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that 
independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that 
the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and 




makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. [BT 249/205] (my underlining) 
Kant does not successfully ‘solve’ the problem, and so Heidegger argues that if we 
only understand things as being present-at-hand, then we must, 
 … conclude that since the being-present-at-hand of Things outside of us is impossible to 
prove, it must therefore 'be taken merely on faith' [BT 249/205] 
As long as the problem of knowledge of the ‘outside world’ is posited in terms of the 
underlying constraints imposed by the assumed ontology the problem will exist. 
Heidegger argues that we will continue to believe “it must still be possible to carry 
out such a proof.” [BT 249/205], but that “the question whether an external world is 
present-at-hand and whether such a world can be proved ... [is] an impossible one” 
[BT 250/206]  
Heidegger’s response is that if we properly understand the nature of the being of 
the entity that is asking the question concerning knowledge of the outside world, i.e. 
Dasein, then we would understand that the question is nonsense. Heidegger 
argues, and this will be addressed later in the thesis, that entities within-the-world 
are only intelligible on the basis of the phenomenon of world, which in turn is an 
essential aspect of the structure of Dasein itself, i.e. being-in-the-world. [summarise 
in BT 252/209] As such there is no external world problem.  
Roughly speaking, each Dasein, is constituted by its encounter with the world, which 
also is the basis for entities in the world being “ontologically conceivable”.  Dasein 
is always already in-the-world and does not need to ‘get out’ from the ‘inside’ to the 
‘outside’ to access thing is the world. There is no independent, self-sufficient subject 
dealing with independent, self-sufficient objects!  It is this work of Heidegger’s 
concerning the ontology of Dasein that is the basis of his attack on the ontological 
presupposition underlying the ‘knowledge problem’. 
Again, I would point out that this is not some rarefied argument pertinent only to 
philosophers. Although it is philosophers that engage in technical descriptions, 
proofs, and so on, it is the way these issues are conceived and adopted as the 
normative accounts that inform our culture more generally and the sciences in 
particular. It is therefore important that if I am developing an understanding based 
on Heidegger’s work that I am also able to bring to the surface the position that is to 
be overturned. 
Heidegger’s argument as I have briefly summarised it requires substantial work to 
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make intelligible.  Every aspect of it requires careful exploration and finally 
embracing Heidegger’s account requires the letting go of the assumed 
presuppositions that the only way of ‘being’ an entity is based in some way on 
substance ontology.   
Heidegger’s Dasein 
Just as earlier philosophers identified a name which captured what they thought to 
be the essence of being human (rational animal, imago Dei, res cogitans) so does 
Heidegger. Heidegger's name for us is Dasein, and it makes its first substantive 
appearance in a lecture course given in the Summer Semester of 1923 called 
Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Just as the previous names do not capture 
everything about the entity with which it is dealing, whether body, soul or mind or 
some combination, nor does Dasein, it does, however, attempt to identify the 
essential defining feature. 
In German Dasein is a compound word that when taken together means existence, 
but when broken down into to its parts (Da + Sein) means 'there being', which is 
Heidegger’s intent.  However, great care needs to be taken in how this is 
understood. When we hear ‘rational animal’ we have an idea of what is being 
referred to, it is those cognitive aspects which are supposed to define us a species. 
If we take ‘being there’ as somehow indicating a ‘there’ is a spatial sense we will 
have completely misunderstood Heidegger’s intent and with it his philosophical 
position. In my initial readings of Being and Time, I found what Heidegger means by 
Dasein as incomprehensible. This is how Heidegger explained Dasein in 1965, 
In the philosophical tradition, the term "Dasein" means presence-at-hand, existence. In this 
sense, one speaks, for instance, of proofs of God's existence. However, Da-sein is 
understood differently in Being and Time. To begin with, French existentialists also failed to 
pay attention to it. That is why they translated Da-sein in Being and Time as être-là, which 
means being here and not there. The Da in Being and Time does not mean a statement of 
place for a being, but rather it should designate the openness where entities can be present 
for the human being, and the human being also for himself. The Da of [Dasein's] being 
distinguishes the humanness of the human being. [ZS 120]  
The French existentialist that Heidegger particularly had in mind was Jean-Paul 
Sartre[ZS].  I would argue, however, that a proper understanding of Dasein, as 
Heidegger intends it, is impossible until a full understanding of being-in-the-world is 
achieved. On this basis, it is another example of having to use terms whose meaning 
is only clarified as the inquiry unfolds. This is the case in both Being and Time and 
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in this inquiry. 
In the passage, Heidegger explicitly rules out understandings of Dasein that may 
typically arise if one looks at the common usage of the word or even the etymology57. 
For a long while, I was thinking along the lines of the "French existentialists” that the 
world was the ‘space’ we inhabit, or at least our understanding of the things, etc., in 
this space58. When looked at carefully his remarks give us no real clue as to what 
he means by the “openness where entities can be present". The “openness” sounds 
like it has nothing to do with us at all, yet the term Dasein is supposed to be naming 
something crucial to the understanding of his conception of Dasein. The puzzle of 
the “openness” being our defining aspect and yet seeming to be something separate 
to us needs to be clarified if we are to make sense of Heidegger’s work. 
In Being and Time Heidegger introduces the term, Dasein, as follows; 
This entity which each of us is himself ... we shall denote by the term "Dasein". [BT 27/7] 
This makes it clear to what entity he is referring to; it is us, it is me. If we take 
Heidegger's idea of not taking any pre-conception to things unless they have been 
clarified, the question we must put to our self is: What are we supposed to 
understand by the entity designated by "each of us is"? While we may not typically 
ask our self this question in the ordinary course of our affairs, I suspect most of us 
would most likely have an answer, even if in a non-specific way.  That answer would 
variously include the body (and I include the brain in this), consciousness, mind, a 
soul or spirit or some combination.  All these answers are consistent, in a broad 
sense, with the various answers which have been posited by the philosophical 
tradition. 
The idea of putting aside presuppositions for Heidegger is not a simple, methodical 
device. Presuppositions form part of our understanding, and as such to the extent 
that presuppositions are wrong or untested then our understanding is tenuous. 
However, Heidegger often takes a much stronger stance and declares some 
understandings to be wrong.  Typically, this is when he knows that there are views 
held that must be shaken free if we are to understand his work.  This is the case 
                                            
57 This ruling out common or alternate meanings which are contrary to Heidegger’s intent is a very common 
practice in Being and Time. In a broader sense, it can be understood as part of the method of ‘destruction'. By 
specifically removing contrary meanings to that which Heidegger intends, one is forced to keep inquiring as to 




with Dasein, and he gives a comprehensive list of what Dasein is not.  Heidegger 
rejects any notion that we are body or soul. [BT 74/47] He rejects the notion of 
Dasein as some equivalent to our consciousness or some form of conscious-self 
[ZS 120]. He doesn’t, however, reject the notion of consciousness which he regards 
as a legitimate phenomenon [BT 151/116], just one not to be confused with Dasein. 
If we think in biological terms and suggest that we are some form of biological life, 
then this too is rejected [BT 75/50]. He rejects "ego-thing" or "person-thing" and with 
this Husserl's concept of the ego [HCT 247], together with the idea of an "I" or a 
subject [BT 72/47]. If we think of Dasein as some "epiphenomena", again rejected 
[HCT 248]. He rejects any notion of us that involves an understanding based on 
substance ontology (present-at-hand) whether the substance is physical (e.g. body), 
metaphysical (e.g. spirit, soul, or ego) or even epiphenomenal entity (e.g. perhaps 
consciousness).  
Heidegger in effect rejects any understanding of us that has hitherto been presented 
in the Western scholarly tradition! If any person holds any of these views concerning 
what it is to be a human, then they do not have Heidegger’s understanding. By 
specifically clearing away, not simply putting them aside for the moment, all these 
possible understandings of being human Heidegger places before us a significant 
challenge. We must not simply think in a new way about the same things, something 
akin to imagining a new order or arrangement, of previously understood things. We 
must think something new.  
By removing every other way of thinking about Dasein that has been present in the 
culture Heidegger does not have in mind some way thinking that has been present 
but not understood. Rather it is that Heidegger’s Dasein has been absent from the 
culture itself, and to a significant extent remains absent.  I suspect that this is why I 
had so much difficulty in understanding Heidegger’ work and then seeing the world, 
even if dimly, as Heidegger sees it. 
The Problem of Dasein 
When I think logically through Heidegger's assertion that being of an entity is itself 
not an entity, the rejection of any concept of being human as an entity automatically 
follows.  I could follow Heidegger’s logic but not its implications.  Before this, I would 
have said that to be a person, a human being, was to be a member of the species 
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homo sapiens59.  Following this, I would have proceeded to consider characteristics 
that defined our species from others, e.g. consciousness, cognition and so on. 
However, all these ways of thinking have been ruled out.  Neither is Heidegger 
thinking of something metaphysical in the sense of other worldly; he is making ‘real 
world’ claims about Dasein.  Dasein is an entity, and further, this entity is something 
that is the proper object of scientific inquiry. [BT 71/46] I struggled to conceptualise 
Dasein in a way that met all these criteria.  Like being, this presented another key 
puzzle. 
It took a long time to recognise that the issue of the nature of the entity of Dasein 
was an essential question to answer. It was always there in Heidegger's work, but it 
drifted in and out of view.  There is a tendency to keep falling back to equating 
Dasein to something familiar, some similar but alternative take on what is already 
known; a powerful pull that is hard to overcome given my cultural background60.  In 
reading Heidegger, you cannot dwell on the puzzling parts, as the solution is only 
accessible when the puzzle as a whole is solved.  Content with the sense that 
Dasein ‘is us’ I suspect, in a similar way to the term being, Dasein became a familiar 
term of use and that it remained unclear tended to fade into the background, a 
dangerous tendency in scholarship! 
The understanding of the entity Dasein was suddenly and unexpectedly brought into 
focus after stumbling across a passage while undertaking another task.  In the 
passage, Heidegger specifically addresses the nature of the entity of Dasein, and 
subsequent searches have failed to uncover similar comments. The remarks, 
quoted earlier, come from the Summer 1928 lecture series, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, the last given at the University of Marburg, and not long after 
the publication of Being and Time. 
If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting 
something that belongs to its essence, and I thereby disregard whether the entity of such a 
nature factually exists or not. In other words, the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic 
constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; I do not, by 
this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, nor am I saying of it that, in accord 
with its essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169] (my bolding) 
With every typical way of considering Dasein as an entity ruled out, but always 
                                            
59 homo sapiens is from Latin and is literally translated as 'wise' man, again identifying what is understood as a 




hopeful that some glimpse of Heidegger's conceptualisation of Dasein would come 
into view this passage was devastating.  Apart from the difficulties it posed for me 
regarding my grasp of Dasein, I failed to understand how Heidegger could argue 
that the sciences deal with entities, that his work on Dasein necessarily precedes 
the sciences [BT 71/45] and yet he makes no claim about the existence of the entity!  
If we combine this claim with the earlier point, that somehow Dasein is already ‘in 
the world’, then understanding what Heidegger means by Dasein as an entity 
becomes a significant problem.   
In Being and Time, given that Dasein is the entity that is the subject of inquiry using 
phenomenology, how can such an inquiry be undertaken if Dasein itself cannot be 
brought into view?  This question is addressed in Chapter 9. 
Summary 
Fundamental to this thesis, and any attempt to understand Heidegger’s work, are 
the concepts of being and Dasein and this chapter has set out the difficulties in 
grasping, these concepts from what Heidegger presents in his work.  
The chapter also provides a summary of the account from the Tradition concerning 
being and Dasein. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, having some basic 
knowledge of the Tradition assists in understanding Heidegger’s work as it is this 
position he is attacking, and he refers to it throughout his work.  Secondly, to give 
proper consideration to Heidegger’s account, this should be against the background 
of a reasonable understanding of the alternative.  Thirdly, our initial understanding 
of the nature of being human and the being of things typically come from the 
normative accounts within the Tradition. These understandings may not be explicitly 
recognised, and so covertly inform our views.  Some familiarity with the tradition 
helps to identify these hidden understandings and is an important part of being open 
to the possibility of new ways of understanding.   
There is a certain necessity for the initial engagement with Heidegger’s work to 
occur with a lack of clarity concerning the meaning of key concepts, to hold the need 
for understanding at bay.  Heidegger is presenting a radically new approach, and 
the ‘unity’ of his account emerges only slowly as the various, seemingly 
disconnected pieces merge, shaped by the very unity they are forming. 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of ‘light dawns gradually’ is apt in this regard.  
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This chapter presents the puzzle and problem encountered in grasping Heidegger’s 
meaning of Dasein and being.  For me, the puzzle remained, but lying dormant, 
even after engaging with Heidegger’s work for several years.  The puzzle awoke 
when I found it difficult to provide a coherent account of the concepts for the thesis.  
If Dasein and being should be intelligible if the ‘unity’ of Heidegger’s work were 
sufficiently well understood then it was clear that my fundamental understanding 
was lacking, and worse, may be errant. This is what forced me back to reconsider 
the concepts of being and Dasein. 
Being and Time is a large dense work and understanding its thesis is made difficult 
because there are concepts that are not only helpful but in my view essential to 
making sense of Being and Time which are not covered in the book. Heidegger 
deals with these concepts in his lecture courses61, but they are often left out of Being 
and Time or reduced from lengthy discussion down to a pithy sentence; perhaps 
due to the already lengthy nature of the book. There is certainly plenty in Being and 
Time, as published, to provoke new thinking but there is the substantial risk that it is 
misunderstood, as is the famous case of Jean-Paul Sartre’s interpretation.  
It was when I went back to solve the puzzle of being and Dasein that I came to 
appreciate the value of Heidegger’s published lecture courses as important 
supplements to Being and Time. As a result of going back to these other works, I 
reconsidered the structure of the thesis. Initially, I had planned and was ‘writing 
towards’ an interpretive account that focused on the structure of Being and Time, 
this was abandoned. 
As I worked towards understanding Heidegger's being and Dasein, I found myself 
re-tracing aspects of Heidegger’s intellectual journey, first with the Greeks, then with 
Husserl. I discovered a rich source of ideas and concepts that seem to inform and 
influence Heidegger's position but are barely discernible in Being and Time.  The 
conclusion I reached was that if the background concepts that inform Being and 
Time could be adequately presented, then the work in Being and Time becomes, 
                                            
61 The 1927 publication of Being and Time was the only publication by Heidegger for around a decade. Most of 
the books authored by Heidegger that have been released were never written as books, they are transcripts of 
his lectures or seminars. The release of these lectures in book form did not start to occur until the 1970s in any 
substantial manner. In the thesis when I first refer to a book I have generally given an indication if it relates to a 
lecture course. Heidegger’s lecture courses are not merely presentations of a fixed course content, that was 
simply repeated and updated year after year. Heidegger used his course as part of his research. The lectures 
were, in effect, the report of his current research into an area that typically covered Heidegger’s exploration and 




not just more accessible, but in my view intelligible.   
Rethinking the problem of Dasein and being, resulted in including in the thesis the 
discussions concerning these two important concepts. In the rethinking, however, it 
forced me to consider what other important concepts Heidegger brings to Being and 
Time without much disclosure. This led to the chapters on linking Heidegger with 
science (Chapters 10 and 11), on intentionality and lived experience (Chapter 12), 
lessons from Heidegger’s encounter with Husserl (Chapter 12 and 13) and a 
different approach to engaging with his concept of the ready-to-hand and world 
(Chapter 13). Perhaps the most significant change that resulted was re-thinking 
Heidegger’s work in terms complex systems theory and emergence (Chapter 19) 
which in led me to a more radical view of my understanding of Dasein as an 
emergent entity.   
In summary, confronting the problem of being and Dasein drove me back to revisit 
previous work and to explore different avenues to find the clarity I sought.  This work 
not only led to clarifying these concepts but to a radically new understanding of 
Dasein and being-in-the-world.  The concern that a lack of clarity around these 
concepts may indicate something missed proved well founded. The discovery of the 
problem occurred as I was completing the penultimate draft of the thesis, which has 
only a distant resemblance to what was finally produced.  Such is the iterative nature 
of encountering new understandings! 






CHAPTER 5: BEING - HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT  
Introduction 
An entomologist sets off to a newly discovered jungle location.  The area has been 
geographically isolated for thousands of years, and the goal is to discover and 
document new insect species. This task requires that the entomologist has a prior 
understanding of the concept of ‘insect’ and can apply it to specific instances.  Only 
then can a little ‘critter’ be ‘spotted’ as a potential insect, examined to confirm the 
classification, and then further examined to see if it is a new species. Heidegger’s 
declared project concerns being and it is inconceivable that he didn’t have a 
reasonably well-formed conception of being as he commenced writing Being and 
Time. Heidegger had explored much of the area contained in Being and Time before 
its writing, and while new material is evident the conceptual framework of being does 
not change. (Kisiel, 1995) In this and the following chapters it will become evident 
that such a framework existed, he simply chose not to make it explicit in Being and 
Time.   
I had read Being and Time several times, making extensive notes and marking up 
the text with underlines, colour highlights and comments.  As covered in the last 
chapter, my view that I had a sufficient grasp of the concept of being for the thesis 
was overturned, and this sent me back to the texts. The approach was simple, I 
went back for a closer look at Heidegger’s project in the context of Being and Time, 
with a specific focus on examples of how he uses the term being. This not only failed 
to achieve the necessary clarity but resulted in a deepening of the puzzle.  This work 
is summarised in this Chapter 2. 
My next step was an exploration of the early Greek concepts of being, particularly 
the ideas of Aristotle, on the premise that Heidegger believes that progress towards 
an understanding of being goes astray after Aristotle [FCM]. This proved very helpful 
and revealed useful similarities between the Aristotelian and Heideggerian 
accounts. Chapter 6 summarises this work.  With the aid of the knowledge gained 
from reading the Greek accounts of being, I identified an important section in one of 
Heidegger’s interpretations of the Greek understanding of being. This proved 
decisive, and I identified a key aspect of Heidegger’s concept of being that helped 
bring all the other aspects together. This account is contained in Chapter 7 of the 
thesis, together with my interpretation of Heidegger’s conceptual framework for 
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being as it applies to Being and Time.   
In the following I explore in more detail Heidegger’s project concerning being, the 
various ways that he applies the term being and the constitution of the structure of 
being. 
Heidegger’s Project 
Heidegger opens Being and Time with a quotation from Plato's Sophists,  
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 
"being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.   
[BT 18/1] 
This is a clear marker for his work, commencing his treatise by pointing out that even 
at the commencement of the tradition one of the giants of philosophy, Plato, 
acknowledges that he is ‘perplexed’ by the question of being. Heidegger then 
immediately observes that even in his day there is still no answer to the question of 
what we mean by ‘being’; a position that still stands.  However, Heidegger notes a 
difference between the contemporary situation and that of the ancients.  Whereas 
the question of the meaning of being provided the " stimulus for the researches of 
Plato and Aristotle" since then the question of being itself since been forgotten by 
the philosophical tradition and subject to "complete neglect".[BT 21/1] Heidegger 
thinks this has happened because it is such a "universal and emptiest of concepts" 
that it "resists every attempt at definition".[BT 21/1]  He then argues that 
notwithstanding the lack of a definition of being in scholarship that "everyone uses 
it constantly and already understands what he means by it", and as such no clarity 
in definition was thought necessary, it was, as it were, "superfluous".[BT 21/1]   
So it came to pass that, 
… that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure 
and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask 
about it he is charged with an error of method. [BT 18/1]   
This is quite a claim!  It is against this background, of not just a neglected question 
but one the Tradition does not believe worth pursuing that Heidegger’s philosophical 
inquiries take place.  His declared project in his most famous work, Being and Time 
is "to work out the question of the meaning of being" [BT 19/1].  
Heidegger is referring to a technical understanding of being, and despite this lack at 
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the technical level he takes as given that we have a general understanding of the 
meaning of being, of what it is "to be", to exist62. This is evident whenever  
… one cognizes63 anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports64 oneself 
towards entities … some use is made of [an understanding of] 'being' ... this expression is 
held to be intelligible ... just as everyone understands 'The sky is blue', 'I am merry' and the 
like." [BT 23/4] 
Here Heidegger is pointing out the self-evident. Whenever I use a computer, a car, 
a coffee cup or even eat a piece of toast, I am exhibiting and understanding of what 
these things are.  If a computer, a toaster, a log and a coffee cup are placed in front 
of my dog Rogan, he would understand them as objects that he must walk around 
(or over!), but not as the entities they are. This is evident by the way Rogan 
encounters and deals with them. Even a young toddler has a rudimentary 
understanding of the difference between entities encountered in the home.  This is 
the general understanding of being.  A technical understanding requires that we 
know what it means to be a toaster or a coffee cup.  It is this technical level of 
understanding that Heidegger argues that the tradition has not properly grasped.  
Being then, is used in two ways by Heidegger. I have a general understanding of 
the being of a hammer when I recognise it as a hammer and use it as a hammer. I 
do not have a technical understanding of the being of a hammer unless I can 
account for what it means to be a hammer.  We can have both an understanding of 
being (general) and a lack of understanding of being(technical)! 
In these examples, the words is, am, and are, often appear.  They are all forms of 
the verb to be.  The very language we use contains a recognition of our general 
understanding of ‘being’. i.e. what it is to be something.  Heidegger regards it as 
self-evident that from an early age we go about the activities of our daily life using 
various things (entities), talking about them, thinking about them and so on.  
Typically, and for the most part, we do this in a manner that indicates we know what 
the various things we engaged with (what Heidegger refers to a comport) are. It is 
                                            
62 I have used the term ‘exist’ in its every day usage and will continue to do so throughout this chapter.  However, 
in the context of Being and Time it is used as a defined technical term by Heidegger with a different meaning.  
Existence will refer to the mode of Dasein’s being.  
63 Cognizes - think about in any way. 
64 Comport - Macquarrie and Robinson in their footnote to this word (note 1 p 23) explain that the German verb 
verhalten can refer to "any kind of behaviour or way of conducting oneself, even to the way in which one relates 




impossible to conceive of human existence without this understanding of being, 
understanding of what things are.  
While the observation that we have a general understanding of being does not seem 
like a profound insight, it does lead to the core question of Heidegger’s work, the 
difference between understanding what is a hammer and what it means to be a 
hammer. It is this difference between knowing what something is and knowing what 
it means to be something that Heidegger is concerned with.  When we think about 
this concept of what it ‘means to be’ we are asking questions about being and have 
entered the realm of ontology, the name given to the study of being. Ontology is part 
of the sub-discipline of philosophy called metaphysics, and this is the field in which 
Heidegger's inquiries take place.   
Another point associated with the observation that we have a general understanding 
of being is that we must, in some way, be given the correct basis for understanding 
entities as the entities they are; otherwise, we couldn’t understand them.  Heidegger 
seizes upon this point and takes our ‘average everyday’ understanding of things 
(general) to work out formally (technical), the basis of our understanding.  While he 
doesn't make it explicit, he is arguing that because we are given a general 
understanding of being, then whatever the technical basis for that understanding it 
must also be the meaning of being for the entity concerned.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the general, contemporary understanding is 
that the being of a hammer refers to the material from which it is made.  In that the 
material aspect of an entity has particular characteristics, size, colour, shape, feel 
and so on, we can then judge what the entity is.  At one level this satisfies 
Heidegger's requirement that the being of the entity (the physical characteristics) is 
also the basis of our understanding the entity. However, we know Heidegger rejects 
this because ‘being is not an entity’.  The challenge of breaking the connection 
between visual appearance and the being of the entity will be a recurring theme in 
the thesis. 
It is because “we already live in an understanding of being” [BT 23/4] (general), that 
it is such a defining characteristic of human existence, that the question as to the 
meaning of what it is to be something (technical) is so important.  Yet, according to 
Heidegger, a formal, thematized understanding of being is "still veiled in darkness" 
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and because of this "it is necessary in principle to raise this question again” [BT 
23/44]. However, Heidegger doesn’t believe we even know the proper way to ask 
the question of the meaning of being. This is reflected in the earlier discussion on 
the structure of his inquiry and is the basis of his articulation of his project in Being 
and Time; 
…  first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim 
in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so 
concretely. [BT 18/1] 
Working in various ways to understand the meaning of being, after some two 
millennia of neglect, was to become the project that defines Heidegger’s 
philosophical career(Guignon, 1993) and was the basis of his fame.  Heidegger had 
been pursuing his project via his lecture courses at the Universities of Freiburg and 
Marburg for some years before the publication of Being and Time in 1927.  Prior to 
this, he was relatively unknown as a philosopher of note outside a small circle, but 
with Being and Time, his first publication of any sort in over a decade, Heidegger is 
elevated to international prominence as a philosopher, and this status continues 
through to today. 
The following passage is a compact summary of Heidegger’s project.  It sets it out 
in the form of the structure of his inquiry discussed in Chapter Three, contains the 
critical assertion that being is not an entity and indicates the key point on which he 
leverages his inquiries, i.e. that we already have an understanding of being: 
In the question which we are to work out [previously mentioned, this is his project or Gefrates], 
what is asked about is being [Befragtes] - that which determines entities as entities, that on 
the basis of which entities are already understood [Erfragtes – formal indication of answer], 
however we may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 25-
6/6] (my gloss in square brackets) 
Fundamental and Regional Ontology 
While I have been using hammers, etc. by way of examples to illustrate what is 
meant by being, the examples are misleading regarding Heidegger's project.  
Concerning his investigation, his project, he states,  
Its aim is one of fundamental ontology. [BT 170/132] 
This requires some clarification. 
Within ontology, the question concerning being is known as fundamental ontology, 
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and its goal is to understand the most fundamental building blocks for entities within 
a particular metaphysical system. In contemporary physicalist account, this would 
be the most elemental sub-atomic participles, for the very early Greeks, as I will 
discuss next chapter it was called the first principle or first element and was typically 
identified by many of the Greek philosophers as either water, fire, air or earth and 
for Plato, it was the ‘forms’.  In Christian theology, the most fundamental source of 
all entities is not a physical element it is God the creator.  In all these systems the 
most fundamental element is an entity, different types of entities, but entities 
nonetheless and as such Heidegger discounts these systems. So, when Heidegger 
states “what is asked about is being” it is being as fundamental ontology.  At the 
beginning of Being and Time Heidegger provides a provisional indication of what he 
regards as the answer to the meaning of being as fundamental ontology, it is an 
… interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being. 
[BT 19/1] 
Heidegger believed that what it means to be anything, this is what fundamental 
ontology addresses, is ultimately not based on a fundamental entity, it is time, hence 
the title of the book, Being and Time. Heidegger never managed to successfully 
demonstrate this point. Being and Time was never published in full in according to 
his plan, and what was published is only a step along the road of his master project.  
Being and Time as published is a regional ontology and ‘being’ thus has a different, 
but related meaning.  As to Heidegger’s thesis of time as the fundamental meaning 
of being, while this is an uncommon position both philosophically and within 
theoretical physics, it is not without some support.  For example the contemporary 
philosopher of science, Tim Maudlin, argues that “it is possible to regard the whole 
of physical geometry— the whole geometrical structure  of the physical universe—
as determined by the temporal ordering of events”. (Maudlin, 2012, p. 215) He 
argues this position based on the development of a new foundational approach to 
understanding physical geometry he calls the Theory of Linear Structures.  (Maudlin, 
2014) Whether Maudlin’s ideas are eventually accepted or not is irrelevant for this 
thesis, the point is that they are being taken seriously. Heidegger’s project fits within 
this broad heroic tradition of trying to think through the most fundamental 
foundations of ‘what is’ in new ways. Having made the point that Heidegger’s main 
thesis concerning time is within the domain of accepted scholarship, even if it is at 
the periphery, I do not pursue this any further. 
 
177 
In a materialist approach, we can, for example, given an account of the body as an 
integration of the various physical and biological systems, an account of the systems 
in terms of their parts and so on down to sub-atomic particles.  The same applies to 
any physical entity no matter how complex and makes fundamental ontology a 
rather straight forward affair and hardly worth the bother.  Heidegger’s remarks 
reflect this state of affairs.  Unlike the materialist account, where there is just one 
region containing all entities Heidegger argues that there are multiple regions, each 
characterised by a unique mode of being, each associated with a different class of 
entity.  In Being and Time Heidegger identifies five different regions or classes of 
entities; Dasein [BT 27/8], entities ready-to-hand [BT 114/83], world [BT 81/54], 
entities that are present-at-hand [BT 79/54] and Nature [BT 92/63].  The study of 
being in each of these areas Heidegger calls regional ontology as opposed to 
fundamental ontology [ZS, PIKC]. However, Heidegger argues that, although there 
is a mode of being that can be exhibited and described based on our encounter with 
each class of entity, he can explore deeper and disclose time as the basis for being 
in each case. If he can demonstrate this, then he has disclosed time as the meaning 
of being, i.e. at the level of fundamental ontology [BT, ZS].   
Understanding the nature of Heidegger’s project helps in differentiating between 
being as fundamental ontology and being as regional ontology, what he sometimes 
refers to as modes of being.  In turn, this helps to clarify passages in which 
Heidegger uses being with different referents, and the context in which he applies 
the concept of time, e.g. 
Thus the way in which being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning 
determined primordially in terms of time, [BT 40/19] 
… the being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of being (readiness-to-hand, 
presence-at-hand, Reality) which characterize entities with a character other than that of 
Dasein. [BT 273/230] 
Because Dasein has an innate understanding of being he argues that he must start 
his investigation with Dasein; 
Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, 
must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. [BT 34/14] 
Being and Time was initially conceived as a project of two parts.[BT § 8] The first 
part being of three divisions; Division I, the preparatory fundamental analysis of the 
being of Dasein, Division II, an interpretation of the being of Dasein in terms of 
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temporality (time) and finally Division III, the conclusion of his thesis, time as the 
meaning of being.  The second part, also of three division was to comprise critiques 
of Kant’s, Descartes’ and Aristotle’s account of being and time based on his findings 
from part one.  
Being and Time, as it is published, is only the first two divisions of part one and 
Heidegger never publishes the remainder of the promised work, as Spiegelberg 
comments, Being and Time “was and will remain a torso” (Spiegelberg, 1994, p. 
336). Not long after the publication of Being and Time there is a shift in Heidegger’s 
approach, that he calls ‘the turn’[MWP], and while he still pursues the questions 
concerning the meaning of being throughout his career, he ceases to do so as a 
fundamental ontology.  (Korab-Karpowicz, ; Sheehan, 2015; Spiegelberg, 1994)  In 
this thesis, my discussions concerning Heidegger’s work will be confined, for the 
most part, to Division I, Part I, of Being and Time what Heidegger called the 
Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein.  The level of analysis that follows in 
Division II, which addresses the being of Dasein on the basis of temporality, is, in 
my view, too abstract to address the thesis question. However, even the analysis in 
Division I gives a clear indication of the temporal ordering evident in Dasein’s 
structure.  
In summary, being has another layer of meaning in Heidegger’s work.  It can refer 
to being as fundamental ontology or being as a mode of being (regional ontology) 
associated with a class of entities.  The basic conceptual framework of being 
remains the same and refers to whatever it is that determines entities as entities.  
However, the specific character of being will depend on whether the term is applied 
at the fundamental level or the regional level.  At the regional level, being will refer 
to something different depending on the region.   
Naming the regions or modes of being 
Regional ontologies reflect different modes of being, but in each case, the basic 
concept of being must remain the same, i.e. determine the entities as entities.  
However, in that the entity and its being are not the same Heidegger gives each 
class of entity a distinctive name and gives a separate name for the mode of being 
associated with the class.  The exception is Dasein, for which there are three terms 




The first and most basic name Heidegger uses to indicate the being of Dasein is 
‘existence’, and it is introduced by way of a formal indication; 
The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.[BT 68/42, BT 275/231] 
The second name refers to existence in its structural form, which Heidegger names 
being-in-the-world. It is investigating this structure that is the starting point of 
Heidegger’s project concerning fundamental ontology; 
 …. we have fixed upon for starting our investigation, we must lay bare a fundamental 
structure in Dasein: being-in-the-world [BT 65/41] 
The third and final term is “care”,  
Dasein's being reveals itself as care.[BT 227/182] 
Care is just a deeper analysis of the structure, being-in-the-world.  
 …  the basic constitution of Dasein, being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even 
more primordial constitution of being [BT 246/202] (translation modified) 
That these three concepts are referring to the same phenomenon is evident in the 
following passage; 
 
The totality of being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as care. In care the 
being of Dasein is included. When we came to analyse this being, we took as our clue 
existence, which, in anticipation, we had designated as the essence of Dasein. [BT 274/231] 
Names for the Other Modes of Being 
The mode of being associated with the entity world is called ‘worldhood’ [BT 93/65], 
for entities ready-to-hand the mode of being is called ‘readiness-to-hand’ [BT 99/69], 
for entities present-at-hand the mode of being is called ‘presence-at-hand’ [BT 
104/74].   
Before the two basic concepts of the separation of entity and being and of regional 
ontologies is grasped the naming convention can be very confusing.  This is made 
more difficult because once he establishes that, for example, readiness-to-hand, 
refers to a mode of being the term being typically drops away.  This passage from 
Heidegger's discussion on equipment is an example; 
.. as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as 
looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand 
announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of 
something with which one concerns oneself … [BT103/73] 
In the passage, he is talking about circumstances in which an entity can shift 
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between being understood as a piece of equipment (something ready-to-hand) to 
something that is an object with no use (something present-at-hand), and then back. 
It does this by a shift in its mode being.  The idea of entities shifting from one mode 
of being to another is complex enough, but if the terminology is not properly 
understood Heidegger’s description is impossible to grasp. It took some time before 
I could read something like, the ‘readiness-to-hand of something ready-to-hand’ and 
understand what he was saying, i.e. referring to the mode of being of a class of 
entities. 
Heidegger tells us that while we can encounter nature, and understand it as 
something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, that the being of nature qua nature is 
different, 
The 'Nature' by which we are 'surrounded' is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the 
kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-
hand as 'Things of Nature'. [BT 254/211] 
There is no name for the being of nature given in Being and Time. 
Limitation of inquiry in Being and Time 
In Being and Time, Heidegger provides an interpretation of the being of Dasein, 
world and the ready-to-hand and this will be discussed later in the thesis.  However, 
he does not provide an interpretation of the class of entities he calls present-at-hand 
and simply indicates that the presence-at-hand of such entities would need to be 
fixed “in concepts which are categorial” [BT 91/63].  By way of a specific example, I 
take this as meaning, for example, that to determine what the being of gold is would 
be to do so in a way that accounts for its colour, malleability, mass, shape and so 
on. This would, I assume, apply to anything present-at-hand.  Heidegger does not 
inquire into the being of these entities in Being and Time, and it is not relevant to 
this thesis.  Nor does Heidegger inquire into the being of nature qua nature, again 
because it has no direct bearing on the Dasein analytic.  However, he does discuss 
the situation when nature is understood as something ready-to-hand, and this will 
be discussed briefly Chapter 14. 
Modes and Clarifying Being 
The touchstone I keep coming back to is Heidegger’s formal indication of being; 
Being -- that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are 
already understood...[BT 26/6] 
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This formal indication must be applicable at the fundamental level and for each of 
the regional ontologies.  This suggests that while being determines entities it must, 
in some way, do this differently in each case, which in turn is the basis for 
distinguishing the differing ontologies.  In Being and Time, each class of entity 
investigated in terms of its being will thus have a different being.  All this sounds 
reasonable, but it brings us no closer to understanding what is meant by being as 
something that ‘determines’ an entity, especially given the restriction that being is 
not an entity and is separate to the entity. 
Exploring how the term ‘being’ is used 
While Heidegger’s primary research goal is stated as fundamental ontology, the 
work concerning Dasein is regional ontology and once this is clarified the basic 
structure of his inquiry is relatively easy to understand, at least in principle.  The next 
task was to bring more clearly into view what Heidegger meant by being. 
If a way a term has been defined does not shed sufficient light as to its meaning, 
another approach is to explore the various ways and the context in which the term 
is used.  To make the term a specific focus of inquiry rather than passing over it in 
a more general way as occurs when typically reading the text as a whole.  This was 
the approach taken and rather than moving towards clarity, the concept of being 
became even more obscure.  Part of the reason for this is that Heidegger appears 
lax when it comes to consistently applying his terms, but the other reason is that 
being seems to be used in ways that are not related to the concept of ‘determining’. 
In the following, I provide some examples to illustrate this. 
Heidegger indicates early in Being and Time he is dealing with “being and its modes” 
[BT 40/19] (refer above discussion). This suggests there is a difference between 
being and a mode of being. However, Heidegger regularly drops the ‘mode of being’ 
in favour of simply using being.  Examples of this are; 
… an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world. [BT 116/84] 
… the being of what is ready-to-hand [BT 105/74] 
… the being of those entities which are present-at-hand[92/63] 
At other times, he introduces the designation “kind” rather than mode e.g. 
The kind of being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand.[BT 101/71] 
Yet presence-at-hand is the kind of being which belongs to entities whose character is not 
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that of Dasein. [BT 150/115] 
Initially, I thought it might be a variation in the way the German words are interpreted, 
but this is not the case.   In the following which I cited earlier, 
the being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of being (readiness-to-hand, 
presence-at-hand, Reality) which characterize entities with a character other than that of 
Dasein. [BT 273/230] 
In this passage, the German translated as modes of being is “Seinsmodi”, whereas 
the German translated for kind of being is “Seinsart”. 
Yet another term Heidegger uses to identify the mode of beings is “way of being”, 
e.g.
… the entity [Dasein] which has being-in-the-world as its way of being. [BT 174/135] (my
gloss) 
A similar usage is found in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
Every entity has a way-of-being [BPP 18] 
The German word translated as way is both cases is “Weise”. 
All the translations are relatively straightforward and reflect Heidegger’s 
inconsistencies in designating regions of being.  It could be argued that this is being 
overly pedantic. However, it must be recalled that initially, the structure of the 
regions of being versus fundamental ontology is not clear.  Additionally, Heidegger 
regularly explores the etymologies of words to make clear in what sense he is using 
them, and consequently, I was looking for precision and consistency.  That said, 
once the basic ontological structure (fundamental versus regions) is understood, 
most of these uses start to make sense, except for ‘way of being’.  Mode, kind, or 
simply being seemed interchangeable but ‘way of being’ didn’t seem to fit. I will 
return to this shortly. 
Then comes the next problem. Even if some grasp is had that mode of being, being 
and kind of being may all refer to a class of entities, we are then confronted with 
passages such as the following; 
Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it - all these ways 
of behaving … are modes of being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are 
ourselves. [BT 26-7/7] (my underlining) 
Mode of being has become associated with the behaviour that Dasein typically 
exhibits.  Then we have, 
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 … in every kind of being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the 
character of its being. [BT 38/17] 
Not only, however, does an understanding of being belong to Dasein; but this understanding 
develops or decays along with whatever kind of being Dasein may possess at the time .. [BT 
37/16] (my underlining) 
Kind of being no longer seems to be a general name for being, as something that 
determines, but in something that can be multiple in type and possessed! 
In making sense of these passages, a number of questions immediately arise; 
Doesn’t Dasein only have one kind of being?  How can it have multiple kinds of 
being that are determinative of its being?  Is this another type of being?  How can 
being be determinative and separate and yet be the name given to the various 
behaviours of Dasein? What does it mean for Dasein to possess different kinds of 
being in a transient way? 
Then there is yet another way the term is used that is problematic; 
That kind of being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always 
does comport itself somehow, we call “existence” [BT 32/12] (my underlining) 
In this passage the phrase, “towards which Dasein comports” presents something 
as separate to Dasein.  This is consistent with Heidegger’s basic descriptions of 
being.  But it raises another problem interpreting the meaning of being. How is it that 
something separate, something which determines Dasein can at the same time be 
something towards which Dasein comports? 
And yet another way of using the term; 
Our investigation takes its orientation from being-in-the-world -- that basic constitution of 
Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined. [BT 153/117] (translation 
modified) 
The phrase “every mode of its being” is problematic.  Heidegger has already 
indicated that Dasein’s mode of being is being-in-the-world.  Essentially this is 
saying that Dasein’s being co-determines every mode of its being.  Again, there is 
nothing wrong with the translation.  The only conclusion is that being must be used 
in two different senses.  
I am not going to push this further; the aim is to indicate the difficulty encountered 
in trying to grasp the intent of being as something that determines entities as entities. 
The understanding of the differences between fundamental and regional ontologies 
helps to clarify his different naming approaches in designating modes of being. 
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However what Heidegger has in mind by being in terms of being as that which 
‘determines entities’, has slipped further away.  The closer I looked, the more acutely 
aware I became of the different ways he uses being.  I held to the notion that there 
must be some consistency, but I couldn’t see it. I would have to try another 
approach, and that was to go back to the tradition and the Greek understanding of 
being. This is discussed in the next chapter.  
Being has Structures 
In Being and Time, Heidegger indicates that the various modes of being each have 
a structure, e.g.  
 … those structures of being which belong to the entities we encounter. [BT 47/25] 
… a primordial structure of Dasein's being [BT 81/54] 
… the structure of being-in-the-world. [BT 134/101] 
… the structure of worldhood [BT 94/66] 
The structure of the being of what is ready-to-hand [BT 105/74] 
The concept of structure contains the idea of something being ‘built’ or constructed, 
and the image of some building initially comes to mind. This, of course, cannot be 
right as this would infer that being is an assemblage of entities; this has been ruled 
out.  The best example I could think of involving non-physical structures was the 
game of chess. The game is based on the set of legal moves the different pieces 
can make.  The game itself is not the physical board or pieces, these are more for 
convenience, and there are many games played between chess masters without 
the use of a board.   However, chess is an entity, and I could not see how some 
other structure associated with being, determines chess.  
Notwithstanding this, the concept of structure is useful.  Whatever I am seeking to 
understand by the characteristic of being as that which determines, it is somehow 
comprised of different aspects. I take structures to be an important concept and 
somehow linked to the determination of the entity.  So, while each of the modes of 
being is different, they are all structures.  
Structures Constitute Being 
At times Heidegger uses the word ‘constitution’ to designate being rather than 
structure.  For example, he talks about domains (as opposed to regions) of entities 
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that the sciences investigate and argues that prior to those investigations, there 
should be  
 … an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic constitution of being. [BT 30/10] 
And in relation to Dasein, 
Our investigation takes its orientation from being-in-the-world - that basic constitution of 
Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined. [BT 153/117] 
By way of note Macquarrie and Robinson[BT] translate the German word 
Verfassung as ‘state’, whereas Stambaugh[BTs] uses constitution. While both are 
acceptable ‘state’ gives the wrong sense, and I hear either a reference to an entity, 
or a particular ‘state’ an entity is in. Both are wrong. When I hear constitution, e.g. 
as in the constitution of a state (i.e. country) there is the notion of constitution as 
determining.  This fits better with Heidegger’s description of being.  I change the 
translation of state to constitution when citing passages from Macquarrie and 
Robinson’s translation.  
The link between constitution, structures and being is evidenced by the following 
passage,  
The question about … structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. [BT 33/12] 
This also provides some insight into another key passage, 
Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes 
to constitute being … [BT 61/37] (translation changed)65 
This passage provides a useful insight into Heidegger's method. Whatever being is, 
it is constituted by certain structures.  The phenomena that Heidegger indicates he 
is interpreting phenomenologically is the structure that constitutes being. In other 
words, to describe the structures of a particular mode of being is to describe the 
being of that mode.   Rather than saying that being determines an entity, we could 
just as correctly say the being-structure determines the entity.  For example, the 
being-structure of Dasein is called being-in-the-world, it is this structure that 
determines Dasein. (Remembering that the structure is never an entity, and it is 
separate to Dasein!)  
We now have the sense that there is some being-structure, that is different for each 
                                            
65 The German word for constitute in this instance is ausmacht. Macquarrie and Robinson use the English 
‘make-up’, again, I have followed Stambaugh and used ‘constitute’. This translation is also what is indicated in 
the German-English dictionaries.  
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class of entities, that determines the entity.  There is clearly a difference between 
something being constituted by way of a structure (being) and something that is 
determined (entity) by being.  The German word translated as determines is 
bestimmt, and there no difficulty or material issues with this translation.  There is 
one way to hear determines, and that is as some form of final decision. Another way 
to hear it is as some necessary antecedent to something happening, for example in 
economics it could be said that it is the buyer that determines the price.  If we take 
the following; 
… existence (Dasein’s being) is the determining character of Dasein.[BT 33/13] 
The phrase suggests that an understanding of determines closer to that of a 
necessary antecedent is more appropriate than some form of declaration or 
decision.  We have then a being-structure that is an antecedent to the entity.  This 
phrasing supports the view of being as something separate to the entity but what it 
means to say that existence (existence) determines Dasein (entity) is still very 
opaque. 
Way of Being 
I want to return to one of the phrases that in exploring Heidegger’s use of being was 
particularly puzzling, the idea of ‘way-of-being’.  There is no doubt that the concepts 
are connected but in what way is not clear.  In Being and Time, the phrase tends to 
be used almost exclusively with Dasein and the only exception I identified was the 
following which suggests that all entities have a way of being;  
… the perception of the simplest determinate ways of being which entities as such may 
possess [BT 57/33] 
In this passage, Heidegger indicates that “ways of being” are “determinate” of the 
entities.  The ideas of ‘way of being’ is suggestive of an action or behaviour and this 
is the strong sense one gets from the following passage; 
… producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of 
something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
interrogating, considering, discussing, determining .... All these ways of being-in … [BT 83/56 
The term being-in in this instance refers to the underlying structure that enables us 
to comport to entities in the world. This aspect of the structure is discussed in 




Sciences are ways of being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need 
not be itself. [BT 33/13] 
The implication here is that the sciences are defined by a particular set of 
behaviours.  The term ‘way of being’ in Being and Time is almost exclusively used 
in relation to Dasein, not surprising given the focus of the inquiry.  However 
elsewhere it apples to the other classes of entities. In Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, we have the following; 
The being of something we use, for instance, a hammer or a door, is characterized by a 
specific way of being put to use, of functioning. [BPP 292] 
The suggestion is that it is the use, or behaviour, of the entity that determines the 
entity.   
Following the concept that the different classes of entities have different ways of 
being, if this means some sort of behaviour, is easy enough.   An entity that is ready-
to-hand is one that is in some way useful, has a function.  Dasein’s diverse ways of 
behaviour have a distinctively different character to, for example, a hammer, and so 
is a different class of entity.  The entities that are present-at-hand are neither of the 
other two, they essentially just ‘present’ themselves to us.  What Heidegger seems 
to have done is simply classify entities according to distinctive ways of acting, 
behaving with respect to Dasein, i.e. different ways of being.  If this is the case, then 
such things as possessing a ‘way of being’ is understandable. 
However, this only adds to the puzzle.  Some key characteristics of being identified 
to date are; it determines an entity, it is both separate, and prior to the entity, it is 
not an entity, it is something hidden, and it has a structure.  If, for example, a hammer 
is for hammering, how does this satisfy all these characteristics?  I even used a 
hammer to try to breakthrough this conundrum. 
The Being of a Hammer 
I go to the shed, bring back a hammer, place it on my desk and look at it.  I tell 
myself that to be this hammer is not based on the entity I see before me, for being 
is not an entity. The way of being a hammer is to drive in nails, which must require 
a solid, physical entity.  I know I need a hammer in my hand before I can drive in a 
nail. But Heidegger says that driving in nails as the way of being of a hammer is the 
being of the hammer. The being of the hammer is not the entity, so it must be its 
function. When I look at the hammer, I put aside the visual image and consider that 
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I know that this object is ‘for hammering’.  But being has a structure and is something 
that is before the physical entity.  How can hammering exist before the hammer, if 
hammering is something that only a hammer does?  This gives the general idea of 
the stream of thought that only ended up going around in circles. 
In a materialist account, what it is ‘to be’ a hammer is ‘to be’ the physical entity I see 
in front of me that has the appropriate characteristics (shape, rigidity, etc.) and is 
suitable for the function of driving in nails.  Frankly, at this moment, the materialist 
account seems far more plausible.   
Conclusion 
In the beginning, as I read Heidegger’s work I recall the frustration of trying to 
understand what he meant by being, even in a relatively empty conceptual sense.  
Somewhere along the way I became familiar with the term and thought I had 
managed to gain a sufficient understanding of being for the purposes of the thesis.  
This proved false and came to light in the manner I discussed in the last chapter 
when I tried to write about being. 
I went back to examine the concept of being in Heidegger’s work in more detail, and 
the above reflects that activity and captures a sense of the re-awakened frustration.   
One of the fundamental premises that I have as I approach this work is that even if 
I can’t grasp what Heidegger is presenting there is, nonetheless, a cohesive 
intelligibility that is there to be discovered.  Based on this premise, I was missing 
something in my understanding of being that would provide this cohesiveness. If I 
could not find this in Heidegger’s work, then I needed to take a step back and look 
at the background to the concept of being. Heidegger indicates that the tradition 
goes astray following Aristotle[FCM] so I went back to the early Greeks with a focus 





CHAPTER 6: STEPPING BACK INTO THE TRADITION 
Introduction 
In a lecture course called What is Called Thinking? given during the Winter and 
Summer semesters of 1951-52, the last before his formal retirement, Heidegger is 
discussing Nietzsche and tells his students; 
From all that has here been suggested, it should be clear that one cannot read Nietzsche in 
a haphazard way; that ... the most important works ... make demands to which we are not 
equal. It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and 
first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years [WCT 75] 
Nietzsche was writing within the Western tradition of metaphysics and, in 
Heidegger’s view, his writing reflected a deep understanding and profound 
engagement with Aristotelian philosophy.  However, the Aristotelian side of the 
engagement is not readily apparent, but it is, according to Heidegger, what provides 
the necessary context for understanding Nietzsche.  Unless Aristotle’s position was 
thoroughly understood, he is overlooked as Nietzsche’s interlocutor, and by 
implication, Nietzsche’s work cannot be properly understood.  What takes one back 
is Heidegger’s claim that this will take ‘ten or fifteen' years of studying Aristotle’s 
work!  While there is an element of impracticality in the comment, it has remained a 
salutary reminder of the investment necessary to come to terms with the ideas of 
thinkers as profound as Aristotle, or Heidegger.   
Initially, I had thought an understanding of Heidegger’s work would be gained from 
just a couple of readings of Being and Time and some supplementary texts.  It 
should be clear by now that this view was misguided.  On first coming across the 
above passage, I was a little amused and surprised but thought nothing more until 
later when struggling with the concept of being.  Subsequent reflection on this and 
other passages brought home the significance of writing within a tradition66.  What I 
suspected was that Heidegger’s remarks about Nietzsche apply to Heidegger, in 
that there was a context within which he was writing that was not readily discernible.  
I have since concluded that while Heidegger’s interlocutors include, at different 
times all the key figures in the philosophical tradition involved with ontology, the 
main figure is Aristotle. 
In the previous two chapters, I have laid out the difficulties encountered in gaining 
                                            
66 ɸ  
  
190 
purchase in Heidegger’s conception of being.  I concluded that part of the difficulty, 
especially for a non-philosopher, is that the concept of ‘being’ is one that is deeply 
embedded in the scholarship of philosophy and the term carries with it a significant 
body of knowledge that embraces discussions from the Pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophers through to the present day. (van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2017)  I 
suspected that lurking in Heidegger’s account were parts of the tradition he 
accepted and others, perhaps the majority, that he rejected.  It was, however, the 
threads of what he accepted, chose to pick up and follow that I was interested in.  
While I had engaged in a reading program that covered various aspects of 
philosophy, including metaphysics, it proved to be insufficient. While I had attained 
a reasonable understanding of ‘what things are’ in terms of general contemporary 
scholarship, i.e. a materialist account, I had failed to appreciate the complexity of 
‘being’ within the context of its history.  I suspect that I had mistaken my 
understanding of an account of being for the phenomenon of being itself and there 
is a difference.  To explain, take for example, the phenomenon of thunder. If I want 
to form a technical understanding of what thunder is, I must ensure that it is the 
phenomenon of thunder that I have in view when I seek the explanation. Regardless 
of whether I hold it to be associated with the thunderbolts of Zeus or a ‘natural event’ 
that is a consequence of lightning, what I must first have ‘in view’ is the deep 
rumbling sound we call thunder, i.e. the phenomenon.  If I pursue thunder based on 
the accounts of thunder, e.g. Zeus’ thunderbolts, I will not get very far.  I had been 
looking at the contemporary accounts of being, of Heidegger’s descriptions, but I 
had still not managed to bring the phenomenon of being itself, or perhaps better put, 
Heidegger’s conception of being, phenomenon, into view. 
Yes, I did have a vague notion that in the thesis I was exploring what it is ‘to be’ a 
Dasein and this has guided my inquiries, but I did not bring sufficiently into view 
what it meant ‘to be’ Dasein.  What does ‘to be’ mean? I had recognised that it was 
somehow connected to ‘determines’ but I still had no idea.  What I was attempting 
was an engagement with Heidegger’s writing, primarily Being and Time, without 
having the phenomenon of ‘being’ properly in view. The upshot was I didn’t really 
understand what it was I was trying to understand, and by implication didn’t really 
understand what Heidegger was doing. This thought had troubling implications for 
the thesis. 
From a historical perspective, Heidegger claims that the inquiry into an 
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understanding of being goes astray after the Aristotle [FCM].  He is not saying the 
Greeks reached any finality in their inquiry but rather that they were making 
progress. It is also evident from the earlier discussions that he rejects every 
conception of being post this time.  On this reading of Heidegger, he goes back to 
the Greek investigations of being to ‘pick up’ useful threads and continue where they 
left off.   If then he is ‘picking up’ the threads of inquiry of the ancient Greeks, my 
approach was to see if I could identify some of those key threads in a way that 
throws light on Heidegger’s work.  In this chapter, I present an account of this work, 
undertaken without Heidegger’s guidance.  In the next chapter, directed by what I 
had learnt, I engaged with a key illuminating aspect of Heidegger’s account of the 
Greeks.   This work proved remarkably beneficial, first in clarifying for me some of 
the roots of contemporary, and my own, ways of thinking, but more important in 
thinking in new ways about being (the threads) which I was then able to carry into 
understanding Heidegger’s work. 
Early Greeks – Two Fundamental Approaches.   
The study of what it is to be an entity, i.e. being, does not relate to accounting for a 
specific instance of an entity, but rather to account for what it is to be any entity.  As 
discussed, for Heidegger this is either at the level of fundamental ontology (all 
entities) or regional ontologies (classes of entities).  
While entities, understood as anything that is, can be in many forms such as, 
chariots, cows, colours, numbers, or imaginary, e.g. Santa Claus, in the Tradition 
the investigation into being primarily deals with the being of entities in the real world 
which we ‘see’ and with which we engage.  I will first provide a simple example and 
then identify two fundamentally different approaches concerning what it is to be an 
entity that was evident among the ancient Greek philosophers; then I will move to 
the views of some of the very early Greek philosophers and end with a more detailed 
discussion of Aristotle’s views.   
The Simple Example 
I am sitting on a chair at my desk, typing on a keyboard as I use the computer. In 
each case, chair, desk, keyboard and computer, are separate, individual physical 
entities.  If I go into the office area of the university, I sit in a different chair, at a 
different desk, using a different key board and a different computer. These also are 
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separate physical entities. If I go into the dining area of my home, again, there are 
different chairs and a different table. Desks, chairs, keyboards and computers come 
in all shapes, sizes, colours and configurations and, yet each is still a desk, a chair, 
and so on.  I can take my desk and chair and throw them on the fire destroying them. 
Every desk and chair in the world could be destroyed, so than none remains in 
existence. I could have a desk and chair built bringing them back into existence.  
Entire categories of entities can come into existence, disappear and reappear, just 
any particular instance can do the same. This coming into and out of existence 
applies to animals and plants and given enough time, also applies to mountains, 
cities, rivers, etc. 
The First Approach 
This simple example points to two important questions for the Greeks. The first is 
that the things ‘that are’, the entities that I and see and touch seem to come into and 
out of existence.  It was this seemingly endless change of things coming into and 
out of existence that the very early Greek philosophers were interested in.  Their 
view was that there must be some order, some constancy, ‘behind’ this seemingly 
endless cycle of change otherwise there would only ever be chaos.  The entities we 
see and deal with were understood to arise out of and return to some fundamental 
material, a first principle or element.   Their interest was to account for things at this 
fundamental level, and as such to be an entity was to be a certain arrangement of 
these more fundamental elements. This was a robust materialist view of things. The 
questions pursued concerned, primarily, the nature of the first principle, the most 
elementary material building block of everything.  From this, all else flowed. Not 
unlike modern materialism. 
The Second Approach 
By the time of Plato and Aristotle, around two hundred years after the beginnings of 
Greek philosophy, a second line of thinking had emerged.  Plato and Aristotle 
identified that when we see a desk, there seems to be something else we could not 
see, that accounts for the entity being a desk.  The physical material we see that 
has been made into the desk was not the being of the desk, being lays elsewhere.  
Being was understood in a way not dissimilar to Heidegger, i.e. it is what determines 
the entity as the entity it is and is basis of our understanding.  In other words, apart 
from the material aspects, something else was going on. 
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Plato proposed that for each entity there was a separate ideal form located in a 
separate world of forms, and that a, typically imperfect, version of this form was 
instantiated into physical material thus resulting in the entity we see.  The concept 
is a little broader than this and I will touch on it further in the following section.  
Aristotle agrees that there is something other than the material responsible for 
entities coming into being and was happy to use the term form, however he rejected 
the mystical world of forms and develops a more grounded approach.  Already it is 
possible to see the issues that I have been struggling with concerning Heidegger’s 
work reflected in the thinking of the Greeks.  
Heidegger accepts much of Aristotle’s account, reformulating it and then extending 
it, pushing further into the investigation of being in areas not pursued, as far as we 
are aware, by Aristotle.  As part of his work Heidegger also identifies in the thinking 
of earlier Greek philosophers the concept of ‘prevailing’67, what I will later refer to as 
emergence, and combines this with Aristotle’s concepts as he developed his own 
thinking. 
In the following I provide a potted history of the Greek’s encounter with being. This 
discussion is, of necessity brief, and I only present the main aspects that helped in 
shifting my understanding of being.  In that it is Aristotle’s account that is most 
informative for understanding Heidegger’s work this is where I will focus most of the 
following discussion.   
The Beginning, Thales of Miletus 
The Pre-Socratics68 were fascinated by the observation that in Nature everything 
seemed to be changing and the concept that there must be, nonetheless, something 
that is unchanging in the universe upon which change was predicated.  What they 
observed is that there is a basic three-part structure that seemed to apply to the 
things they observed, they came into being, changed in some way and then passed 
‘out’ of being.  It was this coming into and out of existence that gave the appearance 
of a constant state of change.  The puzzle was how were the concepts of constancy 
and change to be brought together. 
                                            
67 The concept of prevailing will be covered in the Chapter 7.  
68 This is the term used to classify all the early Greek philosophers before Socrates (469-399BCE), commencing 
with Thales of Miletus. The term is a little anomalous as the lives of a number of these philosophers overlapped 
that of Socrates. 
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Thales of Miletus (624-546BCE), generally regarded as the founder of Greek 
philosophy lived in the Greek city of Miletus, what is today known as MiIet in modern 
Turkey. Reputed to be a mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher, Thales 
argued that there must be a first principle69 of everything. The characteristics of this 
first principle must be that it is unchanging in all aspects, i.e. it had no beginning (i.e. 
no creation), is eternal, is stable, is indivisible and is the unifying basis of all reality.  
Before the time of Thales four distinct elements had been identified (fire, air, water, 
earth70) but these elements were not seen as the origins of the world71. Creation 
was the stuff of myths and attributed to the actions of a pantheon of gods.  An 
account of this world view survives in the form of a poem, Theogony (Hesiod, 2006), 
attributed to the poet Hesiod (c.750-650BCE). It is Thales, for the first time in known 
history, that rejects the account of a divine origin of all that is in the world and argued 
that the world arises from the actions involving some fundamental element, what 
was called the first principle.  
For Thales, water is the eternal first principle from which all else springs and to which 
all eventually return.  Thales argues his case for water as the first principle based 
on his empirical observations. All living things required water to live, water seemed 
to be part of that which gives us life (blood), water can change from solid to liquid to 
gas and lastly the very earth itself seemed to float on water; surely, water is the 
foundation of all else (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007).  It is not possible to know 
exactly how Thales conceptualised his idea of water, but the general idea is clear 
enough.  
Thales and those that followed him up until Parmenides are not typically regarded 
as philosophers, but as an early form of ‘natural scientist’ in that they were inquiring 
into the physical aspects of nature.  However, without Thales and his early followers, 
there is no Greek philosophy as it was in response to this early scholarship that 
Greek philosophy emerges(Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007; McKirahan, 2010). 
                                            
69 The term first principle means origin, primordial source or beginning. 
70 These elements should not be taken literally as in a hand of earth, glass of water and so on.  They represented 
whatever it was that provided the quality of heat, of fluidity and so on.  Fire itself thus represented something 
that contained ‘pure’ form of the element, but it is also present in a living body as indicated by the warmth of the 
body, in rotting hay also indicated by heat and so on.  Blood thus contained ‘water’ which gave it its fluid nature.  
The belief that there were these four basic underlying elements that constituted everything else persisted into 
the seventeenth century. 
71 The term world here denotes the idea of the earth and all material things there on. This is not how Heidegger 




Apart from two short writings by Gorgias(483-375BCE), there are no surviving texts, 
either original or copied, from the Pre-Socratics and what we know of them comes 
from quotes contained in the works of scholars who lived, often centuries later.  
(McKirahan, 2010)  Aristotle, in his book the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 2014b), 
provides a potted history of Pre-Socratics that followed in the line of Thales, a period, 
covering some three hundred years;  
Of the first philosophers, most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were 
the only principles of all things; that of which all things that are consist, and from which they 
first come to be, and into which they are finally resolved (the substance remaining, but 
changing in its modifications), this they say is the element and the principle of things, and 
therefore they think nothing is either generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always 
conserved … Thales … says the principle is water. …  
Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water, and the most primary of the simple bodies, 
while Hippasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus say this of fire, and Empedocles 
says it of the four elements, adding a fourth— earth— to those which have been named; for 
these, he says, always remain and do not come to be, except that they come to be more or 
fewer, being aggregated into one and segregated out of one. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 
who, though older than Empedocles, was later in his philosophical activity, says the principles 
are infinite in number; for he says almost all the things that are homogeneous are generated 
and destroyed (as water or fire is) only by aggregation and segregation, and are not in any 
other sense generated or destroyed, but remain eternally. From these facts one might think 
that the only cause is the so-called material cause…(983b5) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 43663-86) 
Looking closely at Aristotle’s account there are two different lines of argument. The 
first is that the only constancy is material first principles.  The second, expressed by 
Anaxagoras, is that the constancy is not to be found in the principle elements, for 
there is an infinite number of them, but rather the only constancy is change itself.  
However, Aristotle lumps both of these positions together as arguing for a “material 
cause” of everything.   
There was an alternative account to the view that the first principle must be 
associated with one or more of the elements.  This approach proposed that the basic 
elements were ‘atoms’ and the main proponent was Democritus (460-370BCE) who 
argued that the basic elements were minuscule, indivisible particles of matter that 
were in constant motion in the void. Specific entities arose because of various 
combinations of the atoms coming together as a result of random motion, some 
surviving, most not.  He also argued that while we may feel hot and cold, these were 
sensations that arose because of certain arrangements of the atoms interacting with 
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us, i.e. heat and cold were not a characteristic of the atoms themselves, but our 
response to them.  Aristotle rejected the atomist account which probably accounted 
for its failure to gain any significant traction in subsequent generations, eventually 
re-appearing in name only in the modern era.  Aristotle held that the fundamental 
elements were the four principles, but that they were not what determined entities. 
What is remarkable about this position of ‘material causality’ is that in one form or 
another it has endured. For example, in Descartes’ account of physics, he proposed 
that there were minute particles he called corpuscles in constant motion, filling all of 
what we call space, and it was from these particles that everything else was 
formed(Descartes & Gaukoger(editor), 2004) He rejected atomism because under 
this view the smallest particles, atoms, were indivisible and for Descartes, this was 
untenable as God had the power to infinitely divide! (Slowik, 2014)   
While the knowledge of processes and the makeup of the fundamental elements 
has advanced significantly, for the most part, the contemporary understanding of 
things would fall within the broad family of what Aristotle has called ‘material 
causality’. There are other aspects that are also similar, for example, Descartes and 
Democritus both accepted the principle of the conservation of matter, i.e. the sum 
of all the basic stuff in the universe remains unchanged.  It simply gets re-ordered 
in various ways.  Considering that the contemporary materialist account also 
ascribes to the fundamental tenant of the conservation of matter, albeit as 
matter+energy72, we see that the family resemblance is based on a number of 
points. 
Parmenides 
The early Pre-Socratic philosophers were not addressing the question of being; they 
were seeking to identify the most fundamental element that constitutes the basis of 
the world.  Not that much different to what is driving the scientific endeavours using 
the Large Hadron Collider at CERN.  It is Parmenides (c.515-460BCE) who formally 
introduces the question of what it is to be something in a systematic way(Barnes, 
2005). Parmenides is a profoundly important figure in the history of Western thought 
(J. Palmer, 2012) for as a result of his ideas philosophy is changed forever 
(McKirahan, 2010).  Parmenides was from Elea, now called Velia, in Southern Italy 
                                            
72 In modern physics, it is accepted that matter can convert to energy and vice versa. This is captured in 
Einstein’s famous equation E=MC2.  
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a region that was part of Magna Graecia, or Greater Greece and it is Parmenides 
who was the first to give serious thought to the question of what it is to be something 
(the question of being) and the first to use the powerful logical tools of deductive 
argument to support his case(Barnes, 2005; McKirahan, 2010).  Such was the 
power of his arguments that all the major Pre-Socratics that followed him were 
compelled to develop more sophisticated theories in response to his arguments.  He 
was also extremely influential on the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, is a precursor 
to Plato's forms as well as Aristotle's logic, and through them, Parmenides has had 
a significant influence on the Western tradition(J. Palmer, 2012). 
Parmenides fame comes from just one written work, composed in the style of an 
epic Greek poem using hexameter verse(J. Palmer, 2012). The poem is an account 
of Parmenides’ encounter with a goddess who reveals to him, in part one of the 
poem, the true path of knowledge.  All that is known of the poem comes from textual 
references by other writers covering only about twenty-five percent of the work. It is 
thanks to the sixth century Neoplatonist Simplicius(490-560CE) that we have 
Parmenides’ entire metaphysical argument on the attributes of the real or 'what Is' 
and it is this fragment that has been the most influential.   
I am only going to summarise one line of argument of the poem to indicate the 
approach Parmenides is taking.  Parmenides makes the basic assertion that 
something (what is) cannot be created out of nothing (what is not), and the corollary 
that nothing (what is not) cannot be created from something (what is).  The ‘what-is’ 
refers to what is real, i.e. what constitutes reality.  
However, he says, people believe, based on their senses, that entities are both real 
and come to be and then perish.  This belief is in direct contradiction to his basic 
assertion because it implies that what is real, before coming into existence didn’t 
exist, i.e. something (what-is) has been created out of nothing (what is not), and 
similarly, that when it perishes something returns to nothing. 
Parmenides has shifted the focus from the issue of first principles to questioning 
what it means to be an entity.  We can summarise the argument by using the 
example of the chair. If we claim that the chair is real, that it exists, then Parmenides 
asks, where did it come from? If it exists it must always exist; something can’t be 
created from nothing.  That the chair comes into existence means it is not real, it 
does not exist. If it does not exist, but we experience the chair with our senses, it 
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must be an illusion. If we argue the chair didn’t come from nothing it was made from 
wood, then where did the wood go?  If the wood is still there, then we have both the 
wood and the chair, whereas we originally only had wood.  So where did the chair 
come from?  If we simply see the arrangement of the wood as a chair, then the chair 
itself is not real, it is an illusion. This argument can be applied to any entity we 
encounter, including that wood from which the chair is made.    
Parmenides is the first known example where rational argument has been prioritised 
over experience as the basis of knowledge.  Once his premise that the real (what-
is) cannot come from nothing nor return to nothing then any claim that the entities 
we deal with are real is subject to his argument.  The question then of what it means 
‘to be’ a chair or any entity becomes a serious problem.  Subsequent philosophers, 
particularly Plato and Aristotle felt the force of Parmenides argument, and their 
approach, at least in part, can be seen as a response to it.  
Based on his premise Parmenides extends his argument to exclude any possible 
notion of change associated with the real or ‘what is’ and develops a list, supported 
with arguments, as to characteristics of the real.  These characteristics include 
timeless or uninterrupted existence, whole, uniform throughout, not divisible, 
motionless, perfect(J. Palmer, 2012, p. 10), imperishable, ungenerated, unique and 
unchanging(McKirahan, 2010, p. 159).  In Christian theology, this list will be familiar 
as it reflects the essential characteristics ascribed to God as ens realissimum, the 
most real being. (Biard, 2003) 
Plato 
When Plato (427-347BCE), writing a generation after Parmenides, provided his 
account of what things are, it is possible to see the influence of Parmenides in his 
work. In the Timaeus (published circa 360BCE) Plato presents the idea of creation 
as comprising two parts.  The World of Forms in which there exist perfect, immutable 
(unchanging) forms which act as a type of master template for everything ‘that is’ on 
earth.  There are forms for every tangible object such as humans, trees, wheels, 
houses and water as well as for every intangible thing such as red, love, bravery, 
soft, bright and so on.  On Earth, every entity is the entity it is because it reflects the 
perfect form in the World of Form.  For Plato, what determined what it is to to be an 
entity has nothing to do with the physical material from which it is made it is the form. 
To go back to the chair.  For a particular object to be a chair is to possess the form 
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of a chair which is based on the ‘ideal’ form in the World of Forms. 
Our world Plato named the ‘world of becoming’ because things were always coming 
into existence, changing, and becoming extinct. The world of unchanging forms he 
named the ‘world of being’ or the ‘world of forms’ because it has always existed, is 
unchanging, is eternal and is perfect and its characteristics tick off the attributes that 
Parmenides laid down for ‘the real’.  This approach by Plato is deceptive in its 
simplicity, but it provides solutions for the issues of truth, knowledge and existence 
because all these are based on the forms.  The form of the chair, for example, is 
eternal, unchanging and universal and having knowledge of what a chair ‘is’, is 
actually having knowledge of the ‘form of a chair’.  According to Plato we all have 
knowledge of the world of forms, just not consciously, but can access this true 
knowledge through proper training in rational thinking, i.e. philosophical training. 
True knowledge for Plato is thus based on proper thinking and accessing the ideal 
forms and not based on observations of the world, which only presents an inferior 
version of the forms.  It is not hard to see from this that Plato is regarded as the 




Aristotle was born in 384BCE in the Macedonian city of Stagira, in the north east of 
modern Greece. He moved to Plato’s school, the Academy in Athens, to further his 
education when he was around eighteen and stayed there until Plato’s death, 
leaving the school and Athens at the age of thirty-seven.  Aristotle returned to Athens 
in 335 BCE, rented space in the Lyceum and set up his own school. At the Lyceum 
school he is reputed to have established one of the first great libraries of the world 
and where he is thought to have written an estimated two hundred works as part of 
his research and for teaching purposes.  Aristotle was forced to flee Athens in 322 
BCE due to the anti-Macedonian sentiment that was unleashed following the death 
of Alexander the Great in 323BCE, and he died the same year.  Today, only a fifth of 
his original writings survive, with most of the original works lost through various 
misadventures and neglect in the several centuries following his death.73   
73 In terms of the transmission of Aristotle’s works, his teachings suffered two major blows. The first occurred 
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It is hard to overestimate the influence of Aristotle on Western thinking.  His work in 
the area of natural sciences remained influential until the Scientific Revolution in the 
seventeenth century. Aristotle's system of logic was the only system used in 
Universities until the nineteenth century. The Aristotelian philosophical texts are still 
studied, and his system of classification is still evident in the approaches we use 
today.  
I originally understood Aristotle only as a philosopher, but he was much more than 
this. Recognized as the originator of the ‘scientific’ study of life(Lennox, 2014) much 
of his work involved investigating living things, particularly mammals. His zoological 
writings, make up roughly 25% of his surviving oeuvre, and they provide a  
.. record of the first systematic and comprehensive study of animals.  There was nothing of 
a similar scope and sophistication again until the 16th century. (Lennox, 2014) 
Aristotle's studies in zoology were diverse covering the anatomy of octopus, 
cuttlefish, the development of the embryo of chicks, describing the social 
organisation of bees and so on.  He is the first to work out and describe the 
hydrologic cycle (water evaporating, condensing into clouds and then rain), and 
addresses issues such as the movement of the earth surface, observing, for 
example, fossils of sea dwelling creatures located on inland hills.  He was not, 
however a scientist as we would understand the term. His work was often a mixture 
of observation and theoretical speculation, and there is no evidence that he felt 
approximately fifty years after his death when as a result of a dispute, one the leaders of the Lyceum, Neleus of 
Scepsis, removed the library, reported to have consisted of some 10,000 scrolls, from the Lyceum, including 
many of the works of Aristotle.  Not much is known of the fate of the library until a part of it finds its way back to 
the Lyceum School in the early first century BCE. It was later discovered that many of the scrolls had been sold 
to the great library of Alexandria, and subsequently lost when that library was destroyed.  The scrolls returned 
to the Lyceum were taken by the Roman General Sulla following his sacking of Athens in 86 BCE, and sent to 
Rome.  The surviving scrolls of Aristotle’s work were collated and edited in Rome by members of the Lyceum, 
and it is from this work that we have access to Aristotle’s work. 
Apart from the loss of the scrolls there was the eventual closure of the school. Following Aristotle’s death, the 
school continued in various forms, with fluctuating popularity. It survived two major sackings of Athens, the first 
in 86 BCE by Sulla, and the most devastating in 267CE by the Goths.  After both sackings, the school eventually 
re-established. However, all Greek philosophical schools, including those established by both Aristotle and 
Plato, where finally closed, and the associated philosophers/teacher persecuted by the Roman Emperor 
Justinian I in 529CE.  Justinian was attempting to resolve dangerous religious tensions in what was now a 
Christian empire. He enforced the acceptance of the theological position agreed at the 451CE Council of 
Chalcedon and there was no tolerance for the Greek philosophers who were seen as teaching heretical ideas 
and paganism incompatible with Justinian’s goals of a united Christian empire. 
The works of both Plato and Aristotle were subsequently lost to the West although both Greek and Latin version 
were preserved in the East and highly valued by Islamic scholars who discovered them following the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire.  The works of Aristotle eventually found their way back to the West throughout the twelfth 




compelled to confirm his theories, even when this was relatively easy to do. It was 
Aristotle’s work in these areas that make him a key figure that shifts philosophical 
thinking from grand ideas about the cosmos to make a systematic study of entities, 
what he calls ἐπιστήμη φvσική (epistími fysikí) the study of nature.   
While at risk of being too simplistic I take Aristotle’s philosophical work to 
complement his studies into nature in two broad ways.  Firstly, as represented by 
the Categories (Aristotle, 2014a), he provides a framework by which those inquiring 
into nature can define and categorise the entities which are the objects of inquiry, 
an essential part of any research.  Secondly, and more abstractly he inquiries into 
what it means to be an entity and this is reflected in works such as the Metaphysics 
(Aristotle, 2014b).  While the potted history of the Greek’s inquiry into being before 
Aristotle provided some context, it was reading Aristotle’s work that opened a better 
understanding of being and provided insights into Heidegger's approach. While my 
initial starting point was as a materialist,74 it was Aristotle rather than Heidegger that 
help disturbed the hold this approach had on me sufficient to see Heidegger in a 
new way.  Working through the Categories, I could see that the way I understood 
entities was reflected in this work.  The materialist account of what it is ‘to be’ 
something is no more than the properties, what Aristotle calls categories, which 
defines the entity.  It was a revelation when I read that Aristotle did not regard his 
work in the Categories as determinative of what it is ‘to be’ an entity and he 
specifically addresses this in the Metaphysics.  This difference between the 
Categories and the Metaphysics I take to reflect Heidegger’s view that philosophy, 
understood as the discipline that studies the being of entities, necessarily precedes 
the work of science (refer Chapter 11). 
The Categories - An account of the entities that are  
Aristotle approaches the study of being in different ways over his career and each, 
in their own way, is influential.  In the Categories(Aristotle, 2014a) he gives an 
account of all the different types of things ‘that are’ and classifies them into ten 
groups.  The Greek phrase for the ‘things that are’ is τὰ ὄντα (tà ónta) which literally 
means ‘the beings’, which often ends up in English translated as entities75 which is 
                                            
74 ɸ 
75 While not obvious there is a strong etymological link in the word entity with the original Greek formulation of 
beings.  Entity derives from the Latin entitatem (being) which is a from the present participle esse (be), which in 
turn was the Latin interpretation of the Greek philosophical term to on, ‘that which is’. 
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the word used in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time76.  
We are identifying ‘things that are’ (entities) every time we use the verb ‘to be’ in its 
various forms, for example in such statement as, that is a cat, the sky is blue, I am 
happy, there are four of them, etc.  Humans have the innate ability to differentiate 
between and identify entities and our language reflects this.  On the basis of this 
ability, Aristotle examined the different types of ‘things that are’ (entities) and 
ordered them into ten groups called categories and introduces them as follows; 
...each [individual category] signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative 
or where or when or being in a position or having or doing or being affected. To give a rough 
idea, ideas of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four foot, five foot; of qualification; white, 
grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; 
of when: yesterday, last year; of being in a position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-
on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burnt. (1b25 
- 2a4) (Aristotle, 2014a, k. 250-4) 
The following better explains the categories by way of examples;  
5. Substance: In this use of substance it applies to a particular entity as in 
Socrates the Philosopher, Phar Lap the horse, or the apple tree in the back 
garden and so on.  
6. Quantity: This is the extension of an object. If it is a box, it may be 1 metre 
high, 2 metres long and 1 meter deep. If a circle, 10 cm in diameter.   
7. Qualification: Includes descriptions of the qualities of the object, so red, soft, 
odorous, etc. 
8. Relative: This is how one object is related towards and other, e.g. larger than, 
closer than, double in size. 
9. Where (or place): This refers to how the object is situated in its environment 
and would include such descriptions as Adelaide Hills, in the laundry cupboard, 
on top of the shelf. 
10. When (or time): Relates a thing to the flow of events through time.  Yesterday, 
in three months and five minutes are all examples for this descriptor. 
11. Position: Based on Aristotle's examples this seems to refer to a stationary 
position reached after an action, for example, is leaning, is sitting, is lying, 
standing and so forth.    
12. Having: This relates to the condition of something after it has been affected or 
acted upon by something else.  Aristotle's examples include shod, to have 
shoes placed on, or armed as in to have armour placed on, but it would thus 
include clothed, painted, covered, and so on.  
13. Doing (Action, to make or do): This refers to the action undertaken by 
something on something else, so producing, cutting, folding, burning, repairing.    
14. Being affected (to undergo or to suffer): This may be seen as the passive (i.e. 
                                            
76 In their translations notes [BT22/3] Macquarrie and Robinson point out that the German they translate as 
entity is ein Seindes which literally means ‘something which is’ and can be translated as being, or beings for the 
plural, however they opt for entity as it is less confusing. The German word Sein is translated as being. 
By way of example of the confusion that can arise, especially in the English is Heidegger’s phrase, “Das Sein 
des Seienden »ist« nicht selbst ein Seiendes.”[BTg 8/6]  This is translated as “The being of entities ‘is’ not itself 
an entity” [BT 26/6] by Macquarrie0 and Robinson but as “The being of being ‘is’ itself not a being ” by 




no action on the part of the object) involvement in being impacted on or 
changed by another object. It can be seen as the pair to 9. in that it is the thing 
that is cut, is burnt, is made and so on. 
In Aristotle’s analysis, the most important category is that of substance which refers 
to the independent material entity that must exist for the others to exist, i.e. 
categories two through nine are dependent on one.  If there is a red box, for 
example, red cannot exist unless there is some substance, box. The same is true 
for all the other categorial properties associated with the box.  As such we never 
perceive the substance itself, and we recognise the red box by way of all the other 
characteristics.  Note however that in this approach Aristotle is making no claims 
about what it is ‘to be’ a box.  This is dealt with in the Metaphysics.  However modern 
science ‘stays with’ the concepts of the Categories, and understands, for example, 
a red box, to be a particular arrangement of molecules that exhibit certain qualitative 
characteristics (shape, colour, rigidity, etc) and quantitative characteristics (mass, 
length, breadth, etc). 
Having identified the categories and the relationship between them, Aristotle then 
examines the relationship that exists within each category. He points out that when 
talking about Socrates that it can ‘be said of’ Socrates that he is a man, and further, 
it can ‘be said of’ Socrates that he is an animal.  When we say some x is y, then we 
are indicating that in some way ‘y’ exists and further that y is predicated (based on) 
x77.  However, when we say Socrates is a ‘man’ or is an ‘animal’ Aristotle points out 
that this represents a different mode of existence to Socrates himself.  Man and 
animal reflect more general or universal concepts than any individual thing, and on 
this basis, he develops a hierarchical level of description within each category. He 
calls these universals species and genus.  
Under Aristotle's hierarchy, Socrates (individual or particular instance) belongs to 
the grouping of man78 (species) which belongs to the larger grouping of animal 
(genus). The same structure applies to all the categories such that we can have a 
colour (genus), red (species) and the red of that fire truck (particular).  We can 
                                            
77 This also applies between categories. For example, when we say, ‘red box’ it is the same as saying that in 
some way red exists, but it is predicated, based on, the box. 
78 While I would normally use gender neutral language, the use of man as reflecting all human kind is reflective 
of Aristotle’s usage and examples. 
204 
represent this is structure in a diagram, for example, in relation to some entities that 
exist at my place (Figure 5). 
In order to get from genus to species, Aristotle identifies a unique, essential, defining 
characteristic, an essence, associated with the entities that must be possessed by 
an entity to be a certain species.  This is the basis of his defining a human as zoon 
logon echon, or an animal having a rational principle. This basic approach to setting
up a system for classifying things, called a taxonomy, is still used today. An example 
is in biology and although there is a far greater level of differentiation as indicated 
by the number of hierarchical levels in the classification systems. Under this 
scheme, a human, homo sapiens (wise man) is classified as indicated in Table 3 .  
HIERARCHICAL 
LEVEL 










Species: Homo sapiens 
Table 3 Taxonomy of homo sapiens 
Aristotle stipulated that the lower order (species) be defined by identifying unique 
characteristics that differentiate it from within the higher order (genus).  This same 
















principle is applied today when moving from one level to the next.  For example, the 
domain of Eukaryota is differentiated from the group containing all living entities by 
stipulating that anything in this domain must have the complex eukaryotic cells as 
part of their makeup. This then excludes life forms such as the bacteria but includes 
all plants.  Animals are distinguished from plants at the level of kingdom by reference 
to characteristics such as being heterotrophic (typically digesting food in an internal 
organ), motility (being able to move itself), and the blastula stage of development of 
the embryo.  I think the general idea is clear enough as is its connection to Aristotle’s 
classification framework.   
In Aristotle’s scheme, just as there is a dependent relationship between categories 
two through ten on the category called substance, there is also a dependent 
relationship within categories in that the universals are dependent on the individual.  
So for example, there would be no sense in the universal called colour if there were 
not particular instances of colours.  Within the substance category Aristotle calls the 
universals ‘secondary substances’ and the individual extant entities he refers to as 
‘primary substances’.  In Aristotle’s account, the most important classification is thus 
‘primary substance’ as everything else depends on its existence.   One way of 
looking at Aristotle's system is that we have a world full of individual entities.  It is 
entirely impractical if we are going to research nature just to group everything 
together. What Aristotle does is develop a classification system that is based on 
identifiable characteristics observed in the entities themselves and does so in such 
a way that all entities in nature are captured by the approach.  Essentially what 
Aristotle has done has exploited our ability to differentiate entities and formalised it. 
In Aristotle's time, the investigation of nature was confined to what we may typically 
encounter, e.g. animals, insects, plants, rain and so on. This is reflected in the nature 
of research Aristotle undertook.  At this level, there are no considerations given to 
the first principles, i.e. the most basic elements of which things are made.  There is 
not much difference in approach today, except that with the aid of microscopes, 
telescopes and so on, there is a greater range of entities that can be investigated. 
In the Categories, Aristotle acknowledges that the four elements of fire and water, 
etc. comprise the entities we see, but they play no further part in his analysis of 
describing the ‘things that are’, i.e. entities.   
In the Categories, the question of what it is ‘to be’ an entity is not asked, this is left 
to the Metaphysics.  Sometime late, after I had initially written this and subsequent 
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chapters, the significance of this point struck me.  For my entire career, I had been 
confusing the visual presentation (roughly speaking the present-at-hand 
characteristics) by which entities are classified with the separate issue of what it was 
to be an entity79.  What it meant to be an entity, the basis by which I understood it, 
is smuggled into my perceiving.  I am sure that in some way my previously 
unidentified misplaced understanding and the failing to clarify the nature of the 
smuggling was part of my problem in working with Heidegger. It was Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics that was one of the decisive pieces that helped bring about a new way 
of understanding.  
The Metaphysics – Exploring what it is to be a particular entity 
In the Metaphysics(Aristotle, 2014b) Aristotle addresses, among others, the 
question as to what is the substance of an entity, i.e. that which determines the entity 
as the entity it is. Aristotle comments that the Metaphysics should be tackled only 
after the earlier works, which includes the Categories. Aristotle tells us that the 
Metaphysics deals with “the first principles and the causes” (982b1) of things, which 
are “the most universal [and] on the whole the hardest for men to know, for they are 
the furthest from the senses”. (982a25)  It is as if he has set out in the Categories a 
sufficient framework for the conduct of inquiries into the natural world as it appears 
to us, but here, in the Metaphysics he is now going to delve deeper. This is also 
suggested by his comments that the “knowing” that is associated with the 
Metaphysics does not seem to have any practical knowledge, as would be the case 
in inquiring into the natural world of individual entities, the Metaphysics is for those 
who chose “to know for the sake of knowing” (982b1). 
In the Metaphysics, while Aristotle uses existing entities, what are called primary 
substances in the Categories, as the basis of his inquiry, he shifts the way in which 
he is using the term substance.   In the Categories, he just accepts when we look at 
an entity the substance of the entity is present, given to us in the perception, 
whereas in the Metaphysics he asks the harder question, “What is substance?”.  To 
understand this shift, before proceeding with the Metaphysics we need to look at 
Aristotle’s concept of hylomorphic compounds.  
In the Physics (Aristotle, 2014c), Aristotle introduces the concept that the primary 
substances of Categories are hylomorphic compounds, a combination of matter 




(hyle) and form (morphē).  By way of example, the same piece of clay (matter) may 
be made into a jug (the clay in the form of a jug) or a pot (the clay in the form of a 
pot), and similarly, the same wood may be applied to building a table or a chair.  He 
uses this idea that matter takes on different forms in the Metaphysics. In the 
Categories, primary substance refers to the hylomorphic compound, i.e. 
matter+form. In the Metaphysics, as part of his analysis, he treats these components 
separately as he undertakes his investigations to identify the substance of the entity.  
Because Aristotle is asking, in the Metaphysics, what is the substance of an entity 
this term needs to be clarified as it is different to typical modern usage. 
The term substance derives from the Latin substantia, which in turn was a translation 
of the Greek ousia, for ‘being’.  The Latin literally means something that stands 
under or grounds something and the philosophic sense of the word is that it refers 
to the fundamental units of reality used in any particular theory.  Hence for Thales, 
it is water, for the atomists, atoms and for Plato it is forms.  In Aristotle’s Categories, 
he has primary substances as the most fundamental unit. There is a suggestion in 
Aristotle that indicates (Aristotle, 2014b) the Categories is to be primarily used in 
exploring nature, i.e. entities, and there is no need, at this level of inquiry, to pursue 
the notion of substance further.  In Metaphysics, however, he is pushing deeper to 
understand what it is to be an entity. This would equate to the view of Heidegger 
discussed earlier that science deals with entities whereas philosophy deals with 
being.  The Greek ousia (substance) thus refers to the idea of what it is to be the 
entity and not to the entity itself and this is the sense in which Aristotle is now using 
substance. From the early discussion, it can be seen that it is also the sense in 
which Heidegger uses the term Sien or being.  So, for Aristotle, ousia even though 
it comes to us via the Latin as substance, relates to being not to the material aspect 
of the entity.  Thus in the tradition substance ontology which is understood in terms 
of a fundamental entity has parted from Aristotle’s understanding!  In both Aristotle’s 
and Heidegger’s work there is the notion that we can talk about ousia (being) as 
separate to the entity, but that in each case ousia relates to an entity. Aristotle refers 
to this concept that being is only sperate from an entity ‘on account’.  
In the Metaphysics, then, Aristotle is asking the question as to what it is in the entity 
as we perceive and understand it that is the basis of it being that entity. The “what 
it is” is the substance of the entity. He considers some alternatives previously put 
forward including the ‘unity’, basic elements, and change.  I will only deal with his 
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discussion on essence which leads him to his answer.  
The Greek phrase translated as essence is to ti ên einai, which is literally translated 
as “the what it is to be”.  However, the phrase was condensed by the Romans into 
the Latin essentia which is where we derive the word essence.  For Aristotle, the 
essence is something that can be ‘said of’ an entity and identifies the something 
about the entity that determines “what it is to be” that entity.  As we saw above, he 
uses the concept of essence in conjunction with genus to define a species. 
However, the concept of essence applies to all ten categories, defining species from 
a genus, and so Aristotle adds a qualification that in the Metaphysics it is only the 
essence associated with the ‘primary substance’ about which he is inquiring.  This 
makes sense as under his analysis all other categories and the universals are 
dependent the existence of entities as ‘primary substances.’ So in the Metaphysics, 
when he is asking about the defining essence (the what it is to be) he is confining 
the use of essence to the category of primary substance. With the understanding of 
this restriction, he can thus use essence and substance interchangeably, 
remembering that substance is the Greek ousia, i.e. being. 
While the ‘primary substance’ of the Categories for an extant entity that is a 
hylomorphic compound comprises matter+form, Aristotle quickly dismisses matter 
as being the essence.  If we take the example of the clay pot and the clay jug, the 
same lump of clay can be made into either.  If the clay is the essence, then we have 
the situation that the same lump of clay can define what it is to as the jug or as the 
pot.  Clearly there is a problem with this, and accordingly, Aristotle rejects this option.   
He concludes that the essence must be the form.  It is the form of the pot or jug that 
when, in some way, combined with the clay is the basis on which the extant jug or 
pot is ‘what it is’.  
If we drop the pot and it breaks, what breaks? It is the clay or matter, that breaks, 
and it no longer holds the form of the pot.  We typically assign the name of the 
physical object after the name of the form(1033b15) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44684-5), 
and on this basis, we say the pot has broken, in fact, the essence of the clay pot, 
the form, has not broken.  To step through this carefully again:  A compound entity 
is made of ‘matter’ plus ‘form’ as two different things.  The essence that which 
determines the entity is the form, not the clay.  The clay can be understood as, in 
some way, ‘holding’ the form.  When the clay breaks, we may say that entity ‘clay 
pot’ is broken but what has happened is that the clay no longer holds the form.  
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Shortly I will discuss the notion of form as ‘formula’ at which time it will become 
apparent that it is nonsense to talk of the form breaking. By way of another example, 
several years ago, I worked with a person who had had heart replacement surgery. 
While he was thankful for the surgery as he recognized that without it he would have 
died, he did not regard the 'new' heart as somehow replacing part of 'him'.  To be a 
person is not to be the physical material from which the person is made.  In other 
words, the essence of the person is not in the material from which the body is made.  
This is also Heidegger’s point, and so if the idea of form can be better understood 
this may open up space in which Heidegger’s concepts can be understood.  
In the Categories, the word ‘eidos’ or species is used to define the type of thing an 
entity is, but as noted this doesn’t address the issue of being.  In the Metaphysics, 
the defining aspect is such that it means form as contrasted to matter. (Cohen, 2016)  
Similarly in Categories the concept of ‘primary substance’ reference to the 
hylomorphic compound, but in the Metaphysics substance means that aspect of the 
entity that is its essence, i.e. just the form.  It is as if Aristotle accepts that we take 
as a shorthand the appearance of something (i.e. matter plus form), as the basis for 
distinguishing one entity from another, of being able to classify entities and so on. 
However, what this level of understanding masks is that it is the form that determines 
what it is to be the entity and not the hylomorphic compound itself.  This is reflected 
in the Metaphysics when Aristotle remarks that  
Callias or Socrates … are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same 
in form; for their form is indivisible. (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44700) 
The concept of species from the Categories and the concept of form from the 
Metaphysics are related, just viewed from different perspectives. One from the 
perspective of classifying and identifying what something is, the other from the 
perspective of identifying what determines something as the entity it is.  If this is the 
case then we have a clear resonance to Heidegger’s formulation for being, i.e. it is 
that which determines the entity as the entity it is and is the basis by which it is 
understood.  I am not saying that Heidegger holds that ‘form’ is the essence of 
something, I am simply pointing out the similarity.  If this is the case, Heidegger is 
saying that we recognise things because being (his terminology) is somehow 
instantiated into the extant entity.  If this is the case, then it starts to clarify the 
puzzles from the last chapter whereby being can be something that determines the 
entity, something that is before the entity and something that is possessed by the 
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entity or can be said to be in the entity.  Being then can be understood as a universal 
that defines the particular. While aspects of this were grasped before this, it is 
Aristotle's’ framing that is bringing it more clearly into view. 
I am not going to explore Aristotle’s account from this perspective any further. Cohen 
provides a succinct summary;  
The essence of… a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle 
says “by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance” (1032b1), and 
“when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence” (1032b14). It is the form of 
a substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is form that satisfies the 
condition initially required for being the substance of something. The substance of a thing is 
its form. (Cohen, 2016, p. 19) 
The naming conventions can be confusing but in summary: 
• Primary substance – refers to an individual extant entity as a hylomorphic 
compound, i.e. matter plus form.  
• Secondary substance – in the Categories refers to the universal or species to 
which individuals belong. 
• Essence – is the defining characteristic within any category and determines the 
species (e.g. the specific type of entity) from the genus within that category. 
• Essence in the substance category – is whatever determines the entity as the 
entity it is.  For primary substances, it is the hylomorphic compound less the 
matter, i.e. the form. For secondary substances, it is simply the form. 
So, what it is to be an entity is called ‘substance’, within the substance category 
‘substance’, and ‘essence’ refer to the same thing, for Aristotle this is the form.  
Form as Formula 
What Aristotle understands by form needs to be dealt with carefully. By form as I 
have presented it, I would typically think of as shape as in a template, such that a 
certain shape is stamped onto matter to produce the primary substance but this not 
quite right.   In the Metaphysics, we find the following; 
The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. 
(Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44011) 
What is different in this is that the word ‘form’ has been replaced by ‘the formula of 
which is a definition’.  Stepping through Aristotle’s example of the manufacture of a 
bronze sphere we can see more clearly what Aristotle is intending;  
But that there is a bronze sphere, this we make. For we make it out of bronze and the sphere; 
we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. (Aristotle, 
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2014b, k. 44679-81) 
The important point to note here is that the bronze sphere is produced.  It is made 
by bringing a sphere (understanding sphere as form) into the bronze matter, and the 
result is the hylomorphic compound bronze sphere.  He then points out that the 
sphere as form is not produced;  
It is obvious then from what has been said that the thing, in the sense of form or substance, 
is not produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced (1033b15) 
(Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44684-5) 
Aristotle has thus differentiated between the extant entity coming into being, and the 
being of the extant entity, the form or in this case the sphere.  Aristotle elaborates 
this in the following way,  
… we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But if the 
essence of sphere in general is produced, something must be produced out of something. 
(1033b10)  (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44680-1) 
From the above two passages, recalling the earlier discussion on Parmenides, 
Aristotle has addressed some important characteristics of what it to be something 
(form), in that it is not created, and that something produced is always produced 
from something.   
We now come to Aristotle’s comment of essence as formula; 
The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. 
(1017b20)  (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44011) (my underlining) 
The question is, what does he mean by formula, and this is unambiguously indicated 
by the description contained in the following description; 
… a sphere is the figure whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the 
centre.(1033b10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44682-3) 
The essence of the sphere is given, literally as a formula80.  If you specify any point 
in three-dimensional space at a specific location and then draw a figure covering 
every point that is ‘r’ distance from this point you end up with a sphere.  Elsewhere 
Aristotle uses the formula 2:181 to stipulate the essence of an octave (195a30) 
                                            
80 The Wolfram mathematics website defines a sphere as “as the set of all points in three-dimensional Euclidean 
space that are located at a distance (the "radius”) from a given point (the “center"). 
(http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Sphere.html (Accessed 25/08/2017)) This definition is identical to that provided 
by Aristotle. 
81 If the frequency in an octave is x, the frequency of the same note one octave higher is 2x, in one octave lower 
is ½ x, i.e the ration in moving from one to the other is 2:1. 
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(Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9464).  In his discussion on the causes of entities coming into 
being, discussed below, Aristotle also indicates the plan for building a house 
satisfies the idea of ‘formula’. 
The concept of formula is thus a very broad notion, and form therefore has both a 
‘universal’ meaning and a specific meaning. For example, Aristotle’s definition of 
sphere includes all possible spheres, whereas the sphere for a particular entity will 
have a set radius.  The same thing applies to the concept of ‘plan’ for a house. 
When we think of a formula then we must be clear that we are not referring to the 
written representation of the formula, e.g. the sphere as something with the surface 
equidistance from the centre, or a drawing setting out the plan of a building, these 
are simply representations of the form.  An analogy is the concept of numbers in 
arithmetic; no matter how we may write the number ‘three’, either in letters as I have 
just done or as III, iii, 3, etc. we are not writing the number itself, they are 
representations of the number. Similarly, we do not ‘see’ the form itself, neither as 
a general concept nor a sphere of a certain radius.  When we see the bronze sphere, 
we are seeing the bronze in the shape of a sphere.  The confusion arises because 
of the habit, which Aristotle points to, of naming the extant entity after the form! 
In this discussion, it becomes apparent that the entity we see and what it is to be 
the entity, i.e. what it is, its essence or substance, is not the same albeit there is a 
relationship.  This is what Aristotle is referring to when he says in relation to the 
essence, that what he is seeking is “furthest from the sense” (982a25)82.  In others 
words we do not see the form or the substance of what it is to be a certain entity, it 
can only be represented by way of a ‘formula’. There are clear parallels to 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Heidegger’s method concerns the disclosure of the 
hiddenness of being (Aristotle’s essence or form) by way of hermeneutic 
interpretation.  In other words, he is providing a descriptive account or 
representation (the formula) of being and is not talking about any actual seeing of 
something that is typically hidden.  
The idea I am presenting in relation to Aristotle’s ‘formula’ is supported when we 
look at the Greek word translated as ‘formula’, λόγος (logos).  The is a difficult word 
to translate into the English.  At one level, it is translated variously as word, reason, 
82 This is reflective of Heidegger’s comment that the being of Dasein is farthest from us; 
“Dasein is ontically 'closest' to itself and ontologically farthest.” [BT 37/16] 
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cause, speech, and so on, but these do not have the same import as in the Greek. 
Cohen (Cohen, 2016) in his discussion of Aristotle’s metaphysics gives examples 
of the different uses.  In the Topics Aristotle links the word λόγος with the idea of 
giving an account, “a definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence” 
(Cohen, 2016, p. 16) whereas in the Metaphysics, Aristotle links it directly to 
essence, “there is an essence of just those things whose logos is a definition” 
(1030a6), “the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself” (1029b14) 
(Cohen, 2016, p. 16).  Recently I worked with my son to assemble a model of a four-
cylinder combustion engine. The kit came with a set of instructions which guided us 
in the assembling of the model.  In this case, the description or instructions of the 
motor existed separately to the motor. We clearly cannot think of Aristotle’s formula 
in this way. Aristotle’s formula is not a set of instructions; it is an account of the thing 
itself.  However, it is an account, and not the thing itself, and it is on this basis that 
we can describe the sphere in the manner he has.  
Relationship Between Form and Matter 
Many aspects of Aristotle’s work on form and matter have not been covered, and so 
this discussion should not be regarded as a comprehensive account.  I will briefly 
touch on just one other point, without much discussion as it sheds light on a key 
passage in Heidegger’s work which will be discussed later. 
When considering matter, there must be some substance that determines ‘what it 
is’ and this is different to the substance of a hylomorphic compound. Aristotle argues 
that a characteristic of the substance of matter is that it is ’potential’, i.e. a piece of 
clay is potentially a pot, a jug, a plate, and so on.  An important characteristic of form 
is that it is ‘actual’. While form does not exist as a separate entity outside of a 
hylomorphic compound, it is what the entity ‘actually’ is. The ‘actuality’ of the entity 
is produced from the ‘potentiality’ of matter as a result of the form (‘actuality’) being 
worked into the matter.  The point being, however, that for Aristotle ‘actuality’ is 
always the critical aspect of the being of entities and is what they factually are.  In 
Being and Time, Heidegger reverses this priority in relation to the being of Dasein.  
Yet as being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially 
that which, in its potentiality-for-being, it is not yet. Only because the being of the "there" 
receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding 
as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it 




There is a lot in the quote that needs to be unpacked, at this stage, it is important 
only to note that Heidegger regards the being of Dasein in such a way that it is 
Dasein’s potential for being that determines Dasein.  The question that this 
immediately provoked for me is what is the potential for being in a nursing home as 
they are currently operated.  How Heidegger argues his case as summarised in the 
above passages is the underlying theme of this thesis.   
 Causes of an Entity to Come into Being 
The next step in following Aristotle in his exploration of what it is to be an entity is to 
discuss what is called his four causes for an entity.  For Aristotle, we do not properly 
understand an entity until we can account for its coming into being, and this is as a 
result of four causes.  The idea behind this is straight forward.  In that, the essence 
of an extant entity is the form, and this is prior to the entity coming into being, then 
Aristotle is simply saying that to account for the extant entity we have to account for 
how the ‘form’ comes into the matter.  He recognises that living things are different 
to, say, pots, and accordingly he provides different accounts, but they all comply to 
the basic structure of the four causes.  It would not have escaped notice that this 
reflects another aspect of Heidegger’s work, that of regional ontologies! 
We need to be careful with the term ‘cause’ as it has a broader and different sense 
in the Greek than in English. The Greek word translated as cause is αιτία (aitia) but 
can also be translated as reason, explanation, or sake and Aristotle seems to have 
this broad intent in mind.  He discusses his theory of causes in his books 
Physics(Aristotle, 2014c), Metaphysics(Aristotle, 2014b), and Posterior 
Analytics(Aristotle, 2014d) and the following is a summary from those books:  
• Material "cause": the matter or material necessary for the entity to come into 
being.  For a table this may be wood, for a statute bronze or marble, form an 
animal flesh and blood.  An important requirement, however, is that the material 
must be applicable to what is being produced.  
• Formal "cause": the refers to the form, discussed above.  It determines how the 
material will be worked such as to produce the predetermined form.  I have 
discussed the formula associated with a sphere and octave. For a statue or a 
house, it is the plan that the sculptor or builder has.  
• Efficient or moving "cause": the things apart from the material which brings about 
the change.  The efficient cause of a table is a carpenter, of the house it is the 
builder, and, for Aristotle, the efficient cause of a son is the father.  
• Final "cause": is that for the sake of which or the end (teleo) purpose for which 
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the entity is produced.  For a table, this could be for eating; for a chariot, 
transport; for a seed, the tree. 
If we take the example of a house, the final cause or the for-the-sake-of-which the 
house is built is for a family to live in, the efficient cause is the builder, the formal 
cause is the plan for the house and the material cause is comprised of the various 
bits of timber, bricks and so on from which it is made.  If any of these causes are 
removed, then the entity does not come into being. 
Aristotle points out that the four causes do not need to be four discrete causes as in 
the house example.  In the Physics, he provides the following example; 
Some things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but 
again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the principle of motion. (195a5) 
(Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9451-3) 
In other words, hard work is the efficient or moving cause of fitness, but we engaged 
in the hard work for the sake of getting fit.  By way of another example Aristotle 
points out that a cause need not be present, but can be a cause due to its absence; 
For that which by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing about 
the contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of the pilot 
whose presence was the cause of its safety. (195a10)  (Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9453-4) 
I am not going to follow Aristotle’s discussion on the causes any further, it is 
sufficient that the basic concept has been grasped.  
How to Ask the Question 
We now come to the last point I want to make in relation to Aristotle’s examination 
of what it is to be an entity, and this relates to the nature of the question we should 
ask.  
Later in the Metaphysics Aristotle continues his inquiries into what the substance of 
an entity is.  This time he takes “another starting point” to “get a clear view also of 
that substance which exists apart from sensible substances” and since “substance 
is a principle and a cause83, let us attack it from this standpoint.”(1041a5)  (Aristotle, 
2014b, k. 44990-1)  He suggests that we often ask the question concerning the 
substance of something as follows: 
The ‘why’ is always sought in this form -- ‘why does one thing attach to another?’ For to 
                                            
83 Aristotle is here using the term principle in the same sense as the term ‘first principle’ was used earlier, i.e. it 
is the most basic, unchanging thing that accounts for an entity being the entity it is.  The substance must, of 
necessity, be a cause, e.g. in the discussions of form as both substance and the formal cause. 
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inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire— as we have said— why 
the man is musical, or it is something else. (1041a10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k.44991-3) 
Aristotle argues that this is the same as asking, firstly why a ‘man is a man’ and 
secondly why ‘musical is musical’ and he goes on asking,  
… why a thing is itself’ is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the 
thing must already be evident. (1041a10)  (Aristotle, 2014b, k.44993-4)  
As Cohen points out the “only thing that can be a man is a man.” (Cohen, 2016, p. 
29).  Aristotle then argues that we must ask the question differently,  
… why are certain things, i.e. stones and bricks, a house? (1041a25) (Aristotle, 2014b, 
k.45000-01) 
He reiterates this a little later by way of a summary, 
Since we must know the existence of the thing and it must be given84, clearly the question is 
why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that 
which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body in 
this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the 
matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. (1041b5)  (Aristotle, 
2014b, k. 45006-10) (my underlining) 
The argument is simple.  That things exist is self-evident, just have a look around.  
From a scientific or philosophical point of view, asking why things exist is 
meaningless because even if we knew, e.g. God created everything, it still does not 
answer questions concerning the entities that exist. 
It was when I read this account I recognised another aspect of my problem in dealing 
with Heidegger’s being.85  When I was puzzling through the question of being there 
was always the nagging question, “Why do human beings come into existence?” It 
may not have always been present, and it may not have always have been clearly 
articulated, but I recognised it nonetheless. 
Aristotle accepts two things firstly the existence of different types of entities and 
secondly that it is given to us that we can distinguish one type from another.  Based 
on this his inquiry is simple and can be illustrated by way of example.  If all these 
objects in front of me in one group are of different shapes and sizes but are all 
chairs, and in another group, are people of differing gender, occupation, age and so 
                                            
84 This is another link to Heidegger, as one of the premises from which he starts of that we know what things 




are people, what is it that determines the first group as chairs and the second group 
as people?  It doesn’t matter what name we give to entities, they could be called 
anything.   
Because it is given to us know the differing types of entities, Aristotle holds that 
whatever determines a chair a chair or a person as a person must be evident in 
each particular instance of a chair or person.  There should be something that is 
both discernible and common in each chair as the basis of it being a chair and within 
each person that determines it as a person.   Further, if the essence of chair and 
person are understood, then we should be able to account for how this particular 
chair or particular person came into being. In a nutshell, this is one of Aristotle’s 
main projects.  The similarity with Heidegger’s project is evident. 
Putting this approach together with Aristotle’s concept of ‘formula’ opened up a new 
way of thinking that moved passed my simplistic materialism.  I did not buy into 
Aristotle’s account of form, but nor could I reject it completely. However, it was the 
basic structure of his solution that was important. 
Summary  
We can then summarise the aspect Aristotle’s work I have been discussing as 
follows: Aristotle is not inquiring into why anything exists, this is a meaningless 
question for the level of inquiry he is undertaking.  For Aristotle, we start from the 
premise that we know that different types of entities exist and as such the basis of 
discerning this difference of one type of entity from another must, somehow, be 
given to us. A fundamental question then is: What is the basis by which we can tell 
one entity from another? The answer to this question for Aristotle must lie in the 
entity itself because every instance of the entity must have within it the same 
essence that all other entities of the same type.  This essence must be what 
determines the entity as the entity it is.  For Aristotle, the answer is that it is ‘the 
form’ of the entity. And ‘form’ cannot be material, it is not produced, and it cannot be 
something that our senses perceive; it is the ‘formula’, broadly understood.  This 
approach sounds remarkable Heideggerian! 
This then leads to two aspects of an inquiry concerning what it is to be a certain 
entity.  Firstly, to give an account of its essence (formula). Secondly, to provide an 
account of how a specific entity comes into being and regarding this account, 
Aristotle has identified the four causes as the basis of and to guide such an inquiry. 
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There is much more in Aristotle’s work in that he explores various nuances of his 
argument and covers a far greater range of topics, but what I have outlined is 
sufficient to grasp the basic ideas he is putting forward on the topic of being, i.e. 
regarding the inquiry into what things are.86 
What was surprising to me is that the summary of the Aristotelian project as I have 
outlined it is essentially Heidegger’s project, as are the fundamental premises, that 
things exist and the basis of determining the types of entities is given to us. 
Conclusion 
This completes my introduction of an account of being in early Greek philosophy.  
The aim has not been to give a full exposition but to provide a sufficient account so 
that the nature of the inquiries into the ‘things that are’ by different philosophers 
could be understood, if only in a rudimentary way.   
The reading of the accounts of being by the early Greeks brought to light many 
aspects of how being is understood, even today.   The reading of Aristotle proved 
to be more of a revelation than initially anticipated.  What was discovered is the 
same basic project that Heidegger is engaged with, similar views about the 
materialist account, and other similarities into the basic aspect of being, for example 
its hiddenness, and a research approach based on the premise that and 
understanding of being must be given to us. 
Having gained a basic foothold on the topic, I returned to an aspect of Heidegger’s 
encounter with the early Greeks that showed some promise of shedding even more, 
light on Heidegger’s conception of being.  This is the subject of the next chapter. 
  
                                            
86 In the discussion concerning Aristotle I have not mentioned the basic elements of air, fire, water and earth. 
While he rejects these elements as being the substance of what things are, he accepts they are in some way a 
cause of what he terms matter, which may be flesh, timber, clay and so on. However, he does not think that 
matter is a simple combination of these basic elements, there is something else, e.g. 
“… the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else.” (1041b15) (Aristotle, 
2014b, k.45014-5) 
That something else is the “cause which makes this thing flesh.” (1041b25)(k. 45019), i.e. fire, earth, etc may 
be the material cause, but there are other causes. In his surviving texts, there is not a detailed account 




CHAPTER 7: HEIDEGGER, THE GREEKS AND BEING  
Introduction 
The previous chapters introduced the concept of being, discussed Heidegger’s 
puzzling account of being in Being and Time and presented an account of being by 
the early Greek’s which shed some light on the puzzle.  This chapter presents 
another aspect of being from the Greeks, this time from Heidegger’s interpretation, 
that of prevailing. It was discovering this aspect in Heidegger’s account that provided 
the missing piece necessary to develop a sense of cohesive intelligibility as to 
Heidegger’s concept of being.  
Heidegger gave many courses on the metaphysics of the Ancient Greek 
philosophers over his career.  It was not practical to read them all and nor was it 
necessary as much of the content was not directly relevant to the issue I was 
pursuing.  The approach taken was to quickly scan the books, dipping into various 
chapters that looked promising.  One of the added challenges that quickly became 
apparent is that Heidegger leaves the Greek untranslated and this carries through 
to the English translations of his work.  For the key words I have followed suit and 
used the Greek, but also include the English translation in most instances.  
The ‘missing’ aspect of Heidegger’s interpretation of being was found in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics [FCM], a lecture course given in 1929-30.  
The topics covered in the lecture course are wide ranging and included Heidegger's 
analysis of boredom, his discussion on the biological sciences and how they related 
to his work and a summary of his conception of metaphysics at the time.  In the 
section on metaphysics, he provides an account of the relationship between φύσις 
(fýsis87), nature, and λόγος (logos), word, and how the understanding of this 
relationship changes in the work of the Ancient Greeks. It was the change in the 
understanding of φύσις (nature) as it split into two aspects of the same underlying 
phenomenon that proved decisive. Heidegger describes these two understandings 
as nature that which prevails, and nature as the prevailing.  In the chapter, I do not 
critically assess Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek accounts; the goal is simply 
to grasp how Heidegger interpreted the Greeks. 
                                            
87 When I first introduce a word in the Greek script I will also give the Latin script.  I will also provide the English 
translation.  In that Heidegger thinks it is important it use the Greek script I will follow suit for the key words, 
however I will typically include the English words in brackets. 
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Lessons from the Early Ancient Greeks, the Pre-Socratics 
During his lecture course on the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
tells us that the term metaphysics goes back to the ancient Greek term, μετὰ τὰ 
φυσικά.[FCM 25]  The phonetic form of the Greek is metá tá fysiká, which is the 
origin of the English word ‘metaphysics’.  The origins of the English word ‘physics’ 
is also evident.  The term μετὰ τὰ φυσικά literally means ‘after the physics’, and the 
original application of the term was a reference to the works of Aristotle coming after 
his works on physics or the study of natural things. From here it gave its name to 
the branch of philosophy that addresses the topics covered by Aristotle in the 
Metaphysics, i.e. the nature of being, and the term also came to refer to things not 
found in nature, i.e. metaphysical.  In each of the ways the term is used, there is a 
sense then of a divide between the study of nature and things studied in 
metaphysics, or study of science compared to the study of philosophy.  
This division between inquiries into nature as opposed to what it is ‘to be’ a thing of 
nature, i.e. metaphysics, is evident in the standard view of the first of the early Greek 
scholars such as Thales and Anaximander.  While they are typically included in any 
account of Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, they are often regarded more as early 
‘scientists’ or naturalists making inquiries into nature as an entity rather than as 
making philosophical inquiries into ‘being’. (Blackson, 2011)  Heidegger explores 
the early understanding of φύσις (nature) and challenges the way this divide is 
understood.  
From the term μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (metaphysics), Heidegger draws the connection 
between the term φυσικά (fysiká) from this term and the Greek word for nature, 
φύσις (fýsis).  The common etymology can be seen in the Greek script.   In 
discussing the meaning of the word, ‘nature’ Heidegger points out that the word 
(which in German is Natur) comes to us from the Latin natura-nasci which means to 
be born, to arise and to grow. The Latin, according to Heidegger is meant to capture 
the meaning Greek φύσις. We are to understand φύσις (nature) as having an 
emphasis on growth in the sense of that which comes into being, grows and then 
dies, the natural cycle in nature. Already here we can see the similarities to the early 
Greek concepts discussed in Chapter 6.   
Heidegger then expands this, 
We here take growth and growing, however, in the quite elementary and broad sense in 
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which it irrupts in the primal experience of man: growth not only of plants and animals, their 
arising and passing away taken merely as an isolated process, but growth as this occurring 
in the midst of, and permeated by, the changing of the seasons, in the midst of the alternation 
of day and night, in the midst of the wandering of the stars, of storms and weather and the 
raging of the elements. Growing is all this taken together as one. [FCM 25] (my underlining) 
Nature is not understood as the collection of the things in nature.  Heidegger is 
presenting a concept of nature as a dynamic unity, encompassing everything, a 
unity in which things come into existence, change and pass away and in so doing 
“irrupts” or breaks into our most fundamental experiences of existing.  The individual 
instances we experience are experiences of nature itself.  However, we should be 
careful not to think of nature as change, rather nature is,  
 .. the self-forming prevailing of entities as a whole.  [FCM 25] 
Heidegger's interpretation is that what we see, and experience is nature it is one 
entity, a unity.  The Ancients understand this prevailing not as nature separate to 
human, but one that incorporates humans as part of nature;  
The events which man experiences in himself: procreation, birth, childhood, maturing, aging, 
death, are not events in the narrow, present-day sense of a specifically biological process of 
nature. Rather, they belong to the general prevailing of entities, which comprehends within 
itself human fate and its history. [FCM 26] 
Heidegger is claiming that the Ancients understand both the entities that are seen 
‘in’ nature and human kind as somehow not just dependent on the prevailing of 
nature but as the prevailing of nature. The prevailing however is not one of producing 
separate natural things; the entities are themselves nature itself in its prevailing, 
there is only unity.  The extent to which things of nature are, they are sustained in 
the very prevailing of nature.  The radical early concept of φύσις (nature) then, is as 
a prevailing whole which brings human kind into being, sustains it and is that back 
into which it passes when it dies.  
This picture presents a radically different understanding that has come to us 
whereby we see human kind as somehow separate to nature, as having dominion 
over nature.  Modern science, for example, is often portrayed as an endeavour of 
human kind that has the goal to understand nature in order to predict and control.  
To the extent we do see ourselves as part of nature, it is as one thing among others 
which collectively add up to nature; which is simply another version of the materialist 
account.  It is because of the pervasiveness of this view that Heidegger is at pains 
to make the point, and repeats it several times, that the Greek concept of φύσις 
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(nature) cannot be understood in modern terms. [FCM] 
It is out of this whole, Heidegger argues, that the Greeks had a notion of λέγειν 
(légein) which has a literal translation of ‘saith’. Λέγειν (saith) had the meaning of 
‘coming to word’ or speaking, and its function was to take something out of 
concealment, literally to let something be revealed from out of the whole.  If λέγειν 
(saith) is the speaking, then λόγος (word) is what has been spoken-out, and so in 
λόγος (word) the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes manifest. [FCM 
27] The import of this is that we are able to distinguish one entity from another. 
There is a significant difference between noticing that there are numerous objects 
in front of you, perhaps how a very young baby initially sees things and recognising 
that distinct nature of each entity. We thus have the ability to speak out and name 
the existence of different things.   There are thus two sides to what is happening.  
There is the prevailing of nature, and there is the naming of the distinct entities that 
arise from the prevailing. It is because of this innate ability that we can be said to 
name our world into existence.  This also reflects Heidegger’s account of being as 
that which determines entities (the prevailing) and the basis by which they are 
understood (logos). 
This idea of naming is captured and extended in early Christian theology and helps 
to illustrate the power of the concept of speaking that Heidegger is describing.  The 
Gospel of John in the New Testament was originally written in Greek.  In the opening 
verses of the Gospel, John declares that the God is the word (logos) and through 
him, all things come into being88.  The idea that it is the power of the word that brings 
things into being is the Greek concept I am describing.  However there has been a 
subtle, but significant change.  In the Christian theology, there is no longer a 
prevailing of nature; there is just the power of the word (God) bringing things into 
being with the power of logos.  As can be seen in the era of the Greek philosophers, 
and early Christian theologians the concept of λέγειν (saith) and λόγος (word) is far 
more dynamic than we would appreciate, it is this active sense that Heidegger is 
describing. 
                                            
88 From the Book of John in the New Testament (Wansbrough, 1985): 
In the beginning was the Word: 
and the Word was with God 
and the Word was God. 
He was with God in the beginning. 
Through him all things came into being, 
not one thing came into being except through him. (John1 1:3) 
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Heidegger notes that if there is an unconcealing, there must first be something 
concealed. Heidegger believes that this is evident in early Greek thinking and 
translates a fragment from Heraclitus(c.535-c.475 BCE), a Pre-Socratic philosopher 
in support of this; 
The highest that man has in his power is to meditate [upon the whole], and wisdom [lucidity] 
is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the prevailing of 
things, listening out for them.  [FCM 28] (gloss in the original) 
Heidegger places the concepts of concealment and unconcealment in tension, and 
that which λόγος (logos) says is thus άληθέα (alethea), which is that which is 
unconcealed. In Being and Time Heidegger translates ‘alethea’ as truth, and his 
concept of truth is thus the unconcealing of that which is concealed.  For Heidegger, 
this does not mean we see nothing then suddenly an object appears out of nowhere.  
We see an object, a thing, but when it is seen as the entity it is, it has been disclosed 
to us.  We understand the object in its being.  In other words, the truth of what the 
entity is has been revealed. There is no judgment we make then apply it to the 
object; this emphasizes the human side. We are given the truth of the object in the 
disclosure.  This approach to truth is a radical departure from the view of truth in 
modern philosophy and is one of the threads that Heidegger has picked up from the 
ancient Greeks. Discussing the Heideggerian concepts of truth in comparison to the 
tradition and considering its implications is outside the scope of the thesis. 
In summary, the highest thing that is the power of a person to do is "to say what is 
unconcealed" within the context of the entire prevailing of things, i.e. of φύσις 
(nature), the same context in which the person exists.  Heidegger summarises the 
position of the early Pre-Socratics as follows; 
… φύσις, the prevailing of what prevails; λόγος, the word, that which takes this prevailing 
from concealment. Everything that occurs in this word is a matter of σοφία[sofia, wisdom], 
i.e., for the philosophers. In other words, philosophy is meditation upon the prevailing of 
beings, upon φύσις, in order to speak out φύσις in the λόγος. [FCM 28] [my gloss] 
In the above passage note that Heidegger is indicating that something is happening 
“in this word”. Heidegger’s view is that it is the role of the philosopher to understand 
what is the basis by which we understand an entity as the entity it is.  To understand 
the nature of the prevailing that enables us to bring it out of concealment is what he 
refers to as being.  It is the ‘basis for understanding’ that is occurring in the word 
that is the subject of inquiry by the philosophers, and of course, this means it is an 
inquiry into φύσις (nature) in its prevailing.  Again, truth is not about judgment it is 
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about understanding the basis of unconcealment.  In this discussion, there are two 
uses of unconcealment at play. There is the level at which things are unconcealed 
to us in the normal course of events.  For example, we see the trees from the bush 
and can name them.  I take this to be the level of inquiry I discussed earlier in relation 
to Aristotle's Categories. Then there is the level of inquiry for the philosophers which 
involves the disclosure of being itself.   
For Heidegger, what the Pre-Socratic philosophers were attempting to do is 
understand things as a prevailing whole and how it was that entities we see come 
into existence, have their time and pass back into the unity.  To put this another way 
the focus in on the underlying unity and the way this unity manifests itself as the 
entities we see and sustains them.  The Greeks saw the whole or the unity as in 
some way determining what emerged into the world.  To put this in more 
contemporary language, one view is to see the whole as an assemblage or sum of 
the parts; the alternative view is to see the parts as being determined by the unity 
(whole) in which it is contained.  Husserl has a version of this principle, generally 
associated with the Gestaltists, and Heidegger takes it over and adapts it as part of 
his work; this is discussed later in the thesis.  
When Aristotle talks about these earlier philosophers, he uses a conjunction of 
φύσις (nature) and λόγος (logos), to give the term φυσιολόγοι (fysiológoi).  This 
translates as 'physiologists', philosophers of nature or as they became known, 
natural philosophers89, and refers to those who inquire into the things of nature. 
Heidegger finds this understanding of φυσιολόγοι (natural philosopher) misleading 
as it indicates someone who studies a part within the unity of nature.  Heidegger 
argues that φυσιολόγοι (natural philosopher) is a title for those who questioned 
entities as part of the unity, the prevailing of nature itself, and spoke out, literally 
disclosing what they found, bring it into the truth.  In other words, things of nature 
were investigated in the context of being part of the unity of nature and not as 
disaggregated entities. 
In the discussion on the Pre-Socratics in the previous chapter, it was evident that, 
for the most part, scholars were trying to make sense of their experiences in terms 
of some underlying unity.  That unity was comprised of unseen fundamental 
                                            
89 The term, natural philosophers, continued to be applied to scholars inquiring into nature until the nineteenth 
century when it was replaced by the term scientist, a term coined by the Cambridge University philosopher of 
science William Whewell in 1833. 
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elements from which the visible world comes into being only to return eventually.  
While there were differences among the philosophers, typically the same broad 
concepts were still evident. This can be seen even in the work of Xenophanes(c570-
c475 BCE) who proposed that the universe as created by one god more powerful 
than all the other gods. The fundamental units in the creation are, however, water 
and earth, and for Xenophanes, this god thinks things (not dissimilar to saith) into 
existence, but "God thinks and perceives 'as a whole' "(Barnes, 2005, p. 65).  
Xenophanes, by putting forth a god created universe does not need to account for 
the creation of the universe itself, a cosmology, and “needs only to account for how 
the world functions”.  (McKirahan, 2010, p. 64) This is no different to the approaches 
taken by the scholars who shaped the beginnings of modern and philosophy and 
science such as Descartes and Newton.   
The disclosing of things, in a philosophical sense, from the whole is not an easy 
task, it is not a simple pointing to entities and uttering "tree", "spear", "wine" and so 
forth.  As Heidegger comments,  
... the Greek expression for truth is not as harmless as people believe and have hitherto taken 
it to be. Truth itself is something stolen. It is not simply there; rather, as a revealing, it 
ultimately demands the engagement of man as a whole. Truth is in part rooted in the fate of 
human Dasein. It itself is something concealed, and as such is something higher. [FCM 29] 
In this passage, Heidegger aligns himself with what he has been discussing 
concerning the Greeks.  If we are to discover the truth of things, i.e. the basis by 
which they are unconcealed, then we have to acknowledge that, as part of the 
prevailing, our ‘being’ is also concealed.  The inquiry into truth, into unconcealing, 
cannot avoid involving the truth of Dasein itself.  
Heidegger quotes from Heraclitus,  
Higher and more powerful than the harmony lying open to the day is the harmony which does 
not show itself (is concealed). [FCM 29] (Heidegger’s gloss) 
He interprets this passage from Heraclitus as indicating that the early Greeks had 
the understanding that the proper function of the φύσις(nature) lies in what it does, 
(the prevailing) but that this occurs in a way that does not show itself.  There is no 
intent to conceal; it is just what is proper to φύσις(nature) such that λόγος (logos), 
understood as that what philosophers engage in,    
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... has the task of compelling the άφανής(inconspicuous)90, that which conceals itself and 
does not show itself (that which is not self-showing), to show itself, the task of making it 
manifest. [FCM 29] (first gloss is mine) 
Heidegger concludes 
The Greek concept of truth presented here manifests to us an intimate connection between 
the prevailing of entities, their concealment, and man. Man as such, insofar as he exists, in 
the λόγος tears φύσις, which strives to conceal itself, from concealment and thus brings 
entities to their truth.[FCM 29] 
Heidegger reads into these ancient philosophers a basic insight concerning the 
nature of our existence. Of all Earth’s creatures we have an innate understanding 
of what things are, we can differentiate entities one from another and understand 
what they are.  More than this we have been pursuing the basis of that disclosure 
for over two and a half thousand years.  He is not claiming that their detailed 
explanations are correct just their intuitive insights.    
For Heidegger, and on his account the Ancient Greeks, truth is not based on the 
ability to correctly judge, i.e. a cognitive skill.  Truth concerns unconcealment. It is 
the basis by which an entity is determined as the entity it is, i.e. being.  It is this idea 
of truth as unconcealing that Heidegger is drawing out of this early Greek work.  He 
makes it clear that this account is in the ancient Greek writings and is not an 
"artificially playing around with etymologies"[FCM 30].  This approach is a radical 
departure from the contemporary philosophical tradition, and from the materialist 
account. 
This approach is the basis of Heidegger’s explanation of his phenomenology 
presented in Being and Time, albeit less dense and with far more context.  His 
methodology is about the unconcealment of being, that which determines entities 
as the entities they are, i.e. being. Heidegger has gone back to the Greek conception 
of philosophy, to pick up the threads and start from where he thinks were last on the 
right track before things went ‘astray’. 
Two meanings of φύσις (nature) 
The meaning of φύσις (nature - the prevailing whole) develops within Greek thought, 
and Heidegger traces its history as it splits into two related and intertwined 
meanings.  The first sense is as an all-powerful presence, 
                                            
90 άφανής translates as inconspicuous, which becomes an important concept in Being and Time 
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... the vault of the heavens, the stars, the ocean, the earth, that which constantly threatens 
man, yet at the same time protects him too, that which supports, sustains, and nourishes 
him; that which, in thus threatening and sustaining him, prevails of its own accord without the 
assistance of man. [FCM 30] 
While still broader than a modern understanding it is a narrowing of the original 
conception. Φύσις (nature) is that which is always present in its continual coming 
into being and passing away, but it is seen as a  
… distinct from that which is of human making, that which springs from τέχνη (téchni), from 
skill, invention, and production. [FCM 31] (my gloss) 
It is with this the Greeks start to distinguish between φύσις όντα or the things that 
exist in nature and things that are τέχνη, i.e. things that  
… arise on the basis of preparation and production, of a meditation proper to man. [FCM 31]  
This concept enters Being and Time with Heidegger’s identification of the Greek 
concept of πράγματα (prágmata) or ‘things’ understood as those things that we have 
to deal with in our day to day undertakings.  Heidegger stipulates these as referring 
to what he terms as “equipment” [ BT 96-7/68]. 
With this shift, according to Heidegger φύσις (nature) as a prevailing whole has now 
changed and the concept of regions of entities enters Greek thought, e.g. things of 
nature versus things produced by people.  This is a significant move by Heidegger 
as in his work he is claiming, that there are regional ontologies, and each region 
designates a different mode of being.  This is another one of the dropped threads 
that he is picking up from the Greeks. 
The second sense of φύσις(nature) that emerges is of φύσις(nature) as designating 
the prevailing of that which is or that "which lets everything that prevails be" [FCM 
31].  In other words, it does not refer to one of the regions of entities but to the 
essence of the entities, 
We speak of the nature of spirit, of soul, of the nature of the work of art, of the nature of the 
matter. Here φύσις does not mean that which prevails itself, but its prevailing as such, the 
essence, the inner law of a matter. [FCM 31]  
The shift is subtle.  Initially, we have nature as prevailing, and the entities and nature 
are still understood as one and the same. We now have regions.  Within the regions, 
we have nature as prevailing, but it is prevailing in different ways in the different 
entities.  Nature as that which prevails has shifted to refer to that which is prevailing 
in the entities. The grammar is informative if entities are a specific prevailing of 
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nature then while we may name the entities, i.e.  classify them as nouns, their being 
is a verb. This is, of course, indicated in the very word being.  If Heidegger is linking 
prevailing, that which must be disclosed, with being, and I think this is obvious from 
what I have outlined, then being or the essence of an entity is dynamic, it is a verb. 
Note however that there is still the sense of unity. There is still the concept a 
prevailing whole and now within this, regions of difference, each with a different 
mode of being and within regions different type of entities. I take these types of 
entities to relate to Aristotle’s concept of form and species. An important shift has 
indeed occurred if essence is a verb. If this is the case, then it addresses the issues 
of being (essence) not itself being an entity, but it raises the question as to what is 
it that is doing the prevailing?  Heidegger’s answer is that it is time, or more precisely 
the temporalizing of time. 
With this second understanding of nature, Heidegger argues, the Greeks are 
concerned with the essence of entities as things as "constant presence" [BQP 76], 
an idea Heidegger turns into the 'present-at-hand'.   The Greeks had no particular 
interest in a "particular individuation of the essence"[BCP 67] but rather how in 
general the "present-at-hand comes forth into unconcealment" [IM 203], i.e. into 
presence, i.e. it is a concern directed to the regional level. The idea of ‘constant 
presence’ is simple enough.  If there is nature as this unity, the prevailing is that 
which underlies the entities we see or is present to us in a ‘stable form’.  For the 
Greek’s the two meanings of φύσις (nature) are thus inseparable and open up two 
lines of questioning into φύσις, "which intrinsically belong together and continually 
challenge one another." [FCM 32] 
What Heidegger recognises is that the early Greeks are wrestling with very 
fundamental issues based on what they are observing and then thinking logically 
through the implications of what they see.  While there are criticisms of Heidegger's 
interpretations of the early Greeks(Most, 2002), I do not take Heidegger as being 
that interested in a ‘correct’ translation of their work.  For the most part, I do not think 
he is even after any particular 'theory' the Greeks may document to explain what 
they are observing.  Rather I take Heidegger as primarily interested in their 
descriptions of how they 'see' the world free from the incumbencies of the Western 
Tradition and the constraints within which modern science works.  In other words, 
he was inquiring into the phenomena they had in view about which they were 
providing an account.  
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Excursus - Heraclitus 
This previous discussion is critical as it starts to reveal the links between 
Heidegger's conception of being and that of the early Greeks.  I believe that the 
notion of the unity and the prevailing of the unity in the various regions is becoming 
increasingly important in grasping Heidegger’s broad concept of being.  It seemed 
to pull things together.  However, while confident I had the overall sense of 
Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greeks, I felt that because of the critical 
importance of this section I needed some confirmation, perhaps comfort is a better 
word, as to my reading of Heidegger’s interpretation.  This was particularly so 
because aspects of what Heidegger presents I did not originally see and as a result 
is absent from the previous chapter.  Consequently, I aimed to find a source that at 
least reflected the same themes, not necessarily the same precise interpretation, 
which I discerned in Heidegger's work.   To do this, I turned to McKirahan’s 
Philosophy Before Socrates (McKirahan, 2010) which provides both a translation of 
key passages from the fragments of the main Pre-Socrates philosophers and a 
detailed commentary.  The following is from the chapter on Heraclitus of Ephesus 
(c.540-c500BCE) in McKirahan’s text. The citations I use to Heraclitus’ fragments 
are the reference numbers assigned by McKirahan, such that (10.77) refers to 
Chapter 10, on Heraclitus, and fragment 77 translated by McKirahan. 
Heraclitus describes the kosmos as being eternal (10.77), with the basic elements 
of fire, water, and earth which are in a continuous state of systematic change 
(10.75). Heraclitus identified fire as the most important of these elements, but this is 
not important to his overall structure.  For Heraclitus, it is the constant and regular 
change that guarantees stability, i.e. change is what is stable (10.64), and the very 
kosmos is dependent on change.  The example is the river, if it stopped flowing, it 
would no longer be a river, but change its identity to that of a lake.  Heraclitus applies 
this principle to the entire kosmos, such that if “the basic forms of matter stopped 
changing, the stable, ordered, regulated kosmos would cease to exist.”  (McKirahan, 
2010, p. 134)  The kosmos, as a single unity, is “ever-living” (10.77) but within this 
“individual parcels of fire, water, and earth come to be and pass away, are born and 
die(10.74)”(p.135).  These individual parcels are the combination of elements that 
form into the entities we see.   
One of Heraclitus’ fundamental principles is that “all things are one”(10.47).  He 
recognises that what we are confronted with is diversity and the challenge is to find 
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a way to identify the underlying unity.  McKirahan summarises Heraclitus recognition 
of the difficulty of this task; 
This task is also the most difficult because it requires us to learn new ways of perceiving and 
thinking. Once it is accomplished, we can use the same tools to unpack the unity, to 
understand how the diversity exists and functions within it. (McKirahan, 2010, p. 130) 
The unity then, that underlies the diversity of what we perceive is, in some way 
concealed but is accessible.  We see in the above account of Heraclitus the shift 
from the importance of the elements themselves to the process of change, what 
Heidegger calls the prevailing, but also the concept of concealment and the 
possibility of unconcealment. All this aligns with Heidegger's reading, but the 
concept of Logos has yet to be addressed. 
Heraclitus is the first to introduce the concept of the Logos, and this is his great 
discovery. (McKirahan, 2010) Heraclitus goes behind the basic concept of change, 
which has been evident in many of the accounts of his predecessors, and argues 
that there is a general unifying principle behind the change itself, this is the Logos, 
and the “Logos holds always … for all things come to be [or, “happen”] in accordance 
with this Logos,”[10.1].  The concept of “all things” needs to be heard in a very broad 
way as Heraclitus makes a significant leap and argues that the Logos not only 
applies to the physical world but the “practical world of ethics and politics, religion 
and some more strictly philosophical realms.” (McKirahan, 2010, p. 127) 
Because the nature of the Logos, is that which is common to all [10.2] and is 
consistent, it is also available to all humans.  McKirahan draws the connection 
between Logos and human activity; 
This amounts to a claim that the world is governed by a rational principle which humans can 
come to comprehend. We can comprehend it because we are rational as well, and our 
rationality is related to the universal rational principle of the Logos. A noun related to the verb 
legein, “to speak,” logos is a thing said, and hence a word, statement, or story. The close 
connection between what we say and what we write or think accounts for a further range of 
meanings: account, agreement, opinion, thought, argument, reason, cause. Perhaps from 
these last two meanings, it gets other senses: relation, ratio, proportion. All these meanings 
were current in the fifth century. (McKirahan, 2010, pp. 128-9) 
We have thus have two notions, the Logos as the general principle behind 
Heidegger's prevailing and the same term referring to the speaking of the things that 
arise out of the Logos.   Heraclitus’ Logos is presented in a very abstract way as a 
“general principle.” The puzzle then is everything from the kosmos itself to human 
behaviour arises out of this single principle, and McKirahan concludes,  
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..  if everything happens because of a single principle, that principle must function or be 
displayed in many different ways. (McKirahan, 2010, p. 129) 
This is captured in the following; 
For although all things come to be in accordance with this Logos, humans … distinguish each 
in accordance with its nature and saying how it is. [10.1] 
We can observe the Logos at work in different things “according to its nature.” and, 
drawing on McKirahan’s analysis, that according to Heraclitus’ view, 
… that when properly used, language represents (or re-presents) reality in the sense that a 
correct description or account of anything accords with that thing’s nature and says how the 
thing in question is, in that the account itself reflects the nature of that thing. (McKirahan, 
2010, p. 129) 
This again reflects the two concepts of Logos, that which is prevailing and the 
speaking of that which prevails in the prevailing. Additionally, what is evident is the 
notion of regions, in that the Logos, while retaining a common nature, is functioning 
differently in different types of entities in causing them to come into being. 
In Heraclitus’ work, we need to be careful how we understand kosmos.  The Greek 
for kosmos is σύμπαν (sýmpan) and is generally understood to refer to the entire 
universe. This is the sense in which the earlier Greeks understood what they were 
investigating.  This is the first sense of φύσις (nature) to which Heidegger refers.  
However, this is not the main focus of Heraclius, it is what he refers to as Logos, 
that which is prevailing in the kosmos, and in human behaviour.  Heraclitus uses the 
term nature to refer to the Logos and the activity of the Logos, e.g. “Nature likes to 
hide”[10.47].  I take Heraclitus’ Logos, to by the type of understanding to which 
Heidegger’s second meaning of φύσις (nature) refers. 
There are many other interesting points in the work of Heraclitus that seem to have 
a resonance in Heidegger’s work.  However, the above is sufficient to confirm that 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the early Greeks appears to be a valid interpretation, 
without making claims that it is definitive. More importantly, it provides some 
confirmation that my interpretation of Heidegger's work is sufficiently accurate as to 
his intent and so I can move on.  
Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle  
There was then, according to Heidegger, a discernible development in thinking such 
that one unified understanding of φύσις(nature) evolves to an understanding of 
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φύσις (nature) on a regional basis within the unity, and a shift from the emphasis on 
the basic elements to a focus on change or prevailing.  It is within the regions that 
entities become manifest and the subject of investigation, first as regional 
philosophies and later as what we now call sciences.   
There is another decisive shift that needs to be considered, the change from the 
higher order, abstract, thinking about the workings of nature as a whole to an 
investigation of entities.  A shift that sought to understand what it is that is specifically 
made manifest, and the inquiries are what we may roughly understand as the 
activities of natural ‘science’, albeit not in the form of a ‘scientific method’ as we 
understand it.  The key figure in this shift is Aristotle.  I have already provided an 
outline of Aristotle’s work and highlighted how, regarding his inquiries into nature, it 
could be understood as both natural philosophy (e.g. the Categories) and an inquiry 
into the being of entities (e.g. the Metaphysics).  Heidegger’s comments about 
Aristotle are provided against the backdrop of this earlier discussion. 
The Greek word for science is ἐπιστήμη (epistími91) which according to Heidegger 
means  
...  approaching a matter, knowing one's way around in it, being in control of it, penetrating 
the contents of the matter. [FCM 32] 
As Heidegger interprets the history, it is only with Aristotle that the concept of 
ἐπιστήμη (epistími) takes on a meaning of science in the sense of a theoretical 
investigation. With this shift to ἐπιστήμη φvσική (epistími fysikí), natural science or 
what becomes known as natural philosophy embraces an investigation into all 
natural things including those within the domain of biology. (FCM)  This shift 
changes the focus from an exploration into the being of an entity into investigations 
in the entities as they present to us, or to use Heidegger’s term, in their presence-
at-hand. This dichotomy was reflected in the previous chapter in the differences in 
emphasis between Aristotle's work in the Categories compared to that in the 
Metaphysics.  
Heidegger then recognises Aristotle as the key figure that shifts philosophical 
thinking from grand ideas about the cosmos to making a systematic study of entities, 
i.e. ἐπιστήμη φvσική (epistími fysikí) the science of nature.  However, in this aspect 
of his work Heidegger argues that his investigations as ἐπιστήμη φvσική (epistími 
                                            
91 This is also the origins of our word epistemology or the study of knowledge 
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fysikí) are not just investigating the natural entities as entities but the entities as part 
of the larger domain itself, φύσις (nature as region).  For Aristotle, how things arise 
and pass away, the nature of space, time and movement, the nature of the soul and 
so forth are all areas for investigation, as φύσις (nature as region).  For Heidegger, 
Aristotle was concerned with the prevailing of entities, and he clarifies this in the 
following way,  
The prevailing of what prevails here can be grasped as that which determines whatever 
prevails as an entity, that which makes entities. [FCM 33] 
In the previous chapter, I drew attention to the seeming similarities between Aristotle 
and Heidegger and here we have it clearly evident in Heidegger's own words.  
Heidegger's definition of ‘prevailing’ is the same as his definition of being as “that 
which determines entities as entities”[BT 25/6] 
Heidegger argues that for Aristotle ούσίαm (oúsíam - ‘to be it' - the essence of 
entities) is still called φύσις (nature as region), in other words at the level of regional 
ontology, not of the specific entity and this reflects the earlier discussion that the 
essence refers to form or species. For Aristotle, the study of entities (natural 
philosophy) and the study of being are not two distinct and separate lines of inquiry 
but are just two sides of the one coin φύσις (nature as region). Both lines of inquiry 
form part of what Aristotle called πρώτη φιλοσοφία (próti filosofía), First Philosophy 
[FCM].   
Within Aristotle's work, we have the clear distinction between the essence of an 
entity (form) and its physical presence, and this makes its appearance in 
Heidegger’s work as the ontological difference, albeit the concept of form is 
replaced.  This provides one link between natural philosophy and metaphysics. 
However, we are still left with a problem according to Heidegger, and that is whether 
Aristotle did not address, or the extant texts do not address, how these two lines of 
questioning related to each other more generally.  One of the key aspects missing 
from the Aristotelian account is how he understands the regional ontologies as part 
of a unity. It was this precise issue that was apparently responsible for Heidegger 
developing an interest in ‘being’ as a philosophical question. This from Heidegger’s 
autobiographical essay My Way to Phenomenology, 
Ever since 1907, Brentano’s dissertation “On the manifold meaning of being since Aristotle” 
(1862) had been the chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into 
philosophy. The following question concerned me in quite a vague manner: If being is 
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predicated in manifold meanings, what is its leading fundamental meaning?[MWP 74]  
Certainly when Being and Time was written Heidegger thought he could resolve the 
issues in terms of time, or rather what he called the “temporalizing of temporality”[BT 
278/235]92. 
In that in Being and Time, Heidegger not only presents the regional concept of being 
as a unity which gives rise to entities in the region, but also proposes time as the 
unity of being underlying all regional ontologies Heidegger can be understood as 
attempting to complete the Greek project.   However, as I have commented, he only 
completes his ontological investigations in relation to Dasein, the ready-to-hand and 
world and even here there is debate over his success in determining time as the 
underlying unity of being. 
This completes my exploration of the Greek concept of being and of Heidegger’s 
summary of the Greek concepts of nature. 
A Heideggerian Account of Being 
When exploring the Greeks, it was possible to identify the issues and puzzles they 
were wrestling with as some of the same that are evident today.  If I take a piece of 
equipment that I am familiar with and look at it, I have the experience that I know 
what it is by its appearance.  This is a powerful pull. An example is this image of a 
chair93. 
 
Figure 6 A chair 
The very early Greek account simply understood this as a particular arrangement of 
                                            
92 If we consider the concept of change then change can be described as occurring against the background of 
time, i.e. if there is no structure of time there is no change.  I am not going to pursue this aspect further as 
Heidegger’s concept of time is a difficult philosophical one to grasp and there is considerable debate as to how 
successfully he makes his argument(Blattner, 1999). 
93 While it is an image of the chair, it still presents the form. There is another level of analysis concerning images 
as representations and the relationship to the physical object. For a discussion on this refer to Heidegger’s 
History of Concept of Time, [HCT 47ff] 
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fundamental elements.  If we imagined that the most fundamental element was as 
per Figure 7, then we can imagine masses of these elements in random order within 
the cosmos, Figure 8.  The very early Pre-Socratics recognised that there needed 
to be a natural explanation to get from the random order to the chair.  The emphasis 
was on natural explanation as the Greeks, at least among a handful of Scholars, 
had put aside the explanations previously offered by the tradition that the Gods 
created everything.  This question of “How things come together?” is still alive in 
science today at a basic level, for example recent studies are investigating whether 
Earth was formed by a “sudden collapse of dust, rather than the slow build-up of 
space rocks”  (Crane, 2017, p. 8) While we have a lot more knowledge today, the 
structure of this question reflects the same basic inquiry the Greeks were making! 
Modern science proposes the ‘Big Bang’ as the genesis of the most fundamental 
particles, which then progressively combine as a result of the fundamental forces of 
nature, forming complex elements, compounds and so on. While the understanding 
of how this happens is certainly not that of the Greeks, at a higher order, there must 
be some explanation of moving from simple to complex entities; this is the idea the 
Greeks were pursuing. The main point of difference is that the Greeks, as did the 
majority of Western scientists until at least the eighteenth century, had a god as the 
initial origins of the cosmos and not the ‘Big Bang’. 
Greek thinking was diverse, and while they were struggling with the same questions, 
the approaches were divided.  One line of thinking that developed was reflected in 
 
 
Figure 7 Fundamental element 
 
 




the work of Heraclitus that it is not the fundamental elements themselves that should 
be the focus but what it is that is creating the order, and the name he gave to this 
‘what it is that creates order’ was the Logos.  While Parmenides challenges the 
notion of what is real and brings to the fore the question of what it means to be an 
entity, e.g. a chair, one main response to the Paramedian question can be traced 
back to Heraclitus, that whatever it is to be something is found in the Logos. 
In trying to explain the chair, the Greeks understood that at one level it was simply 
a certain arrangement of matter. If we look at Figure 8 and Figure 6 then what is the 
difference?  If we consider it only at the level of the material then there is no 
difference, it is the same material, just differently arranged.  The Greeks, at least a 
significant part of the tradition within Greek philosophy, rejected this and recognised 
that something else is going on. 
Plato’s solution was to invent the concept of forms located in the World of Forms 
and this somehow fused with the material to ‘form’ the chair. He applies this same 
principle to all entities on earth.  Aristotle rejects Plato’s conception of form but holds 
to the idea that for some types of compound entities, what he called hylomorphic, 
there is indeed something in addition to the simple physical material.  Following 
Plato, he uses the term form, but it takes on some of the characteristics of Heraclitus’ 
Logos, i.e. the form appears to be a predictable organising principle.  This is 
reflected in Aristotle's description of form as a formula.  For the same type of entity, 
there is the same organising principle94 or formula. In other words, it is the constancy 
of the organising principle that ensures the constancy of the entity!   Aristotle also 
clarifies the question concerning ‘being’.  Rather than asking why this entity exists, 
he takes for granted that it exists and instead asks two related question, what is the 
organising principle (essence or form) of this type of hylomorphic entity and how 
does the organising principle and matter come together to result in the physical 
entity we see.  Aristotle’s basic structure for answering this second question is 
provided by his concepts of the four causes.   
                                            
94 Note while I am applying the term ‘organising principle’, it is not, to the best of my knowledge, Aristotle’s term.  
The idea of organising principle jettisons the baggage of ‘form’, retains it its link to Heraclitus and Aristotle but, 
as I will discuss, also links to Heidegger.   
 
While my use of organising principle is not the same as a natural law there is a relationship. At one level the 
natural laws can be understood as describing aspects of the organising principle. Similarly, Darwin’s theory of 
evolution is an attempt to approach the concept of what brings entities into being from the perspective of an 
organising principal.  There are, however difference in how it would be applied in evolution, but the idea is there. 
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In Heidegger’s understanding of Aristotle, the first question is the metaphysical one 
and the second is the scientific question. Science, for Heidegger, only properly starts 
when the essence, or what I am calling the organising principle, is understood and 
properly brought into view.  I will address this in Chapter 11 when I discuss 
Heidegger’s intent that his work link to science.  This is an important point for this 
thesis as my claim is that Heidegger’s phenomenology should be understood as 
preceding and being relevant to both the social and the biological sciences. It can 
be seen as the common link or basis for both. 
As we saw, Aristotle identified that while there is an organising principle in living 
things as well as the practical things we use, they differ as to their nature as does 
the means by which the specific entities come into being.  In addition, he also 
identifies a fundamental difference between the structure of hylomorphic entities and 
the simple entities such as matter.  I have not read Aristotle’s writings that address 
human behaviour but, in the writings of Heraclitus he regards, humans and their 
behaviour as being governed by the Logos.     
A case can be made then, that within Greek thinking there had emerged an 
understanding of what things are not based on physical appearance but based on 
some underlying organising principle, what Heidegger calls being, Aristotle calls 
essence, substance or form depending on its application and what Heraclitus refers 
to as Logos.  Further, that this organising principle is in some way different for 
different classes of entities. Heidegger calls these areas of difference, at least in 
some of his works regions, and in Being and Time, he refers to them as modes or 
ways of being. 
Heidegger explored the Greek idea of prevailing, that is that there is some unity, 
that which prevails, but that it is dynamic, i.e. there is a prevailing.  It is out of this 
prevailing that entities emerge.  The implication of this is that there must be some 
unity that is prior to the entity, that this prevailing has different modes, with each 
mode reflecting a different entity. Putting this another way, there is some unity that 
has consistent ways of structuring (the organising principle) aspects of itself such 
that entities emerge.  This idea has links back to views of Heraclitus discussed 
earlier. It also has a resonance with the concept of self-organising systems which is 
a field of contemporary research (Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006).  
Taking this into Heidegger’s work, he identifies a number of different classes of 
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entities that appear to have different organising principles. In Being and Time, there 
are six such classes  
CLASS OF ENTITY NAME MODE OF BEING (Region of 
Being) 




Life  not named 
Nature not named 
Table 4 Modes or regions of being mentioned in Being and Time 
In Being and Time, Heidegger only presents an account of the first three. 
Based on what I have presented, Heidegger’s approach will be to identify what he 
regards as the essence, or organising principle in each of the three classes of 
entities and then describe what he calls the structure of that organising principle. It 
is not identical to Aristotle’s formula, but it is similar conceptually. Heidegger claims 
that each mode of being has a structure [BT 44/22, 48/26, 60/36] and it is this 
structure he will be describing.  The structure is however not static and must reflect 
a ‘prevailing’, and as such is dynamic.  Once understood in this way, a passage in 
Being and Time that describes the worldhood of the world becomes clearer 
The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive for 
worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT 121/88] 
Note must be taken of the phrase “constitutive of worldhood”, this is Heidegger’s 
reference to ‘being’.   In other words, there is a system (unity) of dynamic 
relationships (the assignments and references), what I refer to as the organising 
principle, that determines (being) of world.  As I read Heidegger, the ready-to-hand 
entities, are just a particular arrangement of references and assignments within the 
world.  The structure (organising principle) of each of these individual entities is a 
microcosm (prevailing) of the larger entity of world (unity).  It is then possible that 
within a world, there may be changes that see entities come and go without 
changing the structure of worldhood [BT Ch 3].   
In Aristotle’s work we can understand the entity jug as matter+’form-of-jug’ or just 
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as ‘form-of-jug’.  When we talk about it as just ‘form-of-jug’’, it is rather abstract, but 
it is none the less what Aristotle means by ‘jug’.  We should hold back from thinking 
about a specific manifestation of ‘jug’ as it is possible to have ‘jug’ in many sizes, 
varying shapes and materials.  The same goes for Heidegger. When he talks about 
world, he is referring to a possible extant world that has as its organising principle 
‘worldhood’. When Heidegger talks about ‘worldhood’, he is simply referring to the 
organising principle without reference to a particular world.  This is reflected in the 
earlier passage I cited from Cohen, 
The essence of… a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle 
says “by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance” (1032b1), and 
“when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence” (1032b14). It is the form of 
a substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is form that satisfies the 
condition initially required for being the substance of something. The substance of a thing is 
its form. (Cohen, 2016, p. 19) 
While it is a difficult and abstract way of discussing things, it would be possible to 
disregard any references to specific entities and only refer to the structures of the 
organising principles!  This would, however, be difficult to follow without substantial 
preliminary work. 
Earlier in the discussion of Aristotle, I present an example whereby there is a 
reciprocal relationship between things; 
Some things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but 
again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the principle of motion. (195a5) 
(Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9451-3) 
As Heidegger explores the structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world, what he 
gradually reveals is what could be referred to as a reciprocal relationship between 
Dasein and world, or perhaps better described as reflexive.  The dynamic structure 
that constitutes worldhood depends on the comportments of Dasein, but in turn, it is 
Dasein’s understanding of worldhood that is, in part, determinative of Dasein.  
Solving the Puzzle of Being 
We are now in a position to solve the puzzle surrounding Heidegger’s conception of 
being.  I have identified several passages that when combined account for the main 
aspects of the puzzle, I outlined earlier.  I provide brief comments on each passage 




In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is being - that which determines 
entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we 
may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity.  [BT 25-6/6] (my 
underlining) 
Comment: 
It is self-evident that we understand the difference between entities. We know that 
humans are not the same type entities as jugs and deal with useful things differently 
to mere objects.  The difference arises out of alternate modes of being or organising 
structures that determine the type of entity we encounter. If being is an organising 
principle or determining the structure of relationships, it is not an entity. 
Passage 2: 
Being is always the being of an entity. [BT 29/9] (my underlining) 
Comment: 
Simply put, all classes of entities have some organising principle that accounts for 
the consistent way in which individual members of that class come into being.  When 
referring to being, we are talking about that organising principle and nothing else. 
Passage 3: 
Being in general lies beyond. This lying beyond of being and of the determinations of the 
being of entities, over and above entities as such, is transcendere-"to surpass," 
transcendence. Not as supersensible, metaphysical in a bad sense, whereby what is meant 
is still an entity. [BCAP 7] (my underlining) 
Comment: 
The organising principle must precede the entity and is part of some underlying 
unity.  In this respect, it “lies beyond”.  However, not in the sense of Plato’s forms. 
The organising principle is a description of the structure of the various ways in which 
nature operates. It is a ‘real’ world phenomenon. 
Passage 4: 
What is it that must be called 'phenomenon' [i.e. being] in a distinctive sense? … Manifestly, 
it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something 
that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; 
but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to 





What lies hidden is what I am referring to the organising principle or being.  It is not 
possible when looking at the entity to observe the organising principle that is the 
structure of its being, or essence. It is disclosing and describing of the organising 
principle or structures (i.e. being) that is the aim of phenomenology. What does show 
itself as a result of the organising principle is the various ways of being of the entity. 
 
My comments in relation to the above passages should be seen as summaries only 
and read in conjunction with the preceding chapters.  Other aspects of the puzzle, 
for example, Heidegger’s inconsistencies over language resolve, not by removing 
the inconsistencies but by understanding Heidegger’s overall approach.  An entity 
is then determined by being, possess being and reflects a way of being, for example, 
and each phrase is stating the same thing from a different perspective.   
What I have presented is based on an iterative process that involved reading 
Heidegger, puzzling over his work, reading the Greeks, seeing how Heidegger 
interprets the Greeks and then applying this back to what I understood about 
Heidegger’s work.  While I understood parts of the puzzle it was this process that 
pulled it all together. While the above provides my interpretation of Heidegger’s 
concept of being, it is at, by necessity, a rather abstract level.  It is hoped that this 
will be fleshed out in more detail over the remainder of the thesis. 
Heideggerian Decision Points 
What became clearer is that there is a major decision point in following Heidegger.  
Either one stays with a strict materialist account of what brings entities into being, in 
which case Heidegger’s account is rejected, or one is open to the idea that there is 
some organising principle at work within a unity.  
In Chapter 19 I take the idea of the organising principle and re-interpret in the light 
of contemporary thinking around emergence theory which is starting to influence 
various areas of science, particularly the biological sciences.  This then leads to a 
radical new understanding of Dasein, a possibility that is closed off if the materialist 
account is followed. 
The second major decision point concerns the organising principle for being human. 
Heidegger argues that for a human, what he terms Dasein, the organising principle 
is our existence, the unique way in which we understand the world and interact with 
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(his term is comport) the entities within it and the other Dasein.  He not only provides 
an account of the structure of existence (being-in-the-world) but gives an account of 
how an individual Dasein comes into being.  I am not aware of any other alternatives 
proposed by other scholars as the organising principle (being). 
For this thesis, I accept both his approach and his identification of existence as the 
essence of Dasein. 
Overcoming the Power of Experience 
When I look at the chair (Figure 9 below), I see a chair. I understand it to be chair.  
This is my experience.  At one level my experience is right, it is a chair.  The problem, 
if following Heidegger’s account, is not the experience of recognising the entity as a 
chair. The problem arises when we attribute the basis of this entity as being a chair 
to its appearance, i.e. our experience. 
 
Figure 9 A chair 
Earlier I drew attention to the fact that the chair could be understood simply as an 
arrangement of the underlying elements.  This view was held by the Atomists, 
Democritus, and Blackson summarises this view: 
The only objects are ones that exist eternally. They do not come into or go out of existence. 
They become arranged in various ways, but nothing comes into or goes out of existence 
because arrangements of objects are not themselves objects and hence are not objects that 
come into or go out of existence. (Blackson, 201127) 
I am not going to go over this, that ground has been well covered, but what is of 
interest is the comments by Sextus of Cilicia, the sixth century C E philosopher, 
about the views of Democritus, concerning true knowledge; 
Of these he calls the one through the intellect ‘legitimate’, attesting its trustworthiness for the 
judgement of truth, and that through the senses he names ‘bastard’, denying it inerrancy in 
the discrimination of what is true. To quote his actual words: ‘Of knowledge, there are two 
forms, one legitimate, one bastard. To the bastard belong all this group: sight, hearing, smell, 
taste, touch. (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007, k. 11207-9) 
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Branding knowledge attained through the senses as ‘bastard’ knowledge leaves no 
doubt where he stands.  Regardless of the conceptual framework, he puts forward 
in addressing what things are, Democritus, was arguing that something is going on 
that we do not experience.  The world of our experience is a product of “what is 
going on”, but they are not the same. 
This debate, commencing with the Pre-Socratics, over the appropriate basis for 
accessing ‘true’ knowledge of nature is still evident in the modern era as exemplified 
by Cartesian Rationalism versus Empiricism.  It is also at the heart of whether 
science accesses knowledge of nature itself, or simply is reporting on experiences.  
This aspect is reflected in Kuhn’s thesis concerning scientific revolutions 
(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) and is central to understanding the 
science wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Baldwin, 2015; 
Goldman, 2006a, 2006b; Gross & Levitt, 1997). 
It is one thing to accept the position of Heidegger and the Greeks that there is 
“something going on” in our experience of what things are that is separate to the 
visual experience, it is quite another to support the position.  This very point is at 
play when we consider Marion Miller, is she in some way determined by the physical 
body, that which we can experience, or is there something else at play.  There must 
be some way of specifically thinking through and addressing this very point. Of 
demonstrating that two things are happening in the experience.  If this can be done, 
then the idea of being as some organising principle will have some traction.  It is on 
this point that Heidegger draws on the work of Husserl, published in the Logical 
Investigations (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b). Key areas of Husserl’s work he calls upon 
are Husserl’s inquiries concerning mereology (the study of parts and wholes), 
categorial intuition (roughly understood as meaning and perception), the apriori (the 
sequence of structures necessary for meaning) and intentionality (the structure of 
lived experiences).  Heidegger takes this work, reinterprets in the light of his project, 
which includes the approach I have outlined above, and then proceeds to Being and 
Time.  Just as exploring the work of the Greeks helps in understanding Heidegger’s 
approach the same is true of his encounter with Husserl.  I explore this in Chapter 
12 on Intentionality and Chapter 13 which deals with the relationship between being 
and the experience of things.  
Note: This chapter was one of the last written in the thesis.  The terminology of 
‘organising principle’ was developed during the writing as a way of conceptualising 
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an understanding ‘being’.  While I have occasionally ‘inserted’ the term as part of 
the editing process, I have not re-written the thesis to incorporate the terminology of 
‘organising principle’’ throughout the thesis.  However, this should be held in mind 
when considering the idea of being.  This also reflects the ongoing and iterative 
process of understanding.  
 
Conclusion 
This concludes the discussion concerning the puzzle of Heidegger’s concept of 
being.  In the next chapter, I address the puzzle of Dasein.  
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CHAPTER 8: CLARIFYING DASEIN THE ENTITY 
Introduction 
This section aims to gain some clarity in the way of conceptualising the entity, 
Dasein, as presented in Being and Time.  That this needs to be done is in response 
to the puzzle concerning Dasein that was raised in Chapter 4 over Heidegger’s 
statement he makes no claims concerning the entity of Dasein.  In this chapter, I 
look at various of Heidegger's comments concerning Dasein as an entity, including 
comments about the body and put forward a way of thinking about Dasein that 
makes no assumptions concerning the body.   
Dasein, Existence and Structure 
Heidegger dismisses any notion that Dasein’s being can be understood by reference 
to a soul, body, ego or any other form of 'thing'95. If we are to understand Dasein, 
what it is to be a Dasein, then it is by reference to Dasein's existence.  
... man's 'substance' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence. [BT 
153/117] 
Dasein's 'Essence' is grounded in its existence. [BT 152/117] 
While the term existence as used in ordinary language refers to something being 
'real', e.g. my coffee cup exists, this is not how Heidegger uses the term. Existence 
is Heidegger’s technical term referencing Dasein's way of being and in Being and 
Time "will be allotted solely to Dasein"[BT 68/42].  Used in this way Heidegger can 
say something along the lines of ‘only Dasein exists’ which may sound confronting 
unless we keep in mind that it is a terminology issue only.  Other entities are just as 
‘real’ and Heidegger refers to them as, for example ready-to-hand or present-at-
hand. 
Existence is the name that encompasses all the different ways of being that Dasein 
has related to its living a life.  Without limiting the ways of being examples include 
walking down the street, carrying out a research project, having an understanding 
what things are, having moods, talking, solving a maths problem, opening a door, 
eating a meal, enjoying the garden, loving others, tending to the care of others, 
                                            
95 This is an example where understanding being as an organising principle assists as it is clear that an entity 
cannot fill this role. 
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hammering in a nail, running along the beach with the dog, reading a book, playing 
video games, listening to music, etc.   
All the ways of being of Dasein are what they are because Dasein exists in the way 
it does. No other entity exhibits these ways of being which is why Heidegger is 
arguing that Dasein’s being is unique.  If Dasein’s way being is unique and he calls 
this existence, then it logically follows no other entity has existence as its way of 
being! i.e. no other entity exists. As I have mentioned though, this statement only 
makes sense in the context of Heidegger’s use of existence. 
Understanding the Structure Before Science and Healing 
In Being and Time Heidegger is analysing Dasein's way of being, existence, with a 
view to identifying and describing the structure that enables Dasein to have an 
existence. He designates being-in-the-world as the name of that structure [BT §12]. 
This understanding of existence can be seen in the following passage in which 
Heidegger critiques the approach of the positive sciences,   
... psychology merely dreams about man and human existence, because it must necessarily 
make presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein and of its way 
of being, which we call existence. These ontological presuppositions remain closed off for all 
eternity to psychology as an ontical science. Psychology must let them be given to it by 
philosophy as ontology. The positive sciences, however - and this is what is remarkable- 
arrive at their results precisely while dreaming in this way. [BPP 54] 
The critique is clear, if the sciences make 'presuppositions' about the being of 
Dasein then much of what they are doing is based on 'dreaming'; a proper account 
of being is only available through philosophy. A harsh judgment.  I might add he 
never states that scientists cannot engage in philosophy.  
In Heidegger's view, the positive sciences should have an understanding of the 
structure of Dasein's existence before they do their research, in other words, know 
what it is they’re dealing with.   
The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and 
certainly before any biology. [BT 71/45] 
In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a 
'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely.[BT 75/50] 
This view is even reflected in his investigations concerning the nature of death; 
Methodologically, the existential analysis is superordinate to the questions of a biology, 
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psychology, theodicy, or theology of death. Taken ontically, the results of the analysis show 
the peculiar formality and emptiness of any ontological characterization. [BT 292/248] 
Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist, and long-time post war friend and supporter of 
Heidegger's work took the same view concerning healing, this from a letter Boss 
wrote in Heidegger in the 1960s; 
In the basic structures of the way of human existing which you elaborated, I recognized the 
most reliable outline of an art of healing ... you have also become the most genuine 
representative of basic research in medicine for me. It is only with the background of your 
thinking that the results of modern biology, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and pathology 
can be understood in their essential significance. [ZS 294] (my underlining) 
It is in the sense that Boss found something in Heidegger's work that I too approach 
his research findings.  Ultimately the healing sciences are about supporting the 
existence of Dasein, even if tending to the body.  Unless we know the basis for that 
existence how can this work be done effectively? I believe this to be the fundamental 
problem underpinning modern nursing homes, the link between tending to the body 
and the existence of Dasein is formally missing.   
Dasein's Body 
The almost complete lack of references to the human body, or more particularly to 
the relationship between Dasein and the body in Being and Time is a common 
observation. (Aho, 2009)  The body is of course always present in Being and Time, 
after all, every reference to seeing, hearing, or any other comporting is a reference 
to the body.  Nonetheless, it is a silent body for the purposes of Being and Time.  
Heidegger simply notes that there are problems in dealing with the body which he 
is not going to address,  
This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here. 
[BT 143/108] 
There is a small section dealing with the nature of organs in Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics and other than this Heidegger never "treats" the "problematic" of 
Dasein's "bodily nature".  During the Zollikon Seminars, it is evident that I am not 
the first to be puzzled by the Dasein-body relationship.  Boss raises the issue and 
Heidegger, for the first time in any detail, responds.  While Heidegger's responses 
are not an in-depth analysis, they are enlightening nonetheless.  Heidegger's 
comments follow an admonishment of sorts from Boss:  
MEDARD BOSS: The earlier seminars of 1965 about the body and the psyche were rather 
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unsatisfactory for the participants. They want to be better oriented about where their limitation 
lies if they are always to understand the relationship between the bodily and the psychic only 
as simultaneous. Otherwise, it is clear to everyone that there cannot be any talk of causality. 
No one believes any longer that psychological perception—for instance, [perceiving] a 
butterfly in its significance as a butterfly—can be positively determined by the electric nerve 
impulses in the back of the head. Other [people] took up the reproach of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who wondered why you only wrote six lines about the body in the whole of Being and Time. 
MARTIN HEIDEGGER: I can only counter Sartre's reproach by stating that the bodily is the 
most difficult [to understand] and that I was unable to say more at that time. [ZS 231/292], 
A short but honest answer from Heidegger that merely supports the point of the 
silent body in Being and Time, a silence that was never broken in any material way.  
As an aside, the comment by Boss concerning the butterfly is puzzling as it is a 
reference to a reductionist account of experience to mere brain activity.  His 
understanding that “no one believes [this] any longer” is demonstrably wrong. There 
were systematic attempts to reduce 'the mental' to the physical coming from 
supporters of logical behaviourism by such well-known philosophers as Rudolf 
Carnap(1891-1970), Carl Hempel(1905-1997) and Gilbert Ryle(1900-1976) dating 
back to the 1930s and 1940s (Chalmers, 1996, 2002).   This carries through to the 
present with materialists such as the Churchland (Churchland, 1999) who argues 
that our conscious awareness is nothing but brain activity. 
Heidegger, as indicated by his views on being, is not a reductionist and this is clear 
from a statement Heidegger makes earlier in the Zollikon Seminar series in 1965.  
In the statement he makes his position clear, sets out part of his argument for his 
position and then fires a broadside at the inconsistencies, if not hypocrisy, that is 
evident in some approaches taken by the research community; 
 
When, for instance, the assertion is made that brain research is a fundamental science for 
our knowledge of the human being, this assertion implies that the true and real relationship 
among human beings is a correlation among brain processes. Indeed, it implies that in brain 
research itself all that happens is that one brain, as the saying goes, "informs" another brain 
in a specific way, and nothing more. Then, when one is not engaged in research during 
semester vacation, the aesthetic appreciation of the statue of a god in the Acropolis museum 
is nothing more than the encounter of the brain process of the beholder with the product of 
another brain process, that is, the representation of the statue. Nevertheless, if during the 
vacation one assures oneself that one does not mean it that way, then one lives by double - 
or triple-entry bookkeeping.  Of course, this does not coincide very well with the claim made 
elsewhere for the rigorous nature of science. This means that one has become so 
undemanding regarding thinking and reflecting that such double bookkeeping is no longer 
considered disturbing, nor is the complete lack of reflection upon this passionately defended 
science and its necessary limits considered in anyway disturbing. It seems to me that we 
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should be allowed to demand from science, which attaches decisive importance to 
consistency, this same claim to consistency, especially where the meaning of the 
human being's existence is at stake. [ZS 95] (my bold) 
 
The description of scientists adopting one view towards Dasein's existence when 
they are on holidays and another when in the laboratory is contradictory, but the 
basis of it runs deep in the culture.  The same inconsistencies are observable in the 
running of nursing homes. I suspect if the owners of nursing homes were asked to 
design and run such a facility into which they would be happy to live I doubt we 
would have the same facilities that currently exist.  If this is the case, then it appears 
that the standards and expectations that the nursing home service providers have 
outside the nursing home relating to living a life seem to be put on hold within the 
nursing home when caring for others. 
The question that Heidegger’s response provokes is, “If we are not brain processes, 
etc. is the body involved at all?” Yes, according to Heidegger, this from a discussion 
on mood in the Zollikon Seminars 
If electrical impulses were really able to cause moods, then a machine alone and by itself 
should be able to produce moods.  It can only be said that when electrical impulses are 
present this or that mood appears.  However, this is still far from meaning that an electrical 
impulse can produce a mood.  Mood can only be triggered. A certain brain state is 
correlated with a particular mood. Nevertheless, the brain process is never sufficient 
for understanding a mood; it is not sufficient even in the most literal sense because it can 
never reach into the mood itself. [ZS 196] (my bold) 
Heidegger couldn't be clearer.  He acknowledges that brain processes are involved 
but are never sufficient.  Several years later, in 1972, not long before he died, in a 
lengthy exchange with Boss, he makes perhaps one of his clearest statement about 
the relationship of body and our existence;  
... everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber[sic] and down to the 
most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically 
not inanimate matter but a domain of that non objectifiable, optically invisible capacity to 
receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. 
[ZS 232] (my bold) 
However even though Heidegger accepts that Dasein has a "bodily nature"[ZS 231] 
the body should not be considered as something present-at-hand, like some 
inanimate thing, this only happens at death, 
... in dying this bodily domain changes its way of being into that of an inanimate thing, into 
the substance of a corpse, which drops out from existence [ZS 232] 
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In other words, the body is no longer "in the service" of Dasein's existence; it has 
changed its way of being to simply being an object.   The biological body then needs 
to be understood on the basis of Dasein's existence, however as previously noted 
this is an area that Heidegger never addresses in any meaningful way, an issue 
specifically addressed in Aho's book, Heidegger's Neglect of the Body. (Aho, 2009) 
It was this exchange that was decisive in informing my view of the essential nature 
of the receptive/perceptive-responsive nature of our relationship with the world.  This 
can be viewed from a contemporary evolutionary perspective, in that our 'evolution' 
is shaped by the very nature of our receptivity and responsiveness to the world 
based on the type of being we are, and as such our entire bodily nature serves that 
end96.  If this is the case, then this would fit in with Heidegger's view that it is the 
being of the entity (essentially its particular receptive/perceptive-responsive nature) 
that is responsible for determining the body.  This can be seen in his remarks on the 
nature of bodily organs made more than thirty years before the Zollikon Seminars 
that I cite below.  While I am not going to pursue it here, these comments of 
Heidegger’s can be developed into an understanding of the biology of living things 
as having an intentional structure at their very core.  This would open up a way of 
researching the ‘life domain’ in terms of the varying modes of receptive-responsive 
modalities and tracing evolutionary lines on this basis.   
In the 1929 Freiburg course, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger 
addresses several seemingly disparate topics from a phenomenological 
investigation into boredom, the relative 'poor in world' status of animals other than 
humans to the thesis that "man is world-forming"97.  In the lecture course, he also 
addresses several topics concerning the animal body in general, as distinct from 
                                            
96 This is an interesting line to pursue.  The typically picture within evolution is that it is ongoing in and of itself.  
The view hinted at by Heidegger would suggest that there may be a point that evolution for a particular line of 
animal life may reach an optimum point if its environment is relatively stable.   Such animals have been found 
to exist and are called 'living fossils', a term applied by Darwin in The Origin of Species originally published in 
1859; 
“.. in fresh water we find some of the most anomalous forms now known in the world as the 
Ornithorhynchus and Lepidosiren which, like fossils, connect to a certain extent orders at present 
widely sundered in the natural scale. These anomalous forms may be called living fossils; they have 
endured to the present day, from having inhabited a confined area, and from having been exposed to 
less varied, and therefore less severe, competition.” (Darwin, 2013. k. 1548-51) 
The Ornithorhynchus is better known as the platypus and the Lepidosiren and the lungfish.   This does not mean 
that there is no change in the species, just that there is no material change such the species evolves into 
something different over a period of time.  
97 World as Heidegger uses it is not as it is typically understood in science or in common usage.  This is to be 
addressed in Chapters 14 and 15. 
 
251 
Dasein's relationship with its body.  I am not going to go into much detail, however, 
I do want to address the concept of the body serving the being of the animal as was 
touched upon in the above quote.  This will then be taken up later in the thesis.  
Since Descartes, the image of the body, indeed of the universe, as some form of a 
clockwork mechanism, an instrument of some sort governed by the regular workings 
of the parts described by way of the laws of nature, has been widely adopted.  Within 
the world of nature, Descartes was a materialist to the core!  If the body is broken, 
we attempt to fix it and this instrumental approach has now extended to being able 
to replace a broken part of the mechanism through either a mechanical or a 
transplanted organ. There is much to celebrate in this approach, but there also lurks 
the possibility of misunderstanding, especially about the nature of specific organs.   
Heidegger acknowledges that when we consider various organs of the body, it is 
easy to conceive of them as instruments, 
The organ, the eye for example, is surely for seeing with. This 'for seeing' is not some arbitrary 
property which happens to apply to the eye but is the essence of the eye. The eye, the organ 
of sight, is for seeing....  Is the eye then some kind of equipment, equipment for seeing with, 
even though it does not seem to be an instrument since it does not help to produce anything? 
Or is it not indeed true that it does produce something? Can we not say that the eye produces 
the retina and along with it what is visible and seen? The eye is for seeing.  Is seeing 
produced by the eye? [FCM 218] (my underlining) 
He then adds,  
We must frame our question more precisely if we wish to decide about the instrumental 
character of the eye: Can the animal see because it has eyes, or does it have eyes because 
it can see? Why does the animal have eyes? Why can it have such things? Only because it 
can see. Possessing eyes and being able to see are not the same thing. It is the potentiality 
for seeing which first makes the possession of eyes possible, makes the possession of eyes 
necessary in a specific way. Yet in what sense can the animal see and upon what basis can 
it do so? Where can we find that which makes possible this possibility, this potentiality? [FCM 
218] (my underlining) 
Heidegger is a keen observer and asks questions with subtle variations that are 
aimed at uncovering details or ways of thinking about things that have often been 
overlooked.  Here, as a standard part of his approach, he starts by acknowledging 
the view of an organ of the body as being equivalent to an instrument or piece of 
equipment we put to use. Then from that perspective raises questions that lead to 
examining fundamental differences between an instrument and how it is applied and 
what an organ does within the body.  He then proceeds by making a series of 




The pen is an independent being, something that is to hand for use by various different 
human beings. The eye, on the contrary, as an organ is never present at hand in this way for 
those entities that need and use it. Rather, every living entity can only ever see with its eyes. 
These eyes, like all organs, are not present at hand independently in the way in which an 
object of use or a piece of equipment is present, for they are incorporated into the entity that 
makes use of them. Thus we can recognize an initial distinction by saying that the organ is 
an instrument which is incorporated into the user. [FCM 219] 
Heidegger goes on to argue that the eye does not in and of itself have a capacity to 
'see' and if the eye is for seeing and then  
An eye taken independently is not an eye at all. This implies that it is never first an instrument 
which subsequently also gets incorporated into something else. Rather, the eye belongs to 
the organism and emerges from the organism, which of course is not the same as saying 
that the organism makes ready or produces organs. [FCM 221] (my underlining) 
The concept of the eye (part) emerging from the organism (the whole or unity) is 
very clearly stated.  This same argument applies to other organs. If I understand 
Heidegger correctly what he is arguing is that the animal (and this includes human) 
organism as a whole sees or hears and the specific organ emerges from the 
organism based on the way of being of the organism.  This turns the thinking about 
the relationship between capacities and organs on its head, and this is what 
Heidegger concludes, 
One thing is clear: we cannot say that the organ has capacities, but must say that the capacity 
has organs.  [FCM 221] 
So, unlike a piece of equipment which has a particular  
... readiness for something and possesses this readiness. The organ, on the other hand, is 
in the possession of a capacity. It is the capacity which possesses here rather than the organ. 
It is the capability which procures organs for itself, rather than organs coming to be equipped 
with capacities, let alone with forms of readiness. [FCM 221] 
This idea that it is the capacity that "procures organs for itself" seems at first 
nonsensical and yet what is emerging in science, I would argue, is just this. While 
still in its developmental infancy 'bionic eye' implants “are able to restore some visual 
function in blind patients with hereditary retinal degeneration" (Hafed, Stingl, Bartz-
Schmidt, Gekeler, & Zrenner, 2016, p. 119).  In so doing they seem to be exploiting 
Heidegger's notion of capacity.  
The 'bionic eye' comprises a small external camera which sends images to a small 
device which simplifies and converts the images to fit a small pixel array built into a 
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microchip inserted into the brain.  After some training, the person can see the simple 
images 'coming through' the artificial eye (Hafed, Stingl, Bartz-Schmidt, Gekeler, & 
Zrenner, 2016).  The capacity of the entity (of which the brain is a part) to be able to 
do this is known as plasticity and refers to how "neural networks in the brain 
reorganise in response to new experiences".(Buss, 2016, p. 10)  The question of 
course is what is the organising principle behind the movement captured in the word 
plasticity?  This is not a question that can be answered in this thesis. 
In this example, it is not the simple microchip that sees, and it is not the electronic 
stimulation that sees rather it is how the organism itself adapts the input based on 
the "possession of a capacity". [FCM 221] All that the device is doing is sending a 
regular pattern of electronic stimulus to the brain, no more than this.  It is the entity 
that does the rest, and we do not know how! Martin Heidegger provided his account 
of this structure more than seventy years before the application of the 'bionic eye'.  
The fundamental difference between the nature of an instrument and an organ thus 
highlights a basic flaw in the Cartesian clockwork metaphor of the body. If we extend 
discussion on the organ to the body as a whole, then it is the body that is in service 
of the capacity for existence, it is not the body that has existences as its way of 
being. If this is the case, then the reduction of the person to the body in medical 
science is seriously flawed. 
Dasein and World 
Heidegger makes numerous references (pp. 192, 215, 224, 241, 251, 261, 263) in 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics to the work of influential German biologist 
Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), whom he regards as "one of the most percptive of 
contemporary biologists"(p. 215).  Of particular interest is Uexküll's work on the 
environmental world of animals, the Umwelt98, and while not agreeing with all his 
conclusions Heidegger seems to have been influenced by his work. One of the 
                                            
98 Uexküll's conception of an animal's Umwelt is different to that of an ecological niche which relates to the 
habitat necessary for an organism’s survival.  Rather, as de Waal explains,  
“Umwelt stresses an organism’s self-centered, subjective world, which represents only a small tranche 
of all available worlds.” (de Waal, 2016, k. 136-7) 
We can thus determine an organism’s Umwelt by focusing on its mode of behaviour in terms of its interactions 
with its Umwelt and in turn come to understand more about the animal itself. The Umwelt basically defines those 
complex relationships within an ecological system that show up as having possibilities for the animal's life.   
Thus, a particular eco-system may look healthy overall, but there may be an aspect where one element relevant 
to one species Umwelt has changed and as a consequence that particular species can co longer survive.  Not 
dissimilarly a human world may look intact and functioning well but an aspect of the environment for some may 




notable similarities is the idea that there may be many different animal Umwelts 
operating within the same ecological environment.  As will emerge there is a similar 
notion in Heidegger's work in that two people may have a common public world but 
within this, there are different domestic or work worlds (using the same term as 
Uexküll, this is what Heidegger calls environments, Umwelt.) whose significance in 
terms of offering possibilities for living their life is radically different.  This thesis 
claims that this is the case in the world of the nursing home.  The nursing home 
provides part of the living environment for the workers, but not for the majority of the 
people living in the nursing home, and that this has disastrous consequences. 
What Heidegger seems to be drawing from this is that there is an innate capacity in 
the animal to draw from the general environment aspects that are significant for 
them. The aspects they pull together is their Umwelt.  While individual animals of 
the same species have the same Umwelt, for humans it is on a case-by-case basis, 
within a broader culture.  It is this capacity for individualisation that is distinctive 
about human beings and is, I would argue, essential to the adaptability of the human 
species to diverse ‘natural environments’ around the globe.   
Each of us as a person finds meaning in an Umwelt that is significant for us 
personally.  So, for example, the same common public world of a large city provides 
many different smaller Umwelts. There is the Umwelt of the solicitor, of the chocolate 
store owner, the shoe repair specialist, the coffee shop work, the lecturer and so on.  
For Heidegger, a person's Umwelt is one which is meaningful for them, one that has 
possibilities for living their life as they understand it.   
In the context of this thesis, the general environment of the nursing home may 
provide an Umwelt for some groups but not others.  The attaching of significance to 
an Umwelt is not necessarily something we do consciously, nor are we necessarily 
conscious of deficits within the Umwelt, this just forms part of our 
receptive/perceptive - responsive capacities.  In effect, our being-in-the-world 
structure works without us being aware of its working. 
In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, it is evident that Heidegger is familiar 
with the work of Darwin and of what he calls Darwinism.  In contrasting the approach 
by Uexküll Heidegger notes that the concepts of Umwelt,  
...  signifies the investigation of where and how animals are at home in the world, of the 
way in which they live in relation to their environment. [FCM 263] 
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However Darwinian investigations, from Heidegger’s perspective, are based on 
adaptation and survival, of the fitting of one material thing (i.e. present-at-hand) into 
another; 
In Darwinism, such investigations were based upon the fundamentally misconceived 
idea that the animal is present at hand, and then subsequently adapts itself to a world 
that is present at hand, that it then comports itself accordingly and that the fittest 
individual gets selected. [FCM 263] 
Heidegger accepts that there is a task of identifying the conditions of the material 
sustenance of the material body, but this is not sufficient, 
Yet the task is not simply to identify the specific conditions of life materially speaking, but 
rather to acquire insight into the relational structure between the animal and its 
environment. [FCM 263] 
It is worth noting that since Heidegger’s comments significant work has been done 
on the role of genetics in evolution and there is an ongoing debate as to whether 
evolution occurs at the genetic, individual or species level.   I suspect that Heidegger 
would argue that a systems approach needs to be taken, i.e. look at the way of being 
of the individual animal in the context of the environment, then form an 
understanding of how mutations either enhance or detract from that particular way 
of being in that particular ecological context.  In other words, yes, the genetics 
produces changes in form, but being selects which form survives, not the 
environment, i.e. being determines the bodily entity.  
Heidegger's criticisms in 1929 seem to be just as relevant to the medical sciences 
with respect to the design and running of nursing homes today.  It is not just a simple 
matter of providing material sustenance and shelter. We need to understand the 
structural relationship between the being of the animal (the person) and the 
environment (Umwelt or world) that sustains the way of being.  This approach 
requires that we first understand the way of being of Dasein, understanding that is 
not evident in contemporary practice in nursing homes. 
By way of note, the approach of studying animals pioneered by Uexküll heavily 
influenced one of the founders to ethology, Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) (Lorenz, 
1981).  Lorenz was awarded the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine in 1973 for 
his work, and the work of both Uexküll and Lorenz have been influential in the work 
of contemporary ethologist Frans de Waal(1948- ) (de Waal, 2016).  Lorenz and de 
Waal both support the views being expressed by Heidegger that to understand an 
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animal such investigations are best done by understanding the animal in relationship 
with its natural environment(Lorenz, 1981; de Waal, 2016).  This is reflected in 
Heidegger’s naming of the being-structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world.   
The Problem of Shifting from Body to Existence  
The above discussion suggests that when Heidegger understands Dasein, he does 
so on the basis of incorporating  
everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most hidden 
molecule of hormones... [ZS 232]   
We should not, however, consider this in terms of reducing the person to the body 
for Heidegger then adds that all of this "belongs essentially to existing", in other 
words, the body serves the perceptive/receptive - responding capacity of Dasein in 
terms of its way of being, which is to live a life, i.e. its existence. 
In the two examples of mood and seeing, it is evident that for Heidegger that the 
electrical activity in the brain does not equate to mood and that the eye is not an 
instrument that 'sees'.  There is something else at play, some capacity we have that 
gives us the awareness of what is happening around us.  Heidegger concludes that 
it is not the material body that is of primary concern in understanding what it is to be 
a human, it is in that capacity that translates such things as electrical impulses on a 
microchip into the experience of sight and on a larger scale that gives us the capacity 
for existence.  It is investigating Dasein at this level that is Heidegger's primary 
concern, as he puts it; 
Thus, it is basically not inanimate matter but a domain of that non objectifiable, optically 
invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes 
the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232]  
Even today, science has no idea how the functioning of the human body, something 
physical, gives rise to conscious awareness, to the experience of emotions, to the 
ability to process and find the answer to even simple problems, to experience 
motivation to do one thing and not the other, to have memories, or even how we 
understand what a coffee cup is let alone to manage highly abstract understandings 
such as quantum physics. In short, science does not understand existence, so it 
ignores it and studies human life at the level of the physical. 
There have been significant advances in identifying which parts of the brain are 
involved in different cognitive activities, and in identifying the sequence by which 
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multiple areas of the brain may come into play in processing some cognitive activity. 
However, this is a long way from understanding how this translates into the rich 
complexity of experiences that constitute our existence.  There is, in other words, a 
significant explanatory gap between the activity observed in the functioning of the 
body and our experienced existence.   This does not mean we cannot have a 
scientifically based understanding of what it is to be Dasein, just as it did not mean 
we were precluded from a scientific understanding of heat or gravity, it is just more 
complex.  From Heidegger’s perspective, the first step is to have a sufficient 
understanding of the being of Dasein and that this should then guide the 
science[BT]. 
How to think of Dasein 
In effect there is a gap, on one side there is Dasein’s existence and on the other the 
body.  The emphasis in contemporary science and philosophy is that the 
experiencing side of the gap arises solely from the body side.  The above passages 
from Heidegger would indicate that he has no difficulty with the concept that the 
body is somehow involved.  However, the approach by science is that the body, as 
understood, is sufficient for the lived experiences that form the basis of our 
existence, and this is the Heideggerian point of departure. Heidegger's argument is 
thus with those who want to either discount the experiencing side or to simply 
explain it in terms of the body side of the gap. He will have none of this as I have 
discussed.  
At one level, I had a sense for what Heidegger is saying, but when I tried to pin it 
down then problems arose.  Roughly speaking, the general approach by science is 
to subject an observable, independent entity to scientific scrutiny, using robust 
methods to establish 'scientific' knowledge about the entity.  When a ‘living’ person 
is placed in a fMRI or similar, and the brain is scanned, there is evidence of activity 
of the physical brain. When a person dies, the activity stops.  When the body and 
the brain are dissected there is only material substance.  Given that science has 
ruled out 'spirits' and 'souls' the conclusion is clear, Dasein cannot exist as 
something tangible, it is an activity of the body.  Just as we understand the ticking 
of the clock and the movement of the hands in terms of the functioning of the 
physical mechanism of the clock, similarly we should understand Dasein by way of 
an understanding of the body.  Put like this it is not difficult to understand why 
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Dasein, understood as consciousness, lived experience and so on, has not been 
the subject of normative scientific inquiry.   
For Heidegger who we are lies in the, so far, scientifically unfathomable side of the 
explanatory gap.  We can identify this unified sense of existence so compellingly 
that we have over the history of the tradition called it by such names as the soul, 
consciousness, the 'I', ego, the 'self' and so on.  For Descartes, as an example, it 
was the soul made of a substance he calls res cogitians (thinking thing), which is 
separate to the body and lives on after the death of the body.  Still a view many 
have.  Heidegger rejects all of these ways of thinking.  Indeed, even to think of a 
gap is to suggest there is the body on one side and Dasein on the other, a view not 
consistent with Heidegger’s account.  
A list of characteristics that have been touched on so far in the discussions 
concerning Dasein would include, in no particular order, the following:  
• Dasein is an entity. 
• Receiving-perceiving characterizing the basic constitution of Dasein. 
• Dasein must be understood in relationship to its world.  
• There is a structure, being-in-the-world that can be identified as the structure of 
the receiving-perceiving characteristics. 
• Dasein is us.  We experience Dasein as 'ourself'. 
• We experience Dasein in terms of the life we live, what Heidegger calls 
'existence'. This is our way of being. 
• Dasein is not the body, soul, or any other form of 'thing'.  Dasein cannot be 
equated to our brain processing. 
• The body serves the being of Dasein. 
• We do not know from where the receiving-perceiving capacity arises. 
In the previous Chapter, one of the conclusions was that an entity could be 
discussed at an abstract level, in terms of its being. To use Heidegger’s jargon, this 
is to talk in general terms at the ontological level, what it is that, determines the 
entity.  However, when we talk about the individual entity there is the physical 
presence of the entity, and Aristotle argued that the material which is used to 
produce the entity based on the form must be appropriate. I do not doubt that this 
correlation between appearance and suitability contributes to the problem of 
understanding being.  In Heidegger’s discussion on equipment, in Being and Time, 
he argues this same principle, that the material from which the entity is made must 
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be appropriate [BT §15]. When I think about Aristotle’s bronze sphere or 
Heidegger’s famous example, the hammer, I can bring to mind specific images of 
these entities. Now, when I hold those images, I can distinguish between the 
physical presence and the ‘being’ of the entity.  Using Aristotle's approach, the 
hammer or sphere are (being+material). The same formula holds even if Heidegger 
and Aristotle have different understandings as to what constitutes being.  Does this 
apply to Dasein? 
The extension of this approach is to look at a person and understand not just that it 
is a specific instance of the entity Dasein, but in some way as a compound, 
(being+something else). When first doing this I filled out this formula as corporeal 
body+(being-in-the-world) = Dasein.  Even much of the discussion I have touched 
upon above would suggest this.  But it is wrong! This is to conceive of Dasein in the 
same terms as other entities.  
Heidegger differentiates two different  
… ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a 
λόγος (discussion) may be determined a priori. Existentialia and categories are the two basic 
possibilities for characters of being. … any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" 
(presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). [BT 70-1/45] 
He also states that  
Because Dasein's characters of being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them 
"existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" 
characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein [BT 70/44] 
When we are talking about an entity that is present-at-hand we can see it, we can 
talk about it in terms of the categories.  This is consistent with the Aristotelian view, 
and Heidegger agrees,  
The κατηγορίαi (categories) are what is sighted and what is visible in such a seeing. [BT 
70/45] (my gloss) 
However, Dasein is not simply a different type of being that is somehow merged 
with a body to produce the Dasein entity.  This would still make Dasein an entity, a 
‘what’.  Heidegger is claiming that not only does the being of Dasein represent a 
different class of entity as defined by its being, but he is also saying that Dasein as 
an entity is also radically different.  Dasein the entity cannot be characterised as a 
‘what’ it cannot be discussed in categorial terms.   
Heidegger accepts that there is a connection between these “two modes of the 
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characters of being” [BT 71/45] but that it cannot be dealt with until he completed 
his project.  As is well known, this never happened, and so we are left with the 
recognition of a problem but never a resolution.  
From the previous discussion, it was identified that the inquiry into the being of an 
entity involves two key questions, firstly the clarification of being of the entity and 
secondly an account of an entity comes into being. For a ‘what’ type entity, e.g. a 
hammer, this is straight forward. Whatever the being is, suitable materials are 
crafted in accordance with the requirements of its being.  When the entity has been 
produced, we can look at it, e.g. at the hammer, and describe it categorially.  What 
is the case for a ‘who’ type entity?  What is crafted together with the being, to 
produce the entity?  Given the body is ruled out, how do we even conceive of the 
entity in order to give an account of it coming into being?   
The problem seems to be that, perhaps, as a result of my culture, I find it difficult to 
conceive of an entity in other than physical terms, e.g. even wind is a movement of 
the air particles99.  This gets us back to the problematic comment by Heidegger 
raised in Chapter 4; 
If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting 
something that belongs to its essence, and I thereby disregard whether the entity of such a 
nature factually exists or not. In other words, the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic 
constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; I do not, by this 
statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its 
essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169]  
The statement can be read as a strong stance concerning Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method, the shifting of focus from the entity to the being of the 
entity.  However, this would be inconsistent with his approach concerning his 
inquiries into the ready-to-hand in Being and Time. Here Heidegger makes 
observations of the entities in order to disclose their being.  He even describes the 
characteristics that the physical entities must possess to be equipment [BT].  
Further, in History of the Concept of Time he notes, 
The worldly as already extant is put to use not only in the work itself but also in tools like 
hammers, tongs, nails: steel, iron, ore, minerals, wood. [HCT 193] 
Heidegger has no difficulty in referring to entities other than Dasein as extant and 
making claims as to their existence.  I do not doubt that Heidegger accepts that 




Dasein exists, his entire career is based on Dasein’s existence, so I discount the 
claim as to existence as academic sophistry.  However, what I do accept is that 
Heidegger has no way of clearly defining the entity other than in terms of its being!  
However, this is itself problematic.  In his methodology he is required to bring the 
entity into view in order to make the shift from the entity to being, this was discussed 
in the earlier Chapters.  An example of this is when he is investigating world, which 
is an entity; 
 …  something like the world must come into view. [BT 94/66] 
He even talks about bringing Dasein into view; 
Has our investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view as a whole? [BT 273/231] 
After exploring different characteristics of Dasein and its various relationships what 
I am left with are three points; firstly the concept of Dasein as a ‘who’ entity rather 
than a ‘what’ entity; secondly that when I observe people, I am neither looking at 
their being (which is hidden), nor the entity Dasein; and thirdly when I observe 
people I am observing their way of being.  To illustrate this point.  When I see a 
hammer sitting on the bench, I understand the entity to be a hammer, and I perceive 
the hammer.  When I see the hammer being used for hammering I not only have in 
view the hammer as an entity, but also an instance of its way of being, hammering.  
All this holds true for Dasein, except the entity itself is not in view! 
Summary 
In trying to grasp Heidegger’s conceptualisation of being, a problem was first 
identified and further investigation into Heidegger’s account of being only added to 
the confusion.  There was a solution, but it meant stepping back to explore the 
understanding of being from the perspective of the Greeks, and slowly shifting my 
understanding. 
The same impasse has been reached in relation to Dasein as an entity.   A problem 
was identified, and further investigation into Heidegger’s account has only made 
things more opaque.  This is not a trivial problem.  Even if the being of Dasein is 
grasped, which is the first of the two fundamental questions concerning any entity if 
the entity itself cannot be conceptualised then how can the second question be 
answered, an account of the entity coming into being.  From my perspective, it is 
this second step that is the most critical as it relates to the circumstances on 
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individual Daseins, and if this cannot be addressed, then this thesis fails. Thankfully 
this does not eventuate! As argued later in the thesis, Dasein comes into being in 
the context of its environment and can be thought of as a particular combination of 
understanding and receptivity. 
As in the case of being, my working assumption is that Heidegger has a way through 
this impasse, I just couldn’t see it.  In the case of the being, I found it among the 
Greeks, in the case of Dasein I found it in some case studies in science. It is to those 




CHAPTER 9: HOW TO CONCEPTUALISE AND INVESTIGATE 
DASEIN 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the problem concerning the conceptualisation of Dasein 
was set out. There are two concerns associated with this inability to conceptualise 
Dasein.  The first is how to follow Heidegger analysis of Dasein in Being and Time 
with any surety if there is uncertainty as to what phenomenon he has in view.  The 
second is in the application of Heidegger’s work.  Without a conceptualisation of the 
entity, I struggled to understand the relationship between structure and being and 
how the entity itself could come into being.  This aspect is critical for the thesis.  The 
root of the problem is that Dasein has no physical or descriptive presence in Being 
and Time.  The question then arises, that in such circumstances is it even possible 
to investigate Dasein. Given Heidegger’s work, there must be a solution to this 
dilemma; it is just a matter of ‘finding’ it. This chapter addresses how I ‘solved’ the 
problem of Dasein and then presents a brief description, based on that resolution, 
of Heidegger’s approach to investigating the structure of Dasein.    
Conceptualising Dasein 
The previous chapter sets out the nature of the problem, and on reflection, the issue 
was the tension associated with the pull to conceptualise Dasein on the one hand 
and the presumption of having nothing with which to conceptualises on the other. 
The breakthrough came from the philosophy of science and reading about the 
investigations into heat, Einstein's approach to the special theory of relativity and 
comments by the U.S pragmatist Charles Peirce.  
In this chapter, I give a brief account of these stories and indicate how they help to 
release the tension by revealing a new way of conceptualising entities.  
Heat100 
As a boy, I would often sit around a campfire and see the flames leap about in a 
                                            
100 The history of science concerning the discovery of the nature of heat has been well documented. I used a 
number of sources  (Allchin, 1994; Chang, 2010; M. G. Kim, 2011; Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012; 
Woodcock, 2005) and the account reflects the generally accepted view of the main developments. There are 
differing interpretations of the speed of the shift from one theory to another and so on, however I am not 
concerned with these aspects in this thesis.   
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mesmerising fashion.  What was intriguing was the nature of the flame and heat.  
Above the fire, the heat shimmered in the air, like a stream of ephemeral, 
translucent, patches of fluid escaping upwards.  It is perhaps then not surprising that 
when the scientists of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries turned their 
attention to the investigation of heat, they developed the theory of phlogiston (from 
the Greek phlogistos, to burn or inflame).   
Phlogiston was understood as some type of element.  In some respects, this was 
similar to the Greek conception of fire as one of the basic elements.  Variations of 
the Greek account of the four fundamental elements were still evident at the time, 
perhaps explaining why the phlogiston theory was adopted.  Phlogiston was 
understood to be present in all substances, and when the substances were burnt, 
the phlogiston was released.  The release of phlogiston was the source of heat, as 
heat was its defining characteristic. 
The theory was not the product of a fringe element in science pursuing some 
alchemical belief.  Eminent supporters including Henry Cavendish(1731-1810) a 
pioneering experimental and theoretical scientist in both chemistry and physics and 
the discoverer of hydrogen, and Joseph Priestley(1733-1804) another pioneering 
scientist who, among other things, discovered oxygen (which he had named 
dephlogisticated air). There was also ample research evidence for the phlogiston 
theory. For example, when we breathe out, heat can be felt on the outflowing breath 
and from this respiration was understood as a form of combustion.  The theory of 
combustion stated that combustion could only occur if there is the possibility of the 
release of phlogiston.  It was believed that air absorbs phlogiston but has a limited 
capacity to do so, consequently when air is saturated with phlogiston no more 
burning can occur.  This is demonstrated by putting a lit candle into a bell jar; it goes 
out when the air can absorb no more phlogiston.  Another experiment that 
demonstrates the theory is to put a mouse in a sealed container. Because 
respiration is a form of combustion, respiration stops when the air is so saturated 
with phlogiston that no more respiration can take place. Priestly identified one gas 
that was so devoid of phlogiston that combustion occurs very readily and rapidly, 
indicating there is no initial impediment to the releasing of phlogiston into the gas. 
He gave the name de-phlogisticated air to this gas he had discovered; it was 
subsequently renamed oxygen. 
An alternative theory to heat was developed by Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) who 
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is credited with ushering in the era of modern chemistry. He identified the role played 
by dephlogisticated air as one involving a chemical reaction and it was Lavoisier that 
named the gas oxygen.  Lavoisier argued that the phlogiston theory was not 
supported by his experimental data and instead argued for a free-flowing substance, 
‘caloric’, that moves from warmer to cooler bodies and was responsible for ‘heat’.  
Note that both accounts, the phlogiston and the caloric involved the understanding 
of heat as an entity.  However, the characteristics associated with caloric did have 
better explanatory power than phlogiston when considered against a wider range of 
experimental results.  
The scientific debates between the supporters of the opposing theories continued 
from the late eighteenth century into the nineteenth century with support slowly 
shifting to Lavoisier's position.  Towards the end of the eighteenth century, in 1798, 
a mechanical theory of heat was proposed by Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson 
1753-1814), but the account was speculative and rudimentary.  Numerous 
experimental approaches and developments occurred in the first half of the 
nineteenth century leading to the development of the First Law of Thermodynamics, 
a version of the law of the conservation of energy, in 1850 by Rudolph Clausius 
(1822-1888) and William Rankine (1820-1872). In 1853 William Thomson (Lord 
Kelvin) (1824-1907) published an article in a journal of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh where he stated: “ Heat is not a substance, but a dynamical form of 
mechanical effect.” (Thomson, 1853) This description presents an account of heat 
in its modern understanding and a short time later he coined the term thermo-
dynamics which was adopted as the name for the branch of science that studies 
heat and its relationship with work and energy.  The thermodynamic account of heat 
was understood as the release of energy associated with the interaction of 
microscopic particles that constitute the various materials we use and today four 
basic laws of thermodynamics are commonly recognised, the last being discovered 
in the early part of the twentieth century. The displacement of the caloric theory was 
a slow process, and even at the end of the nineteenth century Brewer’s influential 
science text A Guide to the Scientific Knowledge of Things Familiar in its 1880 
edition (the thirty-eighth) (Brewer, 1852) still described heat in terms of the caloric 
theory.  This slow shift in acceptance of changes in understanding of the basic 
constructs of scientific theories that is the central topic of Kuhn’s Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions that I have previously referred to. 
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The story of the development of the understanding of heat is an important one in the 
history of science and the above is by no means a sufficient account to comprehend 
the nature of the journey, but the journey itself is not what attracted my attention.  
The story can be understood not as a change in knowledge, but as change in 
ontological understanding revolving around the question 'What is heat?'.  Faced with 
the phenomenon of heat, neither the supporters of the phlogiston or the caloric 
theory could conceptualise a solution that did not involve positing heat as an entity 
understood as some form of ‘material’ substance.  We may look back and wonder 
how these scientists could have been so fixated on this conception, but this would 
be wrong, for it carries with it the hindsight contained in the breakthroughs in 
understanding that have since been hard won.  The likes of Cavendish and Lavoisier 
were brilliant, influential, and highly respected scientists and while they argued for 
opposing theories of heat both were convinced that heat was a ‘material’ substance.  
This pull to conceive of natural phenomenon in ‘material’ terms is the very same 
struggle I was encountering in relation to Dasein.  It was the chance discovery of a 
small and often overlooked chapter of the ‘heat’ story that a breakthrough occurred. 
In 1822 Joseph Fourier (1738-1830) published a book (Fourier, 1878) based on a 
mathematical theory that specifically rejected taking a position on the ontological 
‘material’ nature of heat and described how heat behaved.  When I initially 
encountered this approach, I immediately understood it in terms of Heidegger's 
terminology, the way of being of heat. It immediately grabbed my attention, here 
was an approach that did not envisage the entity in ‘material’ terms but incorporated 
the basis of scientific inquiry into the phenomenon! 
Fourier conducted a series of experiments in which he measured the rate of transfer 
of heat from one body to another under various conditions.  From these 
observations, he developed equations that could be used for the basis of accurate 
predictions concerning the change in temperature (heat) under different 
circumstance(Goldman, 2006b).  Fourier’s original article submitted for journal 
publication was obstructed for more than a decade by scientists on the panel 
supporting the caloric theory and he was eventually forced to publish his findings in 
a book.  In the book The Analytical Theory of Heat(Fourier, 1878), Fourier argued 
that “the what” of heat is irrelevant. He pointed out that there had been debates 
going on for over two hundred years which had failed to reach any conclusion as to 
the ‘what’ of heat, rather what was important was to describe and account for the 
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behaviour of heat.  Goldman describes the approach; 
Suppose we have an iron bar and I put one end of it on a hot plate that is at one hundred 
degrees Celsius and you want to know at what time will any point on the bar reach any 
temperature you particularly want until it should all reach one hundred degrees Celsius 
ideally, then my equations will tell you that. What else do you want from a theory of heat? 
Who cares what heat is? Let's bracket that question. (Goldman, 2006a, p. 140) 
The issue of whether a theory needs to correspond to ‘reality’ in terms of the ‘what’ 
of the entity was shown by Fourier to be largely irrelevant.  What did correspond to 
the reality was the changes in state, temperature and so on.  When considered at 
the level of the phenomenon the theory works.   As Goldman notes  
Fourier was a breakthrough in uncoupling the success of a theory to explain, predict and 
control from the further claim that it corresponds to reality. (Goldman, 2006a, p. 141) 
The correspondence to reality is a view that what the entity ‘is’ needs to be 
understood by science in order for the theory to be true with a capital "T".  In this 
approach the ‘what an entity is’ is understood as something ‘material’. This is the 
physicalist approach and harks back to Descartes mechanical account of the 
universe that everything in the Universe must be accounted for on the basis of 
matter and motion.  In the case of heat, even when it was not known what heat ‘is’ 
Fourier's observations were still consistent with observed phenomenon, i.e. reality.  
This approach to solving scientific problems based on observed phenomena 
associated with the entity rather than disclosing 'reality' as ‘what is’ as a material 
account is still contested as being ‘true knowledge’. (Goldman, 2006a) 
Fourier’s approach seemed to reflect Heidegger’s approach; it was a focus on ways 
of behaviour of the entity, not the entity itself.  It was reading about Fourier’s 
approach that started to open up a different way of thinking about entities.  Even 
though I had not grasped the idea of being as an organising principle at the abstract, 
ontological level, I was starting to understand that there was a connection between 
a way of being and the defining behaviour of an entity.   
Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity 
Often 'new' scientific theories arise in response to older theories that had ceased 
being useful in solving the various scientific problems in a field.  This is one of the 
characteristics of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. However, when Albert 
Einstein (1879-1955) published his theory of special relativity in 1905 the theory of 
motion that it eventually replaced, that of Isaac Newton(1643-1727), was not 
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contested, it worked just fine.   
In 1905 Einstein published five famous papers, covering Brownian motion, the 
photoelectric effect for which he won the Nobel Prize, mass-energy equivalence 
(E=MC2), a method to determine the size of molecules and the special theory of 
relativity (STR)101.   The year is referred to as Einstein’s Annus Mirabilis 
(extraordinary year) and each of the papers contributed to the foundations of 
modern physics, including quantum physics and lead to changing the understanding 
of space, time, mass and energy.  
In the paper on STR Einstein was addressing the issue of the meaning of 
simultaneous events that occurred at different distances from an observer.  At the 
time the prevailing view was that the speed of an object was relative to an observer.  
For example, if person A was travelling north at 10kph and overtaken by person B 
travelling in the same direction at 12kph, the relative speed of B from A’s perspective 
would be 2kph.  This idea of relative motion was accepted as a fundamental law of 
physics.  What was puzzling physicists at the time was that various experiments had 
indicated the speed of light was constant regardless of the relative positions and 
movement of the observers.  This was inconsistent with the accepted laws of physics 
indicated that the speed should be relative. The implication of the experimental 
results was that light did not behave in the same way as other objects moving 
relative to one another, something was wrong.  The typical response at the time was 
to reject the experimental results. 
What Einstein proposed was to accept both that the laws of physics for any two 
people travelling at the same speed and subject to identical forces will be the same 
and secondly, more controversially, that the observed speed of light is constant 
regardless of the speed of the observers. Einstein accepted the research results 
concerning the way of being of light and let go of any presuppositions that would 
have light behaving like other entities! He then worked through the logical 
implications of this decision.  It is not possible to conduct experiments at the speed 
of light so much of what he did was by way of thought experiments.  
When Einstein completed his work, what emerged from his thought experiments and 
the associated mathematics, was the Special Theory of Relativity.  The conclusions 
from this and subsequent work were that space and time are not fixed, and separate 
                                            
101 I give a more extensive account of this in Chapter 19. 
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entities, but are relational. This view overturned the understanding of time as a 
steady clock ticking off the passing of time at the same rate uniform throughout the 
universe.  It also overturned the view, held for thousands of years, that space was 
independent of anything in space, that it is uniform in nature, a fixed, constant and 
invariable 'space' in which independent objects were contained.  Einstein concluded 
that how we experience space and time is determined by the reference point of the 
observer and not absolute; however, this is only evident at very fast speeds, and not 
at the pace at which human life is normally conducted. 
Einstein's STR was not met with universal acclaim, it was hotly contested by 
scientists and philosophers alike and took a number of years to gain the acceptance 
of the science community. In summary, Einstein put aside assumptions concerning 
the nature of the entities of light, space and time and stepped through the 
consequences of the observed behaviours, i.e. the way of being.  It was this aspect 
that I took back to Heidegger’s work.  To take the observations as given, and then 
think logically through them and not be dissuaded by the pull of prior 
understandings, or the pull of the material.  
Charles Sanders Pierce and Practical Bearings. 
The third encounter that shifted my thinking was with the work of Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839-1914). Pierce was a U.S. mathematician and scientist and the founder 
of the philosophical school of American pragmatism.  For many years he worked in 
the office of the US Coast and Geodetic Survey which involved him in the 
investigation of the effects of gravity when taking various survey measurement. e.g. 
the impact of gravity on the instruments in different elevations such as sea level 
compared to a mountain elevation.  
In an article published in 1878 Peirce stated that we could define something by 
reference to our combined conceptions concerning the "practical bearings" 
associated with the object, without taking into account the nature of the object itself; 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5) 
His famous example was that all we mean by gravity is bound up by facts concerning 
its effects: 
It is a fair question whether some particular facts may not account for gravity; but what we 
mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects. (Peirce, 1955, k. 771-2) 
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Peirce, like Fourier, was differentiating between the ‘what is’ of the entity itself at the 
substance level (an “account of gravity”) with the what is relevant about the effects 
‘of’ gravity, i.e. its observed, measurable influence on other entities.  Again, when I 
read this, I was starting to ‘hear’ the concept of effects as ‘way of being’. 
Interestingly when Newton first published his work on gravity there was a 
controversy in that Gottfried Leibnitz (1649-1716) accused Newton of claiming 
gravity was some quality of the bodies themselves, i.e. he was making claims about 
the nature of gravity itself.  Newton eventually changed his view and agreed that his 
work only described the effect of gravity and made no claims about gravity itself.  
(Janiak, 2016) This goes to the heart of Peirce's view.   
These accounts of gravity struck another chord.  We cannot touch gravity, we cannot 
see gravity, and we only know of gravity through its interactions with the 
environment.  However, we have a sufficient understanding of gravity that we can 
send satellites into space to sit in geo-stationary orbits above the earth, or to travel 
to the outer reaches of the Universe.  In thinking about this approach, I recalled the 
debates over consciousness and the comments by Galen Strawson rejecting the 
commonly held view that consciousness was a mystery;  
... we know exactly what consciousness is — where by “consciousness” I mean what most 
people mean in this debate: experience of any kind whatever. ...  It is utterly unmysterious. 
(Strawson, 2016) 
Thinking through Peirce’s approach into what Strawson was proposing had a 
particularly strong resonance as Heidegger’s work is typically associated with the 
philosophy of mind(Dreyfus, 1991).   
A Different Way of Knowing 
Reading the above accounts shifted my thinking about how to deal with the 
investigation of an entity where the understanding of the entity itself is unclear.  What 
was decisive in this was the reading Heidegger in Aristotelian terms.  I reframed the 
issue in Aristotelian-Heideggerian terminology, as concerning the problem of inquiry 
into an entity when the categorial understanding of the entity in the primary category 
of ‘substance’ is not clear, but access to its ways of being associated with the other 
categories is accessible.   
In each of the cases I have described, presuppositions concerning the ‘substance’ 
category, were put aside and the focus was placed on the behaviour or ‘effects’ 
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associated with the entities.  In none of these examples were the scientists trying to 
understand the ‘being’ of the entity in a Heideggerian sense.  However, if we follow 
Heidegger, and understand the ‘way of being’ as referring to the categorial aspects 
of the individual, perceived entity, then we are, observing the ‘prevailing of being’ 
within the entity itself.  I need to account for how I drew this conclusion. 
In the previous chapter, we saw that Heidegger proposes that the character of being 
of an entity can be either a ‘who’ or a ‘what’ and in the latter case the nature of these 
entities can be understood and discussed as categories [BT 70-1/45].  I had not 
previously given this much thought, until now.  What I recognised was that I had 
held a very limited understanding of categories102.  The way I had sought to 
conceptualise entities was very visual and focused primarily on Aristotle’s categories 
associated with extension, colour, and place.  This approach was underpinned by a 
belief in the ‘materiality’ of the entity.  These are all categorial ways of being of an 
entity, as is evident from the discussion on Aristotle, and simply reflect such 
statements as ‘the box is red’, ‘the box is a 6cm cube” and so on.  However, these 
are not the only ways of being, there are other categories such as relative, having, 
doing or being affected.  While there is some arbitrariness about how these 
categories are arranged, they are nonetheless a comprehensive account of the 
ways of being of an entity, and ways in which we understand entities.   
When Heidegger refers to the categories, I take this to be referring to them in the 
same broad sense in which Aristotle intended them to be understood, as ways of 
being [AM, BCAP].  This support for the Aristotelian interpretation is explicit in the 
1960s Zollikon Seminars during which Heidegger makes the following comment, 
Predication belongs to something that I say something about, the subject of the proposition, 
what is predicated on the κατηγορία (category) is the predicate. For instance, in a predication, 
I can say something is such and such a kind. Kind is in the category of quality. Something is 
this high and this wide. The how much, as such, means the category of quantity. In Aristotle, 
the indication of the number of categories varies. In any case, these categories are not mere 
determinations of the faculty of understanding as with Kant, but characteristics of the being 
of entities as such. [ZS 122] (my gloss) (my underlining) 
Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, a predicate refers to the categorial aspects of 
being that are dependent on the category of primary substance.  They are ways of 
being (e.g. is red, is 6cm cube) that are predicated on ‘box’.  For Heidegger that we 




have an understanding of being, is reflected when we make a statement about 
something, a proposition.  The structure of the proposition itself reflects the 
“characteristics of the being of entities as such” and should not be thought of a “mere 
determinations of the faculty of understanding”.  Heidegger is rejecting the Kantian 
reformulation of the categories and affirms the Aristotelian view.  While not for this 
thesis, Heidegger is thus rejecting Kantian idealism, and if this is the case, then he 
is also attacking the Kantian foundations of the theories of social constructivism that 
have been so influential in the social sciences for over half a century. 
While I am basing my interpretation on an Aristotelian interpretation of Heidegger, 
this is not to say Heidegger in uncritical of Aristotle.  As I have argued he has a 
different answer to the being of an entity, proposes two fundamental modes of being 
(‘who’ and ‘what’) and in Being and Time makes comment that “even Aristotle failed 
to clear away the darkness of these categorial interconnections” [BT 22/3]. Despite 
this, Heidegger is applying an Aristotelian approach to categories, when it comes to 
entities that are characterised by a ‘what’ mode of being. 
Going back to the above examples, regardless of what the scientists may think they 
are doing, from a Heideggerian perspective they are identifying aspects of the 
structure of entities in terms of their categorial ways of being, understood in the wide 
Aristotelian sense of categories.  This is a significant change in thinking and contrary 
to the ‘narrow’ materialist approach of the culture, as reflected in the unfounded 
posting of theories of phlogiston caloric theories and in my struggle to conceptualise 
Dasein.   
Reflecting on this, the more I recognised that we typically understand things in terms 
of categorial ways of being, it is just not recognised as such, nor is it, certainly in 
general discussion, labelled as categorial103.  However, what I observed in my own 
thinking was the insidious need to posit something material, even if it is not 
perceived.  This is not the substance approach of Aristotle, as he understood 
substance as form, a formula, specifically rejecting the materialist account.  I had 
the tendency to ‘want’ to ground things in something ‘material’, some fundamental 
element.  I recognised that I was at heart an Ionian104 revisionist, the materialist 
                                            
103 Aristotle, as discussed, proposed ten categories of being.  Typically, when thinking about what things are 
we limit our thinking to the first three (substance, quantity and quality).  When considering ways of being all of 
them are at play. 
104 Ionia is the name of the region of Great Greece located in what is now modern Turkey where Thales of 
Miletus and his early followers lived. The name is given to his ‘school’ which had a focus on the first principles 
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account rejected by Aristotle, and I suspect this tendency creeps through much of 
modern science.  For example, even though I know that carbon dioxide (CO2) is 
colourless, odourless and tasteless I take comfort in that it is ‘material’, there is 
something there.  Whenever I understood things in terms of the various categorial 
ways of being, there was the comfort that ‘something solid’, ‘something real’ was 
necessarily there. 
This very point was at the heart of the dispute between the supporters of Newton’s 
work on gravity which argued it was a ‘force’ and the supporters of Cartesian 
mechanistic account of physics which argued that all there is, is matter and motion 
and everything must be accounted for on this basis.  (Gaukroger, Schuster, & 
Sutton, 2002) The Cartesians argued that proposing of gravity as the action of a 
force at a distance was to re-introduce metaphysical ‘entities’, the very type of 
thinking from which scholars were trying to free themselves(Gaukroger, 2006; 
Janiak, 2016). Not only was I an Ionian revisionist I was a Cartesian mechanist!105   
What happens, however, in the absence of evidence concerning the materiality of 
the entity? If we simply put this aspect on hold and work with the other categorial 
modes of being for which there is evidence. This is precisely what Fourier does 
concerning heat, what Peirce is arguing in relation to gravity, and Strawson is 
suggesting regarding consciousness and what Einstein does in relation to time and 
space.  If we put aside the strong pull to ground our initial understanding of things 
as ‘material’, we find that it is often the other ways of being that are most critical and 
determinative for understanding what the entity is.  This is Pierces point when he 
says, 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5) 
For entities which are obscure in terms of their material presence what we must do 
is suspend the material bias and reject unfounded presuppositions put forward to 
‘fill in’ the obscurity which tends to lead the investigation astray.  This then leaves 
the way open to pursuing the investigation in terms of the other categorial ways of 
being for which there is evidence.   
                                            




This is not to say that the material aspect of entities is irrelevant.  In the cases where 
this aspect is initially obscure should science uncover a ‘material’ structure then this 
structure must ‘fit’ with the account of the other ways of being.  This happened with 
heat, which was eventually discovered to arise from the microscopic movement of 
small particles and resulted in the development of the theory of thermodynamics.  
To rephrase this in terms of the thesis, Fourier describes a categorial way of being 
of heat in mathematical terms such that we have an understanding of heat in the 
same sense as Peirce proposes about gravity. This is question one addressed.  
Subsequently, we have an account of heat coming into being as a result of the 
movement of microscopic ‘material’ entities.  This is question two answered.   
When thinking through the character of heat, another aspect became apparent. I 
had previously conceptualised heat as the movement of particles and had blurred 
the line between particle, movement and heat. Without being conscious of the 
process, I was reducing heat to a type of property of the particles themselves.  This 
is the ‘materialist’ bias and is wrong.  Just as the bronze was required for there to 
be a bronze sphere, and we need to grasp that the bronze is not the sphere, the 
particles are required for heat, but are not heat.  I accept that heat exists, heat is, 
but it is self-evident that it is not a predicate of any of the particles.  A particular 
instance of heat only exists as a consequence of the movement of particles within 
a given proximity and under certain conditions, i.e. there is an organising formula to 
extend the Aristotelian concept, or there is a prevailing of an underlying structure to 
use Heidegger’s terminology106.  There is a complex relationship between the 
‘material’ that is necessary to bring an instance of an entity into being, and the being 
of the entity and this relationship needs to be clarified and understood.  This 
relationship lies at the heart of the Aristotelian and Heideggerian understanding of 
what things ‘are’. It is a different way of ‘knowing’. This led to a second significant 
breakthrough in understanding the being of entities. 
While ‘material’ entities (particles) may be necessary for the emergence (coming 
into being) of other entities (heat) through being organised in a particular way 
(movement within a given spatial relationship), the ‘material’ entities (particles) 
should not be confused with the emergent entity (heat).  This breakthrough 
immediately shed light on the passages cited in the previous chapter concerning the 
                                            
106 If we accept the heat ‘is’ and is not a property of the particles as material entities then we are already on the 
way to emergence, even if not named as such. 
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distinction between the brain and human communication [ZS 95] and the correlation 
between electrical impulses and mood, which I cite again; 
If electrical impulses were really able to cause moods, then a machine alone and by itself 
should be able to produce moods.  It can only be said that when electrical impulses are 
present this or that mood appears.  However, this is still far from meaning that an electrical 
impulse can produce a mood.  Mood can only be triggered. A certain brain state is correlated 
with a particular mood. Nevertheless, the brain process is never sufficient for understanding 
a mood; it is not sufficient even in the most literal sense because it can never reach into the 
mood itself. [ZS 196] (my underlining) 
Heidegger accepts that in some way the brain and its processes are necessary to 
bring a mood into being, but it is not a sufficient to either account for what a mood 
is (question one) or how a mood comes into being (question two).  If we accept that 
moods exist (i.e. that they are entities) then by researching moods in terms of their 
material presence without first understanding its various ways of being of mood will 
risk leading the inquiry astray, as was the case with heat and the phlogiston/caloric 
theories.  What is required is a different way of knowing, or rather moving from the 
Ionian to the Aristotelian understanding.  While I have focused on heat in the later 
part of the discussion the similarities with gravity and space-time107 are evident. 
In summary, there were two significant breakthroughs in thinking that arose out of 
the reflections of these case studies from the history of science.  The first was to be 
able to conceptualise an entity in terms of its categorial ways of being without the 
necessity of a material conceptualisation.   The second, which arose in part from the 
first, was that while a material entity may be necessary for an entity coming into 
being, this does not mean that the entity that comes into being is itself a material 
entity!  
Conceptualising Dasein 
The above discussion has focussed on entities that Heidegger characterises as 
‘what’ entities and ties those back to categorial ways of being.  What Heidegger 
                                            
107 In relation to gravity, Newton originally proposed that it was a property of the ‘ether’ that filled space and it 
was only in response to criticism from Leibnitz he changed the conception of gravity to a ‘force’.  Today there 
are two accounts of gravity, one in standard physics based on Einstein’s theory of relativity, interprets gravity 
as a warping of the space-time dimension, while in quantum mechanics, quantum field theory hypothesized 
there exists a particle, the graviton, that mediates the force of gravity.  It is the reconciliation of these differing 
accounts of gravity that is understood to be the key to unifying these two dominant, but separate theories in 
physics.  The entities we understand as time, space and gravity are thus no longer understood as distinct, they 
are, in ways that are as yet unknown, believed to be bound together.  They may yet prove to be aspects of the 
same underlying entity, an entity we are observing in terms of its ways of being which will eventually be 
understood as a single structure. 
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argues, however, is that there is a class of entities for whom the categories are not 
the appropriate way to understand and classify the ways of being, and that class of 
entities is one that is understood in terms of its existence, i.e. Dasein. Simply put, if 
I accept that “I” exist, and I do, while the categories may apply to my physical body 
they are neither appropriate nor relevant to understanding what it is to be a Dasein.  
Heidegger does acknowledge that Dasein 
can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. [BT 82/55] 
This is because of the necessity of the body which must be present in each case of 
Dasein. However, to regard Dasein as the body “one must completely disregard or 
just not see the existential” nature of Dasein. [BT 82/55] What Heidegger is pointing 
to here is the complex relationship between the necessary material underpinnings 
of an entity and the being of the entity itself. 
To differentiate the two broad classes of entities, Heidegger refers to one as having 
a “what” character and the other a “who” character.  Typically, we related the 
pronoun ‘who’ to an individual but in this case, Heidegger is using it in the general 
or universal sense.  Whereas the ways of being of ‘what’ entities are accounted for 
and grouped by categories, Heidegger invents the name “existentialia” [BT 71/45] 
to serve the same role for entities with a ‘who’ character, or existence as their way 
of being.  The singular is existentiale which relates to a specific of way of being. The 
grammatical link between existentialia and existence is self-evident.  What this 
means is that just as we can describe a non-Dasein entity by reference to the 
categories, we should be able to provide a reasonable description of a Dasein by 
reference to the existentialia108. 
When we talk about a specific ‘red box’, ‘red’ is not a category, it is a specific 
instance of the colour red of the entity box.  Red however falls under the ‘species’ 
colour within the category of qualities.  Similarly, existentialia and existentiale do not 
apply to a particular Dasein, they are universal concepts.  When a specific way of 
being is observed in a Dasein, Heidegger simply refers to this as an existentiell [BT 
34/14].  Table 5  is a simple representation of Heidegger’s terminology. 
                                            
108 In the final review of the thesis it struck me that what Heidegger is doing is accepting the categories for non-
Dasein, but is proposing the existentialia as the name for basic ‘categories’ for Dasein’s way of being.  There is 
a need for existentialia because Dasein’s ways of being are radically different to non-Dasein entities. In that the 
categories have proved immensely useful in investigating and classifying non-Dasein entities, the prospect is 
that there is significant benefit in developing the existentialia along a similar line. Heidegger does not do this, 
and I am not aware of this being done by any other scholar.   
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Whereas Aristotle sets out his ten category groupings with clarity and some helpful 
descriptions, there is no such setting out anywhere in Heidegger’s work.  Unless 
one is familiar with the terms, even the shift between the plural and singular forms 
of existentiale can be at first confusing. In Being and Time, Heidegger never makes 
explicit for the uninitiated the use of existentiell and the meaning of his term ontic.  
On entering the Heideggerian world, one must work hard every step of the way! 
By way of example the following are examples of existentiale from Being and Time; 
being-in [BT 79/54], being-amidst [BT 81/55], concern [BT 83/57], worldhood [BT 
92/64], the ‘one’ [BT 167/128], receptive-attunement [BT 172/134], understanding 
[BT 182/143], projection [BT 185/146], and meaning [BT 193/151].  For Heidegger 
all these are classifications (as well as structures) of ways of being that can be 
identified in every Dasein, however, how they manifest in each Dasein varies which 
is where the individuation of Dasein arises.  An analogous situation concerns 
physical objects in that, for example, every such object must have, as part of its 
structure, three dimensions in space, however, there is an infinite variability in the 
actual dimensions exhibited by specific entities.  
Whereas in the extant Aristotelian texts we have a declaration of the categories with 
no discussion indicating how he develops them, in Being and Time we have an 
account of Heidegger’s progressive identification of the existentialia as he works 
through his Dasein analytic. This, perhaps, accounts for the lack of a concise 
summary. 
One thing to note about Heidegger’s existentialia is that they are dynamic, and are, 
by and large, relational processes.  This is because our existence is a continual 
unfolding in the context of our world, a living of our life, and when the process stops 
so does our existence.  For example; the existentiale, concern, refers to the way we 
DESCRIPTION TECHNICAL 
NAME 
‘WHAT’ ENTITIES ‘WHO’ ENTITIES 
(Dasein) 
General structure 
applicable to all 
entities in class 




Specific entity ontic level Specific entity 





Specific ways of 
being called 
existentiell 
Table 5 Terminology relating to being structure 
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‘deal’ with things in the world relevant to our life; the ‘one’ refers to the process by 
which we are brought into being as the Dasein we are by virtue of the culture; 
receptive-attunement refers to how such things as our moods hold open our world; 
and worldhood is the structural process by which we assign our self to certain ways 
of being in the world.  As can be seen, by this very scant introduction, Heidegger’s 
existentialia are radically different to the categories.  I suspect that this was one of 
the reasons why I had so much difficulty conceptualising Dasein.   
As soon as I suspended the need to think in materialist terms and opened up to 
simply ‘following’ Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s ways of being my thinking was 
‘freed up’. Returning again to Peirce’s account,  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955k. 743-5) 
Applying this to Dasein, if we consider what ways of being might have conceivable 
practical bearings in relation to an understanding of Dasein, then the whole of our 
conception of those ways of being is the whole of our conception of Dasein. If we 
think about our life, our existence, then surely the way we deal with things, our 
interactions with people, our various understandings, the influence of such things as 
mood and motivation, all fall within the ambit of things that have practical bearing 
for Dasein.  All these are addressed by Heidegger’s existentialia! All that was 
required was to think of an entity whose organising principle (structure of being) is 
process based, i.e. a prevailing centred around these key aspects of human 
existence; that is the conception of Dasein that I managed to grasp. 
Understanding Structure 
The examples from Fourier, Einstein and Peirce related to a phenomenon where 
science is seeking law like relationships and the work that the scientists produced 
can be subject to repeat tests 'to check' and confirm the outcome.  In other words, 
at the ontic or entity level, one would expect the behaviour of heat in one piece of 
metal to be the same as in another identical piece of metal in identical situations.  
Further, the relationships between the characteristics of the material, the rate of 
increasing temperature and so on can be determined by reference to a specific 
formula (law) such that the behaviour of heat can be predicted with a degree of 
certainty in novel situations.  This does not happen with Dasein.  Heidegger 
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recognises this and comments that the being of Dasein will not be “entirely 
absorbed” and subject to “rational acts which follow certain laws.” [BT 73/47] But 
even the range of individuated behaviour of Dasein, can be understood, according 
to Heidegger, as having a certain commonality in structure. A structure based on 
the existentialia rather than the categories109.   
Heidegger's premise is that all human Dasein's have a common way of being that 
arises from a common structure, being-in-the-world.  What then does Heidegger 
mean by structure? We cannot think of structures as entities, for example, the timber 
frames that form the structure of a house, Heidegger repeatedly rules this out.   I will 
use a metaphor associated with language to illustrate110 and then point out the 
deficiencies of the metaphor to avoid the ‘entity’ trap. 
Assume that nobody has hitherto examined language to determine its structure and 
that this is the task of a scholar.  The scholar places before themselves three simple 
sentences by way of a start, 
• A black cat sat on the mat. 
• The wind is blowing hard. 
• The old lady spoke softly. 
In looking at each sentence, they seem, at first, quite diverse.  The sentences refer 
to black cats, sitting, a mat, wind, blowing, a lady and speaking and there appears 
to be nothing in common about these things.   
The scholar then recognises that there are broadly two aspects in each sentence, 
there is a thing (cat, mat, wind, lady) and there is what the thing is doing (sitting, 
blowing, speaking).  This suggests a structure.  Each simple sentence has thing + 
thing doing something. 
Like all good scholarly approaches each aspect is labelled.  The scholar realises 
that the set of things (cat, wind, mat, lady) are names of objects. A quick check with 
an etymology dictionary reveals an old English word for name is noun which comes 
from the Latin word nomen meaning name.   Convinced that the right word with the 
right pedigree has been found the scholar decides to call the words that name 
                                            
109 Earlier chapters pointed out that Heidegger refers to being as having structures, e.g. “Being and the structure 
of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.” [BT 62/38]   
110 I have no idea how the structure of language came about.  The example has been designed for illustrative 
purposes only and I am making no claim that this is how the structure of English was determined.   
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objects “nouns”.   
The scholar then turns to the something that thing is doing, the sitting, blowing, 
talking, etc.  This is another group of words forming a similar and distinct function. 
The name chosen for this group is verb from the old Latin word, verbum, a command 
to do something.  The most basic structure of the sentence is thus: 
noun (the thing) + verb (what the thing is doing) 
Over time the scholar identifies, categorises and names other sets of words and 
slowly the language is understood as comprising different types of words with 
particular relationships between them, i.e. a structure.  Having identified the 
structure, the ‘rules of grammar111’ are then developed. For example, the order of 
the words 'black the on sat cat mat' makes little sense indicating that there must be 
some order (rule) to structure.    
Before proceeding there are a number of points worth noting: Firstly, whatever the 
structure of the language it was there before its identification within the language. 
We can use language without the technical understanding of the structure. 
Heidegger identifies this as the difference between having a pre-ontological 
understanding of being compared to an ontological understanding’ [BT]. Secondly, 
the various word groups can be understood as various ways of being of the 
language and as such is the structure of language.  This is what Heidegger is getting 
at concerning Dasein, its various ways of being constitutes its structure.  Thirdly, the 
investigation approach to disclosing the structure moves from the ontic (words in 
use) to the ontological (the ontological structure).   This is the same procedure 
Heidegger uses is Being and Time.  
If we substitute Dasein for language Heidegger will be observing the various ways 
of being at the ontic level, identifying commonalities and classifying them as different 
types of existentiale. Perhaps the simplest example is the existentiale grouping he 
names concern.  Heidegger observes at the ontic level (what Dasein does) that we 
have a broad multi-facet way of dealing with things as we go about our life; 
The multiplicity of these things is indicated by the following examples: having to do with 
something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of 
something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
                                            
111 Originally from the Greek grammatike, the ‘art of letters’. 
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interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ...[BT 83/56] 
Heidegger simply pulls this multi-facet way of dealing with things together under the 
one group and names it “concern” [BT 83/56].  There is nothing hidden or mysterious 
in this. It is a simple observation that a key part of our existence is made up of 
engaging or being ‘concerned’ with things. We also have various behaviours 
associated with our dealings with people. In that people are different to objects those 
dealing have a qualitative difference, and he groups them under the heading 
“solicitude”. [BT 157/121].  In other words, Heidegger is identifying what Peirce 
referred to as those aspects that are evident in our life that have ‘practical bearings’ 
to that life.  Heidegger will proceed on this basis, and as he proceeds he will analyse 
the relationship between the structures. 
In language even when the structural elements of the language are identified there 
is still need to understand the way the structural elements are ordered.  In 
considering the ways of being of Dasein, there also appears to be an ‘ordering’.  For 
example, before I use a phone I first need an understanding of what a phone is, I 
have to have the ‘know how’ to use the phone and I have to have a reason to use 
it.  This basic structure applies to most things with which we are engaged.  
Heidegger refers to any necessary ‘ordering’ of one structural component before 
another as ‘a priori’.  
In summary Heidegger’s approach to investigating the structure of Dasein is to 
identify ways of being observed at the ontic level (individual Dasein), and classify 
them as ontological structures, and then analyse those structures and determine an 
ordering or priority between the structures.  Listening to this description carefully it 
is possible to hear the elements of time starting to emerge. If we must first have an 
understanding of something (past), in order to use it now (present) but in using 
something, we must first have a purpose (future) then there is a temporal structure 
that is associated with our engagement with things.   
I mentioned earlier there is a problem with the analogy of language.  While it is 
helpful in understanding the concept of structure, it is flawed in that the elements, 
when we look at them on the page appear static.  This relates to my earlier comment 
that we need to think of Dasein’s structure more as a dynamic structure, it is a 
constant prevailing within each Dasein. Dasein has more of the characteristics of a 
verb than a noun! 
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A final point to note in relation to the disclosure of the structure of Dasein is that 
once identified, the structure of Dasein’s being, i.e. being-in-the-world is not the 
being of the entity. This was made clear in the previous sections.  To use the 
language of the Greek chapter, it identifies the structure of the prevailing in Dasein 
but does not identify that which prevails.  This is the idea that an entity cannot bring 
itself into being and as such there must be some larger ‘system’ or ‘relational totality’ 
which is responsible.  Hence Heidegger’s comment, 
Being-in-the-world is the necessary a priori constitution 112(condition) of Dasein, but by no 
means sufficient to fully determine its being.  [BTg 53] (my translation) 
Even though Heidegger is describing the structure of Dasein’s way of being (what 
he calls being-in-the-world), he recognises that there is still something else beyond 
this. In Being and Time he first tentatively describes the being of Dasein as Care 
(BT Ch 6) and then attempts to provide a detailed analysis of Care in terms of 
temporality.  For this thesis, the primary task is to clarify the structure of Dasein’s 
way of being and to consider the practical implications. Understanding Dasein’s 
being beyond this is interesting but not necessary for the understanding of the 
meaning of shedding of life at the ontic level. 
This concludes the chapter on an approach to conceptualising Dasein as an entity 
and an approach to investigating the being of Dasein. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I addressed the challenges associated with conceptualising and 
investigating Dasein.  Drawing on case studies from the natural sciences, Peirce’s 
pragmatism and Aristotle’s categories I identified that it was possible to understand 
and investigate an entity without recourse to a material based conceptualisation.  
Further, I showed that it is possible to conceive of an entity that, while requiring 
material entities to bring it into being, is itself not a material entity.  Lastly, I have 
illustrated a way of understanding an investigation into an entity by observing its 
way of being at the ontic level and then moving to identify the common structure 
behind the ontic.  It needs to be understood that these are descriptive accounts and 
                                            
112 The German word I have translated as constitution is Verfassung.  This can be translated as state, condition 
or constitution.  Constitution is used in the sense that it is the constitution of a country that determines the 
characteristics of the Country.  Condition and state are both used in the sense of describing the particular status 
of something.  The structure of being-in-the-world exists prior to, and in such a way that it is constitutive or the 
basis on which or the necessary condition on which Dasein is Dasein. 
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not causal.  There is no claim that the structures cause, or are the why, of the entity, 
they are merely an account of what the entity is. 
In the next two chapters, I will present the case for considering Heidegger, not as 
phenomenologist but rather an empiricist using phenomenology as a methodology.  
This understanding helps to place Heidegger’s approach in a closer and very 
relevant relationship with the sciences, and points to a usefulness of Heidegger’s 




CHAPTER 10: HEIDEGGER'S EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Introduction 
I take Heidegger to be a strict philosophical empiricist using phenomenology as a 
methodology.  In this Chapter, I set out my reasons for the approach.  
Thomas Sheehan in his book Making Sense of Heidegger(Sheehan, 2015), opened 
by declaring that he reads Heidegger's work strictly as what Heidegger “declared it 
to be – namely, phenomenology” and accordingly he regards Heidegger as a 
phenomenologist.  I think there is a lot going for this approach and it accords with 
my initial reading of Heidegger. It is indubitable that Heidegger described his 
methodology as phenomenology; however, I want to interpret his work as 
philosophical empiricism using phenomenology as the methodology. In Being and 
Time Heidegger comments;  
Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any 
genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. [BT 490] 
Based on this comment I take Heidegger to be indicating that he is within the broad 
camp of empiricism and is probably best understood as an empiricist using a 
phenomenological methodology.  This is contrary to my initial understanding as 
influenced by the social science interpretations of phenomenology whereby I had 
somehow envisaged his work as somehow in a different 'school'.113  The link to 
empiricism had two puzzles for me, firstly, it seems to align him with the British 
empiricist of whom he seems critical, and secondly it seems to align him with the 
natural sciences which place physical objects at the centre of their inquiries.  I will 
address both these issues and in so doing clarify in what way Heidegger sees 
himself working within the empiricist tradition which, in turn, reveals a little more 
about Heidegger's approach.  
The Empiricism – Phenomenology Link 
By and large philosophical empiricism is synonymous with the term British 
empiricism as Scruton explains in his Short History of Modern Philosophy (Scruton, 
1995) notes, 
It cannot be said that philosophical empiricism is either peculiar to Britain or predominant 
                                            
113 ɸ  
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there. Nevertheless, it is a fact worth remarking that, since the Middle Ages, there has been 
a succession of gifted British writers who have defended a version of the empiricist outlook, 
so that ‘British empiricism’ is now the name of a recognised strand of philosophical history. 
(p. 79) 
The three main formative British philosophers in philosophical empiricism are John 
Locke(1632-1704), Bishop George Berkeley(1685-1753) and the most influential, 
David Hume(1711-1776) and regarding an empirical account of logic John Stewart 
Mill(1806-1873).  When referring to these philosophers Heidegger, will typically just 
refer to British empiricism [e.g. HCT, PIK], supporting Scruton's account. 
In the development of phenomenology, the empiricists have been very influential.  
Moran in his Introduction to Phenomenology (Moran, 2000) notes that Husserl's 
teacher and the 'discoverer' of intentionality, Franz Brentano (1838-1917), 
"championed the British empiricists, especially Hume and Mill" (p. 34) as well as 
other leading positivists against what he regarded as the mysticism that entered 
German philosophy via Kant and Hegel.  Brentano's work on intentionality becomes 
influential in both continental philosophy via Husserl's development of 
phenomenology which develops and significantly extends Brentano's 
intentionality(Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994), and in analytic philosophy, 
particularly in the area of philosophy of mind (Dennett, 1989; Searle, 1983).  
Edmund Husserl is not only influenced by Brentano but certainly in his early period 
influenced by the British Empiricists (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994), particularly 
Hume with whom he had an "obsession" and regarded as a "practitioner of 
phenomenology" (Moran, 2000, p. 69). Husserl's regard for the empiricists is 
something also recognised and acknowledged by Heidegger [ZS 142]. 
While philosophers and scientists alike may be regarded as working within a 
particular 'school', this does not mean that this precisely defines their positions and 
scholarship often progresses by engaging with and critiquing those who have gone 
before within a school.  So, for example, Husserl accepts Brentano's basic insights 
regarding intentionality, but critiques aspects of Brentano's analysis of it (Moran, 
2000; Spiegelberg, 1994) and in turn Heidegger accepts some aspects of Husserl's 
development in intentionality but critiques and rejects others(Moran, 2000)[BPP]. 
Husserl’s connections with empiricism then should be understood in a broad sense. 
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Puzzle 1: Heidegger is Critical of the British Empiricists. 
When reading Heidegger's work the passing remarks about the Empiricists are 
generally critical. His critique is primarily grounded in their Cartesian stance, 
particularly their positions on topics such as representationalism [BPP], seeking 
immanent perceptions through a reflection of consciousness [HCT], splitting of 
primary and secondary qualities of sensation [HCT] and the Cartesian sense of the 
self as consciousness [ZS]. For Heidegger, these are serious criticisms and are 
what his structural account of being-in-the-world is designed to overcome.  How 
then can he be so critical of such basic issues on the one hand but classify himself 
as an empiricist on the other?  The answer can be gleaned from Scruton's definition 
of empiricism,  
Empiricism sees human understanding as confined within the limits of human experience, 
straying outside those limits only to fall victim to scepticism or to lose itself in nonsense.  
(Scruton, 1995, p. 79)  
By nonsense, he is referring to the risk of positing theories and adopting ideas for 
which there is no observable evidence, i.e. empirical evidence.  This approach is in 
direct contrast to Descartes rationalism which argues that the senses cannot be 
trusted and as such, all knowledge must first be anchored in our innate rational 
capacities. 
All the empiricists held that sense data from the outside world entered the mind or 
consciousness and then became the basis for knowledge of the world.  There were 
variations as to how the empiricists thought this process occurred, but the crucial 
point is that for all the British empiricists the sense data was a direct experience of 
the world and this was the only source of 'true' knowledge of the world that we could 
have.   
However, the empiricist’s distinguished the objectivity of the entities within the world 
and what was presented in our mind or consciousness based on those experiences, 
i.e. the subjective entity.  The theories of the different empiricists were, in part, 
differentiated by how they addressed the link between the objective and subjective 
aspects of the entity. It was the adherence to the subject-object divide which 
reflected the view that we are somehow locked ‘inside’ separated from the world 
‘outside’ that places them in the same broad camp as Descartes, notwithstanding 
the differences in terms of prioritising the source of knowledge, i.e. rationalism 
versus empiricism.  The one primary difference was that Descartes was a sceptic in 
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terms of accepting the ‘true’ nature of any experience unless it was rationally 
justified.  In summary, empiricists will ground all knowledge in experience and apply 
our rational facilities to that knowledge to extend it, Cartesians will use rationally 
derived principles for determining the basis for knowledge and apply it to 
experience.   
Heidegger's criticism of both empiricism and rationalism is that they assume the 
nature of consciousness and all that follows [e.g. BPP, HCT, ZS].  If we strip out 
these aspects of British empiricism, we are left with dealing with the experiences 
themselves on their own terms and not mediated through assuming a mind or 
consciousness.  It is in this sense that I take Heidegger to be an empiricist strictly in 
the sense of Scruton's definition as I have presented it.  Consistent with what has 
been discussed to date, Heidegger rejects any formulations or interpretations that 
assumes the existence of entities for which there is no evidential support and rejects 
the basis of the subject-object divide. This is the rejection of what I have termed the 
Cartesian stance.  
This approach is also consistent with the discussion in the previous sections in which 
I support the view that we can come to understand what something is based on 
understanding its 'practical bearings, i.e. through empirical observations of ways of 
being.   
Hume Sans Consciousness Towards Heidegger 
Hume is regarded as the most influential of the empiricists; it is, after all, Hume's 
work that awakens Kant from his "dogmatic slumber" that results in one of the most 
influential books in philosophy, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason(De Pieeris & 
Friedman, 2013).   
Understanding Heidegger as an empiricist can be seen in the similarities in the 
approach that Hume takes, his subsequent influence on phenomenology and in 
particular Heidegger's recognition that Hume was a precursor to his attempts at 
investigating the structure of lived experience.  To illustrate this connection, I will 
consider one important account by Hume, his investigation into the self. 
David Hume's inquiry into the nature of the self is contained in his book A Treatise 
of Human Nature(Hume, 2006), and includes one of the most famous passages in 
the history of philosophy.  In the passage below Hume, an empiricist, is reviewing 
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his experiences to identify an experience of self. He concludes that he has no such 
experience. In the passage Hume uses the term impression, which is a sub-
category, together with thought, of what he terms perceptions;  
By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, 
or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which 
are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those 
sensations or movements above mentioned. (Hume, 2007, p. 13) 
For Hume, all thoughts and ideas have an origin in impressions, i.e. the experience 
of things. To understand anything, we must have had an initial impression of it 
(experience), and this means that an understanding of the self must first be based 
on the experience of the self.  This is Hume's description of his inquiry concerning 
the self; 
THERE are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of 
what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; ... The 
strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this 
view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their 
pain or pleasure. ....  these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is 
pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, .... But self or person is not any one 
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a 
reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue 
invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after 
that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and 
joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It 
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self 
is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea. ... All these are different, and 
distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider’d, and may 
exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner, 
therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I 
enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception 
or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. 
When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound-sleep; so long am I insensible 
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (Hume, 2006, k.4213-32)(my underlining) 
Hume is arguing against those philosophers who say we are aware of "what we call 
our SELF", and his target is the Cartesian philosophers.  There are a number of 
points from Hume's inquiry that have important touchstones with the work of 
Heidegger. Firstly, he is basing his work on what is experienced, not unfounded 
thoughts and ideas (presuppositions). Secondly, he denies we have experience of 
the self. Thirdly, that he differentiates between the types of perceptions, i.e. he 
categorises them.  Fourthly, that each category can be separately considered 
 
289 
(investigate) and fifthly, that they may "exist separately".  All these are significant 
aspects that are found, as I am discussing, in Heidegger's work.  The fifth point is of 
particular note.  It is the ontological claim as to their existence, i.e. it is not an 
epistemological claim. It is here we find perhaps the strongest link to Heidegger, as 
it is the ontological status of experience that Heidegger bases his inquiry into the 
Dasein.   
I suspect that it is these core elements of Hume’s work that Heidegger recognises 
early in his career when he comments;  
Hume's brilliant Treatise already has the form of a rigorous and systematic structural 
exploration of the sphere of pure lived experience. Thus in a certain sense it [is] the first 
attempt at a "phenomenology." [BH 317] 
The "structural exploration of the sphere of lived experience" is an early depiction of 
the Dasein analytic that reaches its culmination in the Being and Time.  
In this, we also see a crucial difference in the Husserlian and Heideggerian projects.  
Husserl's work is focused on a methodology to ensure the securing of 'true' 
knowledge, and as such he saw it as a foundational project that could underpin all 
science. (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994). It is epistemological in character, and it 
is on this basis Husserl was interested in the work of the empiricists.  Heidegger's 
project is, however, ontological and this influences his reading of the empiricists as 
reflected in the above discussion on Hume. 
Heidegger's critique of Hume and the other empiricists is grounded in the 
fundamental critique that he makes of Husserl and is summarised in the following; 
The concept of consciousness has in fact been simply taken over by Husserl from Cartesian 
psychology and Kantian epistemology. Taken over with it is the entire set of the fundamental 
categories in which consciousness is characterized, categories which, for their part, do not 
owe their origin to an analysis of this being in the sense of an inquiry into its specific character 
of being. [IPR 208] 
Husserl's early work was within the empiricist tradition, broadly understood. He 
placed a great emphasis on developing a methodology within this tradition designed 
to focus on the experience of whatever was the object of inquiry and to exclude any 
concepts from the investigation that were themselves not founded in experience, i.e. 
unfounded presuppositions.   
It was Husserl's early achievements in this area that Heidegger used and is the 
basis of his comments to which I referred earlier, that Husserl showed the meaning 
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of "genuine philosophical empiricism" and provided the "necessary tool".  Heidegger 
is referring strictly to Husserl's earlier work, before the introduction of various 
reductions and a shift to a form of Kantian idealism.  It is these moves that Heidegger 
was openly critical as can be seen from the above extract from the 1923-4 Winter 
Semester lecture course Introduction to Phenomenological Research.  Other 
comments in the course are far more direct and rather blunt, and Heidegger devotes 
an entire section (IPR §48) to "Husserl's mangling" of phenomenology. 
By identifying the presuppositions surrounding the use of such concepts of 
consciousness, self, ego and sought and excluding them from his methodology 
Heidegger's approach is even more strictly empiricists than is Husserl's.  Perhaps 
this is why he says, "Edmund Husserl has ... enabled us to understand once more 
the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism" [BT 490] which does not imply 
that Husserl himself implemented the genuine philosophical empiricist agenda, just 
showed the way! 
This then solved my first puzzle. Heidegger can be interpreted as an empiricist, as 
I do, and yet critique the approached of those who preceded him in the tradition, 
which is a reasonably standard scholarly progression of a field.  
Puzzle two: Empiricism and physical objects  
The second puzzle was the close association between empiricism and physical 
objects as is evident in the following remarks by Giorgi concerning the science of 
psychology,  
Physics, biology, and physiology were model sciences for psychology, when it began. 
However, what was not so clearly understood at the time was that in accepting the 
philosophical empiricism that drove the natural sciences, and in accepting its basic criteria, 
psychology was implicitly accepting physical objects as the model for psychical phenomena.  
(Giorgi, 2006, p. 46) (my underlining) 
The puzzle here is that if philosophical empiricism implies accepting physical objects 
as the basis of an enquiry, then this is accepting a ‘material’ based substance 
ontology or physicalism which is clearly at odds with Heidegger's approach.  Giorgi 
is referring to the bias in the natural sciences to understand things as physical 
objects which in turn typically means objects understood in a Cartesian sense, i.e. 
independent and self-sufficient and it is these objects that comprise what we 
understand as reality.   
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Scientific truth understood from this perspective is directly associated with 
knowledge of objects only as physical entities.  This results in two problems firstly it 
limits an understanding of what things are to the material, and secondly, it results in 
the tendency to posit a material object as the cause of the phenomenon, even when 
no object is evident.  This tendency was the main cause impeding an understanding 
of heat as discussed in the previous Chapter, i.e. heat was posited as either 
phlogiston or caloric fluid, and this assumed entity became the subject of the inquiry.   
There is, however, an alternative conception of empiricism that is possible as the 
previous Chapter discussed.  Peirce, for example, highlighted a line of empirical 
enquiry that puts aside any consideration of the material nature of an entity and 
pursues an understanding of that entity via the "effects which might conceivably 
have practical bearing". (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5) To put another way, empirical 
investigation based on the behaviour or mode of being of the entity.   This is also 
reflected in Fourier's approach, and I would argue that it is also the approach taken 
by one of the icons of modern science, Isaac Newton, who eventually described 
gravity as a force acting at a distance, i.e. in term of its way of being114. This is in 
direct contrast to the mechanical approach of Descartes’ physics in which the 
universe is only understood mechanistically and based on matter in motion.  As we 
recall, this was the basis of the Cartesian (materialist) attack on Newton charging 
him with re-inserting metaphysics back into science.  I would argue that just in the 
case of Fourier, Newton's formula is a mathematical description of behaviour and 
not a causal explanation as he is not claiming anything about the entity 'Gravity' and 
is not explaining how the characteristics of the entity itself 'causes' the behaviour.  
In other words, there is an overlap, at least in part, between this approach and the 
stages of Heidegger's method involving ontic observation. 
While the view put by Giorgi reflects the normative conception, perhaps even by 
most working scientists, there is a substantial body of scholarship that holds a 
contrary view. Briefly put, this view argues that what science is dealing with is 
typically an understanding that arises out of experience within a network or context 
of supporting concepts. To follow this line of inquiry any further takes us into the 
debate over what are the real objects of scientific inquiry, the nature of those 
                                            
114 Newton describes Gravity in terms of its effects and his description states that the gravitational attraction 
between any two objects in the universe is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them. This description can be written mathematically as:  
Force of gravity = [(mass of object 1)*(mass object 2)] divided by (distance between objects)2 
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inquiries and the nature of the 'knowledge' gained.   This is outside the scope of this 
thesis.   
Within the history and philosophy of science, there is a view that there has been an 
underlying tension within science dating back to at least the time of Plato and 
Aristotle over this very issue.  This tension is best summed up by the question: Is 
the knowledge that Newton and Fourier provide based on an understanding of the 
entity itself or is it based on our experience of 'practical effect' we assume is 
associated with the entity?  From a Heideggerian perspective provided the 
experiences are properly attributed to what is observed about the entity the answer 
is both! His approach breaks the two thousand-year-old division.  
I think the idea is clear enough.  Pursuing the topic any further is outside the scope 
of this thesis, but it does suggest a potentially productive line of inquiry post thesis.  
A history of this tension in science, without the Heideggerian resolution, is presented 
in the lecture series by Prof Goldman from Lehigh University Science Wars: What 
Scientist Know and How They Know It115 (Goldman, 2006a, 2006b) in which he 
traces the history of this issue from the fundamental difference in approach between 
Plato and Aristotle through to today. 
Material Empiricism versus Experiential Empiricism 
To help distinguish the two lines of empiricism, I refer to that line of empiricism that 
insists on there being a physical object as the focus of inquiry as material empiricism 
and to the alternative approach that focuses on ‘practical bearings’ as experiential 
empiricism (this is, in a sense a tautology, but necessary to emphasise the 
difference).  This approach also highlights that in the natural sciences there is a 
distinction between a descriptive and an explanatory methodology.  If this is 
accepted, then the gap between some social science descriptive methods and 
natural science descriptive methodologies may not be as significant as is sometimes 
assumed. Again, this points to a possible line of research that develops a 
reconciliation between these two branches of science from a Heideggerian 
perspective. 
                                            
115 The course is offered by the Teaching Company and is available at 
http://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/science-wars-what-scientists-know-and-how-they-know-it.html.  I 




If one is a material empiricist as Giorgi is describing then the object of scientific 
inquiry is always a material or physical object, and the investigation is then typically 
constrained by any unarticulated presuppositions associated with what that entity is 
assumed to be. This line of inquiry typically seeks causal explanations between the 
assume physical character of the entity and the phenomenon under investigation.  
The consequence is that if we want to understand the observed phenomenon, it 
must be as some form of mechanistic causal relationship. To achieve this, it is then 
necessary to discover the physical aspects of the entity responsible, investigate its 
physical characteristics and then establish the link between the object and the 
observed phenomenon on the basis of the object’s physical characteristics. This is 
Descartes’ clockwork, mechanistic view of the universe.   
Under this model, if a physical entity is ruled out, then all that is left is some 
metaphysical object, and this cannot be the object of science, and any such inquiry 
is thus not science!   Leading on from this given that consciousness cannot be found 
on the dissection table or made visible in a scanner it thus cannot be the object of 
'real science' a view that has long prevailed and is only now showing signs of 
changing.  It is also this view that underlies the understanding of depression as a 
disease, i.e. finding a specific material cause(Blazer, 2005). This approach typifies 
the current search for ‘consciousness’ and is getting nowhere. 
Husserl then was trapped.  He thought of himself as an experiential empiricist (one 
of his reductions was to suspend belief in the actual physical existence of objects) 
but at the same time appears to have fallen into the trap of assuming the 'self-
evident' nature of consciousness and ultimately of some ego.  He is positing an 
entity with presumed characteristics which then influence his investigation. i.e. he 
has not rid himself of material empiricist tendencies. Husserl was looking for 
phlogiston! This is the basis of the early comment by Heidegger that Husserl ended 
up mangling phenomenology. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the case for understanding Heidegger as a strict 
empiricist.  He criticised the British empiricist on the basis that they breached a basic 
axiom of empiricism by assuming facts not supported by experience. 
Empiricisms is typically associated with focusing on physical objects so as to 
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establish what I would typify as ‘mechanical’ based, law like causal relationships.  I 
call this ‘material empiricism’. An alternative empirical approach is to focus on the 
‘practical bearings’ of the entities under investigation, essentially to gain a 
descriptive understanding of the entity based on the categorial ways of being of the 
entity.  I call this ‘experiential empiricism’.   Experiential empiricism thus has the two 
benefits of providing a means of investigating an entity by way of its ‘way of being’ 
or ‘practical bearings’ and of focusing on the aspects that emerge out of the 
relationships between entities (even in terms of the relationship between two ways 
of being!). It is on this basis that I refine my interpretation of Heidegger as a strict 
experiential empiricist.  This stance does not preclude the work on the material 
aspects of an entity.  Heidegger, for example, uses his approach to develop an 
understanding of the being of an entity (what I have previous called question 1), and 
also provides and account (Chapter 3 of BT) of how specific pieces of equipment 
are brought into being at the ontic level, which clearly involved the material, or 
present-at-hand (what I previously termed question 2). 
In the next chapter, I claim that Heidegger’s work should be understood and was 
intended by Heidegger to be so understood, as part of the endeavours of normal 
science in the form of a productive relationship, but one that comes prior.   
 
295 
CHAPTER 11: HEIDEGGER'S WORK – THE LINK TO SCIENCE.  
Introduction 
Heidegger’s view was that sciences always hold some understanding of what as an 
entity is before they commence their inquiries.  In that the Tradition has gone astray 
and understands entities only as ‘material’ he argues that contemporary science is 
fundamentally flawed. It simply accepts this default position without question. The 
exemplar case for this in the thesis is the story of heat for ‘what’ entities and Dasein 
for ‘who’ entities.  Heidegger claims that the ontological approach he is proposing is 
not just an interesting intellectual exercise but a necessary precursor to the work of 
science.  In this chapter, I make and support the claim that Heidegger intended to 
have his research work concerning the ontological structure of Dasein to be applied 
by the natural and biological sciences. It is understanding this claim that links the 
work in this thesis to the practices associated with the design and running of nursing 
homes. 
My position is that if this claim has merit, then Heidegger gives us a descriptive 
account of the functioning of the living human entity in terms of its existence and 
should be taken as seriously as work such as Fourier’s account of heat or Newton’s 
account of gravitation and motion.  As such if the conditions that lead to the 
phenomena of shedding life can be drawn from Heidegger’s account then this 
should be viewed as having a ‘scientific’ basis.  It should, as such, be treated and 
subject to the same objective scrutiny as any other similar claim associated with the 
application of other forms of scientific ontologies. Put more starkly, if my claim and 
work are sound, then the current structure and running of nursing homes is flawed, 
and this can be demonstrated through scientific analysis based on a sound 
understanding of the entity involved, the human Dasein.  
There are three parts to this claim, firstly Heidegger's work is ontological, secondly, 
his methodology is consistent with the empiricism in ascertaining what an entity ‘is’ 
and thirdly Heidegger makes it clear he sees his work as having such applications. 
That Heidegger’s research is ontological is indubitable. The aim of his project is 
stated on the first page of Being and Time 
Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to 
do so concretely. [BT 19/1] 
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While his project is fundamental ontology as part of this overall project he declares 
and carries out an ontological inquiry into Dasein; 
So far as existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this 
entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. [BT 33/13] 
That Heidegger’s work is consistent with the empiricism has been addressed at 
length in the previous chapter, in which I support my claim that Heidegger can be 
understood as a strict experiential empiricist and that his focus on Dasein’s ‘way of 
being’, i.e. what he calls existence, is consistent with approaches in the natural 
sciences. 
I now turn to the third part of my claim, that Heidegger understood his work as having 
application to science.  
Crisis as the Genesis of Scientific Progress  
Heidegger's view of science is that each discipline sets out its basic understandings 
concerning the science work to be undertaken by the discipline.  In so doing it 
determines how the subject matter of that field is to be understood, the nature of the 
inquiries, how results are to be interpreted, i.e. what constitutes success, and so on. 
Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of 
the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked 
out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of 
being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined. The 'basic concepts' which thus 
arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first time.[BT 29/9] 
The science project of the field continues until progress is no longer being made, 
and it becomes evident that how the discipline has conceptually understood the 
object of it inquires and the object of inquiry itself do not match.  This results in a 
crisis,  
In such ...  crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those 
things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. [BT 
29/9] 
Progress in a science discipline is only possible if it recognises that it has reached 
a crisis and then has the capacity to radically revise its basic concepts concerning 
the being of the object of inquiry.  Heidegger considers the work of radically revising 
the conceptual understanding of the object of inquiry as the real progress or 
movement in the science.  
The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more 
or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. [BT 29/9] 
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I take this idea of 'radical revision' to be what Kuhn refers to as a scientific revolution 
almost forty years later.116   In other words, real progress depends on the extent to 
which a scientific discipline is capable of experiencing a crisis in its basic concepts; 
The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its 
basic concepts. [BT 29/9] 
If we accept this as a model of scientific progress, we are also accepting that, 
Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area 
of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive 
investigation is guided by this understanding. [BT 30/10] 
These basic concepts are the basis by which the science proposes that the subject-
matter of the inquiry should be understood, i.e. it is an ontological decision even if 
not cast in these terms.  The progress in science then depends on the robustness 
of its ontological framing of the entities it is studying.  This does not have to be 
explicit, it can be an implicit framing, as in the case of Cavendish and Lavoisier.  
Heidegger’s Work is Designed to Provide Basic Concepts for 
Science 
Heidegger holds that any inquiry is iterative in character [BT] and from this, he 
establishes a formal structure for inquiry; I discuss this in the methodology chapter.   
Roughly put any inquiry posits initial basic concepts which may be based on simple 
axioms, postulates, or hypotheses sufficient to gain some initial clarification 
concerning the field of inquiry.  Inquiries commence and continue based on these 
basic concepts until results from the inquiries themselves force a revision in the 
concepts.  This construct can be applied to almost any inquiry. For example, if 
looking for a pair of glasses in the lounge room (basic concept) and searching does 
not disclose the glasses, one can look harder (not change the basic concept) or look 
elsewhere (change). In scientific inquiry, cycles involving changes in basic concepts 
can take place over hundreds of years as the case of the inquiry into heat and gravity 
                                            
116 On my reading of Thomas Kuhn's theory of normal science and scientific revolutions (Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012) the model outlined by Heidegger are structurally identical.  How they fill in the detail 
varies in detail, but not materially. Additionally in his account Kuhn provides many detailed examples supporting 
his approach whereas Heidegger simply makes a few sparse references. Kuhn's normal science equates to 
Heidegger's on-going inquiry under a particular set of basic concepts, and his scientific revolution is Heidegger's 
crisis and radical change in basic concepts.  Interesting Kuhn continually refers to the breakdown in the ability 
of a paradigm to address the problems it is facing as a 'crisis'.  Heidegger's work was however published more 
thirty-five years before Kuhn's book. 
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demonstrate.   
Basic concepts should not be grasped out of 'thin air' nor founded on untested and 
accepted ‘truths’ but rather the field must be explored "beforehand" such that the 
basic concepts "become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded' ". [BT 30/10] For 
Heidegger this means 'grounding' the basic concepts in some, even if preliminary 
and vague, understanding of what the entity is , and this can be achieved by 
inquiring into its mode of being, its ’practical bearings’.  
This preliminary research needs to precede the normal work of science, and for 
Heidegger, this approach extends back to the ancient Greeks. He states that the 
preliminary research involves  
... an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being. Such research 
must run ahead of the positive sciences, and it can. Here the work of Plato and Aristotle is 
evidence enough. [BT 30/10] 
 
The role of philosophy in relation to science then is one of a productive partnership, 
Laying the foundations, as we have described it, is rather a productive logic-in the sense that 
it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of being, discloses it for the first time in the 
constitution of its being, and, after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these 
available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry. [BT 30/10 (my 
underlining) 
It is for this reason that  
The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and 
certainly before any biology. [BT 71/45] 
What Kuhn refers to as the scientific revolution is the change in the basic concepts 
of a scientific field, he initially called these basic concepts a paradigm and as such 
the scientific revolution is a paradigm change. He later changed the term to the 
disciplinary matrix. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012)   
It’s clear that Kuhn views what happens in these paradigm changes as philosophical 
in character and not scientific; 
It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to 
philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field. (Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88) 
It is no accident that the emergence of Newtonian physics in the seventeenth century and of 
relativity and quantum mechanics in the twentieth should have been both preceded and 
accompanied by fundamental philosophical analyses of the contemporary research tradition. 
(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88) 
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For Kuhn, as for Heidegger, once the philosophical task has been done, it needs to 
stand back in order for normal science to get on with it; 
Indeed, normal science usually holds creative philosophy at arm’s length, and probably for 
good reasons. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88) 
Heidegger thus sees his work in Being and Time as not just being relevant but 
essential to the sciences.  The structures of Dasein which he identifies and lays out 
in Being and Time must, therefore, be capable of being used in a way that is 
meaningful for the sciences.  This includes those sciences dealing with the human 
being in terms of the cultural aspects, i.e. anthropology (psyche side) and the 
biology of the body (the somatic side).   
Heidegger not only intends his work to be used by science, but he also views his 
contribution as part of the normal part of scientific progress and links this view back 
to the Greeks, another indication he is continuing the Greek project.  
Heidegger Intends Later Work to Be Similarly Applied 
Later in his career, Heidegger shifted his focus to a broader perspective involving 
society itself.  Rather than his work being aimed at a productive partnership with 
science, his focus was more in the prophetic nature of warning of the risks we face 
if society continues in the direction it is heading with regards to its relationship with 
technology.  The productive relationship is thus with society as a whole. 
He is warning not so much of the dangers of technology itself; it is not anti-
technology as some have cast him(Dai, Jian-ping, 2008). His work and warning 
relate to the blind way we are drawn into the way of being of technology, and in turn, 
are being shaped by it rather than understanding and applying technology in the 
service to our own way of being.   For example, these extracts from two of his later 
essays, 
... the nature of technology is established in the objective character of its raw materials. Even 
this, that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of 
technology's nature establishing itself, and not the other way around. [WPF 101] 
and again,  
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand 
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this 
way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve. [QCT 17] 
This phenomenon is evident, for example, when the wilderness of Tasmania is seen 
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as valuable as timber (material) for production, and on this basis clear felled and 
converted into plantation forests that are better suited to production. This is turning 
trees from things of nature into raw materials, "standing-reserve".    
When we see and understand things in the world only on the basis of standing-
reserve to be applied to our purposes, this then demands a move towards more and 
more efficient ordering of things.  It is a particular framing of the way the world 'works' 
[basic concepts] that determines how the world and as a consequence, everything 
will show up in the world in its light, what Heidegger calls Gestell, enframing. As 
Lovitt notes in his introduction to the essay The Question Concerning Technology,   
Enframing is a mode of revealing, a destining of being. Yet precisely under its dominion 
nothing whatever, including man himself, appears as it intrinsically is; the truth of its Being 
remains concealed. Everything exists and appears as though it were of man's making. [QTOE 
xxxiv] 
Heidegger is not concerned with technology as such. It is using and applying 
technology such that the way we are caught by a particular understanding of the 
world pushes out every other way of understanding.  Not just the understanding of 
other things but of our self, as Lovitt continues 
This entrapping disguises itself, in that it develops into the setting in order of everything that 
presences as standing-reserve, establishes itself in the standing-reserve, and rules as the 
standing-reserve". In this "oblivion" that blocks the self-manifesting of being, man's danger 
lies. The danger is real that every other way of revealing will be driven out and that man will 
lose his true relation to himself and to all else. [QTOE  xxxiv] 
In Heidegger's understanding, being is that which determines the structure of the 
entity itself and Heidegger identifies the being of technology as this process of 
enframing, of ordering, standardising, making ready in an efficient manner for 
processing to meet some end.  It is hard not see the way in which economic 
rationalism is influencing this as part of this basic framework that is now driving 
everything in terms of efficiency. Once we have this particular understanding of 
being, and we do not as a culture need to be explicitly aware of this, then we make 
our technology more and more efficient, driven by this underlying, typically 
unspoken understanding of it.    
In principle, there is nothing wrong with this, unless we start to see this is as the only 
way things work, that this is the only understanding of the world that is valid, the way 
the world has to be.  Then we interpret, wrongly, the way being of all other entities 
within this overarching framework and deny the being of entities to be what they 
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truly are.  For example, human Dasein is understood only in terms of productivity as 
a contributor to economic well-being or a cost and thus a drain on economic well-
being.  The well-being of humans is then made subservient to the well-being of the 
economy, an inversion that Heidegger rejects. Discussions around the cost burden 
of an aging society would form part of this understanding. 
While I will not pursue it in this thesis, there is a strong argument that the current 
conception of the 'free market' is a reflection of the era of enframing, when 
everything has a value in monetary terms and decisions are made within this 
context.   Workers used to be people, part of the company and the company part of 
the community.  Workers are now labour units that are ordered and utilised in the 
most efficient manner.  Consequently, when labour units in one country can be 
utilised more efficiently than labour units in another, there is a simple exchange, the 
cheaper unit for the dearer.  In other words, workers are no longer seen as people 
but as 'standing-reserve'.    
My claim is that part of the issue in nursing homes is that the understanding of the 
being of the person has been reduced to a physicalist interpretation.  If we add an 
overlay of enframing, we should expect to see a push for increasing efficiencies in 
the care delivery associated with the body, a re-organising to reduce costs and 
increase income.  This would mean that as part of the management of the nursing 
home we would witness practices that understand people being cared for in terms 
of income, occupied bed days and costs centres, i.e. maximising income and 
reducing costs that are not associated with income revenue.  This would also include 
the design of the building themselves with a view to 'ordering' the spaces in the most 
efficient way associated with the task of physical care, and cost reduction, i.e. 
removing any 'unnecessary' space and focusing on the efficiency aspects of 
'production'.  It will also see changes in the way labour is conceptualised, looking to 
reduce costs not directly associated with delivering the ‘care of the body’, 
substituting lower cost for higher cost labour and so on.  All these things are indeed 
happening! Not only is the being of the person misunderstood but support for that 
being even at a rudimentary understanding of being is being pushed aside by 
enframing.  Pursuing this line of investigation associated with Heidegger’s 
productive relationship with society is outside the scope of this thesis, but is an 
essential line of inquiry to pursue.  Even if the thesis is successful, it will come up 
against ‘enframing’, and this needs to be investigated, named and the 
  
302 
consequences highlighted.  This will be an interesting aspect to explore post-thesis! 
Heidegger’s analysis then is that the technological understanding of things fashions 
the living environment in a way that is toxic to the being of Dasein. In that we have 
forgotten the nature of who we are we are paying the price, this is Heidegger's point. 
He writes for us to take heed, he wants us to change our awareness, not to blindly 
discard technology, but to apply it to support the being of Dasein, as properly 
understood.  Heidegger then is a social activist, or at least he is providing the 
necessary understanding in his work for such activism.  His intent is to have his work 
applied, not just scientifically but at the social level. 
Summary 
In this section, I have argued that Heidegger intends his work to be used not just at 
the scientific but the social level. In Being and Time, he understands his work as 
being a productive partnership with normal science as providing the necessary 
foundations that are essential for normal science to carry out its work.  This model 
is one that is consistent with the approach adopted by Kuhn and is consistent with 
the way in which scientists typically carry out their work.  This intent to have his work 
applied is also evident in his later writings, just on a larger scale. 
My approach in this thesis is based on understanding Heidegger as argued in this 
chapter, as in a productive relationship with normal science and society.  My view is 
that the science on which nursing homes is based has reached a crisis.  The stated 
aim is to support the person in terms of their frailties in a way that people can 
experience an improved quality of life and in this they are failing.  The crisis is 
founded in a failure of the basic concepts associated with what it is to be human that 
inform both science and practice. While this thesis does not address the issue, the 
current mode of understanding and applying technology (broadly understood to 
included economics) is closely associated with this failure and is adding to problems.  
This is yet another project post-thesis based on Heidegger's philosophy. 
This thesis takes the stance that Heidegger’s work is ontological and provides a 
descriptive account of the person from the perspective of a strict experiential 
empiricist and not a material empiricist.  It is as such a legitimate and repeatable 
research inquiry, and it is sufficient to be the basis for normal science. 
Having brought Heidegger’s understanding of being and Dasein into view and 
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identified Heidegger as a strict experiential empiricist working on projects in a 
productive relationship with normal science the next section moves to explore the 
basic concepts Heidegger uses in his research approach.  The first and perhaps 
most important of these, the intentional structure of lived experience, is addressed 




CHAPTER 12: INTENTIONALITY: STRUCTURE OF LIVED 
EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, I have clarified the character of Dasein conceptualised as a 
‘way of being’ and identified the relationship between ‘way of being’ at the ontic or 
entity level and the structure of being at the ontological level. Further, based on this 
relationship I have outlined an approach for disclosing the structure based on the 
observation and analysis of Dasein's way of being. 
In this chapter, I investigate more closely Heidegger's approach to investigating 
Dasein and how the concept of intentionality unlocks an understanding of this 
approach. Intentionality is a concept acquired and adapted from Husserl and 
Brentano, but in Heidegger's hands, it is transformed from the characteristic of the 
'mind’117 directed at or about something, of linking 'mind' to world, to be the key to 
understanding Dasein’s existence and the structure of being-in-the-world.   Based 
on this inquiry Heidegger’s key concepts of comportment and lived experience are 
understood as complex structural relationships. One of the surprises of this chapter 
was the unexpected insight into the phenomenon of Dasein as 'dwelling' among the 
extant which will be covered later in the chapter.    
In Being and Time, the word intentionality/intentional appears only a few times, 
mainly in the notes or the index and only twice in the main body of the text, and then 
in the discussion of the views of other scholars. On this basis, one could be forgiven 
for thinking that it is not a relevant concept, perhaps something used earlier but later 
dropped. However, this is not the case as Heidegger deals with intentionality at 
length in the History of the Concept of Time [HCT], the lecture series given just 
before Being and Time is published and again in Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
[BPP], the lecture series given just after the publication of the book.  Between these 
two courses, there are well over 300 references to intentionality.  Intentionality is the 
structure that underlies every receptive-responsive interaction between Dasein and 
the world, and between Dasein and itself, it is the structure of lived experience [HCT, 
BPP].  Reading and understanding Being and Time without an insight into how 
Heidegger conceives the structure of such basic concepts as comportment and 
                                            
117 Mind and consciousness are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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solicitude on the basis of intentionality is, in my view, an almost impossible task and 
one can only wonder why Heidegger omits it from Being and Time.  
In this chapter, I commence with a basic introduction to the concept of intentionality 
as introduced by Brentano and then move to explore how Heidegger transforms 
intentionality into the structure of lived experience, i.e. of Dasein's existence. 
Intentionality 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was a Prussian born philosopher, pioneering 
psychologist and at one time a Catholic priest, whose work was influential during 
the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century, particularly in continental Europe.  
One of the developments that Brentano introduced into contemporary scholarship 
was intentionality, the name given to the basic idea that a defining characteristic of 
the mind is that it is always directed towards or to be about something, as Crotty 
explains 
 It is the idea that, as Brentano pointed out, every thought is thought of something, every 
desire is a desire of something, every judgement is an acceptance rejection of something.  
Consciousness is always an essentially related to objects.  In short, there is an indissoluble 
union between subject and object. (Crotty, 1996, p. 39) 
Contemporary discussions in continental and Anglo scholarship on intentionality 
commence with the publication of Brentano's book Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint (Brentano, 1995)  and the following two famous paragraphs (Jacob, 
2014) 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called 
the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly 
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be 
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In 
presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  
This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical 
phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying 
that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. 
(Brentano, 1995, p. 68) 
There is some debate concerning the Scholastic term inexistence as to whether it 
refers to existing within the mind or something which does not exist ('in' is a suffix 
indicating a negative). (Jacob, 2014) This debate is of little consequence here for it 
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is generally accepted that Brentano is referring to an object within consciousness.  
Brentano followed the accepted view that, that of which we are aware is presented 
to us as a 'mental phenomenon', i.e. within our conscious mind and that problems 
to be solved included how this occurs and the status of knowledge that is gained 
through such experiences.  As was indicated in the section on Heidegger’s 
empiricism Brentano supported the empiricist stance, but he is not a ‘strict’ empiricist 
in the sense that I have defined Heidegger. 
Brentano divides the intentional phenomena into three classes 
To state our view at the outset, we, too, maintain that three main classes of mental 
phenomena must be distinguished, and distinguished according to the different ways in which 
they refer to their content. ... we designate the first by the term “presentation,” the second by 
the term “judgement,” and the third by the terms “emotion,” “interest,” or “love.”  (Brentano, 
1995, p. 152) 
In this division, there are clear echoes of Hume's comments about perceptions being 
"different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other" (Hume, 2006, 
k.4213-32). However, what Brentano has done is to analyse 'perceptions' in terms 
of its two components, the type and the content, or object.  Consistent with the 
British empiricists these are experiences within consciousness, and Brentano's 
development is to identify a way of structuring these experiences to allow for more 
detailed analysis.  Brentano does not develop or exploit his concept of intentionality 
to any significant extent.  Husserl takes over the concept of intentionality, and it 
becomes a central part of his phenomenology, and in turn, Heidegger develops his 
own take on intentionality [HCT, BPP], and I will come back to this shortly.   
The basic outline of intentionality as I have provided so far is sufficient for this 
discussion, and I am not going to address the specific details of the progress of the 
development of intentionality from Brentano, to Husserl to Heidegger118. 
Using Intentionality to Study Consciousness 
In this section, I adopt the standard interpretation of intentionality as the connection 
between mind and world, i.e. there is a subject-object divide.  One of the benefits 
claimed for intentionality is that it provides a way to study 'consciousness' and a 
simple example will suffice.   
                                            
118 In the History of the Concept of Time Heidegger provides an account of the history of intentionality. 
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Should I see a dog approaching and say, "I am fearful of that dog" then I am stating 
that I am experiencing fear and that the object of my fear is the dog.  This is the 
basic structure of an intentional act.  At the same time, there is also the intentional 
act of perception, whereby the object of perception is also the dog, the intentional 
act of hearing and perhaps the intentional act concerning thoughts about avoiding 
the dog.  At any one time, as this example demonstrates, there are numerous 
intentional acts connecting mind to world which are continually changing in type and 
content.  Part of the phenomenon is that as the numerous intentional acts are 
experienced as an overall unity, and that sense of unity remains even though the 
intentional acts change. In that each event, even seeing a scary dog, involves 
numerous intentional acts occurring at the same time, the concept of intentionality 
enables us to break down this complex event into the separately identifiable 
intentional acts that each share the same object.  This makes possible the isolation 
of each type of intentional act in a way that it can be investigated, fear is an example.  
A starting point in investigating fear is to commence with the simple question, "Does 
'fear' exist?".   If the answer is yes, something Hume agreed with, then fear is 
'something that is'.  In the case of ‘fear of the dog’, fear then is something separate 
to the dog.  It can thus be understood as an independent affective state that exists 
as a possibility within our consciousness, i.e. it is subjective.  When we encounter a 
separate and independent thing in the world that is fearsome, then an intentional 
link is formed between the affective state of fear which is within us (subjective) and 
the scary dog outside of us (objective), and as a consequence, we experience fear 
of the dog.  It is in this way that intentional states enable us to experience the world.  
The intentional act of fear, like many others, is a transient state.  We are not always 
experiencing fear of something, albeit fear is always a possibility.  Some intentional 
acts are continuous with a changing field of objects, for example, perception. 
Nonetheless, we experience seeing something only because of our intentional 
capacity to perceive and there being objects in the world to perceive.  It is in this 
way that intentional acts are, as Crotty put it “an indissoluble union between subject 
and object.” (Crotty, 1996, p. 39) 
In that the various 'mental states' constitute our consciousness, intentionality gives 
us the possibility to investigate the nature of consciousness itself.  Taking the 
example of fear, people will report a variety of things they fear, e.g. heights, spiders, 
flying, a young son's future, and so on.  For the concept of fear to be intelligible fear 
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must not only be something that exists but exists in a way that it is consistent and 
recognisable as fear by these different people.  Intentionality enables each act to be 
identified and understood as a structure; however, it does not provide the basis of 
an accurate description, and there is always room for ambiguity over what one 
person experiences compared to another.  This is one of the aspects that Husserl 
developed as part of his phenomenology, an approach that allows for more detailed 
investigation and description of intentional acts such that people who read a 
descriptive account can say "yes, that is what I mean when I say fear".  Just how 
this is undertaken is not of importance here, the main thing is to understand 
internationality as the linking mechanism between subject and object, and as a 
useful concept to identify and isolate individual mental states which can then be 
investigated. 
I want to push the concept a little further to show how differences in the structure 
can be identified. From the above example, I could make the statement, "That dog 
is fearsome".  This would be a judgment about the dog, a different type of intentional 
act.  Someone else may make the judgement concerning the same dog, "That dog 
is friendly".  Just as the intentional act of fearing the dog must have sufficient 
constancy to be intelligible as fear, so too judgment must have a constancy for it to 
be intelligible a judgement.  The key difference is that within the constancy of 
judgement, there must be the capacity of having contrary content for the same 
object, i.e. the dog as fearsome and the dog as friendly.  This difference is one 
based on the attitudinal stance of the individuals, and both views may be correct.   
This points to a possible difference in the structure of cognitive acts such as 
judgement compared to affective acts such as the emotion of fear.   
There is a different aspect concerning the content of a judgement. If I claim the dog 
is a German Shepherd and the other person claims it is a Belgian Malinois, then 
both claims cannot be right.  So, in this case, we have the structure of a judgement, 
variable content but both views cannot be correct.  This point to a further division in 
the structure of judgement, that between judgements concerning facts relating to 
something objective, i.e. in the world, and judgements concerning assessments or 
opinions arising from the perspective of the individual. i.e. subjective.  
Whereas there is no way of determining the validity of one opinion judgement over 
another, fact judgements are truth claims that have the possibility of being validated 
by reference to objective sources, i.e. independent of subjective opinion.  In the case 
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of the dog species, perhaps by checking a recognised reference that describes both 
German Shepherd and Belgian Malinois.  This aspect of intentionality leads into the 
field of epistemology which investigates what it means to be a true claim.  Part of 
Husserl’s project was to use intentionality and phenomenology as a way of 
achieving certainty over the objects of inquiry of science, i.e., so science does not 
confuse a ‘German Shepherd’ with a ‘Belgian Malinois’, as such his project was 
more to do with epistemology than ontology.  
I am not going to extend the discussion on intentionality further. The aim has been 
to introduce a basic account of intentionality and to demonstrate that while it may 
appear a relatively simple concept, it increases in complexity the more it is explored.  
Additionally, since intentionality is understood in structural terms it also sheds a 
slightly different light on the concept of structures.  
Mental States and Clarifying the Nature of Ontological Subjectivity 
The discussion on intentionality leads to the issue of the nature of 'intentional or 
mental states' and objections that they cannot be studied as an object of science 
because they are subjective, not objective.  This objection is based on the view that 
science is only interested in objective inquiry, and because intentional states are 
subjective, they are ruled out as legitimate objects of scientific inquiry.  I want to 
address this issue by reference to work of the American philosopher John Searle 
and then by the material versus experiential empiricist perspective. 
While not directly referring to intentionality119 in this instance, Searle addresses the 
difference between subjective and objective existence as opposed to subjective and 
objective claims to knowledge in a paper published in the journal of the Royal 
Society under the title How to Study Consciousness Scientifically (Searle, 1998).  In 
the paper, Searle identifies nine theses used by the material empiricists as to either 
why consciousness can't be studied or must first be reinterpreted as something else, 
e.g. information processing.  I am only going to address one of Searle's points where 
he attacks the argument that the subjectivity of consciousness means it cannot be 
investigated by science (what he terms Thesis 2).  Searle’s main claim is that it is 
possible for something to exist other than in a material form.  This has a resonance 
with the earlier discussions in the thesis on different ways of being, and as I have 
                                            
119 Searle's work in this area is, heavily influenced by his work on intentionality and he credits Brentano with its 
development. (Searle, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1990, 2007) 
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discussed, consistent with Heidegger’s stance. 
Searle uses two statements as examples for his argument; the first being 
“Rembrandt was born in 1606.”  Searle notes that the truth or falsity of this statement 
is not dependent on the attitudinal preference of the person making the statement.  
The truth or falsity is a matter of "objectively ascertainable fact", and as such, the 
statement is epistemically objective. The second statement, "Rembrandt was a 
better painter than Rubens" is of quite a different character.  It is epistemically 
subjective because there is no independent, objective test that can speak to the 
truth or falsity of the claim. Why? Because the statement is a matter of individual, 
i.e. subjective opinion.  This example is relatively straightforward and reflects a very 
strong axiom in science that science is about objective, independently verifiable 
claims and not subjective or opinion based claims.  There is no disagreement on 
this point.  
What Searle suggests is that there is a confusion between the epistemic 
understanding of the subject-object differentiation of a claim and the ontological 
subject-object distinction regarding the existence of things.  It is the ontological 
aspect that needs clarifying.  Searle points out that some entities have a subjective 
mode of existence in that they exist only within the person (subject) experiencing 
them.  Searle gives the following example, 
... my present feeling of pain in my lower back is ontologically subjective in the sense that it 
only exists as experienced by me. (Searle, 1998, p. 1937) 
In this sense, all conscious states are then ontological subjective because "they 
have to be experienced by a human or animal in order to exist." (p. 1937) Entities 
that exist as subjective conscious states are thus different from entities that exist in 
a mode independent of human experience, for example, "mountains, waterfalls or 
hydrogen atoms" (p. 1937) which have an objective ontological mode of existence.  
Science is about epistemically objective knowledge, but we can have epistemically 
objective knowledge about entities that are ontologically subjective. To continue with 
Searle's earlier example, 
… in the epistemic sense, it is an objective matter of fact - not a matter of anybody's opinion 
- that I have pains in my lower back.  But the existence of the pains themselves is ontologically 
subjective. (p. 1937) 
While using slightly different language, Searle is arguing that there are intentional 
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objects (entities) within consciousness and that they can be studied objectively.   
According to Searle then, there are different ways in which something can exist, and 
he rejects the reduction of such entities to simply a physical phenomenon.  In his 
book The Mystery of Consciousness (Searle, 1997), he argues against the 
reductionists and materialists, 
They end up by denying the obvious fact that we all have inner, qualitative, subjective states 
such as our pains and joys, memories and perceptions, thoughts and feelings, moods, 
regrets, and hungers.  
I believe the urge to reductionism and materialism derives from the underlying mistake of 
supposing that if we accept consciousness as having its own real existence, we will somehow 
be accepting dualism and rejecting the scientific worldview. ...  consciousness is a natural, 
biological phenomenon. It is as much a part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or 
photosynthesis.  
We are blinded to the natural, biological character of consciousness and other mental 
phenomena by our philosophical tradition, which makes "mental" and "physical" into two 
mutually exclusive categories.  (Searle, 1997, p. xiii-xiv)  
In the above quote, it is evident that Searle holds similar views to that of the 
empiricists and Husserl120, i.e. that consciousness exists in its own right, and it is 
what should be the focus of study in understanding our human mode of interaction 
with the world.   
What is important in the above discussion to date is the notion of intentionality as a 
structure of experience, that the structure has two aspects (the act and its content), 
that there are experiential states that have an ontological existence and that the 
mode of existence of these entities is different to 'material' entities, i.e. there is more 
than one way to be other than as a material object.  That Searle, a contemporary 
and influential, analytic philosopher is comfortable with this approach is important 
as he opens the door to the acceptance of the principle of multiple ways of being an 
entity.   
Recalling the discussion on Dasein, if the various intentional acts are understood 
using Heidegger’s language of ‘ways of being’ then there is a remarkable similarity 
in the understanding of intentionality, and I include Searle’s account in this, and 
Heidegger’s concepts.  The most obvious points of difference are that this approach 
to intentionality is based on the subject-object divide or Cartesian stance and further 
                                            
120 Searle does not, however, support Husserl’s phenomenological approach or his concept of ideal forms. 
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it is based on the concept of mind or consciousness, both are positions rejected by 
Heidegger in his considerations of Dasein.  These points will have to be addressed 
if Heidegger’s structure of Dasein is to be understood as intentional.   
Dasein Understood as an Intentional Structure, Being-in-the-
World.  
The above account of intentionality reflects that basic idea as generally accepted 
and I have attempted to presented it as convincingly as possible.  There are two 
aspects of the above discussion that carry over into my account of Heidegger's work. 
The first relates to the idea that there are various modes of existence possible 
without resorting to materialist accounts.  This accords with Heidegger's view and is 
clear in this quote concerning the existence of Dasein,  
... Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of 
entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their being is 'a matter 
of indifference' ; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their being can be neither a matter of 
indifference to them, nor the opposite. [BT 67-8/42] (my underlining) 
This idea is not only relevant to understanding Dasein as an entity but will also come 
into play in understanding such things as equipment and world.  I discuss these 
entities later in the thesis.  
The second point is that Heidegger accepts the broad notion of intentionality as a 
directedness as identified by Brentano, but not as one object directed to another.  It 
is how Heidegger responds to this last point that results in a radical transformation 
of intentionality by Heidegger.  His attack and response is summed up in a comment 
ridiculing the idea of intentional acts somehow reaching out into the world;  
... furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty 
to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, 
retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as 
Dasein.[BT 89/62] 
His last point should not be simply passed over. He is claiming that as Dasein we 
do not exist inside our head with access to the outside world.  He is making the 
strong claim that Dasein is already outside as Dasein.  If conceptualising Dasein in 
non-material terms was a challenge, how is this claim to be understood?  
Understanding the basis of this critique and what Heidegger means by the "Dasein 
which knows remains outside" is the aim of this following section.  
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Heidegger shifts the understanding of intentionality from a connecting structure 
linking us to the outside world to intentionality as the structure of Dasein itself, as 
the structure of Dasein’s existence, as the structure he names being-in-the-world.  
Grasping how Heidegger conceives of this radical change overcomes a major hurdle 
is understanding Being and Time. 
It is not easy to follow Heidegger's account on intentionality from reading Being and 
Time.  The terms lived experience, intentionality and comportment which are so 
visible in the lecture series both before (History of the Concept of Time) and after 
(Basic Problem of Phenomenology) the publication of the book are virtually absent 
from Being and Time.  However, the concepts of comportment and intentionality 
infuse the book so deeply without being specifically named that Heidegger, in my 
view, gives himself an almost impossible task of making Being and Time intelligible. 
A point I have made several times on other topics.  A significant part of my 
interpretation of what Heidegger is 'doing' in Being and Time is drawn from these 
other works.   
Ruling Out Ways of Understanding Intentionality 
As was seen in earlier discussions, e.g. concerning Dasein, Heidegger will rule out 
ways of thinking about a topic he rejects, typically because they are unfounded.  
This is in keeping with his strict empiricist's stance and method.  In his discussion 
on intentionality he makes these clear declarations of how not to think of 
intentionality;  
... one thing is already clear: before anything else, its structural coherence must be envisaged 
freely, without the background presence of any realistic or idealistic theories of 
consciousness.  [HCT 36] 
All theories about the psychic, consciousness, person, and the like must be held in abeyance. 
[HCT 36] 
The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is 
not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic 
ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are. [BPP 64] 
…  intentionality must not be misinterpreted on the basis of an arbitrary concept of the subject 
and ego and subjective sphere and thus taken for an absurd problem of transcendence. [BPP 
64] 
The comment in the last quote, "absurd problem of transcendence", refers to the 
problem of how the world can be accessed from consciousness.  The notion of 
‘transcendence’ is evident in Kant's transcendental idealism (Stang, 2016), and 
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following Husserl's transcendental turn (Husserl, 1989) he introduces the 
transcendental reduction or epoché to focus only on consciousness. Heidegger 
rejects any notion of transcendence understood in this way.  He argues that the very 
nature of Dasein is transcendent because of its intentional existence, i.e. already 
'dwelling among the extant121, i.e. there is no 'gap' to cross as Dasein’s way of being 
is already as being-in-the-world. 
An Account of the Intentional Structure of Dasein's Existence. 
The steps involved in understanding how Dasein itself relates to intentionality, 
comportment, lived experience and existence are crucial to understanding 
Heidegger's work.  The line of argument is complex, and so I will lay out these steps 
free of any textual support to make it easier to follow and then present the textual 
support for each step.  This difficulty is not only my perception; it is one Heidegger 
recognised as well, 
It should first be noted that this attempt to make intentionality clear, to see it and in so doing 
to apprehend what it is, cannot hope to succeed in a single move. We must free ourselves 
from the prejudice that, because phenomenology calls upon us to apprehend the matters 
themselves, these matters must be apprehended all at once, without any preparation. Rather, 
the movement toward the matters themselves is a long and involved process which, before 
anything else, has to remove the prejudices which obscure them. [HCT 29] 
Heidegger advises, however, that it requires no special talent, just avoid any 
speculative considerations and stick to the phenomenon,  
The following considerations call for no special talent. They do demand that we set aside our 
prejudices, learn to see directly and simply and to abide by what we see without asking, out 
of curiosity, what we can do with it. [HCT 29] 
This comment is an unveiled criticism of the Husserlian approach and its technically 
difficult reductions. Taking into account Heidegger's advice what follows is a 
preliminary overview of his account of the intentional structure nature of Dasein's 
existence. 
Dasein's way of being is existence. This is who we are and is the very basis of our 
self-understanding. Our existence is characterised by our various lived experiences, 
                                            
121 Heidegger states his interpretation of transcendence, in opposition to Kant's, very clearly in Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology, 
 
" ... the intentional constitution of the Dasein's comportments is precisely the ontological condition of the 
possibility of every and any transcendence. Transcendence, transcending, belongs to the essential nature of 
the being that exists (on the basis of transcendence) as intentional, that is, exists in the manner of dwelling 
among the extant." [BPP 65] 
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the expression of our various ways of being.  The technical name that Heidegger 
gives to lived experiences is comportment and our comportments and hence lived 
experiences are structured by intentionality.  
Comportments comprise all the numerous ways in which we can interact with any 
entity, i.e. other Daseins, entities that are not like Dasein and even ourselves as an 
entity. Comportments are a directing-towards and include all the things previously 
named intentionality in the earlier discussions, but also include such comportments 
as making things, dealing with things, talking about things and so on.  
Lived experiences, as comportments are always expressed, i.e. when I look at 
something when I think of something when I desire something when I am making 
something and so on. Lived experiences arise in the 'doing', i.e. from the doing of a 
comportment.  
All comportments have an intentional structure which is comprised of a movement, 
the comporting-towards (called the intentio122) and that towards which the 
comporting-towards is directed (called the intentum123).  The structure of 
intentionality can be readily seen in this account. The next step is logical, but the 
realisation of the logical consequence is somewhat of a surprise.   
The two moments of the comportment (intentio and intentum) are a unity, and the 
lived experience is constituted by the expression of this unity.  The lived experience 
of perceiving a coffee only arises when the perception (a type of comportment) is 
actually expressed, i.e. it is a unity of both perceiving and the coffee cup.  To put 
this another way perceiving does not exist as an actuality separately to the 
comportment, it only exists as a possibility.  We must then have the possibility of 
perceiving before we have the actuality of a perception.  (This is why bionic eyes 
are possible). 
Our existence is manifested in lived experiences (comportments) which are 
constituted only when they are expressed, i.e. there is a unity of the intentio (the 
type of comportment) and the intentum (other entities, objects in the world, etc.).  
Our actual existence is dependent on comportments which in turn are dependent of 
                                            
122 Intentio refers to the type of comportment, in Latin it means intention, but this should not be understood in 
sense of common English usage.  
123 Intentum is the object of the type of comportment, in Latin it literally means aiming. 
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the possibility of the various types of comportment (intentio) and of the possibility of 
accessing entities necessary for those types comportments (intentum).  If in part, 
my existence is constituted by my lived experiences collecting and tending (types of 
comportments) pink lustre china (the object of the comportment), then my lived 
experiences and hence existence is diminished if I am denied access to pink lustre 
china. This is the situation Marion Miller confronted on moving to a nursing home. 
Our existence is the unity of the flow of all the lived experiences and is thus the 
present ongoing actualization of the structure of comportment taken up from the 
oncoming flow of possible comportments.  The flow of possibilities thus maintains 
our existence.  The quality and character of our lived experiences and hence 
existence rises and falls with the nature of those possible comportments, i.e. the 
future.   
Limitations of Account 
There are several limitations of the above account.  The first is that it does not 
address the nature of the entities to which we comport.  It is this step that will allow 
us to understand what is meant by world and the nature of being-in.  I have tried to 
avoid any reference to world in the above account and address it in the coming 
chapters. 
The second limitation is each Dasein is different, having a unique combination of 
likes, dislikes, desires, motivations, understandings and so on.  It is these 
differences that determines what shows up as a possible comportment that is 
meaningful and relevant to the unique existence of the Dasein concerned. For 
example, I have no fondness for pink lustre china, whereas this was important for 
Marion Miller. This aspect will be addressed later. 
Textual Support for Interpretation 
Having laid out Heidegger's line of argument, I will now discuss the various steps in 
more detail linking it back to Heidegger's work.  I will use the concept of comportment 
as the main entry point to this discussion. 
Comportment and Being and Time 
Comportment is an important technical term in Heidegger’s work in this section I will 
describe what he means by the term, but first I want to address its lack of obvious 
presence in Being and Time.  
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In many English translations, comportment is the typical translation of the German 
word Verhalten and comport or comporting the translation for the verb verhaltent124. 
In German, all nouns are designated with a capital letter, and it is not uncommon for 
the verb form to have the same spelling.  In Being and Time, the translators note 
the following in relation to the verb form of the word verhalten,  
... can refer to any kind of behaviour or way of conducting oneself, even to the way in which 
one relates oneself to something else, or to the way one refrains or holds oneself back. [BT 
23, note 1] 
The note goes on to say, “We shall translate it in various ways.” In relation to the 
noun, Verhalten, the translation note indicates that Verhalten can mean ‘behaviour’, 
‘conduct’ or ‘relates to’ [BT 162, note 1] 
These variations in translation help to mask the technical nature of the term.   
Despite the translation notes the translators do occasionally use comport for the 
verb verhalten or a variation of the verb, verhält for example; 
Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport 
(verhalten) ourselves in any way, is being; [BT 26/7] (my gloss for the German) 
In this case, the two variations of the verb verhalten and verhält are translated as 
comport; 
That kind of being towards which Dasein can comport (verhalten) itself in one way or another, 
and always does comport (verhält) itself somehow, we call "existence”. (my gloss for the 
German) 
While the variation in interpretations does not help, by and large, the sense one gets 
is that a comportment is simply a description of a behaviour towards something, 
which is what the translators’ note identifies.  In searching through Being and Time, 
where comport is used in a general way, there is no linking it to the concept of an 
existentialia, a structure.  Yet in Basic Problems of Phenomenology a search quickly 
reveals the following; 
As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. 
[BPP 61] 
Moreover, in the History of the Concept of Time 
By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently 
takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a 
                                            
124 For examples of comportment as the English translation refer BPP, FCM, HCT, LQT, BCAP, ZS, POA 
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comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. [HCT 37] 
Not only does comportment refer to a structure, but it is somehow tied into 
intentionality.  The problem in Being and Time is not one that arises because of the 
translation, the clarity of articulating the structural aspect and its relationship to 
intentionality is just not there in Being and Time.  Given the two courses, I have 
referred to were not published until well after Being and Time and Heidegger had 
no other publications for the ten years before Being and Time it is puzzling why he 
chose not to make these connections clearer.   I now return to the main discussion.  
Comportment and Intentionality 
Heidegger provides examples of comportments which provide both an indication of 
the nature of comportment and a link to intentionality; 
The comportments of life are also called acts: perception, judgment, love, hate. [HCT 36] 
Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself toward something. 
Representing is a representing of something, recalling is a recalling of something, judging is 
judging about something, presuming, expecting, hoping, loving, hating-of something. [HCT 
29] 
By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently 
takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a 
comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. [HCT 37] 
As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. 
[BPP 61] 
In the above quotes Heidegger ties the concept of comportment and lived 
experience together, and while this is correct, there is a subtle difference which I will 
address below.  The other point to note is that the examples of comportments are 
the same as those given earlier for intentionality, e.g. “perception, judgement, love, 
hate” [HCT 36], similarly the structure “recalling is recalling of something, judging is 
judging about something” [HCT 29].  We know Heidegger does not accept the 
traditional interpretation of the structure of intentionality and so he must have 
something else in mind.  A clue to this is in the final quote, where intentionality is 
described as both the structure of comportments and of the “self-comporting 
subject” [BPP 61], i.e. Dasein.  In some way, Dasein, lived-experience, 
comportments and the structure of intentionality are bound together. This is what 
must be unpacked. 
So far, the concept of comportment may be understood simply as a replacement for 
intentionality, i.e. somehow related to mind.  Heidegger certainly includes this 
 
319 
understanding appears to use the term “psychic comportment” [HCT 29] to capture 
this aspect. However, Heidegger radically revises the concept, and in Being and 
Time, Heidegger introduces different types of comportments, one of which is 
"concern", a specific classification of comportment which relates to Dasein's 
comportment to entities other than Daseins.  Of these comportments, Heidegger 
tells us that  
 ... multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, 
producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, 
giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, 
considering, discussing, determining .... [BT 83/56] 
However, there is also a deficient mode, 
Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest - these too are ways of concern; but 
these are all deficient modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a 'bare 
minimum'. [BT 83/57] 
’Concern’ then is the name of a structural component, and existentiale, and relates 
to the ontological level and does not refer to a characteristic of an individual Dasein.  
As a structure, it indicates the possible range of relationship an individual Dasein 
may have and the examples indicate that it is meant to cover the whole gambit of 
such relationship both those we may think of in positive terms, but also negative and 
deficient.  We must keep in mind at all times that Heidegger is providing a descriptive 
account of what he has observed, it is not a causal account.  The question to ask is 
simply this; ‘Does Heidegger’s descriptive account capture the diversity of the ways 
in which Dasein can comport itself towards entities other than another Dasein?’ If 
the answer is yes, then his descriptive account is confirmed, and the name he 
assigns this aspect of Dasein is ‘concern.’ 
Heidegger's use of the word ‘concern’ has no relationship to common usage, i.e. "I 
am concerned about such and such", and he makes this quite clear in a detailed 
explanation having introduced the term [BT 83/57].125 
The term 'concern' has, in the first instance, its colloquial [signification, and can mean to carry 
out something, to get it done [erledigen], to 'straighten it out'. It can also mean to 'provide 
oneself with something'. We use the expression with still another characteristic tum of phrase 
when we say "I am concerned for the success of the undertaking."' Here 'concern' means 
                                            
125 What is lost in the English is the connection between concern and the being of Dasein, care.  The German 
for concern is Besorgen and for care is Sorge, i.e. there is an etymological connection as well as a structural 
connection.  This is also true for the other major grouping of comportments, solicitude, which is translated from 
the German word Fürsorge.  
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something like apprehensiveness. In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the 
expression 'concern' will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an 
existentiale, and will designate the being of a possible way of being-in-the-world. [BT 83/57] 
This is a reminder that in every case the meaning of Heidegger's technical terms 
should never be assumed. 
In Being and Time the mode of comportment that Dasein has towards other Daseins 
Heidegger names "solicitude" [BT 157/121].  
those entities towards which Dasein as being-with comports itself … are themselves Dasein. 
These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude. [BT 157/121] 
Heidegger does not give the same comprehensive list of examples for solicitude as 
he provides for concern but does provide some examples of both the positive and 
deficient modes of solicitude; 
Even 'concern' with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, are forms of 
solicitude. [BT 158/121] 
Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one 
another-these are possible ways of solicitude. [BT 158/121] 
Recalling the sense of structure from the example of language, and taking the lead 
from his account of concern then Heidegger is just providing another descriptive 
account of our structure, our way of being Dasein. In that he observes that we 
engage with people, when dealing with them as people, in a qualitatively different 
way than we deal with other entities, he has created another sub-category of 
comportments and named in solicitude.  His rationale for the name is interesting but 
secondary to the identification of the distinct category of comportment. 
In Being and Time, apart from these specific categories of comportment, the broad, 
general nature of comportment is indicated in various places by the fact that Dasein 
can also comport itself towards itself [BT 35/15], its being [BT 68/42], world126 [BT 
118/86], its possibilities [BT 237/193] and towards death [BT 298/254]. 
Comportments no longer have the narrow usage of intentionality as first conceived 
by Brentano, i.e. the structure of mind as psychical acts, it has been expanded to 
cover every conceivable relationship or ‘directedness’ that Dasein may have in the 
conduct of its life.   
                                            




In summary, comportment covers all the various ways in which we relate to virtually 
anything.  The two main categories of comportments that Heidegger identifies in 
Being and Time are concern and solicitude.  The structure of any comportment is 
referred to as intentionality, which has a direct link back to its historical roots; 
Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being directed-toward. 
Annexing a term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls this structure intentionality. [BPP 
58] 
However, if we consider the earlier cited passage, we also have intentionality as the 
structure of Dasein; 
As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. 
[BPP 61] 
Based on this we have the idea developing that our existence is the unity of all the 
comportments with which we are engaged. As a descriptive account, this has a 
certain solid ring to it.  If we take the reverse, i.e. remove every possible way in 
which we comport to anything at all, then can we be said to exist? I think not127.  If 
this is the case, then intentionality is indeed both the structure of comportment and 
as such the structure of Dasein.  Just how this is the case needs clarification. 
Heidegger's Intentional Structure. 
That Heidegger regards intentionality as the structure of comportment is beyond 
doubt; 
... because intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself, ... [HCT 31] 
To begin with, intentionality as a structure of the Dasein's comportments. [BPP 59] 
The fundamental question is how Heidegger understands intentionality.  Heidegger 
makes no other claim other than intentionality is a structure of comportment and 
leaves aside that it is a ‘linking’ structure;  
In maintaining that intentionality is the structure found in comportments, we have in any case 
avoided the danger of lapsing into construction and into a theory which goes beyond what is 
before us. [HCT 37] 
By not inserting unfounded presuppositions of the structure linking subject to object 
it leaves open other interpretive possibilities.  This is in keeping with my claim that 
                                            
127 This is an alternative approach to the Hume passage quoted earlier in which he observes that we always 
have perceptions, and if we are absent any perceptions then we can be said to not exist. “When my perceptions 
are remov’d for any time, as by sound-sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to 
exist” (Hume, 2006, k. 4232) 
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Heidegger should be understood as a strict experiential empiricist. 
The way intentionality is presented in the tradition is that there is the subject-person 
(self, ego, etc.), certain experiential capacities (love, desire, perception, etc.) and 
then there are the separate objects (entities).  Under this model, the experiential 
capacities form a union between subject and object at which time we have the 
intentional structure.  As I have indicated Heidegger specifically and emphatically 
rejects this view, and there are other informative passages in which this is rejected; 
It is not the case that at first only a psychic process occurs as a non-intentional state (complex 
of sensations, memory relations, mental image and thought processes through which an 
image is evoked, where one then asks whether something corresponds to it) and 
subsequently becomes intentional in certain instances. ... . Intentionality is not a relationship 
to the non-experiential added to experiences, occasionally present along with them. ... By 
intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently 
takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process .... [HCT 36-7] (my underlining) 
..  intentionality must not be misinterpreted on the basis of an arbitrary concept of the subject 
and ego and subjective sphere and thus taken for an absurd problem of transcendence ... 
[BPP 64] (my underlining and bold) 
Heidegger describes the intentional structure of comportments in the following way: 
Every comportment is a comporting-toward ... We call this comporting-toward in the narrower 
sense the intendere or intentio. Every comporting-toward and every being-directed-toward 
has its specific whereto of the comporting and toward-which of the directedness. This 
whereto of comportment and toward-which of directedness belonging to the intentio we call 
the intentum. Intentionality comprises both moments, the intentio and the intentum, within its 
unity ... The two moments are different in each comportment; diversity of intentio or of 
intentum constitutes precisely the diversity of the modes of comportment. They differ each in 
regard to its own peculiar intentionality. [BPP 58] 
All Heidegger is saying here is that the basic structure of intentionality includes an 
object that is the focus, the intentum, and mode of comportment, the intentio.  The 
intentional structure comprises both these aspects as a unity.  In that there is an 
almost infinite number of things to which we can comport (intentum) and a vast array 
of ways in which we can comport (covered by concern, solicitude and so on) then 
the possible combinations of these two is what “constitutes precisely the diversity of 
the modes of comportment” [BPP 58] and hence the diversity of our existence, one 
Dasein from another.  Note, however, that he regards these as two moments, this 
will be important and will be discussed in a later chapter.  By way of foreshadowing 
that discussion, Heidegger recognises that before we can comport towards anything 
(the intentum), we must first understand what it is. This opens up a line of inquiry as 
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to the being of the ready-to-hand and world. 
We have seen earlier examples of the diversity of the ways of comportment.  It 
should always be noted that whenever Heidegger uses the term comportment, even 
if it is not explicit, it has inherent in it an intentional structure with two aspects as a 
unity.  This point is crucial for the unity is the basis of the lived experience, i.e. of 
Dasein’s existence. Heidegger repeatedly refers to being-in-the-world as a unity, 
one structure with different aspects and this approach comes from his analysis and 
interpretation of the structure of intentionality. 
In the next step, I draw the link between Dasein and existence followed by 
establishing the link between existence and comportments.  
Dasein understood as existence. 
Establishing a link between Dasein and Heidegger’s concept of existence is 
straightforward; 
The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. [BT 67/42].   
Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence [BT 33/12]  
As I have previously argued the idea of essence is interchangeable with being as 
such, combined, these two quotes also satisfy Heidegger’s formal indication of being 
as that which determines an entity (quote 1) and is the basis by which the entity is 
understood (quote 2). 
Having made the link between Dasein and existence, this does not tell us much. I 
now move to establish the link between existence and comportment where the real 
work is done. 
Existence understood as comportment 
In the lecture course Logic: The Question of Truth given in the winter semester of 
1925/26 Heidegger makes the clear statement, 
... comportments of ourselves, i.e., comportments of the being that we are and that we 
call existence. Therefore, these comportments are ways that existence can be, ways in 
which it is as it is and can be as existence. [LQT 176] (by bold) 
There is perhaps no clearer statement in Heidegger’s writing that comportments are 
our ways of being and are what he understands as our existence.  The timing of the 
course is important.  Whereas the History of the Concept of Time is the course given 
six months earlier, in the Summer of 1925, this course is the last Heidegger delivers 
  
324 
before he goes off to his cottage in Todtnauberg to commence writing the draft of 
Being and Time.  It is highly unlikely that there is any material shift in Heidegger’s 
understanding of comportment and existence from the lecture course to Being and 
Time.  
In the 1927 Summer course of Basic Problems [BPP] there is also a clear link 
between comportment and entities; 
To exist then means, among other things, to be as comporting with entities. [BPP 157] 
(Heidegger's emphasis) 
If we take this interpretation back into Being and Time, then there is the statement 
that Dasein understands itself in the way in which it comports with entities, 
Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things 
environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned. [BT 155/119] 
I am interpreting “find ‘itself’” as an alternate expression for understands itself, and 
the term “proximally concerned” refers to the comportments with entities that it most 
typically deals with.  As an aside, in this statement, we have a strong suggestion as 
to how to go about investigating the being of a particular Dasein. i.e. analysis the 
person’s comportments with which it is primarily involved.  I will take up this point 
later in the thesis when I propose a ‘daisy petal’ method to map the changing 
possibilities of existence. 
Having established the link between existence and comportments I want to establish 
the link between comportments and lived experiences.  
Comportments are Lived Experiences 
When I drink from my coffee cup, it is both a comportment structured by intentionality 
and an experience. There are two ways of understanding experience; one is in the 
context of "What is the experience like in drinking from a coffee cup?"  I could say 
such things as relaxing, satisfying, it picks me up and so on.  Heidegger is not 
primarily interested in this type of experience.  The other way to understand this, is 
as an alternate name for a comportment that is enacted, i.e. lived experience.  I will 
discuss the difference between these two types of experience below in the excursus 
to the chapter.  What needs to be clear is that Heidegger is interested in "lived 
experience" understood as an "expressed comportment".   
... our comportments, lived experiences taken in the broadest sense, are through and through 
expressed experiences; even if they are not uttered in words, they are nonetheless 
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expressed in a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as I simply live in 
them without regarding them thematically. [HCT 48] (my underlining) 
In the above quote and elsewhere in the lecture series History of the Concept of 
Time Heidegger links the two terms, comportment and lived experience, as 
synonymous by stating one and then repeating the other. An example of this type 
of phrasing is when I say, "I watched my favourite football team, Port Adelaide, play 
on television."  The terms my favourite football team and Port Adelaide are 
interchangeable.   This is how I take Heidegger to be using comportment and lived 
experience above and in the following examples, 
We must learn to see the data as such and to see that relations between comportments, 
between lived experiences, are themselves not complexions of things but in turn are of an 
intentional character. We must thus come to see that all the relations of life are intrinsically 
defined by this structure. [HCT 36] (my underlining) 
In a section where Heidegger is questioning Husserl's conclusions, he links the two 
again, 
In what way, as what are lived experiences, comportments, the various modes of the 
consciousness of something, found in the natural attitude? [HCT 95] (my underlining) 
In the next step, I confirm what should by now be obvious; intentionality is the 
structure of lived experience.  
Intentionality as the Structure of Lived Experience - A Confirmation 
Given that comportments are lived experience and given that intentionality is the 
structure of comportment then there should be references to intentionality as the 
structure of lived experience.  If we find this to be the case, then it would strongly 
suggest that the interpretation that I have taken is correct.  Heidegger makes these 
references, 
... intentionality is a structure of lived experiences as such and not a coordination relative to 
other realities [HCT 29] 
Acts refer to those lived experiences which have the character of intentionality. [HCT 36] 
... that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences and not just a supplementary relation, 
HCT 37] 
 ... the lived experiences themselves are as such intentional. This is our first specification, ... 
already important enough to provide the footing for holding metaphysical prejudices at bay. 
[HCT 37] 
The last quote is perhaps the strongest and it also contains a reference that is 
staking out his strict empiricist credentials.  
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Having laid out the various relationships between the terms I know want to draw out 
the implications in term of an understanding of Dasein.  
Implications of the Analysis  
In Being and Time Heidegger briefly discusses the views of German philosopher 
Max Scheler (1874-1928) who adapted the early work of Husserl into his own 
variation of phenomenology(Spiegelberg, 1994). Heidegger noted that for Scheler 
an intentional act is only experienced in the performance of the act at which time it 
is given in reflection [BT 73/48] and Scheler’s claim that the person only exists in 
the performance of intentional acts,  
... the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially 
not an object. [BT 73/48] 
Moreover, this is understood by Scheler as 
 the person 'is’ … the unity of living-through which is immediately experienced in and with our 
Experiences". [BT 73/48]   
This is a radical claim.  Heidegger, however, identifies a problem with the claim in 
that it posits the person as both the performer of intentional acts and the unity 
associated with living through the experience associated with those acts.  This 
raises the ontological question as to what is the meaning of 'performance' as distinct 
from ‘performer’?  Apparently, Scheler does not address this. Heidegger indicates, 
however, that Scheler is moving in the right direction by avoiding defining the person 
as a thing, physical or psychical.  Scheler’s approach points to the conceptual 
problem that arise if we are not clear about the nature of the experiences, the nature 
of comportments and the problem of conceptualising how Dasein is to be ‘found’ 
among all this.  This is what Heidegger has discovered, a way through the apparent 
intertwining on the various aspects. 
Heidegger’s claim is deceptively simple, we are the unity of our expressed 
comportments, and the unity of our expressed comportments he calls existence.  
The comportments do not need to be things we do consciously.  For example, a 
person with a fear of dogs may be hyper-vigilant concerning the presence of a dog, 
and spot one some distance down the road, well before their companion does. 
Neither the hyper-vigilance that results in perceiving the dog nor the anxiety and 
fear that suddenly rises to the surface in relation to the dog occur with any 
deliberateness, it just happens.  As I sit typing, tapping the keyboard, watching the 
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words appear on the screen, checking the flow of my argument, hearing Anne 
tidying up in the next room, aware of the sounds of Mahler drifting in the background 
and so on, all these are expressed comportments.  As we move through each day, 
from one location to another, from one encounter to another, our thoughts are 
drifting from one topic to another, and we engage in one activity after another. There 
is an endless procession of expressed comportments, of lived experience, of the 
flow of existence. 
There is no doubt that we need a body to achieve all of this, and there is no doubt 
that the body influences the range of possibilities open to us, by Heidegger’s claim 
is that what it is to be a human Dasein is not understood by reference to the body it 
is understood by reference to our existence. 
With this as his starting point, Heidegger then starts to observe and analyse our 
existence.  As indicated he notes that it is characterised by a relatedness, whether 
in thinking, feeling or doing we are in relationship to other entities. This relationship 
is what is called a comportment.  When present in an individual Dasein a 
comportment only occurs when it is expressed, i.e. it is a particular lived experience.  
A comportment is essentially a way of talking about lived experiences (understood 
in relational terms) in a more general abstract way. 
Heidegger initially analyses comportments in two ways.  Firstly, he identifies there 
is a structure to each comportment, and the name of that structure is called 
intentionality. The structure of intentionality always consists of two parts, there is the 
object that is intended, and there is the way in which it is intended. This simple two-
part structure then leads to a large number of possible comportments. For example, 
the statements “I see my keyboard”, “I touch my keyboard”, “My keyboard is wearing 
out” represent three different comportments about the same object. Secondly, he 
divides comportments into two basic groupings, those dealing with other Dasein’s, 
which he calls solicitude, and those dealing with entities, he calls, concern. 
The reason he makes this division has not yet emerged in the above discussion, but 
it is easy to explain. Heidegger makes the general observation that the way we 
understand something (its being) is reflected in the nature of our comportments 
towards it.  For example, I eat an apple, I drink from a coffee cup, I love my wife, I 
use the keyboard to write, and so on.  He is not interested in aberrant behaviour or 
behaviour that lacks understanding; he is investigating the normal, day to day way 
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we deal with things as they are typically understood. He calls this, investigating 
things in their “average everydayness” [BT 38/16].  If our comportments with things 
reflect our understanding of being, then the qualitative difference in the way we 
comport to things like pieces of equipment compared to other Dasein means there 
is a fundamental difference between equipment and other Dasein.  An investigation 
into these two classes of entities and Dasein’s relationship with them should thus 
disclose aspects of the structures associated with entities as well of the structure of 
Dasein itself. 
Dasein then is understood as ‘lived experience’.  This is the interpretative possibility 
that is made available by not assuming intentionality as a link between object and 
subject. Heidegger avoids the Scheler problem of separating performer and 
performance; he simply jettisons the performer as there is no evidence for such an 
entity.  If we recall this is exactly what Hume concluded!  For Heidegger Dasein 
exists in lived experience that has an intentional structure.  This cannot be 
understood as the saying that Dasein lives in the moment, in the present, this would 
be a mistake.  We always need to keep in mind the temporal structure referred to 
earlier. 
The majority of what is discussed in this chapter takes place before what is written 
in Being and Time.  In Being and Time, he puts on hold virtually all reference to the 
relationship between, intentionality, comportments and lived experiences.  However 
I have demonstrated this is his understanding both before and after Being and Time 
and it is not possible to address why he puts aside this approach, and it is pointless 
to speculate.  What I have outlined so far is however only rudimentary, and there 
are many outstanding questions, for example, what is the basis by which we 
understand the entities toward which we comport, what is the basis by which we do 
things one way and not another, and so on.  It is in the Dasein analytic section of 
Being and Time that Heidegger progressively digs deeper into the very structure of 
intentionality and discloses the basis of the unique character of Dasein itself. 
In summary, we are at this point: 
1. Dasein is constituted and understands itself, primarily and for the most part on 
the basis of its expressed comportments, i.e. lived experiences.128  
                                            
128 This is simply a restatement of: "Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in 
those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned." [BT 155/119] 
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2. Lived experiences have an intentional structure, a unity comprising two aspects, 
an entity and a mode of being towards that entity. 
3. We comport towards things primarily based on our understanding of what things 
are, i.e. their way of being. 
Finally,  
4. If we are our lived experience and lived experience only arises out of the 
expression of a comportment with entities, then there is no separation between 
subject and object. To put it starkly no entities, no lived experiences, no existence -
- no Dasein!  
We thus end up in a similar situation faced by Einstein, either accept the evidence 
and follow where it leads or stay with the status quo and the unfounded 
presuppositions that shaped the understanding of the status quo.   If we follow 
Heidegger step by step the inevitable conclusion is that whatever Dasein is it cannot 
have an existence that is independent of entities, there is no subject-object divide 
as is maintained by the tradition. 
All these conclusions are consistent with or directly flow from the analysis of 
existence, lived experience, comportment and intentionality discussed above.  It 
also addresses Heidegger's objections to the tradition, e.g. 
The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is 
not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic 
ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are. [BPP 64] 
and it means that in existing we are already 'in' the world, "dwelling" with entities, 
The statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of 
being of our own self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always 
already dwelling with the extant. [BPP 64] 
It belongs to the nature of the Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already with other 
beings. [BPP 157] 
The basis on which we can be said to ‘be in’ the world as being-in-the-world does, 
however, need to be explicated and this is another task Heidegger completes as 
part of the Dasein analytic and is addressed in Chapter 17. 
Summary 
This completes this aspect of the analysis.  In earlier chapters, I had identified a 
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problem in conceptualising Dasein other than as ‘material’ object.  This has now 
been addressed in far more detail by way of understanding Dasein as ‘lived 
experience’, i.e., as its expressed comportments. 
Regarding the thesis, the inquiry into the meaning of shedding life has now been 
provided with a more definite direction in that if Dasein's existence is constituted by 
its comportment with entities, then shedding of life (understood in terms of 
existence) must in some way be associated with comportments. How this is so will 
emerge with a better understanding of Dasein’s world. 
Excursus: Which Experience 
In Being and Time Heidegger distinguishes between two German words which both 
refer to experience Erlebnis/erleben (noun/verb) and Erfahrung/erfahren 
(noun/verb) and they are translated as Experience and experience respectively [BT 
72].    
What Heidegger is interested in is experience as Erfahrung and not Erlebnis.  If I 
take the example of my encountering the scary dog then this experience can be 
understood in terms of comportments (lived experience) (Erfahrung) or as an 
experience I live through (Erlebnis) and recount afterwards in terms of the 
'frightening dog encounter' and tell of the circumstance, all my feelings, racing heart 
and so forth, in other words it has content derived from introspection.  
Inwood explains (Inwood, 1999)that Erlibnis is the experience where one would say 
to another "That was quite an experience." (p. 61) while erfahren comes from fahren 
which has the sense of 'to go', 'to travel' or 'to go forth'.  Erfahrung then has an 
external orientation; one is primarily focused on the experience that is arising from 
some objective, some external event, and the experiences one can learn from such 
events. The connection with comportment and lived experience is reasonably clear 
given that comportments have a 'comporting-towards' aspect.  This is, Inwood says, 
reflected in the German word for empirical science Erfahrungswissenschaft as 
contrasted to an essay on a personal experience which is Erlebnisaufsatz. (Inwood, 
1999, p. 61) 
In Age of the World Picture and What is a Thing Heidegger gives a brief history of 
the word and Inwood summarises this; 
1. Experience is at first passive: we come across something without going in search of it.  
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2. In active experience, we 'go forth' (er-fahren) to look for something.  
3. We go to something to see (perhaps with artificial aids such as microscopes) what happens 
to it under varying conditions, either waiting for the new conditions to arise or intervening to 
produce them. 
 4. Experiment: we intervene in something to see what happens, if we do such and such, only 
now we do so in 'anticipation [Vorgriff, 'foreconception'] of regularity, e.g. when so much - 
then so much' (Inwood, 1999, p. 62) 
Heidegger then is primarily concerned with the experience as understood from the 
perspective of an empirical investigation of comportments.  Yes, we can experience 
fear as Erlebnis, but we can also understand the event as Erfahrung, to examine 
the event in terms of its experience of our relationship to the world, in other words, 
it has a disclosive aspect.  The stance then, that Heidegger is taking as a 
philosophical empiricist is one of Erfahrung.   
Regarding social science research, a phenomenological inquiry based on Erlebnis 
is thus of a different character to one based on Erfahrung.  It would be questionable 
that one based on Erlebnis, for example, the experience of moving into a nursing 
home, that focuses on the former and fails to do an analysis in terms of Erfahrung 
could be termed Heideggerian.  I am not aware of any social science methodology 
that takes an approach based on Erfahrung, understood in Heidegger's use of the 
term 'lived experience', i.e. as comportments with an intentional structure. Having 
highlighted the two ways in which experience can be understood I will not pursue 
this any further. 
Hiddenness of Intentionality in Being and Time 
The terms lived experience, intentionality and comportment are virtually absent from 
Being and Time albeit the concepts behind the terms are very much present.   
To understand the concepts, I have referred to the lecture courses given 
immediately before and after the publication of Being and Time (published in 1927) 
and checked the consistency of use of these terms in the courses.  The lecture 
course given at the University of Marburg in the Winter semester of 1925 was History 
of the Concept of Time and the course given just after the completion of Being and 
Time for publication was the Marburg University, Summer 1927 course Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. 
While not too much can be drawn from it, I performed a search of PDF copies of the 
three works to determine the frequency of use of the words. This simply indicates 
  
332 
the extent to which the word, and hence the concepts, are present in the 
discussions.  In History of the Concept of Time, the term comportment or comports 
occurs over 120 times, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology the term is used over 
320 times129 while in Being and Time there are no hits for comportment and 48 for 
comports.  The alternatives for comportment, solicitude and concern, appear in 
Being and Time over 340 times.  The term intentionality or intentional appears in 
History of the Concept of Time approximately 330 times and in Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology approximately 300 times while in Being and Time just over ten 
times and then mainly in footnotes and the indexes. The term lived experience 
appears in the History of the Concept of Time just over a hundred times but is 
dropped in Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology replaced with a 
different word, Erfahrung, which is translated as experience.   I did not do a word 
count on the word experience is it is used in other contexts. 
The word frequencies indicate however that Heidegger seems to be doing his best 
to re-word these important concepts in this published book, whereas at the time of 
the lectures I doubt that there were any plans to have them published.  The result 
of this was that initially, I was oblivious to the influence of intentionality on 
Heidegger's work. Even in the lecture courses, Heidegger's line of argument is not 
clear although it can be slowly explicated by carefully reading.  Without these texts, 
I doubt that I would have been able to make sense from Being and Time of the line 




                                            
129 These numbers are based on a search of PDF copies of the books.  The search may not pick up all instances 
as a result of the vagaries of PDF documents, but the numbers are typically reliable indication of the occurrence 
of a word.   
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CHAPTER 13: HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER & UNDERSTANDING 
Introduction 
I have argued that understanding Heidegger’s work as he presents it in Being and 
Time is greatly facilitated by having a prior understanding of key concepts that he 
worked through prior to the writing of Being and Time.  This has been demonstrated 
in concepts such as being, intentionality, comportments and Dasein.  When the work 
of the Greeks was discussed, there were two concepts that were touched upon but 
not developed in any significant way. The first is that when we see an entity, it is not 
the physical aspect of what we see that determines our understanding of it, 
something else is at play.  This was evident in Aristotle’s idea of a hylomorphic entity 
where it is the form and not the matter that determines the being entity.  The second 
was the idea that in some way it is an underlying unity that constitutes entities; this 
was captured in Heidegger’s discussion of the prevailing. Heidegger eventually 
unifies these two concepts as being, understanding how he does this is central to 
understanding his work.  In this chapter, I come back to these two points and discuss 
them from the perspective of the work undertaken by Edmund Husserl. It was this 
work that influenced Heidegger and pointed him back towards the Greeks [MWP] 
as he strove to address his own project concerning the meaning of being.  
Understanding some of the Husserlian basic ideas assisted in understanding 
Heidegger and as such, some of these are discussed in this chapter. 
Initially, while I could ‘hear’ the discussions, whether from Aristotle or Heidegger, as 
to the difference between the perceived entity and its being I found the concept very 
difficult to grasp fully.  If I took it up, it would be on the basis of yielding to the 
argument rather than any deeper awareness.  Two additional pieces of work 
assisted in closing the gap, reading Husserl’s account and developing several 
‘experiments’ as ways to demonstrate these points, to bring the phenomenon into 
view. This work proved decisive, not only in understanding ‘the difference’ but in 
understanding a number of Heidegger’s concepts, particularly the concepts of 
worldhood and being-in-the-world. 
The issue of ‘seeing’ the phenomenon is very important, but it is not an end in itself.  
It is linked, certainly from a Heideggerian perspective to the structure of 
understanding which forms part of Dasein, as well as opening up the access to the 
being of entities.  The chapter has two sections, the first addresses issues such as 
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the risk of presuppositions in understanding, the necessity of understanding the 
basis of understanding, the difficulty of ‘seeing’ the ontological difference and 
Heidegger’s two meanings of understanding.  The second section explores three 
concepts from Husserl’s work that are informative in understanding Heidegger’s 
approach. The three are ‘categorial intuition’ which is associated with the ontological 
difference, wholes and parts which informs the concept of being as a relational unity, 
and lastly, the concept of founded which clarifies the term in Heidegger’s work.  It is 
in this section I introduce and discuss several illustrative examples or ‘experiments’ 
that were useful in demonstrating the phenomenon and which added an 
‘experiential’ dimension to the understanding. 
Section One: The Necessity of Understanding  
Introduction – Functionality not Appearance  
In the previous chapter, the structure of intentionality was indicated as consisting 
two parts, the object intended (entity) and mode of intending (perception, love, 
producing, etc.).  When I initially studied this topic, I took for granted that we 
understood the entities towards which we comport.  It didn’t occur to me to question 
the basis of this understanding130.  It was when I did think about this that I noticed 
that I was still struggling to avoid placing the determination of what entities are (i.e. 
their being) in the entities themselves.  For example, the coffee cup131 looked like a 
coffee cup, and it was a coffee cup because of its various physical characteristics132.  
Associated with this I took for granted that I understood it as a coffee cup because 
this is what I had learnt growing-up in the culture133 and as such I simply recall that 
learning when I see the cup.  Husserl has no fundamental disagreement with the 
view of what it is to be a coffee cup, but he rejects the simplistic notion of learning 
and recall as the basis of knowledge about the cup.  Heidegger rejects both the 
account of what a coffee cup is and how we know.  Notwithstanding this rejection, 
Husserl’s work helps explain Heidegger’s and this is what is addressed in the 
chapter. 
                                            
130 ɸ 
131 As this example of the coffee cup suggests, the entities I am discussing in this section are those that we 
use in some way as part of our own work or tasks. Unless otherwise stated I am not using the term entities to 





The first issue mentioned above, not recognising the need to identify ‘understanding’ 
as a separate aspect of the intentional structure I put down to inexperience. 
However, it becomes a crucial aspect of Heidegger’s analysis as he pulls this 
phenomenon apart and to do this, it is important not to overlook ‘the obvious’.  When 
we understand what something is there must have been some time in the past when 
we didn’t have that understanding, and this points to a separate aspect of the basic 
structure of intentionality that is operative prior to our encountering the entity in a 
comportment.  Heidegger comes to recognise this as forming part of a more 
fundamental intentional structure of Dasein itself he calls ‘being-in’ which I explore 
in Chapter 17.  In relation to the second aspect, the basis on which we understand 
the entity, Heidegger recognised that in a comportment it is the way of being, or 
roughly put, what the entity does, in a particular context that is critical, not how it 
looks.  Whereas Aristotle has matter+form = useful thing, Heidegger adapts this to 
present-at-hand + readiness-to-hand = useful thing.  Just as for Aristotle the 
essence (or being) of the useful thing is in its form, for Heidegger the essence 
(being) of the useful thing is its readiness-to-hand (albeit to what this refers is yet to 
be established).  Just as Aristotle argues that when we see the useful thing, we see 
the ‘form’, Heidegger argues that with the sight of circumspection when we see 
useful things we are seeing the readiness-to-hand.  Whereas for Aristotle form is a 
type of formula understood as an aspect of logos, for Heidegger each useful thing’s 
readiness-to-hand can be roughly understood as its ‘functional fit’ in a relational 
network of other ready-to-hand things. It is this relationally based functionality, very 
broadly understood, that is the real target of understanding in a comportment 
towards useful things.  So, while there may be a correlation between the basic 
physical characteristics and the functionality, it is the latter that is determinative for 
understanding the entity.  This understanding is captured in the language in the 
saying “form follows function”134.  It is the correlation with the physical characteristics 
and our bias towards valuing what is physically seen that, I believe, is the basis on 
which we conclude that the being of an entity is posited in the material aspects. How 
Heidegger sees this operating will become clearer in the next two chapters.  The 
above indicates why examining the intentional structure becomes important for 
Heidegger but the discussion needs to come back to looking at how I reached this 
                                            
134 In this context the term form is typically understood as referring to the physical aspects, albeit there is a 
direct connection from a Heideggerian perspective between this and the being of the equipment. 
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understanding, and that is through Husserl.   
What sent me to Husserl’s work was Heidegger’s comments in the lectures on the 
History of the Concept of Time where he acknowledges Husserl’s account of 
‘categorial intuition’ as an important breakthrough in identifying that it is not the mere 
visual presentation of entity that is the basis of understanding of what an entity is, 
something else is involved.  While Heidegger rejects Husserl’s account as to what 
that something else is, he accepts the phenomenon, which Heidegger will interpret 
as being!  This chapter primarily focuses on various aspects of Husserl’s work that 
help to identify the phenomena that Heidegger then takes over, for it was being able 
to see the phenomenon Husserl was describing that became the bridge from my 
then way of thinking to Heidegger.  Before I move on to Husserl, I want to provide a 
brief description of my then ‘way of thinking’ and how easy it is to be led astray, and 
then link this to Husserl’s and then Heidegger’s position. 
A Brief Journey: From Old Thinking to Husserl and Heidegger. 
If an entity moves from not being understood to being understood, there must be 
some basis for that shift, for the change in understanding.  We could say that we 
simply learn to ‘recognise’ what something is and that when we then encounter the 
object again, we remember what we have learnt.  If we then think about the 
‘mechanism’ by which this occurs, we can posit that we receive the ‘visual input’ 
from the entity and this then evokes the memory of what has been learnt.  The same 
logic then applies to things we hear, taste and so on, i.e. we receive some form of 
sense data which is then linked to the ability of the mind to ‘process’ this data from 
the world and make sense of it.  It is this ‘making sense’ that is the basis of 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the world is grounded in the experience of the world 
itself.  This is essentially an empiricist position which I came to recognise as my 
understanding of how we access the world135 as contrasted, for example to 
Descartes’ rationalism.   
While there are differences, this account describes the basic model of British 
empiricists who developed various models of how we access the world through 
experience and then explored how we can have surety that the judgements we 
make with respect to that experience constituted ‘true’ knowledge of the world. The 
British Empiricists, however, had different metaphysical positions, for example, 




Hobbes was a materialist, Locke a dualist and Berkeley, an idealist(Priest, 2007) 
albeit these are all variations of substance ontology.  It is not hard to see how this 
account, then translates into a research project for science, e.g. the investigation of 
how the visual system of the body receives this sense data, passes it through to the 
brain, where ‘memory’ is stored, and how the sense data is matched against 
‘memory’ to result in a recall of what something is, and so on. 
Edmund Husserl’s project focused on securing the basis of the knowledge of things 
by way of phenomenology.  He accepts the basic approach of empiricism 
concerning the priority of experience as the basis of knowledge of the world and the 
concept of sense data, however, he rejects most other aspects of the British 
Empiricists’ various models.  Husserl argues that the human mind has an innate 
capacity to identify the essential ideal form that constitutes any entity and that this 
is the basis by which we understand entities.  If we take as an example, a letterbox, 
there is a myriad of design possibilities that a letterbox may take arising from an 
unlimited combination of shapes, sizes, colours, materials and so on, such that a 
letterbox at one design extreme is hardly recognisable to that at another extreme.  
Under the British Empiricist account, there is thus a need to learn a range of 
examples of letterboxes and learn how they may vary.  Husserl rejects this approach 
arguing that once the human mind recognised the basic essential form of what 
constitutes a letterbox that this is the basis by which we understand the entity, e.g. 
the letterbox.  Every entity then, both tangible and intangible, has for Husserl an 
identifiable ideal form as part of being the entity it is.  
Put another way; there must be some essential constancy that is associated with 
each entity being the entity it is, otherwise, there is no stability of ‘things’ in the world, 
and there is only chaos.  For Husserl, this constancy is associated with the concept 
of ideal forms, which, because humans have an innate understanding of what things 
are, must be the basis of our understanding things.  For Husserl, these ideal forms 
must, therefore, be able to be identified and described from the things themselves 
as they show up in our consciousness and we do not need to rely on any 
presuppositions as to what things are. The methodology he developed for this 
project was phenomenology and developing and refining this phenomenology as 
well as carrying out phenomenological research became his lifelong project.  By this 
description it is clear that Husserl’s work was not addressing any fundamental 
concerns about ontology (what things are), it was philosophical research into 
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knowledge (epistemology), and his primary concern was to secure, for science, a 
basis for the certainty of knowledge. His approach did not challenge the accepted 
model of the Cartesian subject-object divide.   
What is of interest is that Husserl’s starting position is that we have an innate 
understanding of what things are. He then assumes the ontology, which is a 
substance ontology and links this to the concept of ideal forms as the basis for 
understanding.  Heidegger takes the same starting point, that we have an innate 
understanding of what things are, but he does not assume the nature of the 
ontology.  Instead, he argues that if we can establish the basis of our understanding 
of entities, then this is the ontological basis of the entity. He effectively takes the 
same starting point as Husserl, and then turns Husserl’s approach on its head!  In 
that our comportment (which has the structure of intentionality) towards useful things 
is based on our understanding of their ‘functional fit’, it is thus the functionality and 
not appearance that is the key to unlocking understanding the ontology of the thing! 
Heidegger and Husserl 
Husserl’s, approach requires a fundamental presupposition, that what entities are, 
its being, is based in the entity itself.  This is the standard position in the Tradition 
and is in contrast to Heidegger’s view that the entity and its being are different.  This 
leads Husserl to his theory that what is exhibited in each type of entity is a unique 
ideal form that humans have the innate ability to recognise.  Because the form can 
only be discerned from the entity itself, his methodology only allows descriptions of 
the form to arise from direct experiences of the entity itself.  Those experiences are, 
according to Husserl, what we encounter in our consciousness, and as such his 
phenomenology was focused on the experience of our encounter with entities as 
they showed up in consciousness. 
This approach has merit in that it puts boundaries on what can be known in 
determining an entity and rules out considering unfounded presuppositions in 
reaching a fixed view as to what an entity is. If the approach were applied to, for 
example, the investigation of heat, it would have prevented scientists from positing 
heat as either phlogiston or caloric and left open alternative ways of investigating 
this entity.   There are also some similarities with Peirce’s concepts, albeit Peirce 
never develops a methodology based on his ideas as the basis for research.  
Heidegger recognised in Husserl’s work however that despite his injunction against 
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presuppositions, Husserl held some unchallenged presuppositions that impacted 
the direction of his research. The two most important are Husserl’s acceptance of 
the basic character of consciousness and the concept of ideal forms.  In Heidegger’s 
view, both of these were in line with the traditional thinking typified by both Descartes 
and Kant.  Husserl’s holding to these presuppositions shaped his research in 
directions that, according to Heidegger, take him fundamentally in the wrong 
direction and was responsible for Husserl’s “mangling” of phenomenology[IPR].  In 
other words, untested presuppositions are evident in Husserl’s work notwithstanding 
it is this type of risk he was developing his version of phenomenology to address. 
In Husserl’s work, however, Heidegger also recognised that Husserl had identified 
an important phenomenon and had carried out important research associated with 
it. That phenomenon was that there is a difference between that which is given to 
us by way of perceptual experiences of an entity136, what Husserl called the 
sensuous intuition and that which is the basis by which we know what the entity is, 
which Husserl named the categorial intuition [HCT].  The name indicates that we 
somehow know what entities are based on their categorial presentation within 
consciousness.  Husserl believed that within our consciousness we were able to 
discern the ideal form of each entity and then apply this to any actual instance of 
that entity.  A concept not all that dissimilar to that of Plato!  
Heidegger recognises that the phenomenon is important, but rejects that it is based 
on categorial representation, this is yet another presupposition.  If we recall the 
discussion concerning Aristotle, there is a difference in the application of his work in 
the Categories and the Metaphysics.  The Categories is a useful way for ‘natural 
scientists’ to recognise, describe and classify entities, but it is not the basis of initially 
determining the being of entities.  Aristotle argued, as does Heidegger that the 
determination of what entities are is a different question and must be addressed 
prior to work of the ‘natural scientists’.  There appears to be in Aristotle’s work a 
recognition that there is a correlation between observed ways of being (categorial) 
of the entity and the basis of what an entity actually is (form).  In other words, 
‘science’ deals with the entity once it has come into being, which means once it is 
instantiated into matter, i.e. the physical. On this basis understanding the categorial 
aspects of the physically instantiated entity is a legitimate task for ‘science’.  This 
                                            
136 This is the same stance held by Plato and Aristotle. 
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relates to Heidegger’s view of the relationship between his work and that of science 
as discussed in Chapter 11.  
A fundamental mistake in applying Aristotle’s work in science is to confuse the 
identification of an entity based on the categories with its form or essence. An even 
greater mistake, at least from a Heideggerian perspective, is to focus primarily on 
those categories that relate to the physical aspects of the entity and overlook the 
relational and functional aspects that are essential to its being.  If we recall the 
discussion on biology, this is the mistake biologists make when looking at animals 
in isolation and why Heidegger was supportive of the approach of Uexküll, and why 
I introduced the work of the ethologists Lorenz and de Wall. As will become evident 
in the next chapter, Heidegger, when investigating the ready-to-hand, actually 
disregards the physical aspects of the entity and focuses on their relational aspects. 
A radically different, but appropriate, application to the Aristotelian categorial 
concept.  
Husserl rather than exploring and applying Aristotle’s concepts of form adopts the 
concept of Plato’s forms, rejected by Aristotle, to support his approach.  He does, 
however, reject the notion of the world of forms. Holding that the ideal form is present 
in the entity itself and that this is what we perceive in consciousness.  As Husserl 
progressed in his work, he became increasingly focused on identifying the ideal form 
of things in our consciousness which he thought must be the basis of our 
understanding.  At no time, so far as I am aware, does Husserl undertake any 
rigorous philosophical research concerning the metaphysical position that he is 
assuming, and he appears to end up with a hybrid form derived from Aristotle and 
Plato.  This lack of philosophical rigour in Husserl’s work exasperated Heidegger, 
which is evident in a letter he wrote to a friend, Karl Löwith dated 20th March 1923, 
he makes the following statement in recounting a seminar he has given on Husserl’s 
Ideas (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012) 
... In the final hour of the seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to such an extent 
that I dare say the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now cleanly laid out. 
Looking back from this vantage to the Logical Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl 
was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. [BH 374]  
Husserl had moved to Freiberg in 1916 and Heidegger work as his assistant from 
1920-1923.  While Heidegger acknowledges the early work of Husserl and the 
influence of Logical Investigations (published in 1900-01), Heidegger’s 
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disillusionment with Husserl’s journey since Logical Investigations is evident.  In 
part, I suspect because of Husserl’s failure to follow through on his research 
program as outlined in the Logical Investigations and maintain a strict empiricist 
stance, instead drifting off into a form of transcendental idealism.   
It was in the phenomenon associated with Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition 
that Heidegger recognises the possibility of a methodology to investigate being.  
This is the work published in the Logical Investigations. He also recognises the 
phenomenon as the same one that is evident in Greek philosophy in their quest to 
understand being and it was this recognition that Heidegger credits with sending 
him back to study the Greeks once more, but from this new perspective. [MWP].   
While Husserl pursues his methodology as a program aligned with epistemology, 
Heidegger recognised in Husserl’s work possibilities for investigating being, in other 
words it has applications for ontology.  I suspect that seeing the possibilities 
associated with Husserl's early work is Heidegger’s major breakthrough in his own 
project.  While Heidegger specifically mentions[HCT] three key aspects of Husserl’s 
work, categorial intuition, intentionality and the a priori, I also suspect that his work 
on mereology was also significant, and I address this later in the chapter.  Heidegger 
takes this work then adapts, extends and applies them to his own work, without the 
constraints of Husserl’s presuppositions and comes up with a radically new account 
of being.  This is what is presented in Being and Time. Heidegger’s stance on 
presuppositions is thus the most demanding and severe of all the empiricists.  
Comportments Require an Understanding of Entities 
Comportments are always comportment towards entities, however, what was not 
discussed earlier is that such comportments require an understanding of what the 
entity 'is'.  This is what Hofstadter, the translator, of Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology is getting at in his introduction,  
We cannot encounter entities and behave suitably toward them unless we understand them 
- in our very encounter and comportment - as being, in their being. The understanding of the 
being of entities is necessarily antecedent to the experience of them as entities. I cannot use 
a hammer as an instrument unless I already beforehand understand the instrumental 
functionality that is characteristic for hammer and hammering ... [BPP xviii] 
In Heidegger's work what it is to understand something is a complex and difficult 
concept to grasp.  This chapter aims to explain Heidegger's notion of what it is to 
understand something and his concept of 'phenomenological seeing'.  As part of 
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this, I will explore the relationship between the entity as it is 'perceived' and the being 
of the entity as well as bring into view the two distinct components. 
Because these two aspects of visual presentation and understanding are unified in 
our perception137, they are not 'seen' as two aspects, and therefore we tend to 
attribute the understanding component (i.e. meaning) to what is visually presented.  
This results in an interpretative approach as to what things are based on the material 
characteristics of the entity which is responsible for that visual presentation.  This is 
the reduction that is associated with the materialist or physicalist position as to what 
things are.   Recalling Heidegger’s reduction as part of his phenomenological 
method, he deliberately turns from the entity as given, to being, i.e. the basis by 
which we understand the entity.  If we fail to recognise the two aspects of what is 
given to us when we perceive and understand an entity, then it is impossible to 
undertake phenomenological research based on Heidegger’s method.  
The Material Aspect is Not Denied 
Heidegger does not deny that all entities are in some way founded on the material 
(what Heidegger calls present-at-hand) and further that there are entities that can 
be understood as the entities they are in terms of their simple presentation, i.e. 
categorial, for example, a rock138 [BT 79/54].   This is simply a statement concerning 
the basis of understanding and not an articulation of the structure of being of these 
entities.  Heidegger is indicating that in these cases this will be related to whatever 
it is that ‘produces’ the categorial aspects, he does not explore this.  In the case of 
entities understood in their ‘present-at-hand’ mode science typically has a ‘correct’, 
if not technically specific, understanding of being and proceeds accordingly [BT].  
This is not to suggest, as has been previously indicated, that science has a correct 
understanding of the being of nature[BT]. 
The distinction between understanding material ‘stuff’ as material ‘stuff’ in its own 
right, and when the material is used to produce something else is the same 
phenomenon that Aristotle is getting at in his distinction between simple entities and 
compound or hylomorphic entities.  Similarly, Heidegger does not deny that those 
                                            
137 I have already discussed intentionality as a unified phenomenon.  What this indicates is that there is an 
associated unified phenomenon, that of understanding-perceiving. 
138 Even here there are some complexities with how we understand the present-at-hand. However, by and large 
Heidegger accepts the traditional view for basic material objects, so long as they are not incorporated into our 
life and have not become an object of our comportment.   
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entities to which we comport, what he calls the ready-to-hand, have what he calls a 
foundational relationship with the present-at-at-hand, it is simply that the present-at-
hand is not what determines the ready-to-hand entity as the entity they are as the 
ready-to-hand.  This is no different to Aristotle’s claim that the bronze is not what 
determines the sphere when we see a bronze sphere. There is something else at 
play.    
That Heidegger accepts the material basis of things is easily demonstrated. For 
example, in relation to Dasein, he accepts that there is the body,  
... for even entities which are not worldless - Dasein itself, for example - are present-at-hand 
'in' the world, or, more exactly, can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely 
present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential 
state of being-in139. [BT 82/56] 
Heidegger’s reference to “wordless” will be addressed in the next few chapters. 
About those entities to which we comport (the ready-to-hand) Heidegger makes it 
clear that  
... only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. [BT 
101/71]  
In other words, the material is required to being something ready-to-hand into being, 
and in this the Aristotelian bronze sphere is a good example.  Care must be taken 
with these statements otherwise traditional ways of thinking keep creeping in, a 
difficulty I still have140.  That physical stuff is present (present-at-hand) does not 
mean that this is what is responsible for bringing these entities into being, what 
constitutes them.  Heidegger makes it clear, for example, that even though “only by 
reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand” this does 
not mean it is "ontologically founded" (how the entity is constituted) upon the 
"presence-at-hand" [BT 101/71]. 
One of the reasons that I am focusing on this point is that it is essential for the 
understanding of caring for people in any health setting, particularly nursing homes 
that we distinguish between the body and the person.  While the body is essential 
for bringing the person into being, the body is not the person, and yet the 
preponderance of activity in a nursing home is in addressing the needs of the body.  
Even if there is a unthematized understanding of this fact, there will be some 
                                            




presupposition of what the person is that creeps in and informs the way we engage 
with them.  In other words, how we understand the person in the nursing home will 
be reflected in our comportments towards them! In itself, this is a topic future 
Heideggerian research.  However, unless we have a thematic understanding of what 
it is to be a person, properly grounded in the being of the person, we are at risk of 
causing unintentional harm.   My claim, and it is the motivation for this thesis, is that 
this is what is happening. Clarification is therefore needed.  Understanding the 
difference and the relationship between the present-at-hand, the ready-to-hand and 
Dasein is critical. 
‘Phenomenological Seeing’ is Hard 
One of the significant challenges that I have been attempting to point out is in 
overcoming the pull of seeing things only in terms of the physical so as to 'see' what 
it is that contributes to our understanding.  Heidegger calls this 'phenomenological 
seeing' [MWP, ZS].   Reiterating the prior discussions, the 'focus' on that which 
contributes to our understanding is the same that determines entities as the entities 
they are, namely being.  My stance in Heidegger's work is that we should never 
regard being simply as the basis for the intelligibility of entities, i.e. understanding.  
Intelligibility for Heidegger has the same basis as that which determines entities as 
the entities they are, i.e. the being of the entity.  This is why Heidegger's work is 
ontological.  
Heidegger recounts the difficulty in grasping the mode of inquiry based on 
phenomenological 'seeing' in his autobiographical essay, My Way to 
Phenomenology.  In the essay, he talks of how he repeatedly read Husserl's Logical 
Investigations during his university years to understand Husserl's methods but that 
all his "efforts were in vain"[MWP  75].  It was not until Husserl moved to Freiburg 
University, where Heidegger was working, that, as he recounts, he "met Husserl 
personally in his workshop" following which "my perplexity decreased slowly, my 
confusion dissolved laboriously". [MWP 75] Heidegger then goes on, 
Husserl's teaching took place in the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenological 
"seeing" which at the same time demanded that one relinquish the untested use of 
philosophical knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of 
the great thinkers into the conversation. [MWP 78] 
As indicated, the central point of this phenomenological 'seeing' is to be able to 
separate what I call the 'raw' perceptual or visual presentation of an object from what 
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it is that gives the object we see its meaning as the entity it 'is'.   
Not dissimilar to Heidegger's experience I read his text many times and did not fully 
grasp what this point was getting at.  When I saw a coffee cup, all I saw was a coffee 
cup! No matter how hard I tried what stood before me was a coffee cup.  It took me 
several years of reading, identifying and removing the influence of other ways of 
understanding and of constructing examples and thought experiments until I finally 
'saw' and understood.  Even when I could experience the phenomenon, it was not 
until I took what I had acquired into my reading of Aristotle’s work that the 
understanding started to consolidate.  This does not mean that I have learnt and 
mastered all the tools, far from it, but I do believe I am on 'my way'. 
Comportments141 and the priority of Understanding 
In the previous chapter, the concept of lived experiences as comportments was 
discussed and the intentional structure of the comportment was outlined which 
described the two aspects of a unified phenomenon. As I have been discussing 
implicit in this is the necessity of first understanding the entity as the entity, it is in 
order to comport towards it.  This is the thrust of the following key passage from 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology;   
Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis], it 
is an understanding of being [Verstehen von Sein] that lies at the root of all comportment 
towards entities. Comportments toward entities belong to a particular entity, which we are 
ourselves, the human Dasein. It is this understanding of being which first of all makes 
possible every comportment toward entities. [BPP 16] (Translation modified) 
This passage is restating one of the main points of the last chapter, that the 
comportments are part of us as an entity. However, it is making two additional and 
related points about Dasein.  Firstly, that an understanding of the being of entities 
(what an entity is) is what makes comportments possible and secondly, that the 
understanding of being, and hence any structure that supports it must come before 
comportments.   While not of significance to this thesis, this very point is part of 
Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl.  A central plank to Husserl's theory is that we have 
an intentional relationship with things in the world, and his method involves 
                                            
141 In these comportments Heidegger is taking the average everyday situation in which we are dealing with 
things familiar to us, not unusual cases when we encounter strange objects.  The sort of entities Heidegger is 
referring to the common everyday items we use, e.g. coffee cups, pens, desks, chairs and so on.  These are 
the exemplar case in which he explores understanding.  We do encounter strange and unfamiliar objects and 
there is certainly some understanding present in those encounters, but it is a derivative mode of understanding 
and not typical of our normal encounters and as such are not good objects for investigation 
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investigating and applying an understanding of intentionality itself as the basis of 
'true' knowledge'.  Heidegger points out that there is a prior task to be done, 
investigating the nature of being of entities prior to undertaking the type of research 
in which Husserl is engaged. 
From a Heideggerian perspective, whenever we comport ourselves towards an 
entity there is implicit in that comportment an understanding of what the entity is, its 
being.  If we did not have any understanding of what entities are then, we could not 
engage or relate to entities appropriately and as such this understanding of being 
thus "lies at the root of all comportment".142  In that comportments are the basis of 
our way of being Dasein (refer the last section) and given that an understanding of 
being is the basis of comportments, then the conclusion is  
  Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Dasein [BTs 11/12]143 
Understanding then is a ‘structural’ aspect, i.e. it is an existentiale [BT 182/142], and 
Heidegger names it as a part of the structure of being-in-the-world, specifically part 
of being-in (BT Ch 5).  Given that having an understanding of being is constitutive 
of Dasein it is ontological.  However, at the ontic level we have an understanding of 
being as part of our daily lives, hence Heidegger's conclusion; 
Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. [BT 32/12] 
This follows from the following: 
• Dasein’s essence (existence) is its comportments (lived experiences) towards 
entities 
• Comportments are constituted on the basis of our understanding of the being of 
the entities to which we comport, 
• The understanding of the being of entities is thus constitutive of the individual 
Dasein. 
 
This is reflected in various comments Heidegger makes about Dasein, e.g.  
Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence [lived experiences of 
                                            
142  In other words, as humans we are able to understand what an edible red berry is from a poisonous one, a 
chair from a table, a pen from a screw driver, and so on and on the basis of this understanding deal with 
(comport) with these entities appropriately.  If the human species did not have this understanding of the being 
of entities we would not have developed the various cultures we have throughout history, we would not be the 
human creatures we are! 
143 The passage is from the Stambaugh translation as the Macquarrie and Robinson translation does not 
capture this important constitutive aspect of understanding of being: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein's Being." [BT 32/12] 
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comportments] [BT 33/12[ (my gloss) 
Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things 
environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned. [BT 155/119] 
 
It is based on this unique, defining character of Dasein as being ontico-ontological 
that Heidegger selects Dasein as the entity with which to commence his main 
project, the meaning of being in its most primordial sense (refer earlier discussion).  
As Heidegger presents it, 
If to Interpret the meaning of being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity 
to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its being, towards 
what we are asking about when we ask this question. [BT 35/15] 
Heidegger's strategy then is to use the fact that we are determined, in part, by our 
understanding of being as the basis of his inquiry into the meaning of being.   
Two Meanings of the 'understanding of being' 
Before proceeding I want to clarify two ways in which Heidegger uses the term 
'understanding of being', and I repeat the quote from Basic Problems used above, 
Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis], it 
is an understanding of being [Verstehen von Sein] that lies at the root of all comportment 
towards entities. Comportments toward entities belong to a particular entity, which we are 
ourselves, the human Dasein. It is this understanding of being which first of all makes 
possible every comportment toward entities. [BPP 16] (I have added the German) 
(Translation modified) (my underlining) 
In the English translation, Hofstadter does not include the German words translated 
as ‘understand of being’.  It was the repetition of this phrase that sent me to the 
German edition [BPPg] to clarify what Heidegger was getting at.  
The German translated as ‘understanding of being’ in the first instance is 
Seinsverständnis and in the second, Verstehen von Sein.  In both cases the 
translation is correct however Heidegger is differentiating between two uses of 
'understanding of being' that does to come through in the English.   
In Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger explains,  
... the conceiving of an entity; or, more generally and cautiously, ... the apprehending of an 
entity ... is what we call, among other things, Seinsverständnis, the understanding of being, 
which we shall now be investigating more minutely. We say "understanding of being," 




However, this is to be distinguished from Verstehen von Sein (understanding of 
being) which Heidegger explains  
… is that which, in apprehending and in grasping, is thrown over against, lies over against 
as the graspable, more exactly, … that which is conceived as such in the conceiving [i.e. 
comportment], the conceptual contents or, as is also said, the meaning. [BPP83-4] (my gloss 
& underlining) 
The Verstehen von Sein (I call this understanding of being 1 as it is prior to 2) is the 
deeper understanding of the meaning of being itself. It is that which constitutes the 
entity as the entity, whereas Seinsverständnis (understanding of being 2) is the 
application of this understanding in the understanding of the object as the object it 
is.  
We can thus only understand entities as the entities they are (2) because we have 
this ability as Dasein to understand being, i.e. what constitutes entities (1).   
Understanding (2) can only occur on the basis of understanding (1).  This does not 
mean we are aware of the basis of (1), we are not.  This is Heidegger’s point.  It is 
an unthematic understanding, what he calls pre-ontological. 
So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of being is other than 
that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in 
which a pre-ontological understanding of being is comprised as a definite characteristic. [BT 
33/13] 
This pre-ontological understanding is not cognitive; it is not an ability we acquire, it 
is who we are.  It is when we attempt to formalise the what it is to be an entity and 
do so in simplistic materialist terms that things go astray.  Further, this ‘going astray’ 
has repercussions when we trust the formalised account rather than the intuitive 
account.   For example, we have constructed nursing homes on the ‘formalised’ 
‘materialist’ account of being, and yet the evidence is clear that the ‘person’ is 
suffering.  Based on hundreds of conversations over the years, there are many 
nurses and care workers who sense that there is something wrong, cannot precisely 
identify the problem but feel powerless to do anything.  Marion Miller’s story points 
to the same phenomenon. 
Heidegger’s research is to use our ability to understand what things are (2) to get at 
the deeper level (1) Hofstadter, the translator of Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
spells this out more clearly in the introduction, 
…  the human Dasein always already encounters entities in terms of a pre-ontological, pre-
conceptual, non-conceptual grasp of their being. Ontology as a scientific discipline is then 
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nothing but the unfolding, in the light proper to thought and therefore in conceptual form, of 
this pre-conceptual understanding-of-being, Seinsverständnis. It is the ... conceptual 
comprehension, of what earlier was grasped only in the immediateness of the living 
encounter. [BPP xxiii] 
In Being and Time Heidegger repeatedly states we have this pre-ontological 
understanding, but it is expressed in its most emphatic form when he states,  
But this vague average understanding of being is still a Fact. [BT 25/5] 
He describes this pre-ontological understanding in a number of ways, all in the same 
paragraph, as “average”, “unilluminated”, “obscured” and “vague” [BT 6/25] all 
referring to the fact that we do not know the basis of this understanding, and this 
gives him his project; 
The very fact that we already live in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being 
is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. 
[BT 23/4]  
Verstehen von Sein (understand of being 1) is not only that on the basis of which an 
entity is what it is, i.e. being, but it is clear that this is the source of the meaning of 
entities. The critical implication of this is that the basis of the meaning (i.e. being) of 
a perceived entity is not found in the entity itself as understanding (2), it is found 
elsewhere, in whatever is the source of being.   
This has implications for Heideggerian based social science research that is seeking 
to investigate the meaning of particular lived experiences. It is not found in the lived 
experiences themselves, the understanding of being (2), it has to be gleaned from 
an understanding of being (1).  This thesis is exploring the meaning of ‘shedding 
life’.  I started on the basis that the answer was to be found in a close examination 
of lived experiences (based on understanding 2) it took me some time to recognise 
I needed to have a deeper understanding (1) which meant having an understanding 
of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world. Hence the heavy emphasis placed on explicating 
Verstehen von Sein.144 
If we go back to the earlier discussions of Heidegger’s understanding of being as an 
underlying organising principle, then in relation to Dasein Heidegger is claiming we 
are accessing this via our understanding of the structure of being-in-the-world.  
Being, as the organising principle, that which is prevailing in entities, that which 
determines the entity as the entity it is, is formal understood as Verstehen von Sein 





This also applies to the understanding of present-at-hand entities. As I have 
previously pointed out, the being of gold is not found in its categorial description; 
this is the basis by which we understand gold as a certain metal (understanding 2).  
The being of gold (understanding 1), that which determines gold as gold, must be 
sought in the organising principles that ‘produce’ the entity with the particular 
categorial characteristics we observe, but, in turn, the organising principles must be 
consistent with all the other base elements.  When we find this, we have an 
understanding of the being (1) of the class of entities, base elements, and we will 
have an account of how the organising principles bring each base element into 
being, i.e. the elemental entity we perceive.  This is the fundamental takeaway 
lesson from Parmenides; entities do not fundamentally erupt into being out of 
nothing, there must be some a priori happening.   
We are thus not creatures who make meaning we are creatures who by the very 
nature are compelled to understand meaning, because of  
 .. the average understanding of being in which we always operate and which in the end 
belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself. [BT 28/8] 
However, as already indicated, this does not mean we get it right all the time, or that 
it is always a complete understanding as  
Not only, however, does an understanding of being belong to Dasein; but this understanding 
develops or decays along with whatever kind of being Dasein may possess at the time [BT 
37/16] 
Heidegger’s practice typically, but not always, entails him using the same or similar 
words to describe the ontological structure he is talking about (e.g. Verstehen von 
Sein) and to describe the experience at the ontic level (e.g. Seinsverständnis).  
While there may be subtle differences in the German, as in the case of 
understanding, this is often lost in the English.  As I have demonstrated identifying 
the way in which Heidegger uses words and applies them at the ontological and the 
ontic level is of significant benefit in understanding Heidegger’s Being and Time. 
This is a hard-won lesson. 
Section Two: Understanding 'understanding of being'  
In this section, I explore the idea of the 'understanding of being' (Seinsverständnis) 
that we have as Dasein.  The direction of inquiry for this section is provided by 
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various comments made by Heidegger in the History of the Concept of Time 
concerning categorial intuition which he acknowledges as a genuine discovery by 
Husserl and which he adapts and extends as part of this understanding of being.   In 
this section, I will discuss not only the concept of categorial intuition but also the 
theory of wholes and parts and Husserl's idea of founding.  All three of these 
concepts appear in Heidegger's work, albeit significantly changed regarding their 
application.  My aim is not to give a rigorous account of Husserl's work and then 
trace its adaptation and development by Heidegger, that is a different project, it is 
simply to introduce the concepts and to demonstrate them.  
Much the initial phenomenological research of this work is carried out by Husserl in 
his seminal works called Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) It was in 
reading the relevant sections of this work to gain a better understanding of categorial 
intuition that I discovered Husserl's work on wholes and parts (the study of which is 
called Mereology).   It is clear that Heidegger has been influenced by both the broad 
concept of categorial intuition but also aspects of Husserl's work in mereology. 
My account has drawn on various works in including those by Husserl (Husserl, 
1989, 2001a, 2001b) Heidegger [HCT] and others (Moran & Cohen, 2012; Moran, 
2000) 
Edmund Husserl - Background 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) initial education was in mathematics gaining his PhD 
in Mathematics in 1883.  He commenced a long teaching career in philosophy 
commencing at the University of Halle in 1887 and ending with his retirement at the 
University of Frieberg in 1928.  During the latter part of the nineteenth century 
through to the early part of the twentieth century, science was going through a 
tumultuous period.  A number of events had raised serious concerns over 
knowledge and challenged the idea of the certainty of knowledge and the basis by 
which knowledge could be accessed.  Aristotelian logic, the bedrock of ‘logic inquiry’ 
for over two thousand years was being replaced by developments of Gottlob Frege 
(1848-1925). The certainty of Euclidean geometry as the way to understanding 
space was shaken by hyperbolic geometry developed concurrently by János Bolyai 
(1802-1860) and Nikolai Lobachevsky (1792 -1856), followed by Bernhard 
Riemann’s (1826-1866) Riemannian geometry.  In both cases, the new geometries 
were developed after casting aside a central postulate Euclid had set down and, in 
part, was the basis of his system. There was also the debate over the nature of heat 
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to which to which I have already referred, the cascading impact of the Darwin-
Wallace theory of evolution published in 1858 and many others.  The upheaval 
continued well into the twentieth century with Einstein’ theories of special and 
general relativity which emerged, in part, because Einstein relinquished 
presuppositions concerning both the nature of time and space and the accepted 
character of matter itself was being questioned by the new field of quantum 
mechanics.   
Husserl’s philosophical project can be understood as a response to this perceived 
crisis concerning the nature of knowledge and the need to anchor knowledge in 
certainty.  This is evident in his Logical Investigations published in 1900-01 through 
to the publication of one of his last books The Crisis of European Sciences and a 
Transcendental Knowledge (Husserl & Carr(Inroduction), 1970) originally published 
in 1936.  During this period, there was also a debate concerning how we access 
knowledge, and a strong view was contained in the form known as psychologism.  
This is the view that we do not have direct access to nature, and what we experience 
is determined by our psychology as such the knowledge and associated laws of 
nature are either grounded and/or explained by reference to our psychology, not by 
access to the ‘real’ world.  Husserl’s project can also be seen as an attack on 
psychologism.  While still maintaining an anti-psychologistic stance, Husserl’s views 
shifted significantly from the Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) which 
reflects a realist position, to Ideas (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012), where he takes 
up a Kantian stance and argues that understand based on ideal forms. Husserl’s 
work shifts to a form of transcendental idealism as the basis of knowledge. 
The influential aspect of Husserl’s work for Heidegger comes, as is probably evident, 
from Logical Investigations and he rejects Husserl’s later developments.  Before 
moving on to these aspects, I will give a rudimentary account of Husserl’s method 
concerning the acquisition of knowledge.  
An Husserlian Approach to Describing What an Entity Is 
Husserl’s fundamental premise was that the experiences we have are of the ‘real’ 
world things themselves and moreover, we all have the same innate capacity to 
have the same experiential understanding of the entities.  Properly understood and 
interpreted these experiences can thus provide the certain basis for grounding 
knowledge, a necessary condition, from Husserl’s perspective, for any science.  Put 
another way, science should not and need not ‘guess’ or put forward unnecessary 
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presuppositions as to its knowledge of an entity. We can determine this by a 
phenomenological interpretation of our experiences of the entity as presented to 
consciousness. 
Husserl’s approach was to identify and describe the essence of an entity, and by 
essence, he meant whatever was the categorial aspect necessarily present in each 
instance of the same type of entity that accounts for our knowing it as the entity it is. 
He called this the ideal form. By way of a simple example, I will give an account of 
how to describe the essence of a letterbox, the example I introduced in a preliminary 
manner earlier. 
An important method in Husserl’s approach is what he calls 'eidetic variation’. These 
are essentially a series of thought experiments that are carried out to isolate the 
essential categorial components of an entity such that a descriptive account of its 
essence is then possible.  In relation to a letterbox, it involves first identifying all the 
various categorial properties associated with a letterbox and then subjecting them 
to variation.   For example, if all other categorial properties are held consonant and 
the colour is changed it is still understood as a letterbox, and so colour can be ruled 
out as an essential feature. The size can be varied, either reduced or increased, 
and there will be a point where it is either too small or too large to be understood as 
a letterbox.  Likewise, the shape can be varied, perhaps considering shapes such 
as a cylinder, a cube, a rectangular box shape and with each change consideration 
is given to its intelligibility as a letterbox. This process is continued through all 
relevant categorial properties until the sufficient and necessary determinants are 
identified and described.  At this point the basis by which we understand a letterbox 
has been identified and described, i.e. we have our definition as an ideal categorial 
description. 
Common physical objects are reasonably straightforward, but then there is the 
challenge of determining the essence of such things as a musical note, desire and 
so on.  In that, each of these entities is capable of being understood as the entity 
Husserl claims that in each case there must be some defining essential categorial 
‘definition’ that we intuit, which gives us knowledge.  He saw the task of his 
phenomenology to identify and describe the essences for all the entities relevant to 
the various sciences.  Certain knowledge of things is thus based on knowing the 
essential definition or form applicable to each entity.  In effect, the knowledge we 
carry around is not the memory of the countless thousands of varieties that may 
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exist for each species of entity; it is the knowledge of the categorial form.   
For Husserl, then we perceive something, say a coffee cup, there are two aspects 
in the perception, there is the sensuous intuition of the object and what he calls the 
categorial intuition which gives us the meaning of the object of the coffee cup. 
Intuitions are Husserl's names for what is experienced in consciousness. The 
categorial intuition is something not given by the senses but is rather what occurs in 
our consciousness.   
On this basis, Husserl is relatively consistent with the tradition from an ontological 
perspective.  His innovation is the epistemological approach he brings to it, based 
on having a categorial intuition of what things are (Husserl, 1989, 2001a, 2001b).  
This is not unlike Plato's ideal forms except that Husserl places them in 
consciousness whereas Plato had them in the world of forms.  In Husserl’s work, 
we thus see the way in which insights from previous philosophers can be pulled 
together. He synthesises various aspects of Plato (ideal forms), Aristotle 
(categories), Descartes (mind/world subject/object) and Kant (the active role of the 
mind in determining perceptions, transcendental idealism) into phenomenology as 
a way to explore the essence of things as part of a theory of knowledge.  As 
mentioned this does not mean he takes over the explicit accounts and detailed 
theories of these philosophers, it is more the fundamental insights which are then 
applied in a novel way.   
While Logical Investigations was marked by a realist ontology, Husserl moved 
progressively into transcendental idealism in his pursuit of a "pure phenomenology" 
and added increasing complexity to his methodology, e.g. the transcendental 
reduction, and in so doing became increasingly isolated from most of his former 
students and followers. (Crowell, 2009; Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994)  It is this 
turn towards idealism that takes Husserl on an investigative journey deep into the 
workings of consciousness in pursuit of the pure ego as the source of the unity of 
our experiences.  (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012; Husserl, 1999) It is this 
development in Husserl’s work, which started to emerge after Logical Investigations 
and before Heidegger’s encounter with Husserl at Freiberg, that leads Heidegger to 
talk about "Husserl's mangling" of phenomenology[IPR].  For Heidegger, the active 
role of the mind in determining knowledge places Husserl in a direct lineage from 
Descartes and Kant; 
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In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant subsequently undertook for the first time a systematic 
analysis of Descartes's starting point regarding the determination of the objectivity of the 
object. With his phenomenology, Husserl defined, unfolded, and gave a foundation to Kant's 
position on this [matter] [ZS 119] 
Demonstrating Categorical Intuition 
Without addressing Husserl's theory, it is important to have a grasp of the 
phenomenon he has in view when he talks about the difference between sensuous 
and categorical intuition, remembering that it is this discovery that was crucial for 
Heidegger in his work.  It is the phenomenon itself and not Husserl’s theoretical 
understanding of it that is important.  
To demonstrate the difference between sensuous intuition and what he terms 
categorical intuition it would be preferable to have some familiar and unfamiliar 
objects to physically present, however, this is not possible in a written work.  Instead, 
I will initially use some words which are not in common uses, words in differing 
scripts and then some photographs of (hopefully) unfamiliar objects.  The aim is to 
create a situation in which the experience of seeing a sensuous intuition and not 
knowing its meaning (categorial intuition) and seeing the same sensuous intuition 
and knowing the meaning can be contrasted.   
Example 1: Unfamiliar words 
By way of note, the use of words in this way is not quite the same as a physical 
object because there is a sense in which the word itself interposes itself between us 
and the object it 'represents'. The use of words as object thus results in some 
blurring of the phenomenal experience, but I think the example will suffice. 
When reading a word, we typically do not distinguish between the visual 
presentation of the word itself and the meaning that accompanies that word, it simply 
shows up as a word that is familiar, something we understand, but the two 
components are there nonetheless.  This can be demonstrated by looking at words 
with which we are unfamiliar. We recognize the visual presentation as a word (a 
very deficient level of understanding) but not the meaning.  For example, the 
words145 given in the box below will present as a possible word, but I suspect at 
least one will have no meaning.  The idea is not to ponder over them but to simply 
look at them and in that moment of initial looking check your experience.  It could 
                                            
145 All the words are found online and checked with The Free Dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/) as 
at 19 May 2017 
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be ‘I know the word’, ‘It looks like a word, but I do not know its meaning’ or perhaps 
‘Just a few meaningless letters’;  
crepuscular, tmesis, nebbish, schwa, zeugma, paralipsis, oenophile.    
The word meanings are presented in Appendix 4.  Take one word that was 
previously unfamiliar, read the meaning and apply it in a few sentences.  Now re-
look at the word in the list. There is probably a slight shift in the experience.  It has 
now become a little familiar.  As the words are understood and used they become 
more and more familiar, the acquisition of the meaning changes the experience with 
the word of how the word is perceived.  However, the actual ‘visual’ presentation of 
the word does not change. Something has been added to the experience.  The 
phenomenon I am attempting to isolate and demonstrate is the shift in the 
experience of understanding, given that the sensual perception remains constant. 
Example 2: Unfamiliar script 
The example can be pushed further by altering the visual presentation.  Have a 
quick look at the words in the following box; 
   िबरालो; القط ;   แมว;  貓   
I suspect that at least one of these scripts will not mean anything. The sense of 
familiarity that was present, even when seeing an unfamiliar English word is even 
further diminished. Even in an unfamiliar English word we recognise the letters and 
have a sense that a word is being presented.  Changing the script removes this.  
The identification of each script and the meaning of the word is given in the 
footnote.146   
While the markings look like a script, it would not be hard to convince someone that 
I have made them up mimicking the script of a foreign language.  The visual 
presentation which has a vague sense of a foreign language and thus possibly 
means something then becomes nonsensical markings, meaningless pattern.  This 
would be the equivalent of me presenting the markings ‘xzwqtg’ to an English reader 
for whom it would show up as nonsense, whereas to a non-English reader familiar 
only with, say Arabic script I suspect that ‘xzwqtg’ may show up as possibly meaning 
                                            
146 Each visual presentation represents the same word in Nepalese, Arabic, Thai and Chinese --cat. 
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something; it would be an interesting experiment.    
However, in each case, the 'raw' visual presentation of the English words or the 
foreign language script is identical regardless of our understanding of the meaning.  
A Nepalese or Arabic reader, for example, sees exactly the same markings on the 
page; it is the meaning that has changed.  The experience of unfamiliarly is 
associated with 'not understanding' the meaning, not in any failing associated with 
the visual representation.  This difference in experience is attributed to the 
'categorial intuition', not the sensuous intuition.   This notion of familiarity is used by 
Heidegger in Being and Time, for example 
Dasein … is 'in' the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-the-world, 
and does so concernfully and with familiarity. [BT 138/104 
In this passage, the reference to “concernfully” addresses the structure of a 
comportment and “familiarity” addresses the pre-ontological understanding that 
Dasein has.  I think Heidegger has accurately identified and named the 
phenomenon associated with this mode of understanding; it reflects knowing 
something so well we are comfortable with it, it ‘feels’ familiar.  
More Complex Examples 
On the following two pages, are photographs of four unusual objects.  When looking 
at the objects, without trying to guess what they are, simply observe if they are 
familiar or not.  This will occur immediately the object is perceived. As in the case of 
the unfamiliar words, there will already be some minimal understanding, i.e. it is a 
tool of some sort, it is manufactured, it is used for something, etc. It is not possible 
to present a ‘tool’ to someone in the culture without there already existing this 
minimal level of understanding.  
On the page following the photographs, I have given a brief description of each item.  
When the descriptions are read, and the objects are again looked at they are now 
seen 'as' something more definite.  There still may be a sense of unfamiliarity, but 
the experience of perceiving the objects is now different.  The objects could be 
presented again, this time with some variations to materials, colour and so on and 

















Photograph 2 Object B 
Photograph 1 Object A 
Description:  
Length – approx. 18cm – Metal 












Photograph 3 Object C 
Description:  
Approx. 18cm long - Metal 
spikes each approx. 5mm 
 
Description:  
Height - approx. 18cm – 






A vintage Lillicrap Hone for sharpening razor blades. The 
blades were flat two-edged safety blades. The blade was 
placed in the hone and move back and forth, turned and the 
action repeated. The friction of the blade edge against the 
glass ‘honed’ the razor’s edge, sharpening the blade. [photo: 
(Lillicrap hone - Uranium Glass Razor Blade 
Sharpener. anon,  n.d.)]    
Object B: 
An early British Grenadier (soldier) match case. Grenades at the time were small, 
hollow metal balls with gunpowder and sealed with a wooden plug which contained 
the fuse. The soldier carried a piece of slow-burning cord called a slow match to 
light the fuses.  The slow match was carried in the brass container attached to their 
shoulder belt. [photo: (Slow-fuse. anon,  n.d.)] 
Object C: 
This is a tool that used to be used by sock/wharf workers to move burlap bales.  The 
handle was held in one hand, and the spikes grabbed the burlap making the bales 
easier to move. [photo: (Dock workers bale hook. anon,  n.d.)] 
Object D: 
This is a mould for lens making. The grinding paste is put into the mould, and the 
glass worked against the mould to form the shape. [photo (Mold for making glass 
lenses. anon,  n.d.)] 
  
Photograph 5 Razor blade 
used in hone 
Image: (Gillette Platinum-
Plus. anon,  unknown date) 
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For Husserl, once we have knowledge of a baling hook we can recognise the 
essential form in each of the baling hooks and on this basis know them as baling 
hooks!  For Heidegger, the basis of what it is to be a baling hook cannot lie in the 
material from; it lies elsewhere. For Heidegger, as I will explore in the next chapters, 
it is the relational context in which the tool is used. This is a profound difference in 
understanding what things are.  Even intuitively there is a sense in which Heidegger 
‘feels’ right. As we read the descriptions of what the entities are we are placing them 
in context, a relational context with other entities, we try to understand how they fit 
in, i.e. their ‘functional fit’ in a relational network of other useful things. 
Theory of parts and Wholes 
Another aspect of Husserl's work that is informative and useful in understanding the 
concepts Heidegger uses in Being and Time is the third Investigation147 of Husserl's 
Logical Investigations(Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) titled On the Theory of Wholes and 
Parts.  The study of parts and their relationship to other parts and the whole has 
been a topic that has attracted philosophical attention since the time of the ancient 
Greeks.  However, it is Husserl's investigation published in Logical Investigations 
that is regarded as one of the first major studies in contemporary philosophy and 
established it as a field of inquiry. (Tieszen, 1995; Varzi, 2016) 
The study of the relationship between wholes and parts is called mereology and in 
the Mereology entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Varzi gives examples 
of ways in which parts can be parts of whole not just physically but spatially and 
temporally (Varzi, 2016);  
Broadly speaking, in English, we can use ‘part’ to indicate any portion of a given entity. The 
portion may itself be attached to the remainder, as in (1), or detached, as in (2); it may be 
cognitively or functionally salient, as in (1)–(2), or arbitrarily demarcated, as in (3); self-
connected, as in (1)–(3), or disconnected, as in (4); homogeneous or otherwise well-
matched, as in (1)–(4), or gerrymandered, as in (5); material, as in (1)–(5), or immaterial, as 
in (6); extended, as in (1)–(6), or unextended, as in (7); spatial, as in (1)–(7), or temporal, as 
in (8); and so on. 
(1) The handle is part of the mug. 
(2) The remote control is part of the stereo system. 
(3) The left half is your part of the cake. 
(4) The cutlery is part of the tableware. 
(5) The contents of this bag are only part of what I bought. 
(6) That area is part of the living room. 
                                            
147 There are six investigations published in 2 volumes and they all related to phenomenology and the theory 
of knowledge.  
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(7) The outermost points are part of the perimeter. 
(8) The first act was the best part of the play. 
The concept also applies to such things as; an element in a mixture (flour in a cake), 
membership (e.g. goalie in a soccer team), geometry (e.g. arc of a circle), grammar 
(e.g. noun as a part of grammar, a letter as a part of a word), logic (e.g. sequences, 
relationship between propositions and conclusions), mathematics (e.g. set theory) 
and so on.   
All the above aspects of wholes and parts are touched on by Husserl who 
understood   
 … the word 'part' in the widest sense: we may call anything a 'part' that can be distinguished 
'in' an object, or, objectively phrased, that is 'present' in it. (Husserl, 2001b, p. 5) 
The concept is extended to anything that can be considered a "predicate" of an 
object including its colour, shape and so on.  Husserl was initially a mathematician 
and logician, and this is evident in his investigation of parts and wholes where he 
often set out relationships as laws, for example, this statement relating to non-
independence, 
A content A is relatively non-independent in regard to a content B ( or in regard to the total 
range of contents determined by B and all its parts), if a pure law, rooted in the peculiar 
character of the kinds of content in question, ensures that a content of the pure Genus A has 
an a priori incapacity to exist except in, or as associated with, other contents from the total 
ranges of the pure Genera of contents determined by B.  (Husserl, 2001b, p. 22) 
As can be seen, the field of mereology is extensive and once it starts to get 
formalised in terms of logic and set theory can become complex very quickly.  The 
above examples also indicate that the concepts of wholes and parts pervade every 
aspect of our lives in how we understand things and in the language we use, we are 
just not aware of it. Another thing to note is that mereology overlaps with a Categorial 
approach, it is examining a number of the same phenomenon but from a different 
perspective. Understood in this way, it is possible to see how Husserl used the 
concepts of parts and wholes as part of his broad account of categorial intuition. 
How Husserl applied the work is not of concern for the thesis. The aim is simply to 
bring the phenomenon into view. 
One aspect that does not stand out in the above examples is the concept of meaning 
or understanding which was the aspect that Husserl was primarily interested in.  For 
example, when we look at a coffee cup we see a unity, a whole, the coffee cup as 
one thing. However, it is possible for us to focus on the cup's colour, its shape, size, 
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components, contents and so on.  However, it is also possible to understand any of 
these aspects separate to the cup and in relations to other objects. Echoes of 
Aristotle’s analysis of the relationship between categories can be heard in this 
account, albeit Husserl is perusing the analysis with far more precision than is 
evident in the extant Aristotelian texts. 
Seeing Things as Whole 
In discussing the concept of wholes and parts, reference is often made to the Gestalt 
psychologists who investigated various aspects of how things show up for us and it 
was the Gestaltists who popularised concepts such as gestalt, figure-ground and 
the ‘sum is greater than the whole’. The investigations by the Gestaltists were 
influential in the early twentieth century, and Heidegger attributes the credit for the 
initial discoveries that the Gestaltists built upon to Husserl, I provide a brief account 
of the relationship between Husserl and the Gestaltists in Appendix 5. 
A simple everyday example of perceiving things as a whole is seeing a car.  We see 
the car as a single unity and do not first identify wheels, doors, bonnet, headlights, 
bumpers, etc. and add them together.  Our typical mode of encountering entities in 
the world is just to see the 'big green car'. On Husserl's account, the perception of 
the car is based on the combination of the visual intuition, and the categorial intuition 
(the categorial form of the car) and Husserl calls these 'moments of unity'.   
We can, of course, identify parts in a whole and Husserl distinguishes two types, 
those parts whose existences are dependent on the car, e.g. the car is green, the 
car is a sedan, and those parts that can have a separate existence, e.g. the car 
doors, the car headlights, etc.  All these parts are entities in their own right, indicated 
by being able to make statements such as "The car is green", "That is a door".  
Again, the similarities to Aristotle's categories is evident.  
While there are some wholes that do not contain parts, for example, a spoon, 
Husserl calls these simple wholes, most entities are complex wholes comprising a 
number of parts, e.g. a car or a cutlery set.  Wholes then can be parts of other 
wholes, e.g. a spoon as part of a cutlery set, or a door as part of a car. Cars can, in 
turn, be part of a whole, e.g. fleet.  From this example, it is easy to see how this idea 
flows across to mathematics and set theory.  There is the set of all spoons, the set 
of all cutlery sets, and the set of all spoons not part of a cutlery set and so on.  By 
way of another example, I can see a whole bed, which is part of a whole bedroom 
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which in turn is a part of a whole house which in turn is part of the street and so on.  
Heidegger uses a very similar example albeit he does not use the language of parts 
and whole, 
... desk in the classroom, the classroom in the university building, the building in the city of 
Marburg, Marburg in Hessen, in Germany, in Europe, on Earth, in a solar system, ... [HCT 158] 
What I am doing at the moment is identifying the phenomenon, and what will 
become obvious later is that Heidegger interprets the phenomenon differently to 
Husserl. i.e. same phenomenon different understanding. 
Husserl explores many different relationships between wholes and parts. For 
example, in some cases, it is impossible for two parts to be present at the same time 
which happens primarily in the case of non-independent parts, e.g. a car cannot be 
both red and green at the same time.  As Husserl explains, 
We cannot at will make the same content at one time part of one sort of whole, at another 
time part of another sort. To be a part, and, more exactly, to be a part of some determinate 
sort (a metaphysical, physical or logical part or whatever) is rooted in the pure generic nature 
of the contents in question, and is governed by laws which in our sense are a priori laws or 
'laws of essence'. (Husserl, 2001b, p. 39) 
There are also some wholes which cannot exist without parts and Husserl gives the 
example that there cannot be a king without subjects, master without servants or 
father without children. Similarly, one cannot be a servant without a master and so 
on.  There is thus contained in this notion the idea of mutually dependent correlates 
in that each is a part of the others whole.   
This last point is extremely important in Heidegger's work and is perhaps one of the 
pivotal concepts in the structure of being-in-the-world.  As will be discussed in the 
chapter on worldhood, it is the mutual, necessary and dependent relationships 
between Daseins that is the base relational structure which determines world.  Time 
and again aspects of Husserl’s phenomenal findings crop up in Heidegger's work, 
but in a novel and reinterpreted way. 
The Whole Determines the Part. 
There is a common idea that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and this 
is typically attributed to the founders of Gestalt psychology (see Appendix 5).  An 
example is that the wall is more than just the sum of bricks and mortar.  However, 
this understanding is not what the Gestaltists, nor Husserl, meant.  Husserl 
understands the whole as determining our understanding of the part.  Kurt Koffka 
 
365 
(1886-1941), one of the founders of Gestalt psychology goes further.  Koffka 
explains that the idea is that the whole is not a mere sum of the parts, it is prior to 
the parts.  Understood in this way it is independent to that of the parts, and a 
corollary that leads from this is that the parts are understood on the basis of the 
whole (Koffka, 2005).  This particular concept can be seen in Heidegger’s account 
of the present-at-hand, whereby anything present-at-hand is what it is only in the 
context of a world.  
Parts and Wholes - examples 
In the following, I will demonstrate the phenomenon of wholes determining what it is 
to be a part. 
Example 1: One Mark and Multiple Meaning 
I approached the development of this example on the basis that if the ‘whole’ 
determines the meaning of the parts, then there should be situations in which we 
could identify one object which has different meanings depending on the context 
(the whole).  I found it difficult to find physical examples, however, I found using 
marks on a page demonstrate the same phenomenon. 
The Multiple Meanings of X and O 
In the world 'box' the letter 'o' is nothing more than a circle that we perceive as the 
letter 'o' because of the context. Similarly, the letter 'x' is nothing more than crossed 
lines.  When we look at the visual aspect of these letters, it is their relationship as 
part of the word that generates the meaning that these are particular letters.  Visual 
presentation and meaning have come together. 
If a person signs a letter to a loved one "love you, xoxo " then we read (and see!) 
the ‘x’ and the ‘o’ not as letters but as hugs and kisses. Here there is the same visual 
presentation, different context, different meaning. In neither case do we see the 'x' 
as simply two crossed lines or the 'o' as a simple, symmetrical closed loop, which is 
all they are once stripped of meaning.  It is actually very hard to see them in this 
way, but once we do it brings what it added to our experience by the 'categorial 
intuition' more clearly into view.   
There are a number of different ways we can see or ‘perceive’ the humble ‘o’; 
• ‘o’ as a letter 
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• ‘o’ as a number 
• ‘o’ as a hug 
• ‘o’ as a game placeholder (e.g. Nought & Crosses) 
Similar the letter ‘x.’ 
• ‘x’ as a letter 
• ‘x’ as a kiss 
• ‘x’ as a variable in algebra 
• ‘x’ as a game placeholder (e.g. Nought & Crosses) 
• ‘x’ as indicating a wrong answer 
When we make the statement that we see ‘x’ as a kiss or ‘x’ as an algebraic variable, 
is a statement that enunciates the two aspects of the ‘perceiving’, the sensuous 
intuition and the as related to the categorial intuition.  As we shift from understanding 
the ‘x’ as a letter, to say ‘x’ as indicating the wrong answer, the visual aspects of 
what we are seeing are the same, it is the understanding that has shifted. This is 
the phenomenon at work.   
These examples apply to where something is being used by Dasein, as a particular 
thing, a ready-to-hand entity, and I want to stay within that constraint.  On this basis, 
if we extend the basic idea then it applies to anything Dasein uses as something.  
Heidegger claims this very point; 
In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 
'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; [BT 189/149] 
We do not need to make any explicit statement, an assertion, that we see something 
as something. If I am playing Noughts & Crosses and place ‘x’ in a square when it 
is my turn, I am applying my understanding of the ‘x’ as a game marker without any 
conscious interpretation going on. The same thing happens when I am eating my 
breakfast cereal and using a spoon; I am using the object as a spoon.  Heidegger 
calls this phenomenon of understanding something as something, the as-structure 
of interpretation. [BT 190/150] It is the same phenomenon to which Husserl is 
referring to when he talks about the unity of perception as being comprised of the 
‘sensuous intuition’ + ‘categorial intuition’. 
Once we understand what something is, then there is a powerful pull to always see 
it as this something. For example, when we understand what a coffee cup is, we no 
longer even have the sense that we are seeing this object as a coffee cup, the as 
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structure of interpretation takes over and we just see the coffee cup.  This is what 
Heidegger is getting at when he says 
When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us 
bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp 
something free, as it were, of the "as", requires a certain readjustment. [BT 190/149] 
He goes on,  
When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure 
to understand it anymore. This grasping which is free of the "as", is a privation of the kind of 
seeing in which one merely understands. [BT 190/149] 
This phenomenon is, sadly, a common feature of some dementias, where there is a 
breakdown in the person’s ability to recognise objects as the entity it is.  There is a 
“failure to understand it anymore”, in other words, the as-structure has come a part.  
Dementia is one of those breakdown cases that provides support for the 
phenomenon that Husserl and Heidegger are describing.  It also points to the 
application of a Heideggerian understanding in dementia; this, however, is a project 
outside the thesis. 
In that we cannot tell what a thing is merely by looking at it (i.e. without the as-
structure or categorial intuition) reducing the meaning of something to its physical 
aspect is nonsense.  Another illustration of this point is that the way we use the 
marking X as a letter is a contingent characteristic of our culture, it may have been 
otherwise.  In the Greek alphabet for example, χ, is the letter ‘chi’ and is pronounced 
like the English k as in kite.  In other words, in English, we may have used another 
mark altogether that has all the same meanings we now ascribe to X.  Put another 
way, the visual presentation and the meaning are different, and it is the meaning we 
understand. 
This concept that there may be different ways of arranging ‘material’ structures’ that 
result in the same entity is known as 'multiple realizability'.  From the 1960s the 
concept has been a significant feature in the debates within the philosophy of mind 
and used as an argument against the reductionist approach of reducing conscious 
experience to physical brain activity. (Bickle, 2016; Chalmers, 1996; Searle, 1997) 
This idea is present in Aristotle's work on hylomorphic entities.  What a thing is, 
according to Aristotle is based on its form not matter, as such a bronze sphere and 
a marble sphere are both spheres because the essence of being a sphere is not in 
the material it is the form.  Similarly, I have three calculators of different ages and 
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technologies.  The material, structural arrangements of the material and the power 
source vary, but I understand, ‘see’ and use each of them as a calculator. This is an 
example of multiple realizability. 
Summary 
The aim has been to demonstrate that there is a difference between the ‘physical’ 
presentation of a thing and understanding the thing as something.  I started 
demonstrating this is the first set of examples and in this set, the idea was extended 
to more clearly highlight that the seeing-as is based on a broader context, in which 
the entity sits.  That it is in some way part of a large whole and it is this whole that 
determines what the entity is.   What I am focusing on is the phenomenon and 
bringing this into view, not the account of the phenomenon.  As was evident in the 
passage from Heidegger he uses a completely different language to Husserl and 
his account is radically different.  Whereas for Husserl, the account of the 
phenomenon is based on the categorial intuition that operates on the basis of ideal 
forms, for Heidegger it is the structure of being.   
Example 2- Dots, Lines and Faces 
In this example, I want to demonstrate the power of the relationship of the whole to 
the part that determines the part that I want to bring more clearly into view with this 
example. 
In Figure 10 four characters are presented placed along a line; a dot, horizontal 
dash, small vertical line and another dot.   They may appear as either four separate 
objects, or perhaps as meaningless marks that could be the result of random 
'doodling' or perhaps of something unfinished.  
 
Figure 10 Dots, lines and dashes 
However, if the four separate objects are rearranged in a certain way, as in Figure 
11,  they show up as a 'face', i.e. a single entity, a unity or a whole. This unity is 
designated in the very language we use, 'a' face.    We do not have to work at 
'aggregating' the four separate markings and then identify them as a face; the face 
is what is given to us in perception, it is what shows up for us.  The coming together 
of the marks and meaning as a face occurs as a unified experience, it is also called 
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a Gestalt.   
 
Figure 11 Face 
However, there is a lot more to be drawn from this.  When we look at the face what 
we see are eyes, nose and mouth, not markings.  We see the marks as an eye, as 
a nose and as a mouth.  While they are parts, they are also ‘wholes’.  It is quite hard 
not to see a face and to resist the pull of seeing the small vertical line as a nose, or 
the dots as eyes.  This is the same point Heidegger was making in the above 
discussion.  What has happened is that the whole has given meaning to the parts.     
The drawing looks nothing like the face of any animal, yet we see a face. Even if I 
slowly break the relationship of the parts, as in Figure 12, we still see a face, and on 
this basis, see the parts as eye, nose mouth. Even in the fourth arrangement of 
marks a face is trying to ‘appear 
 
Figure 12 Movement of face back to dots and dashes 
The marks have to be moved quite some distances from where we would expect a 
nose, eye and mouth to be position before the marks show up merely as marks. 
Looking back at Figure 10 the marks themselves, free of the as-structure reappear. 
This tells us nothing about what it is to be a nose or an eye, that is a different 
exercise.  However, the same phenomenon is at play with ready-to-hand entities, 
and this is behind Heidegger’s example of encountering a room; 
Equipment-in accordance with its equipmentality- always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to 
other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, 
doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, 
so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us 
(though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; [BT 97-8/68] 
The phenomenon that Heidegger is referring to is the same. Just as we first do not 
see the eye, nose and mouth and then assemble these parts as a face, the same 
applies to the study.  We do not first see all the separate pieces of equipment, things 
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ready-to-hand, in the room which then “add up to” a room, we simply encounter the 
room. Heidegger’s reference to equipment belonging to other equipment is part of 
his account of what things are, in other words, it is not just the basis by which we 
understand them it is the basis by which entities are determined, i.e. being. I address 
this in the next chapter  
Example 3: Duck-Rabbit 
I provide the famous example of the duck-rabbit148, that demonstrates two points, 
firstly that the same visual object can be understood as two significantly different 
things, i.e. the same line drawing is understood as a duck and, at a different moment, 
as a rabbit.  In that the line drawing itself stays the same, it is our understanding of 
the lines that changes.  This is a more complex version of the ‘x’ and ‘o’ example.  
The second, associated, point is another example of the concept that the whole 
determines the part, but a more dramatic one, is that parts of the drawing are 
determined by how we understand the whole drawing, e.g. the ears becomes a beak 
and vice versa.  
Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944), a pioneering American psychologist, famously used 
an adaptation of duck-rabbit illusion (Figure 13), in his work to argue that perception 
is not merely a matter of visual sense data but that there is also mental activity 
                                            
148 The first known instance of the duck-rabbit which appeared as an anonymous drawing in the 23rd October 
1892 edition of Fliegende Blätter (p. 147), a weekly satirical magazine published in Munich, Germany. 
 





involved.(Jastrow, 1899)While the concept of ‘mental activity’ is an explanation more 
aligned with the Cartesian account than Heidegger’s  it is the phenomenon I am 
focussing on.   Looked at one way this drawing shows up as a rabbit, looked at 
another as a duck149.    
When the illustration shows up as a rabbit the protruding part of the drawing shows 
up as the rabbit's ears, whereas when seen as a duck, the same parts show up as 
the duck's beak.  In both cases the visual stimuli, or sense data, on the retina is the 
same, but our understanding of the part (ears or beak) is determined by how the 
whole shows up for us.  Another important thing to note is that the image cannot be 
seen as both a rabbit and a duck at the same time!   If we have never had an 
encounter with a duck or a rabbit the drawing may only show up as that with which 
we are familiar, refer footnote regarding the influence of context150.  
Interestingly a contemporary philosopher to Heidegger, born in the same year, but 
in neighbouring Austria, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1952), uses a stylistic version 
of this drawing, Figure 14, in his famous Logical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 2009, 
p. 204) 
Notwithstanding its stylistic presentation, the ambiguity of the drawing still works. 
Wittgenstein was using the ambiguity of the duck-rabbit to support his argument that 
in perception we don't see that the drawing is a duck or rabbit, but that we see the 
drawing as a duck or as a rabbit.  (Wittgenstein, 2009) In other words, the drawing 
                                            
149 When my wife was first shown this drawing, it showed up as a rabbit for a short while and the suddenly 
flipped, much to her surprise and delight, to a duck.  
150 In one study when children were tested on Easter Sunday, when the Easter Bunny comes to deliver the 
Easter eggs, the drawing was more likely to show up as a rabbit, when they were tested on a Sunday in October 
it was more likely to show up as a duck (Brugger & Brugger, 1993).  The implication of this is that the 
understanding of something is also influence by the social context at the time. 
  
Figure 14 Wittgenstein’s Duck Rabbit 
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is an interpretation. This distinction is one that is important to Heidegger and why 
he insists that we perceive something as something [BT].    Interesting Wittgenstein, 
along with Heidegger is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth 
century.  Whereas Heidegger stands at the beginning of what is referred to as 
continental philosophy, the early work of Wittgenstein stands at the beginning of 
analytic philosophy.  However, later in his career, Wittgenstein makes a radical 
change in direction, and this is reflected in the Logical Investigations, and he starts 
to explore similar phenomenon to that which Heidegger was investigating; this is 
what is reflected in his account of the duck-rabbit example.  
While the actual fact of the drawing, the markings on the page, is not dependant on 
us, that the drawing shows up as a duck or as a rabbit does depend on us.  
Heidegger makes this very point, albeit not specifically in relation to the duck-rabbit, 
on a number of occasions, for example; 
It must be stated that the entity as an entity is 'in itself' and independent of any apprehension 
of it; accordingly, the being of the entity is found only in encounter and can be explained, 
made understandable, only from the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure 
of encounter.[HCT 217] 
Entities are in themselves the kinds of entities they are, and in the way they are, even if, for 
example, Dasein does not exist. ... being "is" not, but being is there, insofar as Dasein exists. 
[MFL 153] 
We need to be careful in understanding these comments.  He is not claiming that 
being as determinative of entities vanishes, this is not possible.  It is rather that the 
disclosure of being that is dependent on us, and this is clearer in Being and Time.  
Entities are quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the 
acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is 
ascertained. [BT 228/184] 
This statement also makes clear that entities are not constructed, they exist 
separately to our understanding of them.   This is further support for my reading of 
Heidegger that his work cannot be used to support the constructivist account of 
knowledge.  There are other arguments to support this interpterion, but that is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Example 4: Final Example 
Below, I have included photographs of two different scenes. The first is an old 
church, looking towards the altar, with a chair either side of the altar, font, a serving 
table to the right and what looks like a possible incense holder.  The second 
photograph is part of a country garden constructed mainly out of stone. There is the 
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stone retaining wall, the bird bath, the stone paving, and stone seat.  Stop reading, 
look at the pictures for no more than a couple of seconds as if it were merely a 
passing scene. The idea is not to scrutinise the scenes, but simply observe what 
immediately shows up, like walking into Heidegger’s study.   Then return and start 
reading again. 
 
Photograph 6 Old Church 
Original Image: (Chapel - Fortaleza de Sagres, Portugal. Bradley, 2014) 
 
Photograph 7 Irish Stone Garden 
Original Image: (Irish Stone Garden. anon,  n.d.) 
Were the different elements I named observed?  Do you recall the font and the bird 
bath? If so then this is an example of the same object but in a different context 
(whole) and it is seen as a birdbath or as a font depending on the scene.  The objects 
were photoshopped into the scenes, and unfortunately, my skills are rather limited 
in this area, but I think the intent of the example works, even to a limited degree151.   
This is a similar, but ‘real’ world example to the same lines drawn on a page showing 
up as too different things.  In this case it is the unity of the setting that influences 
                                            
151 I have tried it out on several people and the phenomenon was observed.  It failed with one person who is 
not, and has never been a church ‘goer’, and did not know what a font was. 
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how we see the object. 
This concludes my examples on bring out the phenomenon concerning the 
difference between the visual presentation (understood as the present-at-hand) and 
understanding.  
Founding 
The last concept that I want to comment on is that of founded relationships.  
Heidegger regularly uses this term in Being and Time, and the translators note that 
a   " 'secondary' or 'founded' phenomenon is one which is based upon something 
else" (BT 57 note 5) and that Heidegger took over the notion from Husserl.  This 
does not quite capture Heidegger’s intent, and it is this that I want to discuss.  
Heidegger uses it in a number of ways, for example; 
.. biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. 
[BT 75/50] 
Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded 
essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. [BT 191/192] 
Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon being-in-the-world.[BT 90/62] 
To be clear what Heidegger is getting at it is worth understanding the technical 
meaning of this term as established by Husserl.  As I indicated earlier, although 
Logical Investigations is important as the seminal work for phenomenology, it is also 
a work in logic.  Husserl is engaged in the process of making empirical observations 
and from those observations using logical analysis to draw out what he regards as 
laws of essences, i.e. laws relating to the structure of consciousness that gives us 
access to the knowledge of things.  This can be seen in his definition of 'founded' 
which I quoted in full. 
If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive 
unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such requires foundation by an M or 
also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M. If accordingly Ao, Mo are 
determinate instances of the pure kinds A or M, actualized in a single whole, and standing in 
the relations mentioned, we say that Ao is founded upon Mo, and that it is exclusively founded 
on Mo, if Ao's need for supplementation is satisfied by Mo alone.  (Husserl, 2001b) (p. 25) 
The above definition is straightforward and demonstrates Husserl's intent regarding 
establishing laws of essences based on empirical observation and the application 
of logic.  Like many logically based laws, it thus becomes accessible to a prior proof, 
which Husserl provides.  Simply put if object A cannot exist unless there is an 
existing object B then A is dependent on B.  This, however, does not mean, albeit 
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there could be, a dependency of B on A.   
One of the most important uses of a founded relationship by Heidegger is ruling it 
out; a technique encountered previously.  He acknowledges that things present-at-
hand (think material things) are necessary for there to be the useful entities he calls 
ready-to-hand. However, this is not a founded relationship.  
Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined 
ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything 
ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-
hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand? [BT 101/72] (Heidegger’s italics) 
The question is rhetorical, and the appropriate response is, no. There is thus a 
necessary relationship with the present-at-hand, but not a founded relationship, 
unlike, for example, knowing and being-in-the-world in the above series of quotes.  
If we recall the discussion on Aristotle, the same account is evident. In the example 
of the bronze sphere, the bronze is necessary as one of the causes to bring the 
sphere as an entity into being, but the bronze is not the basis by which the entity is 
a sphere.  In other words the sphere is not founded on the bronze. 
Heidegger and Natural Attitude 
The starting point of inquiries for both Husserl and Heidegger is what is perceived 
in what is called the 'natural attitude'.   This is the way we normally see things, i.e. I 
‘see’ a coffee cup.   However, after the Logical Investigations Husserl becomes more 
and more focused on exploring how it is that we know what things are and he was 
convinced that the answer was ‘inside’ our consciousness, i.e. the experience we 
have, of the object itself.   In order to bring to the fore, with increasing clarity, the 
nature of the experiences he progressively introduces a series of what he calls 
reductions.   The first is what he calls the epoché, whereby he puts aside any 
consideration questions concerning the reality of the entity that is behind the 
experience, essentially putting aside any existing biases or presuppositions that 
explain the phenomenon.  The idea is to simply focus on how the object of 
investigation presents itself in consciousness.  (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012) 
The transcendental reduction is the process by which Husserl seeks the essence of 
a thing in terms of ideal categorial forms.  This requires him to break with any 
‘sensuous intuition’ that is given to us in consciousness associated with the natural 
attitude and isolate the categorial form within consciousness.  This is only a basic 
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account of the reduction, but I think the intent is clear enough. 
Heidegger rejects these reductions, and this is the nub of his critique, 
Let us recall the sense and methodological task of the phenomenological reduction. It seeks 
to arrive at the pure consciousness starting from the factual real consciousness given in the 
natural attitude. This is done by disregarding what is really posited, by withdrawing from every 
real positing. In the reduction we disregard precisely the reality of the consciousness given 
in the natural attitude in the factual human being. ...The sense of the reduction is precisely to 
make no use of the reality of the intentional; it is not posited and experienced as real. [HCT 
109] 
The result of this is  
The sense of the reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the 
question of the being of the intentional could be based. [HCT 109] 
All of Heidegger's work is based on the natural attitude.  His basic premise is that 
the human Dasein has a pre-ontological, pre-theoretical understanding of being that 
is reflected in the comportments towards things in the world, and this is reflected in 
the ‘natural attitude’.  For Heidegger, our understanding of what things are is 
reflected in the way we deal with things, in the world, on an average everyday basis. 
In that our understanding is based on the same phenomenon that determined 
entities as the entities they are, i.e. the phenomenon of being, then being itself must 
be accessed in the world.  This requires that we remain in the ‘natural attitude’ 
focusing the direction of our inquiry onto our dealings in the world, not the 
experiences of the transcendental ideal forms consciousness. This is in line with 
Heidegger's investigative stance as a strict experiential empiricist.  
Summary  
In the previous chapter, I discussed the intentional structure of comportments and 
the concept that our existence is the flow of lived experience that arise from 
expressed comportments. The phenomenon of directedness, of comportments, is 
one that is relatively easy to grasp.  The idea that who we are, understood as 
existence, or the flow of lived experience is a little more difficult, and this aspect will 
be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapters.   
However, in the intentional structure, Heidegger identifies a fundamental aspect of 
the structure that requires investigation, that of understanding.  This was discussed 
in the first section of the chapter.  
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What is crucial to grasp is that when we see and understand an entity, there are two 
components, there is the bare physical intuition, and then there is the basis on which 
we understand the object.  This is the phenomenon that Husserl calls categorial 
intuition, and it was, in part, the discovery of this phenomenon by Husserl and 
published in the Logical Investigations that Heidegger recognised as key to his 
project of investigating the meaning of being and which lead him back to the Greeks. 
This occurs notwithstanding Heidegger rejects Husserl’s methodological 
development post Logical Investigations, and his account of how we understand 
entities, i.e. based on ideal forms.  Heidegger’s recognition and use of aspects of 
Husserl’s earlier work was illustrated in the passages on the as-structure, and the 
encounter with the room.  
Initially, I could not see the phenomenon.  I just did not get what Heidegger was 
talking about when he spoke of seeing something as something, the relevance of 
the as-structure, or what he meant by seeing “something free, as it were, of the 
“as”[BT 190/150].  It was, for this reason, I turned to reading Husserl’s accounts and 
developing various examples to ‘force’ the phenomenon into view. Even though I 
have used the terms ‘sensuous intuition’ and ‘categorial intuition’ at times in 
discussing the examples, this was only by way of convenience and a means of using 
Husserl’s work to get to Heidegger's. They should now be discarded.  They are 
Husserlian concepts rejected by Heidegger and, based on his interpretation of 
Dasein, I agree. 
In one-way Heidegger and Husserl are close, in that they are dealing with the same 
basic phenomenon, but this closeness masks the fact that they are conceptually and 
philosophically miles apart in their understanding of the phenomenon, their method 
of investigating the phenomenon and the conclusions they reach as a result of their 
analysis.  So, while reading Husserl has been of use in accessing and bringing into 
view the phenomenon, the rest of Husserl’s concepts need to be abandoned if 
following Heidegger. 
One of the most fundamental differences is how each conceptualises where the 
work of understanding takes place.  For Husserl, it is in ‘us’.  We receive the 
‘sensuous intuitions’, what he calls sense data, and then we somehow marry them 
up with the ideal forms so as to produce the experiences of seeing objects, hearing 
particular sounds and so on.  It is not that we consciously do this, it is just part of 
who we are. This is in line with the accounts of the British Empiricist and part of the 
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traditional account of who we are.   
Heidegger’s stance is radically different, and the following is an example from the 
Origins of the Work of Art; 
We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the 
appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in 
the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate 
distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things 
themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or 
even mere sounds. [OWA 152] 
In that Dasein’s existence is the lived experience of expressed comportments it is 
not the intentional structure that underpins those lived experiences.  Recalling that 
the being of the entity is not an entity, Dasein is the entity that is ‘produced’ by the 
functioning of the being-in-the-world structure in the context of a particular world.  
The interpretation of an entity as something, the as-structure, is a structural aspect 
of Dasein’s being, not of Dasein.   This view of who we are reflects, perhaps, the 
most fundamental difference between Husserl and Heidegger  
This chapter completes the essential background work I found necessary in 
understanding Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world.  In the next chapter, I 




CHAPTER 14: THE WORLDING OF THE WORLD 
Introduction: 
This chapter is an explication of Heidegger’s concept of the classes of entities he 
calls world and the ready-to-hand.  As indicated Being and Time is almost 
incomprehensible without a grasp of the prior understandings Heidegger brings to 
his analysis and accordingly this chapter uses the concepts previously introduced 
for interpreting the concept of ‘world’.  
The chapter has four distinct but related sections.  The first discusses what 
Heidegger means by ‘being-in’ when he refers to ‘being-in’ the world.   Heidegger’s 
main method is ruling-out ways of thinking that are tied in with the wrong way of 
thinking about world.  Part of the strategy seems to be to create room for considering 
alternatives approaches to understanding world.  The second section explores the 
character of the ready-to-hand based on structural relationships and how Heidegger 
drives this analysis to a radical conclusion; the structure of the ready-to-hand and 
world are the same.  Section three addresses ways in which we can ‘see’ the world. 
Section four is a discussion on Heidegger’s concept of world as something that is 
exhibited in its ‘worlding’, and places this approach in the broad camp of scholarship 
that sees entities as dynamic relationships rather than as static material entities.  
Implications of this approach are also discussed.  
A Note on Average Everydayness 
Throughout the analysis of the structure of Dasein, Heidegger is considering Dasein 
only in the context of its ‘average everydayness’. [BT 69/43] This is how the typical 
average person goes about their life, using equipment and conducting their affairs 
in a way that reflects the average understanding of the community.  For example, 
chains saws were developed for use outside, cutting down trees and then cutting 
them up into manageable pieces.  This is the context in which we should consider 
chainsaws.  If we entered a house and saw a person cutting up their furniture, we 
would immediately understand that something was odd, that this is not normal and 
appropriate behaviour or use of a chainsaw.  Such ‘abnormal’ use is possible as a 
way of being of Dasein, but it is not typical ‘average everydayness’.  Unless stated 
otherwise, this ‘average everydayness’ is the context of all the investigation in 
Division I of Being and Time. 
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Section 1: Preliminary account of World and dwelling-In 
Introduction 
In this section, I commence the discussion by linking back to the previous chapter 
and the discussion on faces and the relational unity. I use this to extend the concept 
into Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time where he commences with the 
relational unity of a room.   
Following Heidegger’s line of inquiry, I will show that what underpins the relational 
unity of a room is the same as that underpinning world and that we can understand 
the room as a ‘whole’ in its own right or as part of a greater whole. i.e. world.  
Using the understanding of the concepts of the previous section the inquiry also 
shows that equipment can only be properly understood as equipment for doing 
things on the basis of it being part of a whole.  This does not mean it is devoid of 
understanding, but that it will seem, somehow inappropriate. 
The Relational Unity 
I want to represent the example of the faces, except this time I have included the 
dots, and dashes in a straight line to commence the sequence (Figure 15). This is 
simply a reminder that there is a phenomenon associated with the way relationships 
are structured that determine what things are as both a ‘whole and a ‘part’.  In the 
'face' example we do not 'see' the relationship, it is 'hidden'.   This is the essence of 
the phenomenon I was drawing out in the last chapter. I am not making any claims 
that the structure underlying the phenomena of the face is the same as world, just 
that such a phenomenon exists and that it applies to world.  There will be no more 
material discussion of this example apart for the odd reference.  
This idea of a 'hidden relationship' of which we are somehow aware is what is behind 
Heidegger's unity of equipment presented in his example of seeing a room,  
 
Figure 15 Dots and faces 
 
381 
.... ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. 
These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add 
up to a sum of realia and fill up a room.  What we encounter as closest to us is the room; and 
we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as 
equipment for residing. ... Out of this the ‘arrangement’ shows itself and in this each 
‘individual’ item of equipment. Before this a unity of equipment has already been discovered. 
[BT 97-8/68-9] (translation modified) (see translation note below) 
I am going to call this room the study.   What Heidegger is pointing out is that when 
we first walk into the room, it presents as a study (think face), a unified whole, and 
this is based on the relational arrangement he calls the unity of equipment (think of 
the arrangement of eye, nose and mouth). 
We could rearrange the pieces of equipment in this study in many different ways, 
and it would still show up as a study.  There could also be a different desk, perhaps 
a library unit, the windows and doors in a different place and it would still show up 
as a study.  If everything in the room was piled into one corner of the room before 
first entering it, then there would be a different encounter.  We may not immediately 
recognise the room, then spot various items in the corner and reach a conclusion 
that this was the study, i.e. it is no longer.  The room has shifted from being a study 
too was a study.  This change is brought about not by a change in the equipment, it 
is the same equipment, but the arrangement of the equipment, i.e. the relationship 
that exists between the pieces of equipment.   
If we entered a room and there were four walls, windows, doors but multiple desks 
each with inkstands, pen, ink, paper and so on (an early twentieth-century example!)  
Then when we first entered the room what would show up for us (what we 
encounter) is an office.  Many of the same elements of the study are present but in 
different numbers and as such the relationship between things has changed.   This 
showing up 'as' something, e.g. study, office, etc. is what Heidegger is focussing on. 
Heidegger is not attempting to explain why this occurs; he is describing the 
phenomenon, something others can also observe and describe as I have done and 
as such his observations and analyses are replicable.  Much of the science that 
goes on in the biological sciences is undertaken on the same basis, i.e. it is a 
description not explanatory.  
So far, I have shown that somehow the arrangement of the equipment plays an 




From Room to World 
So far it has been determined that for the room to be a study that it must have a 
particular arrangement of pieces of equipment.   I now want to draw out and expand 
on some other points in the example. 
To be a study then is not directly associated with any definite piece of equipment.  It 
is not this desk, together with this inkstand and so on.  It is the arrangement of any 
study desk, any ink-stand, any pen and so on.    A desk may be in a study, office, 
classroom etc. it is not dependent just on being in a study.  This reflects the idea 
discussed earlier of parts and wholes. A desk can be regarded as a whole, but it 
can also be regarded as part of a ‘whole’ office or a ‘whole’ study and so on.  
Additionally, whatever it is then that we understand or what it is that determines the 
desk as a desk is not defined at the individual, specific item level, it is at the higher, 
general level, i.e. at the ‘a desk’ level not ‘this desk’ level.  Similarly, with the study, 
it is understood because ‘studies’ are understood.  This doesn’t mean that we do 
not identify a particular study as Mary’s study, it is just a specific instance of a study.  
As to what constitutes equipment, i.e. the desk as a desk, I will come back to the 
question below. 
Long before I first enter any study, the study as an entity must exist in the culture.  
It is not something I invent or construct in my head; it exists as a real entity in the 
world. Before a study can show up for me as a study, I must then first 'discover' what 
particular arrangements of 'a unity of equipment' are required for a study to be a 
study, hence, in part, Heidegger’s comment “a unity of equipment has already been 
discovered.” This understanding of something being what it is prior to our discovery 
will be important in a moment in understanding different aspects of world. 
A particular arrangement of a unity of equipment can be understood in relational 
terms and as such called a relational unity.  It is this relational unity that creates 
what could be understood as the ‘relational space’ which we refer to as the study.  
This ‘relational space’ is what Heidegger calls world; it is the “ 'wherein' a ... Dasein 
as such can be said to 'live' ” [BT 93/65]. Heidegger applies the term to the larger 
public world as well as our own domestic environment [BT 93/65] as well as the 
workshop [BT 100/71].  This ‘relational space’ or world in which we live is a unity, a 
whole, and it has the characteristic previously discussed concerning wholes, in that 
they may belong to larger wholes. For example, my study is located in my house, 
which in turn is located in the area of Mylor in the Adelaide Hills and so on.  These 
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descriptions, however, should not be heard as geographic locations when used in 
this way, they are all ‘relational spaces’ in which I live.  This, of course, does not 
stop them being considered in purely ready-to-hand terms, and as having a definite 
location in extended space.  The point to grasp is that study, workshop and world, 
when discussed in terms of a Dasein living its life, are all ‘relational spaces’, having 
the same basic structure that is in some way related to the ready-to-hand within 
those spaces. 
From a Heideggerian perspective we thus have the following sequence; 
1. Studies exist in broader world of a particular the culture  
2. We learn (disclose) what a study is on the basis of the unity of relationships 
associated with a particular unity of equipment.  
3. When we first enter, we see a study, based on the relational unity of equipment. 
4. We then notice the arrangement of things in this study  
5. Notice specific items in this arrangement. 
In that a study is a world, then the same basic principles should apply to any world, 
large or small.  This implies that the particular world or ‘relational space’ must be 
disclosed before we can enter it a carry out whatever it is we will be doing in that 
space.  This is what Heidegger will claim, and I discuss this later in the chapter. 
We need to keep in mind that Heidegger is making observations from the stance of 
‘average everydayness’ not as a specific act of inquiry. Imagine visiting a friend, 
having not seen them for some time, nor having been to their current house.  You 
meet at the front door, immediately start a conversation only old friends have and 
deep in conversation move through the house to the back sunroom.  After an hour, 
suddenly realising you are late for some other appointment, goodbyes are said 
followed by a hurried departure, walking back through the kitchen and lounge to the 
front door. What would we recall of the house?  Probably the ‘kitchen’ and ‘lounge’, 
but what was the specific arrangement of the various pieces of furniture and 
equipment?  Chances are we would not recall any of these details, all that showed 
up was ‘kitchen’ and ‘lounge’. We can typically navigate our way around the world 
without having a specific awareness of individual items.  This is the phenomenon of 
understanding the ‘whole’ without having to be aware of all the details that are the 
parts in the ‘whole’. I might add that if there were a chainsaw sitting on the kitchen 
bench as you went passed, this would stand out as it ‘doesn’t’ fit what typically forms 
part of a kitchen. The same is true when we are walking around; typically, it is the 
exception that springs into view. 
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Translation and Interpretation Note 
In the above discussion the passage I referred to was originally as follows: 
Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment 
shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. [BT 97-
8/68-9] 
I modified the translations as follows152; 
... Out of this, the ‘arrangement’ shows itself and in this each ‘individual’ item of equipment. 
Before this, a unity of equipment has already been discovered. (my translation) 
In the German, there is no reference to ‘emerging’.  The German is zeigt sich means 
to show or display itself, not emerge which is misleading in describing the 
phenomenon.  The term is used only once not twice, albeit this is a minor point.   
The phrasing in the original translation is ambiguous and can be read as the 
‘individual’ item showing itself from the totality of equipment. This is misleading on 
two counts, firstly the word ‘totality’ can easily be misunderstood and secondly the 
two movements of the showing, the room and then the ‘individual’ equipment are 
dependent on the prior disclosure of the ‘unity of equipment’.  The shift from ‘totality’ 
to ‘unity’ needs elaboration.  
In the original English translation, the term totality should not be understood as in 
the sense of a sum of things or a collection.  The German word that is translated for 
'totality of equipment' is Zeugganzheit, and the relevant word segment is ganz153 
which is a word to designate a whole. For example, ganz Deutschland refers to 
Germany as a whole, as the single entity.  To refer to a collection of things, in terms 
of each member of a group, the German word is alles. e.g. alle Deutschen refers to 
every single German.  To refer to all the equipment, a form of alles Zeug, all the 
equipment, would be more appropriate.  
Consistent with the discussions in the previous chapter, Heidegger is indicating that 
we should understand the study as a unity of equipment, a whole.  Just as we can 
assemble a car out of various parts, the car is not the sum of the parts, it is a 
separate whole, and so it is with the study.  For this reason, I translate Zeugganzheit 
as a "unity of equipment", and we must remember that this "unity of equipment" is 
                                            
152 The German reads: 
“Aus ihm heraus zeigt sich die »Einrichtung«, in dieser das jeweilige »einzelne« Zeug. Vor diesem ist je schon 
eine Zeugganzheit entdeckt.” [BTg 92-3/38-9] 
153 The other word segments are zeug which is a general collective noun used for equipment, things, etc and 
heit which simply designates a noun form of the word. 
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what it is because of the relational arrangement, that which is 'hidden'. 
Note on equipment. 
The German word translated as equipment is Zeug. It refers to ‘stuff’ or ‘gear’ that 
is in some way useful, e.g. fishing gear, all the household stuff and so on. It is thus 
a general collective noun. In some respects, the term ‘equipment’ is too grand and 
maybe a little misleading. Stambaugh, in her translation [BTs] simply uses the 
translation “useful things” which is perhaps a closer translation.  For example, I refer 
to my ‘fishing gear’ rather than equipment, and yet the sinkers and hooks are meant 
to be captured by Zeug.  In future work I will probably change to ‘useful things’, but 
I commenced the thesis by following the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of 
Zeug as equipment as so will not change. Equipment then should be understood 
broadly to include all ‘useful stuff, gear and equipment’. 
Anything we use and employ as something in the carrying on of our activities 
Heidegger designates as ready-to-hand. This includes equipment but also 
consumable items, and if we are employing the wind for sailing, then it includes this 
understanding of wind.   
In the last chapter, there was the example of the foreign, unfamiliar objects.  When 
the object was unfamiliar, it was not useful as we did not know its use.  Even if its 
function is known and understood by others, for us, it was not.  As such it was not a 
useful thing, it was not understood in the relational context in which it could be used. 
This state of understanding Heidegger calls present-at-hand, it is merely a thing.  
When we understand the function of a thing in the context of the usefulness of other 
things, then our understanding has shifted.  This new understanding of the things is 
understanding it as ready-to-hand. 
In this section, we are primarily dealing with equipment, i.e. things for which we 
understand their function, their usefulness.  
Understood in this way just as a desk is a useful thing, something ready-to-hand, so 
is the study.  However, the study is a type of place that is useful which is why 
Heidegger designates the study "as equipment for residing" and it is this idea of 
"residing" that I want to explore.  Recalling the discussion on ‘wholes’ and parts, 
there is the concept that a ‘part of a whole’ can itself be understood as a ‘whole’.  
The study can be understood as a ‘whole’ for residing, but in turn, it is also part of a 
‘house’ which is a larger space residing, and the house is part of the town, and so 
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on.   
From Dwelling in a Room to Dwelling in the World 
We can only enter the room as a study if we understand a prior understanding of ‘a 
study’, this is self-evident.  If walking through an unfamiliar part of the University, we 
stumble into some exotic physics laboratory we may not have a clue what it is. It is 
simply a room full of strange equipment whose use is veiled; we certainly could not 
use the equipment as such it is not a place in which we can 'reside', a place in which 
we could engage in activities associated with living our life.  Even if we are told about 
the equipment’s purpose, this gives us a partial understanding only.  Because we 
do not have the ‘know how’ and access to the room as a physics laboratory we 
cannot properly enter it as something ready-to-hand.  Put another way, the ‘unity of 
equipment’ has not been fully disclosed to us.  
What can be seen emerging in this line of thinking is the understanding of particular 
‘spaces’ that are the ‘wherein’ of the various useful things with which we engage as 
part of living our life. In a word, in which we ‘’reside’.  The concept of ‘spaces’ should 
not be taken too literally. As Heidegger indicates, it is not the space demarked by 
the four walls of the study.  It is the ‘space’ mapped out by the functional relationship 
between all the ready-to-hand useful things was access as part of our expressed 
comportments.  If an architect is familiar with an old building, then as she sits in her 
office reflecting on the building as she prepares renovation plans, the ‘space’ 
includes that old building.   
In other places Heidegger does not use the term residing, he uses the term dwelling 
or describes it as a place with which we are familiar. (e.g. BT CH 2) 
... those entities with which Dasein proximally and for the most part dwells.[BT 92/63] 
signifies "to reside with ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54] (translation modified) 
 
It is worth pointing out a gross error in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation 
concerning this concept.  The last passage cited is translated in the book as, 
"to reside alongside ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54] 
The word “alongside” is problematic.  The German translated as “to reside 
alongside” is “wohnen bei” [BRg 73/54]. The verb ‘wohnen’ is perhaps better 
translated as to live, e.g.  “I live most of my life in the workshop”. However, as long 
as we hear reside in this way, it doesn’t matter. The word “bei” means at or with, as 
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in “I live with Anne”, or “at the workplace”.  If we understand the concept of 
‘equipmental spaces in which we live’ as being constituted by the functional 
relationships between them, i.e. as I have introduced the concept, we can never live 
alongside them. Even the Stambaugh translation of “to dwell near …, to be familiar 
with” [BTs 55/55] is problematic.”  Heidegger is talking from an existential 
perspective, i.e. in relation to our lived experiences, our existence.  When we are 
‘in’ these ‘spaces’ living our lives, it is the ‘spaces’ as constituted by the relational 
connections. Heidegger calls the way in which we ‘in’ these ‘spaces’ being-in and 
this is a structure of being-in the-world; 
"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein, which has being-
in-the-world as its essential constitution. [BT 80/54] [Heidegger’s italics] 
From the previous work, this can be understood as saying that in describing the way 
Dasein lives its life, it has the ability to understand things based on relational unities.  
These relational unities are the present-at-hand structures that are the ‘spaces’ in 
which we dwell, in which we encounter the equipment we use to live our life.   When 
we learn and have the know how to ‘dwell’, i.e. live our life by doing things, in these 
‘spaces’, Heidegger says that a unity of equipment has been discovered.  
Returning to the idea of a room as a complete whole, a unity in and of itself, this is 
better described by Heidegger in History of the Concept of Time. Heidegger also 
uses the term familiarity to indicate that we are dealing with something which we 
understand.   
My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put 
together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential 
unity as closed, from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out. 
Such an environment of the nature of a closed referential unity is at the same time 
distinguished by a specific familiarity. The closed character of the referential unity is grounded 
precisely in familiarity, and this familiarity implies that the referential relations are well-known. 
[HCT 187] (translation modified)154 
In this section, Heidegger is using the term ‘referential unity’ rather than the ‘unity of 
equipment’.  This is the same phenomenon described from a different perspective 
as will be addressed in a moment. 
The phenomenon of familiarity is something we do not experience other than when 
                                            
154 I have changed the translation to reflect my interpretation of Heidegger's work.  The German words related 
to the changes are Verweisungszusammenhang - which can also be translated as referential context and 
geschlossenen Verweisungsganzheit which translates as a closed referential whole. 
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it is absent.  For example, we do not notice the light on in the room until the light is 
turned off.  We may experience the lack of familiarity when moving to a new work 
environment. We do not know immediately where everything is, how this office 
functions and so on; it is unfamiliar.  Within a week or two we are comfortable in the 
workspace; the experience of unfamiliarity has gone. However, we fail to notice the 
experience of familiarity because it is now so pervasive, it has become part of our 
everyday lived experiences.  It is the familiarity with the ‘referential unity’ of all the 
useful stuff in this office that enables us to ‘be in’ the office, move around it, live in it 
as such. Before this occurs, we must have become familiar with the referential 
relations associated with offices in general, and with this particular office.  For 
example, we may know there is a place for office supplies in an office, we just need 
to learn where it is in this office. However, a new employee fresh from school may 
not even know that any office has a place for office supplies.  
When we enter the office or the study it is not entering it "in a geometrical spatial 
sense, but as equipment for"[BT 98/68] living.  In other words, it cannot be 
understood as a corporeal body entering into the three-dimensional space created 
by the walls.  To speak of ‘alongside’ or ‘near’ in this context is thus a nonsense.  
However, this does not mean we cannot simply view the situation as a physical body 
entering physical space, but in so doing we have eliminated Dasein as an entity that 
dwells-in, and the office as a place for dwelling-in.    
At this point, considering the two aspects of the phenomenon of understanding an 
entity may be helpful.  If we consider the strange physics laboratory all that is 
presenting to us are objects as present-at-hand, this is the visual presentation 
devoid of the necessary understanding of what the objects mean, in Heidegger’s 
terms, we do not understand their way of being.  The example of the foreign objects 
was an illustration of this point.  What we now have is this same phenomenon 
applied to ‘spaces’, not just to individual objects.  To be able to enter a ‘space’ in 
which we can do things it cannot be in a “geometric spatial sense” but as a place 
with which we are familiar, a place in which we can ‘live our life’, to dwell, i.e. as 
ready-to-hand.  That we can first enter a laboratory as ‘present-at-hand’, become 
familiar with its various workings and then later enter it as ‘ready-to-hand’ is the 
same phenomenon, indicating the two aspects at play.  To put this another way, 
while the scientist can dwell in this laboratory, I can’t. 
When a carer, cleaner or a nurse enters a nursing home, it is a place which is familiar 
 
389 
in the sense that they understand how it works for them. It provides a place wherein 
they can engage in those expressed comportments, to have lived experiences that 
are meaningful in terms of who they are, their existence.  For the older people ‘living’ 
in the nursing home, the question that arises is whether or not the nursing home 
offers the same opportunities to engage in the expressed comportments that are the 
lived experience of an existence that is meaningful, i.e. relevant to how they 
understand themselves.  Put another way, is the nursing home a place where older 
people can reside, can dwell?  We cannot yet answer this, but there is an intuition 
that the inquiry is heading in the right direction. 
By way of a summary to date.  In the last chapter, we have moved from 
understanding intentionality as a directedness, to intentionality being the structure 
of comportments, to expressed comportments being our lived experiences, our 
existence.  We then progressed to understanding that comportments with entities 
are based on a prior understanding of the being of the entity.  Now, what has been 
introduced is that the ‘spaces’ in which we dwell are the ‘relational unities’ or ‘unities 
of equipment’.  Depending on the particular ‘relational structure’ this could be a 
study, a kitchen, an office, a laboratory, or a nursing home, each of which may be 
part of a larger ‘relational unity’.  The character of these ‘spaces’ is one of ready-to-
hand, of a useful space in which we do particular things related to our existence. 
While we do not ‘see’ the relational structure when we are working (concernful 
comportments) in the study we are dependent on this structure with which we are 
somehow familiar.  In that our life is an unfolding of lived experiences (expressed 
comportments) to live a life thus requires familiarity with the various environments 
such that they provide a habitat in which to dwell, to live our life.  
The Move from Rooms to World 
To date, I have introduced the phenomenon that there are relational unities.  This 
was demonstrated in the examples given in the last chapter.  This phenomenon has 
been employed in this chapter by indicating that it is the particular arrangements of 
equipment that determines if the room is a study, kitchen or office.  In this the 
character of the ‘relationships’ that form that unity have yet to be clarified, this will 
be the task of the next section.  The aim at the moment is to provide an overview of 
the basic Heideggerian concept at play.  
Heidegger considers the study to be a whole, and thus an entity in its own right.  
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However, following the previous discussion on wholes and parts, the study, while 
understood as a whole can also be part of a whole, in this case, a house. I have 
already touched on this.  However, we must not slide back in understanding the 
house as a collection of geometric spaced filled with objects which are used for 
different things.  The house, in turn, must be understood as a ‘unity of equipment’, 
a relational whole.   It is because we understand the 'unity of equipment' that is the 
house that we can comport towards the entity that is understood as ‘house’, i.e. we 
can dwell in it, it is a place wherein we reside, live our life.   
Where this is heading is now perhaps becoming clear, the house is part of the street, 
the street forms part of the city and so on.  To be familiar, with a city is to have a 
prior disclosure of the relational unity that constitutes a city, and when we comport 
our self to parts of the city, we can be understood as 'dwelling' within the relational 
unity of equipment that constitutes a city.  Once we have this concept, then we have 
now moved to Heidegger's idea of world.  While Heidegger typically reserves world 
for these larger structures, the same structure applies to “one’s ‘own’ closest 
(domestic) environment” as well as the larger ‘public world’. [BT 93/65].  It can thus 
be the world of New York, the world of the university or the world of the nursing 
home, the world of the workshop or the ’study’ world. They all have the same basic 
structure [BT 93/95] and have relationships one to the other that can be understood 
in terms of wholes and parts.   Metaphorically, this can be envisaged as a giant 
networked cobweb that is structurally the same no matter where you look, but the 
structural arrangements in one part may be different to another, giving each region 
of the cobweb a unique character within the whole. 
Heidegger's concept of world can, on a preliminary basis, be thought of as this 
relational unity of equipment.  Heidegger progresses this idea to the concept of a 
referential unity which has a related, but slightly different meaning, which I address 
below. Given that comportments have the structure of intentionality, they require an 
understanding of the entities ready-to-hand prior to any comportment.  In that a 
specific piece of equipment can only be understood in the context of a unity of 
equipment, i.e. a referential unity, then Heidegger is arguing that the disclosure of a 
world (a referential unity) must occur before comportments are possible.   
While there will be some obscurity in the concept, what should be emerging is that 
there is a linking of the idea that the relationships between equipment (referential 
unity) that constitute the ‘spaces’ in which we dwell, and the idea that Heidegger 
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calls these ‘spaces’ worlds or environment.   What has to be clarified is the aspect 
of the phenomenon discussed from the previous chapter that it is the whole that 
determines the part.  If this is to apply, then it must be demonstrated that it is the 
relational unity that determines the equipment.  Additionally, the nature of the 
relationship needs to be brought into view.  This is the task of the next section.  First, 
I want to take a closer look at the phenomenon of ‘dwelling’ or being-in. 
Clarifying Being-in (dwelling) the World  
The concept of being-in can be heard as 'residing-in' or 'dwelling-in', and it relates 
only to Dasein.  Heidegger goes to great lengths to point out that when he refers to 
being-in, he is not meaning 'in' in the sense of one object inside another. As 
Heidegger is intending the idea of ‘in’, entities other than Dasein cannot be 'in' a 
study, a kitchen, or an office in the sense of dwelling, they can only be 'in' in a 
physical way.  This is also true when considering the physical human body of Dasein 
[BT 79/54].  Heidegger explains, that when we hear “being-in ‘in the world … we are 
inclined to understand” it as the same relationship entities that are physically 
present, extended in space, “have to each other with regard to their location in that 
space.” [BT 79/54]. Heidegger gives the example of water in a glass, or clothes in a 
cupboard as ways we understand ‘in’, and pushes the point saying that this 
relationship  
… can be expanded: for instance, the bench is in the lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the 
university, the university is in the city, and so on, until we can say that the bench is 'in world-
space'. [BT 79/54] 
In this last set of examples, Heidegger deliberately introduces the term “ ‘in world 
space’ ” to emphasise the point he is making; that this is the way we are “inclined to 
understand being-in” in the world.  For all these examples Heidegger agrees that 
there is a “being ‘in’” relationship between these entities.  When we are referring to 
these entities in this way, it is as present-at-hand entities whose ontological 
characteristics are “categorial” [BT 79/54]. In other words, Heidegger does not deny 
that when we are considering the physical aspects of entities that they can have the 
type of ‘in’ relation we understand them to have, even to the extent of being ‘in’ the 
‘world’.  The point he is driving home is that Dasein is not its body, it cannot be 
thought of in the same way as a physical object because it is ontologically different.  
What constitutes these entities, their categorial ontological characteristics “are of 
such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of being is not of the character of 
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Dasein” [BT 79/54].   
So, yes, these other entities can be thought of as being ‘in’, but this is not what 
Heidegger means when he is referring to ‘being-in’ as this term only refers to Dasein.  
To push the point again, just after he emphatically states that ‘being-in’ is 
constitutive of Dasein’s being, “it is an existentiale”, he reiterates that we cannot 
think of any “corporeal Thing (such as the human body)” as being-in [BT 79/54]. 
While elsewhere Heidegger uses the technique of ruling out ways of thinking 
concerning how his concepts are to be understood, nowhere else does he go to 
such lengths to rule out a way of thinking as he does with being-in and Dasein.  This 
approach forces us to consider other ways of thinking and warns us that if we drift 
back to thinking in this way we have gone astray in our understanding.  This was, 
for example, part of the challenge in thinking about or conceptualising, even if 
initially in general terms, the concepts of being and Dasein as intended by 
Heidegger.  In thinking about what it is the Heidegger means by ‘being-in’, part of 
the elements have already started to emerge, even though they may appear only in 
a vague way.  These elements include being-in as a structural aspect of Dasein (an 
existentiale) that describes a common and essential characteristic of our existence 
and that somehow it is to do with an understanding of the relational unity of 
‘equipment’ that determines the ‘spaces’ in which we live.  Just how is yet to be 
explored. 
In the section in Being and Time [BT §12] where Heidegger rules out the way of 
thinking that should be applied to ‘being-in’, he goes into the etymology155 of the 
word 'in' to orientate our thinking in the ‘right’ way before he proceeds with his 
analysis Dasein’s structure.  Given the importance Heidegger places on this, I will 
briefly discuss what he appears to be emphasising and the direction he seems to 
be pointing us.  
Heidegger suggests that the word ‘in’ derives from the older German word "innan"156 
which has the meaning of “wohnen”, which, as pointed out translates as ‘to live’ or 
                                            
155 I will briefly go through the explanation that Heidegger provides.  Whether his analysis of the etymology is 
correct or not is irrelevant. What is important is that it sheds light on one of the most important terms in Being 
and Time, being-in-the-world. 
156 In a footnote to this section Heidegger makes reference to Jacob Grimm’s (1785-1863) collection of essays 
Kleinere Schriften.  In the English translation, Macquarrie and Robinson [BT 80 note 1] advise that the essay to 
which Heidegger refers is a discussion on a number of archaic German words associated with the concept 
Heidegger is getting at, i.e. dwelling, residing, etc. 
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as Macquarrie and Robinson prefer "to reside".  This is followed by “ "habitare157", 
"to dwell" ". [BT 80/54] Heidegger seems to be pointing us towards understanding 
this as a ‘living-in’ which is a dynamic concept and far removed from the way that a 
pen or my computer can be understood as being in the study. Heidegger then turns 
back to ‘innan’ and discusses the suffix ‘an’; 
'An' signifies "I am accustomed", "I am familiar with", "I look after something". [BT 80/54] 
This aspect picks up the phenomenon of familiarity that was discussed in the earlier 
chapters.   The idea of looking after something is a comportment and as such has 
an intentional structure, and whatever the ‘something’ is requires understanding 
which in turn has the two aspects referred to earlier.  The concept of being-in is thus 
rich with all these aspects that have been touched upon to date.  Understood in this 
way, when Heidegger refers to dwelling in a study or the world, one can start to 
grasp why it only refers to Dasein as it relates to characteristics of the way a Dasein 
lives its life.  There is no sense in which my pen has familiarity with the study!   
This takes us to Heidegger’s next point of discussion.  The German word for the 
English word ‘am’, as in ‘I am’, is 'bin'.   Heidegger says that 'bin' is connected with 
'bei' "[BT 80/54].  In Being and Time Heidegger does not expand on the word 'bei', 
and so the connection is not clear.  It is a German word used as a locative 
preposition, i.e. at, in, upon and so on.  I take it however that Heidegger is using it 
in the sense of ‘I am at home’ or ‘I am at work’.  The German word phrase ‘ich bei’, 
which Heidegger does not elaborate on, has the sense of placing oneself within a 
locational sense, but in an abstract, not physical sense.  For example, the German 
musical Ich bei Tag und du bei Nacht translates into English I by Day and You by 
Night.  Heidegger draws the connection by saying that ich bin ('I am') is connected 
to ich bei  and that this, 
 ... means in its turn I live, keep myself in the world as something familiar in such and such a 
way. [BTg 73/54] (my translation) 
On this reading, President John Kennedy’s famous 1963 phrase “Ich bin ein 
Berliner” would be to understand oneself as a Berliner by virtue of the way of life of 
a Berliner and not simply by locating oneself in Berlin.  Indeed, it was the 
                                            
157 “habitare” is in the German and is left untranslated. It is unclear how this is to be ‘heard’ as there is no direct 
equivalent in modern German. The modern German Habitate has the sense of a living environmental habitat.  
However, if the word is the Latin habitare, and Latin etymologies are referred to in the discussion, then the 
meaning incorporates the sense of ‘living’. 
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identification with the life of the West Berliners, subject to the embargos imposed by 
the East German communist authorities to which Kennedy was referring.  I take it 
that this illustrates Heidegger’s intent by relating ‘ich bin’ to ‘ich bie’ and as such, 
there is support for Heidegger’s interpretation. 
Heidegger then draws the link between ‘I am' (ich bin) to the infinitive form of the 
verb, which is 'being' (Sein), and concludes that when 'being' is used in conjunction 
with Dasein, it  
signifies "to live in ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54] 
Accordingly, we reach a formal understanding of the being of Dasein, 
"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Dasein, which has the 
essential constitution of being-in-the-world.  [BTs 55/54]158 
The constitutive structure of Dasein thus comprises two key aspects "being-in" and 
"the world".  As we have seen 'being-in' is dwelling-in and is based on a familiarity 
with the world of which Dasein has disclosed beforehand.  Drawing upon the 
previous work addressing the structure of intentionality we can see that Heidegger 
has significantly transformed Brentano’s concept into the very structure of Dasein. 
The intentional structure is not one that directs and connects our mind to the world; 
it is the structure of living (the mode of comportment) in the world (the entity).  As 
this is what is common to all Daseins, Heidegger has identified a structure 
associated with our way of being and then classifies it ontologically. It becomes 
‘being-in’ as a structure associated with ‘the world’. While the structure of the world 
is yet to be described, once it has, it is easy to see the intentional structure that is 
informing the unified phenomenon Heidegger calls being-in-the-world.  
Once we are at the ontological level, it is a very ‘high level’ of abstraction as it covers 
all the various modes of expressed comportment exhibited by all Dasein.  It must be 
remembered that world is not the physical stuff, it is the ‘space’ created by whatever 
‘relational unity’ in which a Dasein dwells.  
Translation and Interpretation Note 
I have made a material change to the standard translation in the above discussion, 
                                            
158 As indicated by the reference I have used the Stambaugh translation.  The Macquarrie and Robinson 
translation does not provide the proper sense of what Heidegger is getting at; 
" "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its 
essential state. " [BT 80/84] 
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and the following is my rationale for the change. 
German Text 
Der Ausdruck »bin« hängt zusammen mit »bei«; »ich bin« besagt wiederum: ich wohne, halte 
mich auf bei ... der Welt, als dem so und so Vertrauten [BTg 73/54 
Original English translation 
The expression 'bin' is connected with 'bei', and so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" 
or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. [BT 
80/54] 
Comment: 
My concern in this passage is the “dwell alongside … the world”” which is translated 
from, halte mich auf bei .. der Welt 
The standard translation is misleading. The translation of ‘alongside’ has too strong 
a link to the one present-at-hand entity being ‘alongside’ another.  Further, the term 
‘dwell’, does not appear, it appears as a variation of the phrase “I reside”.   I translate 
the phrase “halte mich auf bei … “as keep myself in” or “maintain myself in”. 
This gives us  
The expression 'bin' is connected with 'bei', and so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn I reside 
or I keep myself in…  the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. [BT 
80/54] 
If we hear ‘keep’ or ‘maintain’ not in the sense of physical, but as tending to or caring 
then we have a direct link to Heidegger’s name for the Dasein’s being, Care.    
Absorption in And Disclosing the World 
In this section of Being and Time, there is a difficult to translate but very informative 
sentence that illustrates both Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and one of his 
methods.   I will present the German and then the two standard English translations 
followed by my comments. 
German: 
Das »Sein bei« der Welt, in dem noch näher auszulegenden Sinne des Aufgehens in der 
Welt, ist ein im In-Sein fundiertes Existenzial. [BTg 73/54] 
English Macquarrie & Robinson 
'Being alongside' the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world (a sense which calls 




"Being together with" ["Sein bei"] the world, in the sense of being absorbed in the world, 
which must be further interpreted, is an existential which is grounded in being-in. [BTs 55/55] 
Comments and Discussion 
Heidegger has gone, as I have argued, to great lengths to avoid any understanding 
of Dasein in the world in other than as the ‘relational space’ in which it lives.  Here, 
however, Heidegger has not used words that can be translated as ‘living’, ‘dwelling’ 
of ‘residing’ but given the context, this is the what he is expressing in his term “Das 
»Sein bei« der Welt”.  This phrase is literally translated as “ ‘being in’ the world”, 
where Sein bei is translated as ‘being in’ and it refers to the way a Dasein, as an 
entity, is in the world, i.e. it is an observation concerning the entity or the ontic.   
In the earlier discussion on structures, I pointed out that what Heidegger is doing is 
moving from observations at the entity/ontic level to describing ‘structures’ at the 
ontological level that capture and describe the commonality observed at the ontic 
level. This method is simply providing a descriptive account of what things are is the 
investigation approach that was first identified by Aristotle and to which I referred in 
Chapter 6.  What Heidegger is expressing in this sentence is that there is an 
essential characteristic that is part of every Dasein existence that he has observed, 
and he is pointing it out, it is our way of ‘being in’ (Sein bei) the world.  Having 
identified the common characteristic at the ontic level, he then names it as an 
existentiale, an ontological structure.  The name he attributes to this is “In-Sein”, or 
in English “being-in”.  Heidegger will frequently use similar, and sometimes the 
same, German word to describe the phenomenon at the ontic level and the name 
he is giving to the structural element.    This is what is happening with the use of the 
terms “Sein bei” (being in) describing the ontic level phenomenon and “In-Sein” 
(being-in) being the name he is giving to the ontological level ‘structure’. 
While I think the translations of “being alongside” and “being together with” are 
problematic they are trying to present an alternative to “being in” which lacks the 
differentiation of the German.  Wherever possible, I think it is preferable to find an 
English word that tries to reflect what Heidegger is doing but also helps to 
differentiate the terms.  This is not always possible, and the translators will 
sometimes use a capital letter at the beginning of the word to indicate a different 
usage, e.g. articulate and Articulate [BT 195 note 1].  In relation to Sein-bei, my 
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preferred translation is ‘being amidst’, and this should be heard as ‘being in’ as per 
the discussion. 
Being Absorbed 
This brings us to the next informative aspect, the German phrase Sinne des 
Aufgehens in der Welt.  This is a description of the ontic way in which Dasein, the 
entity, is in the world; the description is “being absorbed in the world”, the translation 
is fine.  The idea is to reflect that most of the time (our average everydayness) we 
simply go about our activities of living not paying particular attention to the ‘things’ 
we are using as part of what we are doing.  We typically do not notice the floor, the 
doors, desk, chairs, the keyboard, coffee cup and so on.  When someone is so 
immersed in work they may fail to notice what is going on we say they are “deeply 
absorbed in their work”, this is similar sense to what Heidegger intends.   
Whatever we are doing requires our engagement with entities ready-to-hand, which 
in turn forms part of the unity of equipment or the referential unity that has been 
discussed. There is a sense then, that as we go about our work we are ‘absorbed’ 
not so much in the work but in the relational unity, what I have been referring to as 
the ‘relational space’ what Heidegger refers to as world.  That this is the case 
becomes apparent a little late in Being and Time when Heidegger states that the 
“world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand" [BT 106/75], rather the world, at the 
ontic level is “that ‘wherein’ a … Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’ ”[BT 93/65]. 
Summary 
This section has introduced two concepts.  Firstly, informed by the previous 
chapters, that world should, in some way be understood as a relational unity.  The 
nature of this relational unity has also been discussed, but as yet only in a vague 
way as, in some way, connected to the ready-to-hand.  The aim of the next section 
will be to bring the character of the relational unity more clearly into view.  The 
relational unity is a flexible concept, and Heidegger calls this structure world, and 
makes it clear that it is the same basic structure regardless if it is the ‘world’ of the 
workshop, what he calls a domestic environment or the wider ‘public world’.  In that, 
he applies it to a workshop it also applies, for example to my study area where I 
carry out the work of researching and writing this thesis.  It is for this reason that I 
introduced the term ‘relational space’ to describe this same phenomenon, i.e. it is 
the ‘relational space’ that determines the ‘wherein’ that I live my life. Different 
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‘relational spaces’ or worlds may have specific names in the culture; study, office, 
city, nursing home, world of the theatre, and so on.  All of these are unities, or 
‘wholes’ and are entities.   Secondly, the nature of being-in the ‘relational space’ or 
world is not and should never be understood as my bodily presence inside a 
prescribed space.  Being-in relates to the way we have an unthematized 
understanding, what Heidegger refers to as our being absorbed, in the relational 
unity associated with the ready-to-hand of the particular ‘space’.  It is the way in 
which we are familiar with the ‘space’ in this way that is the basis by which we can 
engage in the activities that form the expressed comportments, the lived 
experiences that constitute our existence.   
The next sections discuss how Heidegger explores our relationship with a class of 
entities within the ready-to-hand, what he refers to as equipment or useful things, 
and then identifies and describes the characteristics of the relational unity. 
Section 2: From Equipment to the Relational Unity of World 
Introduction 
The various ways in which the term being is used can lead to quite a lot of confusion 
and even Heidegger moved away from using the term later in his career(Sheehan, 
2015).  This is associated with the different uses of being discussed in Chapter 5. 
To help avoid this confusion, I will occasionally use Peirce's term, practical-bearing 
when an entity’s way of being is referred to.   
Different classes of entities have different ways of becoming the entities they are 
and as a consequence have different ways of being.  Dasein, world, ready-to-hand 
and the present-at-hand are the main classes of entities discussed in Being and 
Time. Each has unique ways of being which are determined by its being.  In this 
section it is the ready-to-hand entities that will be discussed.   
Sub-Classes of Ready-to-Hand 
The entities, other than Dasein that are incorporated into the activities of Dasein’s 
living, either positively or negatively, have a structure of practical bearings 
understood in terms of their typical relational involvement with each other.  They are 
also understood on the basis of how they fit-in, one with the other. These entities 
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are known as the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit159), and their way is called 
readiness-to-hand. (Note again the similarity of names between the ontic level and 
the ontological!) There are various sub-classes of entities within the broader class 
of ready-to-hand including equipment [BT 98/69], materials [BT 100/70], natural 
products [BT 100/70], environing Nature [BT 101/71], work or product [BT 100/71], 
signs (e.g. stop signs) [BT 109/78] and so on.  The reference to Nature is in the way 
it breaks into and impacts on our lives or the way we harness Nature for our 
purposes. It is not referring to Nature understood qua Nature. 
Because all these sub-classes of entities are designated as having a way of practical 
bearing that is called readiness-to-hand means that the same basic ontological 
structure constitutes them.  The class of being that Heidegger chooses to explore 
to determine the structure of the ready-to-hand is equipment. It is equipment that 
we primarily use in our concernful comportments to get things done; it is the most 
common class of entities with which we engage.  
Heidegger’s Method 
The workhorses of Heidegger’s method are observation and logical analysis, and in 
investigating the being of equipment, this is the approach he takes, initially focusing 
on what we do with equipment (practical bearings). The same ontological structure 
underlies both complex and simple things and as such Heidegger typically uses 
easy to access examples; his famous example starts with a hammer. While such 
observations are necessary, he warns that by themselves such observations, if 
focused on the wrong things, will not show what constitutes equipment. 
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering 
with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped 
thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the 
using. [BT 98/69] 
The method involves not looking at the equipment (hammer thing) itself but rather 
to focus on what it is doing, the way it is related to other entities via these ‘dealings’; 
this is the reduction. In that, we are observing what the entity is doing in relation to 
other entities we are observing ‘categorial’ characteristics [BT 184/144] generally 
overlooked in the materialist approach.  That Heidegger refers to the characteristics 
of the way of being of the present-to-hand as categorial has resulted in objections 
                                            
159 The German word zuhanden simple means something close at hand, in readiness, at one's disposal and it 
is this sense that Heidegger is trying to capture. The suffix ‘heit’ simply indicates a noun form of the word. 
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from some Heideggerian commentators, e.g. Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 1991) in that he also 
applies the term to the present-at-hand [BT 91/63]. However, if we recall Aristotle's 
categories (Chapter 6), then such things as the way in which one entity ‘bears’ on 
another or is impacted by another are categorial concepts, just as the physical 
characteristics are.  Heidegger is correct in applying the term categorial in both 
cases; it is simply that the broader set of categories does not apply to the present-
at-hand.  It would be useful to clarify this in more detail; however, this is not required 
for this thesis and as such not addressed. 
In the earlier examples of the unfamiliar tools (e.g. the slow match container), it was 
not possible to understand what the thing was simply by looking at the physical 
characteristics of the object itself.   Heidegger makes the same point, 
No matter how sharply we just look at the 'outward appearance' of Things in whatever form 
this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. [BT 98/69]  
The way of being of the ‘slow match’ is reflected in the categorial characterises other 
than the physical (i.e. substance, quantity, quality) and unless we have access to 
them the being of the ‘slow much’ remains hidden. Heidegger's use of 'discover' 
should be noted.  This was first encountered in relation to understanding the 
relational unity of equipment associated with being a study.  ‘Discover’ is a technical 
word for Heidegger and so it suggests something similar may be happening here.  
Recalling Aristotle’s categories, the last two were ‘doing’ and ‘being affected’. These 
were complementary, whereby ‘doing’ indicated some form of action or behaviour 
on the entity in relation to another and ‘being affected’ refers to the involvement with 
the entity ‘doing’, and reflects how it is being affected.  Neither of these ways of 
being is evident simply by looking at the entities.  Further, if we recall the discussion 
on Husserl’s mereology, he identified there were certain reciprocal relationships that 
determine each entity, e.g. king and subjects.  This same phenomenon seems to be 
at play here, and so we have the being of the hammer being disclosed when we put 
it to use, i.e. hammering.  What Heidegger has not yet discussed is that when we 
hammer we are doing something to something; this is the relationship. 
Theoretical versus Practical Behaviour 
Heidegger distinguishes between two types of behaviour, " 'practical' behaviour" and 
"theoretical behaviour". What he claims is that we are not going to "grasp" anything 
ready-to-hand theoretically [BT 99/70].  Simply put if we want to understand what a 
piece of equipment properly ‘is’ then we must use it, and the more we use it, the 
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better we understand it160.  In doing this we do not understand the hammer as a 
shank and metal head, we understand it in terms of its practical-bearings.  For 
example, we have to learn to properly ‘do’ with a hammer so that it produces the 
required ‘effect’ on the nail.  This is true even concerning the ‘slow match’. Even 
though we may never have seen one working, we bring to bear a body of practical 
knowledge from prior experience.  Simply explaining what a technical piece of 
physics equipment is would give me some insight, but I could still not use it. I could 
not grasp what it is in terms of its functioning; I do not have the practical know-how. 
The Structure Revealed 
The ‘in-order-to’ Structure 
Heidegger’s starting point is the observation that as we go about our daily life we 
are engaged with various useful things, what he calls equipment, a sub-class of the 
ready-to-hand. Recalling the previous discussions, our engagement with things is a 
comportment, and the specific name Heidegger gives to comportments towards 
entities is concern.  
We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern ‘equipment’.  In our dealings we 
come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. [BT 
97/68] 
I have already discussed the wide scope that the concept of equipment covers.   The 
clothes I am wearing, the desk and chairs I am using, the music player I am listening 
to, the jug that boils the water for my coffee, the tin I store the ground coffee in, and 
so on all fit under the category of equipment. 
His next step is to identify that equipment is “essentially ‘something in-order-to’ …”.  
In that equipment should be heard in a very broad way so to should ‘in-order-to’ and 
the related concept of ‘dealings’.  There are two ways in which ‘in-order-to’ can be 
taken. The first is to focus on what the equipment does, e.g. we use the hammer ‘in-
order-to’ hammer and the other way is to focus on the relationship between the 
equipment and what it is doing in relation to other equipment. E.g. the hammer is 
used ‘in-order-to’ drive in nails.  Heidegger specifically rules out the first 
consideration as the way to disclose the structure;  
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering 
with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped 
                                            




thematicaliy as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the 
using. [BT 98/69] (my underlining) 
While Heidegger gives the example of ‘hammering with the hammer’ this must be 
read in conjunction with the underlined section, i.e. the focus of hammering is not 
the hammering as such, it is what the hammering is doing161. This can be seen a 
few lines further down when Heidegger comments; 
In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to 
the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time. [BT 
98/69] 
If we take the hammer as something ‘in-order-to’ drive in the nail, we can see that 
the focus of Heidegger’s attention is once more informed by the Aristotelian 
categories, in this case, ‘having an effect’. A hammer then is essentially something 
that has an effect on something else, i.e. nails, and the effect is to ‘drive them in’ or 
to use Heidegger’s term ‘in-order-to’.  We can then consider the nail and look at it 
the same way.  The nail is something ‘in-order-to’ make fast.  This link continues, 
for example we ask, why do we want something to be ‘made fast’, and the response 
needs to be framed as an ‘in-order-to’.  Depending on what is being produced it 
could be ‘in-order-to’ provide storage, e.g. shelves for books, protection from the 
elements, e.g. in the case of a house.  This chain ends in a final ‘in-order-to’ either 
to provide care of and easy access to the books for Dasein or perhaps shelter for 
Dasein. Heidegger refers to the essential relationships that are constituted by the 
‘in-order-to’ aspects as a structure. Equipment then, understood as something ‘in-
order-to’ as part of the structure can never be properly understood by itself, hence, 
taken “strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment.”[BT 97/69] 
As in most things in Heidegger’s work, there are sub-classes. In the case of the ‘in-
order-to’, the nature of the relationship can be classified in different ways. In the 
section on equipment in Being and Time, he provides four examples, “serviceability, 
conduciveness, usability, manipulability.” [BT 97/68] and later in the chapter, he 
adds “detrimentality” [BT 114/83].  Understanding precisely what Heidegger means 
by some of these terms is difficult. In summary, they can be understood as follows: 
Serviceability (Dienlichkeit) and usability(Verwendbarkeit) are the two most frequent 
                                            
161 Recalling Aristotle’s ten categories of ways of being, category 9 is ‘Doing’ which is the action of something 
doing something to something else.  The reciprocal to this is category 10 ‘Being affected’ or being impacted or 
changed by something else.  Heidegger is thus making categorial observations, just not the ones typically used 
in a materialist account in determining being. 
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types of ‘in-order-to’ that Heidegger refers to and they are often paired together, for 
example; 
The "towards-which" of a serviceability and the "for-which" of a usability prescribed the ways 
in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete. [BT 114/83] 
It is not easy to clarify the difference between serviceability and usability in the way, 
but they have different and important roles.  The usability of the shoe is in the 
wearing [for-which], whereas the serviceability of the shoe is the service it offers 
towards wearing [towards-which]162.   I may have a good pair of walking shoes this 
is the serviceability that it offers. I put them on (wear them) and want to go for a run 
and find they are not very useable for this purpose.  The serviceability can be 
thought of as being in the offering, and the usability in the receiving.   The in-order-
to structure can be imagined a series of relationships the quality and nature of which 
is determined by the interplay of the serviceability offered and the usability required.    
Conduciveness (Beiträglichkeit) relates to the work itself.  For example, the way in 
which the shoe is made must be conducive to the serviceability it will offer and hence 
the usability required.  This is evident in the following passage; 
 … the work, in accord with the kind of being it has, is itself in the character of 'conducive to.' 
The shoe is for wearing, the table for use, the clock for telling time. [HCT 192] 
Here the phrase “the shoe is for wearing” should be heard as “the shoe is conducive 
for wearing”, etc.  
Manipulability (Handlichkeit) is determined by the serviceability requirement.  For 
example, a screwdriver may offer the right serviceability to unfasten a particular 
screw. However, if the screw is in such an awkward location the screwdriver cannot 
be used; it does not have the appropriate manipulability. In other words, within this 
particular equipmental set of relationships, it doesn’t fit.  A special screwdriver is 
required ‘in-order-to’ access the screw.  In Basic Problems, Handlichkeit is 
translated as ‘handy quality’, but the intent of what I have explained is evident; 
The place of a piece of equipment within an equipmental contexture is always determined 
with regard to the handy quality ["Handlichkeit"] of the handy thing prescribed and required 
by the functionality totality. [BPP 310] (my German gloss) 
In that all of these are types of “in-order-to” there is a relational aspect that should 
                                            
162 Again, this description, as is the case for the other types of in-order-to, can be understood in terms of 
Aristotle’s broader list of categories. 
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be evident.  Serviceability only applies to finished equipment and relates to the way 
it can ‘have an effect’ on something. Usability relates to how something is affected 
by the serviceability; something can thus be more or less serviceable for a particular 
use. Conduciveness relates the relationships between the work (equipment) as 
made and the serviceability it then offers; equipment made in different styles and 
with different materials can thus be more or less conducive for the serviceability 
required.  There is a dynamic tension in ‘in-order-to’ structure as the most 
appropriate serviceability is sought in equipment to meet the usability requirements.  
In designing the equipment to offer a particular serviceability, consideration is thus 
given to what is most conducive to that serviceability in terms of design, materials 
and so on.  This can be represented as follows: (conduciveness  serviceability 
 usability).  Understood in this way the ‘in-order-to-structure’ is a dynamic set of 
relationships where ultimately the equipment is determined by the relational 
structure itself. In other words, the structure is the basis for any piece of equipment 
coming into being. 
Approaching the Structure from a Focus on the Work 
When we have reached a certain level of competence with a piece of equipment, 
often the ‘awareness’ of the equipment itself disappears, in Heidegger’s terms it 
“withdraws” when we are using it; we focus only on the work being produced.  
People who touch type will often have this experience, the keyboard disappears, 
and there are only the words flowing into the screen.  Heidegger tells us that this is 
phenomenal support for the fact that what we are primarily focused on is the work, 
not the tools; 
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, 
as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our 
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with 
which we concern ourselves primarily is the work-that which is to be produced at the time; 
and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. [BT 99/70]  
This then points to a relationship,  
The work bears with it that referential unity within which the equipment is encountered. [BT 
99/70] [translation modified] 
From here Heidegger masterfully pulls out this referential unity; 
The work to be produced, as the "towards-which" of such things as the hammer, the plane, 
and the needle, likewise has the kind of being that belongs to equipment. [BT 99/70]  
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In other words, there is a sense in which these tools are 'linked' in some relationship 
to the work being used.  Heidegger calls this the 'towards-which'.  If we think back 
to Aristotle's four causes, this has an echo of the ‘final cause’ or better put the ‘for-
the-sake-of-which’ the activity is undertaken.  This is evident in the next step; the 
work that is produced is something that has practical-bearing, it is equipment ‘for 
something’. 
The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing (footgear); the clock is manufactured for 
telling the time. [BT 99/70]  
All our tools then, are in some way directed towards the work, and the work we 
produce is then directed towards its use, which indicates a reference from the tools 
through to the end use of the work.  However, it is not the tool itself that is of 
importance it is the specific usability of the tool,  
 The work which we chiefly encounter in our concernful dealings - the work that is to be found 
when one is "at work" on something - has a usability which belongs to it essentially; in this 
usability it lets us encounter already the "towards-which" for which it is usable. [BT 99/70]  
Having traced the linking relationship towards the end use, Heidegger then traces 
the linkages back the other way, to the source of what is used in the work, the 
material as the " 'whereof” of which it consists"[BT 100/70]. This points to an entire 
chain of things, all of which have their mode of practical-bearing, and hence are 
constituted by the structure of readiness-to-hand. 
In the work there is also a reference or assignment to 'materials': the work is dependent on 
leather, thread, needles, and the like. Leather, more-over is produced from hides. These are 
taken from animals, which someone else has raised. Animals also occur within the world 
without having been raised at all; and, in a way, these entities still produce themselves even 
when they have been raised. So in the environment certain entities become accessible which 
are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced. Hammer, 
tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist 
of these. In equipment that is used, 'Nature' is discovered along with it by that use - the 
'Nature' we find in natural products [BT 100/71]  
Having first identified a structure based on the ‘in-order-to’ relationships, he then 
refines this by identifying and classifying different types of ‘in-order-to’, primarily 
serviceability-usability. He then identifies that these aspects act as a series of points 
in a dynamic set of relationships that provide references or assignments one to the 
other. These provide a sense of directionality, destination and purpose establishing 
the dynamic relationship between the different aspects of structure (conduciveness 
 serviceability usability). This determines how the equipment comes into 
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being in terms of its design and material, i.e. the structure becomes concrete.  This 
is given in the following; 
The "towards-which" of a serviceability and the "for-which" of a usability prescribed the ways 
in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete. [BT 114/83] 
What Heidegger has laid out is the being of equipment (the referential unity of 
relationships) which is the basis by which equipment is determined as the equipment 
it is. This is the Aristotelian question 1.  He has also specified the way this referential 
unity is responsible for the entity itself coming into being, i.e. materials are chosen 
and manufactured on the basis of conduciveness to the needs of serviceability, etc. 
This is the Aristotelian question 2. 
In relation question 2, Aristotle argued that we need to account for the entity coming 
into being by reference to what he called the four causes of change.  Heidegger has 
rejected Aristotle’s account of the essence of equipment as being the form, even if 
understood as a formula, however, he has retained the notion of the organising 
principle, and this arises out of the dynamic nature of the referential structure.  We 
thus have Heidegger’s account of a piece of equipment coming into being as follows, 
Material: The material from which things are made. 
Formal: The organising principle is the unity of the relational structure  
Efficient: The production processes 
For-the-sake-of-which: The ‘towards-which’ of usability 
Based on this analysis my claim is that this Aristotelian-Heideggerian structure 
applies to all equipment and is the basis by which such entities come into being.  In 
relation to this thesis, this structure accounts for the design and construction of 
contemporary nursing homes.  The organising principle associated with the 
structure can be understood in terms of the usability of the nursing home, which in 
turn is reflected in the serviceability that is provided by the physical form, i.e. what 
has been constructed.   
The ‘usability’ of the nursing home is the ‘care’ of older people with a range of frailties 
of the body.  The ‘care’ is thus the organising principle of this particular piece of 
equipment within the larger context of the culture. How care is understood will thus 
be evident in the physical design and construction of the nursing home and in the 
practices involving the nursing home.  I contend that ‘care’ as understood within a 
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nursing home is based on a basic understanding that relates almost exclusively to 
the body and not to supporting the person having a life, as such this should be 
evident in the conduciveness and serviceability of the nursing home construction.   
This line of research is outside the scope of the thesis, but the work of the thesis 
points to this as an informative line of research.  
It is possible that the same building fabric can be used in different ways to serve 
different ‘usabilities’.  Heidegger acknowledges this basic principle in that some 
equipment is specialised and some has flexible use,  
The tool has the character of being of 'in-order-to.' The range of usability of a tool is narrower 
or wider. A hammer has a wider range of usability than a watchmaker's instrument, which is 
tailored precisely to his particular kind of concern. The narrower the sphere of use, the more 
unequivocal the reference. [HCT 191] 
There is then the possibility that a constructed nursing home may be applied to more 
than one conception of ‘care’ or ‘usability’ however this can be relatively easily 
confirmed by observation of the practices within the ‘referential space’ of the nursing 
home.  As part of this, it must be remembered that a nursing home is something 
ready-to-hand as both a world and a piece of equipment. This is in accordance with 
the above discussions. 
In observing this account carefully what we see is that a specific piece of equipment 
is neither determined not understood as the basis of its physical form, but rather its 
part in a larger unified structure.  Indeed, the physical form arises in response to the 
structure.  This larger structure is the structure of ‘world’ viewed from the perspective 
of equipment, not Dasein.  This structure is the same that Heidegger identified in 
the Greek account of being in terms of nature as the prevailing.  The equipmental 
unity is world viewed from a particular perspective, we thus have the concept of 
world as that which prevails, and in its dynamic prevailing, it gives rise to entities.  
World as such is prevailing in the equipment, hence the commonality of structure.   
Nature as something useful 
In the above discussion, reference was made to Nature in terms of being a source 
of materials to be used in the referential unity. Heidegger points out that when we 
understand things of Nature in this way it is  
The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the 
wind is wind 'in the sails' [BT 100/70] 
Notice it is not the forest as forest. What has happened is that we have transformed 
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these entities from what they are in themselves (nature qua nature), into materials 
for a ‘use’ for Dasein.   
Things of nature that have the misfortune to have characteristics that can be ‘used’ 
as materials get transformed from Nature qua Nature to Nature qua ready-to-hand, 
pulled into the structure that is ‘producing’ things for use. Once this occurs, it is 
doubtful if many Dasein’s can ever see Nature qua Nature and what shows up for 
them is, a resource to be exploited. For example, a forest as wood chips, a river to 
be dammed for power. From being a tree as part of a wilderness eco-system to 
being a woodlot for the mill and planks and lengths of timber for building a house. 
There is no way that the tree that shows up as part of Nature, and a tree seen as 
suitable for milling are the same tree; even if physically (present-at-hand) they are 
one and the same.  I suspect that this is a significant part of the environmental 
activism that was so much part of Tasmanian life over the last four decades. What 
has transformed them, is the dynamics of the relational structure!!  This is 
Heidegger’s point.  Heidegger is thus saying that Dasein (not necessarily all) will 
often see things in nature not in terms of Nature itself, but in terms of how it can be 
adapted for our use.  While not for this thesis exploring the implications of this way 
of understanding has implications for the environmental movement and even the 
debates on global warming. 
From the Work to People – The Public World 
The work that is produced therefore refers to the "whereof" from which it is produced, 
the "towards-which" of its usability through to the "the person who is to wear it or 
use it." [BT 100/71].  This type of reference can occur when something is ordered 
or produced for someone specifically.  For example, when I take my car to a local 
mechanic there is a direct relationship between my need to have the car attended 
to, the work required on the car itself, the tools and materials needed to do the work, 
the doing of the work by the mechanic, the garage space, the consumable material 
used and so on. They all need to come together as part of a referential unity.  Apart 
from this jobbing situation there is also the case of mass-produced goods; 
Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means 
lacking; it is merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average. [BT 100/71] 
Now comes the critical step, 
Thus along with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with 
Dasein's kind of being entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-
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hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which 
is at the same time ours.  Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not 
only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world.   [BT 100/71]  
In other words, there is the place in which we work, our workshop, a place in which 
we understand how everything works, where we can use the various pieces of 
equipment to go about our daily activities, a place in which we are familiar. This is 
the place wherein we dwell.  However, from the domestic world of the workshop, we 
are also connected, whether we recognise it or not to the activities of the far broader 
world, the public world.  Even if we have some knowledge of this broader world, we 
will probably not be familiar with the domestic words in which our customers, and 
suppliers and so on work and live, i.e. dwell; we are connected to them nonetheless.  
The ‘public world’, which is a ready-to-hand entity, is, regardless of whether or not 
a particular Dasein has knowledge of it. From my perspective, this makes Heidegger 
a realist. 
One of the things to notice is that the relational network is not static. It is the 
antithesis of materialist structures.  If we include every aspect, follow every linkage 
through to its source, it is a dynamic, immense and unknowable network of flowing 
‘froms’ and ‘tos’ that pump through the referential unity. Little wonder that later 
Heidegger will talk of the ‘worlding of the world’[TT]. This, of course, is the nature of 
the modern world.  If I follow the linkage relationships just from the parts of my 
computer, then based on the various stamps on the component parts, the links 
extend to China, Singapore, Japan and Philippines. These linkages include the 
means of transport, the means of distribution of the parts, the factories, the material 
sources for each of the parts, the resources used in the factories, the workers in the 
factories, the clothes the workers need to work, and so on.  Each point along the 
way will have relational links that extend out in a multitude of other directions.  In the 
early 1980s I travelled to a remote area of Papua New Guinea when people were 
still living in a way that had, for the most part, been unchanged long before 
Europeans arrived.  There was little sign, then, of European influence.  The domestic 
and public world of these villages was radically different.  If Heidegger is right, then 
the more that a domestic world links to a public world then the more the public world 
determines the character of the domestic world.  From an anthropological 
perspective the change in relational linkages in the public world, resulting in the 
transformation of the domestic world would be of significant research merit. 
However, it may be too late; the world may be too connected.  The same 
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phenomenon should be evident in any other ways. For example, the functioning of 
all nursing homes in Australia is now determined in important ways by the same 
aspects of a wider world (e.g. federal compliance, funding schemes, building codes, 
medical best practice, etc.).  The more uniform the structural way of being of the 
nursing home, the less capacity there is for significant innovation and change that 
may require structural reconfiguration.  It does not necessarily preclude innovation, 
but if all material resources are consumed to support a structure determined by the 
wider world, then significant innovation becomes difficult.  The other impediment to 
change which will emerge later is that the need for such material innovation 
becomes concealed.  These are areas of future research from a Heideggerian 
perspective. 
Environing Nature Accessible to All 
We all have our different domestic worlds in which we dwell, in which we have 
meaningful comportments, but each of our domestic worlds is part of the public world 
in some way.  There will always be part of the public world for us to discover, there 
will always be other possible domestic worlds for us to discover.  No one person 
knows all the public world and by implication all the domestic worlds.  World then is 
a collective undertaking of all people interconnected via their public worlds through 
to their domestic environments.  There is, however, a place that is accessible to 
everyone, environing Nature. 
Along with the public world, the environing Nature is discovered and is accessible to 
everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some 
definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation 
for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence 
or absence of daylight … [BT 101/71]  
Regardless of our awareness of the relationships when we are engaged in our work 
all the other entities involved in the work are brought along with it; 
Our concernful absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of 
discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending upon the way in which we are 
absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along in the work and with it ... 
remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness. [BT 101/71] 
This concludes the setting out of the relational structure of the world.  However, this 
setting out has not brought ‘world’ into view; it has simply pointed to relationships.  
The next section brings the world ‘into view’. 
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Heidegger’s Four Worlds 
For the sake of completeness, I want to briefly touch on Heidegger’s four uses of 
the term world presented in Chapter III of Being and Time [BT 93/64-5]. I am simply 
going to present them without any detailed discussion as the meanings are self-
evident based on the discussions to date. 
1. World can be used to refer to all the entities with the world, or the universe 
understood as present-at-hand entities. This is an ontic concept.  This is the 
physicalist or materialist conception.  It is also possible to have a specific ‘realm’ 
for example all the “possible object of mathematics.” 
2. World can function as the ontological term associated with the being of the 
entities mention in 1. 
3. World can be understood in another ontical way, as an entity that “wherein” 
Dasein dwells, i.e. on the basis that has been discussed in this chapter. This is 
world as referential unity. 
4.  World is also understood as what Heidegger calls an ontologico-existential 
concept he designates worldhood.  Essentially this is the ontological structure 
for world in 3 and is also an existentiale of Dasein.  This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Heidegger will occasionally refer to world understood as 1. and indicates that when 
he does, he will place it in quotes, i.e. ‘world’ to make the use clear. The term world 
is reserved by Heidegger for the third expression of world.   
Section 3: ‘Seeing’ the World 
Introduction 
There are two key points to draw from the analysis so far.  The first is that we 
understand equipment in terms of what it does, its usability, and its usability is 
determined by the requirements of the referential unity.  It is this aspect of ‘usability’ 
that ties in with Heidegger’s name for this class of entities, the ready-to-hand.  This 
understanding is different to understanding a thing just as present-at-hand. This was 
demonstrated earlier when looking at the unfamiliar equipment.   The difference is 
not simply that we understand 'a function' that is attached to the present-at-hand 
object, rather it is because we have been able to grasp the usability of the equipment 
in terms of its fit with other equipment and to some end purpose, the for-the-sake-
of-which. The glass hone has a towards which of sharpening razor blades, the blade 
for shaving, the shaving for a Dasein to have a neat or groomed appearance.  The 
slow match container, for holding the device for lighting fuses, which detonates a 
bomb, which destroys or kills to help win the battle.  Notwithstanding the slow match 
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holder is no longer used, it gives us an insight into a world, even if the world has 
passed.  Heidegger uses this approach when analysing a painting of an old pair of 
work boots in The Origin of a Work of Art. [OWA], i.e. his analysis disclosed a 
different world. 
The second point is that there are relationships between the ready-to-hand entities 
based on those aspects associated with them being ready-to-hand. It is the usability 
of the equipment that is important in making the shoes; it is the suitability of the 
leather that enables it to be worked into shoes, it is the usability of the shoes as 
something to wear and so on.  All these aspects come out only in the relationship in 
which they are used.  I will expand on these in the next section. 
There is then a unity of equipment, constituted by a network of references 
(Heidegger also uses the term assignments) that is required for any single ready-
to-hand entity to be (function, be usable, be suitable, etc.) the thing it is.  This is 
basis behind Heidegger’s comment that,  
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there 
always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. [BT 97/68] 
This unity of equipment is also called world and has readiness-to-hand as its way of 
being. 
Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic 
circumspective absorption163 in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-
hand of a unity of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with 
the world. [BT 107/77] 
If we recall the early Greek idea of Nature as that from which things emerge, we see 
the same idea here in that it is only possible, on the basis of world for there to be a 
specific type of ready-to-hand entity in the world.   
There are two things happening; firstly, the world is that which determines the ready-
to-hand entities within the world and secondly it is our familiarity with the world that 
enables us to understand these entities as such. Again, this is the two parts of 
Heidegger’s formal indication of being.  For example, to understand the slow match 
container one has to understand, fuse, burning, bomb, detonate, explosion, war and 
                                            
163 Note that the German word here is Aufgehens.  Earlier I translated this as disclosure as it was at the 
ontological level.  Here Heidegger is describing the ontic level and as such I have left it as absorption.  This is 
another example of Heidegger playing with words. In this case the same word is used but slightly different uses 
of the word are applied at the ontological level and at the ontic level.  
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so forth.  To understand war is another complex set of relationships, and so on.  To 
repeat, “Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. “[BT 97/68] 
Each piece of equipment has its own unity of equipment, which in turn will typically 
belong to a larger unity of recall study, house, street, city.  However, not only does 
the unity cascade out in this locational sense, there is a unity around the desk, the 
chair, the ink and so on. For the chair, there is the shop from which it came, the 
workshop, the timber suppliers, the glue suppliers, and on and on.  The relational 
network is pervasive; this is the worlding of the world.  The relational unity of the 
study and the chair must both be disclosed beforehand. If we recall, the concept of 
a part also being a whole, this is what is happening in the relation of the chair and 
the study. 
Similarly, we can think of the increasing unities such as bank account, bank, world 
of banking, world of finance, world of commerce, country economy, each with the 
interlocking unities for each piece of equipment.  These expanding unities are then 
not sharply defined.  A motor vehicle, for example, is a unity. However, it can be 
understood as part of the petroleum industry, the road system, the motor vehicle 
fleet of a company, the asset of a family, manufacturing industry, and so on.  What 
it is to be a motor vehicle is determined by its relationship to all these separate 
worlds, i.e. a larger set of reference, a larger unity of equipment, a larger 
understanding of world. 
'Seeing' the world 
It may seem obvious, but it is easy to overlook, if we consider the concept of wholes 
and parts, a whole can never be part of ‘it’ itself while at the same time the whole is 
constitutive of the parts. This is what Heidegger is getting in the following;  
The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities 
that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their 
being, as entities which have been discovered. [BT 102/72] 
In that there is a world first then entities in the world, the same applies to our 
understanding. We must first disclose (understand) a world before we discover 
(understand) the entities within the world [BT].  
The question then arises that given we do not see the structure itself, that the entities 
are within the world and we dwell within the world is it then possible to 'see' the 
world.  Recalling the earlier discussion on gravity and Peirce, it is not necessary for 
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an experiential empiricist to have sight of a physical object, it is possible to bring it 
into view in terms of its 'practical bearings'.  However, there lies a problem, for the 
world to function as a world, it must remain unnoticeable.  An analogy is turning on 
the light in a dark room.  We see all the contents in the room because of the light, 
but we do not notice the light itself.  We ‘see’ the role of the light by way of a 
breakdown case, we turn the light off!  Similarly, Heidegger’s method of ‘seeing’ the 
world is to look at the boundary or breakdown cases.    
Once we are absorbed into our world and have a familiarity with it, we typically 
engage with things in their ‘worlding’, of everything functioning.  In this circumstance, 
we see the equipment we are dealing with in their ready-to-hand mode, as a 
hammer, for example.  The alternative is when we see them either as something 
with which we are unfamiliar or as something that doesn’t ‘fit’ within the referential 
unity and offers no possibility for being useful. In this case, we experience them as 
just objects, present-at-hand.  A boundary or breakdown case occurs when we 
experience the ‘cross-over’ from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand or the reverse.  
This occurs when the referential unity is disturbed, and the entity actual changes 
mode and we understand that it has changed mode. The earlier example of the 
unfamiliar objects related to a move from the present-at-hand, to the ready-to-hand, 
even if the shift was only to a vague understanding of its readiness-to-hand.  This is 
a shifting into a referential unity and is a way of ‘seeing’ the world at work.  Most of 
the examples that were provided in the previous chapter were aimed at showing the 
phenomenon of a relational structure of a unity determining the understanding of the 
parts. Not all of them were related to the concept of world, but the general principle 
was evident enough. 
Examples of the ‘World’ at Work 
I experienced a real-world example a couple of years ago when we were having our 
house renovated.  The carpenter was working with lengths of timber, a couple of 
saw horses, saw, nails, screws, hammer, etc.  I understood he was making 
something but not what.  I watched as he cut some of the timber to specific lengths.  
Some were approx. 2 metres in length others around a metre.  An end of some 
lengths was then cut to give what looked like a 45o mitre cut.  Having mitred the 
ends, a longer piece and a shorter piece were joined using the mitred ends to give 
the appearance of a large timber 'L' shape.  I still had no idea what he was making. 
To this ‘L’ section was added another longer piece to give a large 'U' shape.  The 
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’U’ shape was just over 1800mm high, what seemed to be a metre wide and each 
piece was around 100mm wide.  Then he added a narrower piece of timber, around 
30mm wide and 10mm thick to the centre of the inside edge of the three pieces of 
the ‘U’.  The 'penny dropped', my world kicked it, he was making a door frame.  What 
I had initially seen as just pieces of timber had changed and once I saw them as a 
door frame, I could not ‘unsee’ it. The carpenter had to make another, and this time 
almost from the start what I saw was a door frame being made.   
The frames were installed later in the day, and I now use these frames in situ, and 
most of the time I do not even see the frames. I just go in and out, and I certainly 
never see them as a particular arrangement of painted timber.   This was a transition 
of timber pieces seen as present-at-hand, to switching over to ready-to-hand, to the 
door frame as a ‘piece of work’, to the door-frame as a piece of completed 
equipment, to the door frame as part of the house; from present-at-hand objects to 
various stages of ready-to-hand.  This experience of suddenly understanding, of 
experiencing the ‘switchover’ is 'seeing' the world 'at work'.   
An older door frame had been removed, and I experimented by slowly dismantling 
it.  As I pulled it apart, the pieces of the door frame showed up as a door frame until 
almost the end, what then happened was that I saw the longer pieces of timber as 
the sides of the door frame, i.e. as material for a door frame. Even now when I see 
one of the remaining pieces among my timber supply, I tend to see it as 'the side of 
the door frame'.  They are not experienced as equipment, as something completed, 
rather they are still experienced as what they are, material that could be 
reassembled as a doorframe, they still hold within them this potential and as such 
they are still understood as a mode of ready-to-hand. It is very much like the 
example the faces as I presented one image after another, slowly pulled apart, the 
pull to see a face is very strong.  In this case is the worlding of the world, working to 
understand the pieces as material for a door frame. 
Heidegger’s ‘Breakdown’ Example 
Heidegger uses three ‘breakdown’ cases for his examples. When something 
suddenly breaks, when something is missing and when something stands in the 
way.  In each case, an unexpected stop to the flow of work occurs. I will only address 
the equipment breakage case to demonstrate.   
Imagine using a piece of equipment, say an electric saw. The timber is carefully 
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measured, the guideline marked, the timber clamped, the saw started, and the cut 
is underway. The concentration is on the guideline, moving the saw through the 
timber and the cut.   Suddenly there is a loud noise, and the saw just stops.  
Heidegger describes this moment of surprise when suddenly the saw is doing 
nothing.  At that instant, just for a moment, we are bamboozled and do not 
experience the saw as equipment, but as "pure presence-at-hand" [BT 103/74] This 
lasts only a moment.  Very quickly we refocus and determine that the saw is broken.  
Our experience has passed through the saw as ready-to-hand performing the work, 
then in a ‘What the?’ moment it is experienced as present-at-hand, then as 
equipment ready-at-hand, but broken, something in need of repair. Heidegger calls 
this mode the "un-readiness-to-hand".   
When something is un-ready-to-hand it is in limbo, it is not fully ready-to-hand but 
can be.  It is not working, and we know it is not working, but it holds the promise of 
something that once worked and may work again.  In the repair workshop, the status 
changes again when the broken tool becomes the ‘work for repair’, i.e. it is now 
something ready-to-hand again as part of a process, it is similar to materials in this 
regard.  The possibility is that after the repair it returns to its status as equipment, or 
is unfixable and drifts to something just present-at-hand; a tool with a past but no 
usable future. 
The world 'at work' shows itself initially not by looking at the tool but in the 
breakdown. It is in the rapid switch from ready-to-hand, to present-at-hand to un-
ready-to-hand and in the change in the status of the saw from equipment to an object 
of work and back to usefulness that world is revealed.  It is in these crossover or 
breakdown cases that Heidegger indicates that the structure of the world, the 
references or assignments become evident, 
When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-
order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not 
observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But when 
an assignment has been disturbed - when something is unusable for some purpose - then 
the assignment becomes explicit. [BT 105/75] (my underlining) 
Another Example – Something Missing 
Another example is the situation when something we take for granted and regularly 
use in carrying out a task is unexpectedly found to be missing, preventing us from 
doing a task.  Imagine coming home late after a long day at work, quickly preparing 
and having a meal and attending to some necessary family activities.  Tired and a 
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little weary you then set about making your speciality cake promised for a function 
the next day.  All the basic ingredient needed are in the pantry, you have brought a 
decoration for the top of the cake, everything is planned and ready.  You go to the 
pantry, reach for the icing sugar, and it’s not there, it's missing.  Our looking for icing 
sugar comes  
... up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-
to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh. 
[BT 105/75] 
The icing-sugar, that which is missing, is understood as ready-to-hand, but it is not 
there, not available for use, there is just the sense of unfulfilled need, this is the 
emptiness of encountering the un-ready-to-hand. Heidegger senses that the more 
urgently we need what is missing, the more that which we are working on, the cake, 
"seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand",  
It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged 
without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient 
mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the being-just-present-at-hand-and no- more of 
something ready-to-hand. [BT 103/74]  
What seems to be happening is that there is a flow in the processes, the linking 
relationships are not static they are dynamic, the world is ‘worlding’.  When there is 
a breakdown in the dynamic nature of the relationship, this process structure 
becomes evident.  The particular worlding we are engaged with stops. The more 
entrenched the stoppage against the urgency we need to proceed, the more the 
work in front of us ’feels’ useless in its incomplete mode. Stripped of the dynamic 
relationships, in a word, de-worlded, it has shifted from ready-to-hand to present-at-
hand. When we are aware of what is happening, we are ‘seeing’ the world in the 
same way we see the role of the light when we turn it off. 
The dynamic nature of relationships is there even if not noticed. When two pieced 
of timber have been nailed together as part of a frame or a larger piece, the nails 
are ‘holding’ things together. This holding is dynamic; it is ‘holding’ the timber 
together. If the nails ‘give way’ the relationship is broken, and an aspect of the 
worlding of the world stops or is reduced.  For example, if it were a bookcase, and 
the shelves collapse, the bookcase no longer holds books. 
More importantly and critically, these breakdown cases presented examples for us 
that the normal flow of our activity, the expressed comportments associated with our 
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lived experiences stop. At that moment, for that which we were engaged, the world 
stopped worlding! 
Summary 
The world is made up referential unities, of assignments, and it is these that 
constitute the ready-to-hand, these that are the basis on which things can be useful.   
We can identify such references and assignments when they are 'lit' up in 
breakdown or crossover cases; when we notice the ‘worlding’ stop or start.  Just as 
surely as the Swiss movement of a watch stops when a small cog loses its 
relationship with another cog, so too does the ‘worlding stop’ when the structures 
are ‘broken’ or ‘missing’.   
Not only does the work with which we are concerned stop because of the 
breakdown, but we experience a change in understanding associated with the 
event.  The breaking of the references that constitute the unity of a particular ready-
to-hand entity can be thought as a de-worldling or loss of worldhood. 
That the world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) 
that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, 
the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood... [BT 106/76] 
However, if the world can be 'lit' up in this way then it is something that already is,  
But if the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already 
been disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible 
for .. concern.  The world is therefore something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already was, 
and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never do more than come 
back to the world. [BT 107/76] 
Simply put, if the breakdown in the relationships stops what is happening, then the 
relationships must be essential to what is happening.  Those relationships form an 
integrated unity that Heidegger calls world.  There is also the implication that if going 
into a nursing home requires the jettisoning of all the things that we need to keep 
our world worlding through our engagement with them that our world has effectively 
stopped.   
Section 4: Discussing the Concept of World 
Some Clarification 
The first point to emphasise is that world is not a fixed term relating to a specific 
entity.  The term world in the sense Heidegger is using it is a ‘common noun’ and 
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can refer to any referential unity and as such we can talk about “The world of ‘the 
theatre’ or ‘academia’”, “The world of the nursing home or the aged care industry”, 
“The word of stamps or cars”, “The study was her world”, or “He spent his life in the 
world of football” and so on.  While “a world” can be understood as a whole or a 
unity, it can also be understood as part of a larger whole. So, for example, there 
may be the ‘world of the radiography department’ which in turn is part of the ‘world 
of the hospital.’ 
A world can be understood as a world and as an entity ready-to-hand, e.g. as in a 
hospital.  When we are considering the hospital as a ready-to-hand entity, 
something useful, we must then consider the larger public world which determines 
the hospital as a hospital.   There are then different levels of analysis that can take 
place and care must be taken in defining the entity-world relationship in this regard.  
For example, hospitals are part of a country’s health system, but this is the wrong 
level of analysis if we are considering the nature of activities and equipment used in 
a neo-natal ward.  That Heidegger considers worlds as ready-to-hand is evident 
from the following quote: 
… the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in 
which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. [BT 100/70] 
This quote also indicates the different perspectives used in talking about world.   
A world must exist prior to a Dasein discovering the world.  We can discover a world 
in a general sense and have an understanding of it in a deficient mode as a place 
in which we barely function, where we have little ‘know-how’.   For example, we go 
into the accountant’s office on some tax matter, and we see the desks, the 
computers, the files on the shelves and so on. We know broadly speaking what the 
accountant’s office is sufficiently well that we can engage the accountant to do work 
for us.  However, do not have the ‘know how’ at the level required to be able to work 
in the office and as such it holds no possibility for us to engage in comportments 
(lived experiences).    
The world outside of our domestic world is typical of this type, remembering that our 
domestic world is a part of the larger world.  In the above quote then, we can 
encounter the “world in which the wearers and users live” but only in the general 




Here again there are different possibilities: ''world" may stand for the 'public' we-world or 
one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment. [BT 93/65] 
All these different possibilities have one thing in common; they have the same 
structure which is why they are a world. 
It is worth mentioning that because a spatial area does not define world, there may 
not be an alignment between a specific geographic spatial area and a person’s 
domestic world. Take a person living in the suburbs travelling to work, say, at a 
university campus.  They may be familiar with their home, the nearby shops, and 
sports ground, not familiar with most of the area along the journey to the university 
and then at the University they may only be familiar with the area of their department, 
specific lecture rooms, the library, cafeteria and so on.   The geographic area over 
which they might travel is quite larger, and yet the world with which they are familiar 
is still a unity, but this domestic world comprised of different aspects does not 
correlate with the broader geographic world over which it is spread.  A common 
example today would be fly-in-fly-out workers for a mining company. 
A word of caution is needed at this point. It sounds like a person’s world is one in 
which they are familiar and have sufficient competency to do things, and this means 
that this is sufficient to provide the possibilities for comportments (i.e. lived 
experiences), i.e. to have an existence.   There is still a missing piece, what makes 
specific comportments meaningful for us. I will come to this shortly. 
A Radical Understanding of World is Revealed  
For Heidegger, when we make a statement such as “that is a workshop” or “that is 
a study” of “that is a nursing home” he is making a strong claim that these are entities 
that are, i.e. they are real.   This part of his claim is not that controversial.  However, 
what he is arguing is that these entities are not and should not be understood as a 
collection of present-at-hand things. They are not a specified arrangement of certain 
physical things that are assembled to produce a workshop, a study, or a nursing 
home.  As I have presented, Heidegger specifically rejects this account.  This is the 
substance ontology approach, what the tradition accepts.  It is also the normative 
view in scholarship today.  It is what Husserl accepted, and it was on this basis that 
he developed his account of knowledge based on ideal forms.   
Heidegger accepts that what we see is physically there.  The error occurs when we 
base our understanding of what things are based on the physical characteristics of 
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what we see.  There is something else going on.  This is what Aristotle understood 
when we rejected the accounts of the first Greek thinkers, calling them ‘materialists’.  
It was what Husserl understood, but he couldn’t break free of the Cartesian 
metaphysics. To demonstrate that something else is going on was the purpose of 
the previous chapter and the examples I presented.  This chapter presents 
Heidegger’s account of what is ‘going on’ in relation the ready-to-hand entities.   
From the time of the ancient Greeks, things were understood, broadly speaking, in 
one of two ways.  There was the substance ontology of the early Pre-Socratics and 
even Plato.  While there are variations between them, broadly speaking, this group 
argued that the only real things are those that are accounted for strictly in terms of 
some basic substance.  This is what could be termed the ‘Lego’ view of the world, 
where things are progressively built from the bottom up.  Heidegger described the 
alternative account, that Nature is a prevailing whole from out of which entities come 
into being and pass away; that these entities are the prevailing of Nature. In other 
words, Nature, as that which prevails in its prevailing is evident in these entities.  
Heraclitus, for example, argues that the only constancy is change.   
If we focus on Heidegger’s account of the Greeks, what we see is that Heidegger 
has taken the principle of the prevailing and applied it to world.  World is that which 
prevails, and its prevailing gives rise to ready-to-hand entities such as the equipment 
we use.  Understood in this way the workshop has the structure of world, however, 
the workshop is itself a prevailing of a large context, a larger world, and so on.  In 
other words, if we ‘stand back’, there is only one world, with a common structure. 
However, we can ‘drill down’ and examine the world more closely, and we see the 
same structure of the world prevailing. Closer still and the same structure is evident 
until we come to the equipment and tools we use in the world, and lo and behold the 
same structure has brought them into being.   The ‘relational space’ that is the study, 
the workshop or the nursing home can thus all be understood as ‘world structure’ 
and it is because we can ‘be in’ this ‘relational space’ or ‘world structure’ that we 
have the possibility of the living the life we do.  Each ‘relational space’ can be 
understood in either general terms, or we can have a far more detailed, ‘a fine grain’ 
understanding of a ‘relational space’.  The character of that understanding can also 
vary from ‘theoretical’ knowledge to having ‘practical knowledge’ that enables us to 
participate in the worlding of the world in an area.  Within Heidegger’s work, while 
there is an acknowledgement of the role of the ‘theoretical’ it is ‘practical’ knowledge 
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that is at the heart of ‘worlding’.  Daseins’ world is formed and maintained by the 
various Dasein’s being actively engaged with things, this is the worlding and is 
requires know-how, or technical skill.  If there is no worlding then there is no basis 
for theoretical or know-what understanding. 
When we look around us what we are witnessing, without the awareness of what is 
happening is the “worlding of the world” [TT] or using the description from the 
Greeks, what is happening is the ‘prevailing’ of the world.  Rather than a bottom-up 
Lego approach focusing on the material, Heidegger’s account is a top-down, a 
dynamic approach focusing on relationships.  In his account, the ‘material’ aspect 
represents what has been employed in response to a particular ‘worlding’ that is 
occurring.  
This account of what things are, as a dynamic concept based on the relationships, 
has significant implications.  Change the relationships, and you change the nature 
or the characteristics of what things are, even the character of a specific world. 
Imagine if at the same instant, every person stopped participating in the ‘worlding’ 
of this world as is currently understood, i.e. doing the things we do, with the 
equipment we do, for the purposes we do them, in a phrase ‘cultural practices’, and 
did something radically different. If the relationships between things are changed, 
then a ‘new world’ emerges.  This may seem far-fetched but consider the following 
thought experiment.  At the moment, the organising principle of the capitalist world 
appears to be a combination164 of profit maximisation, tax minimisation & 
individualism and this, in turn, leads to a valuing and reinforcing of one style of 
relationships over another, this was discussed in Chapter 11 together with 
Heidegger’s concept of enframing.  If the organising principle becomes, as the Dalai 
Lama, suggests, compassion (His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama, 2001), then the 
world gets re-organised with a different set of relationships being valued.  If this 
occurs, many of the same relationships will remain the same.  However, the ones 
that are highly valued for ‘maximising profit’ and everything that flows from that 
organising principle are subject to revision, and the relational practices associated 
with active compassion get highly valued and supported. Old relationships will 
disappear, and new ones would take their place.  Exploitive corporate practices get 
                                            
164 For the purposes of the thought experiment the precises identification of the organising principles is not 
essential, albeit those I have named are around the mark.  Nor does it matter that the organising principles have 
permeated the entire culture. The organising principles are ones that are currently dominant and responsible for 
bringing about change to the basic structures of the culture.  
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replaced.  Wage exploitation disappears.  The devastation of remote habitats for 
minerals, timber and food crops that displace hundreds of thousands of indigenous 
peoples stop.  The resources of a community are restructured to enable the frail to 
be supported with a life of dignity.  The ways in which the world fundamentally 
changes are not insignificant.   From a Heideggerian perspective, this is not a 
rejecting of technology it is changing our relationship to it; this was part of the 
conclusion of the discussion in Chapter 11. Nor does it mean forsaking an attention 
to economics, it simply transforms it from an ‘ends’, i.e. Aristotle's ‘fore-the-sake-of-
which’ to a means, with, I would suggest powerful consequences; it creates a ‘new 
world’.  In practice, most of the equipment and know-how we have remains, it simply 
gets rearranged into a new set of relationships.  I have suggested the Dalai Lama’s 
concept of compassion as an organising principle, properly understood the same 
organising principle is contained in the writings of the Gospels of the New 
Testament.  One does not need to subscribe to the dogma of Church theology to 
embrace the concepts as organising principles. 
What is important to understand is that just because there would be a ‘new world’, 
this is a new ‘whole, a new ‘entity’ it is, however, the same ontological structure in 
both the ‘old world’ and ‘new’ world.  This is the transformative power that is 
unleashed from Heidegger’s analysis. 
If this understanding is correct then for the nursing home to change its outcomes it 
must change its organising principles and from this changes in the ready-to-hand 
entities and associated practices will flow. This must be understood as a change in 
the ‘structure’ of relationships that constitute the nursing home.  Going back to 
Aristotle provides the key, as I demonstrated in the above example. It is the ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ that drives the bringing of an entity into being.  At the moment, the 
‘for-sake-of-which’ of the nursing home is the care of the frail body, and this has 
structured the relationships. This is the organising principle.  If then a change in 
outcomes from a nursing home is what is required, this means a change in how the 
nursing home ‘worlds, ’ i.e. the relational practices. However, this requires that a 
new ‘organising principle’ is established, a new ‘for-the-sake-of-which’.  However, 
the work of the nursing home is intrinsically bound to an understanding of Dasein, 
and this has not yet been answered from a Heideggerian perspective.  Putting 
forward a new organising principle will thus have to be deferred until the being of 
Dasein is brought in to view.  
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The account I am presenting of Heidegger is not meant to portray Heidegger as the 
only person to think in terms of emergence, he is not.  This approach extends, as I 
have indicated, back to the Greeks and from the mid-nineteenth century, there is 
evidence of this approach developing to the point that there is now a significant body 
of scholarship supporting this approach.  It is evident in the areas that carry names 
such as complexity theory, self-organising systems, chaos theory, systems theory, 
process philosophy, and process theology.  Even though such approaches are now 
an important part of science from meteorology to quantum physics, this does not 
mean that there is cohesion in this broad ‘camp’.  Heidegger’s account, while sitting 
in the ‘camp’ is still a radical account of the ready-to-hand and Dasein and nowhere 
could I find the type of systematic analysis that Heidegger applies. In Chapter 19 I 
provide my interpretation of Heidegger’s account of Dasein within this broad 
approach. 
Within Heidegger’s work, while there is an acknowledgement of the role of the 
‘theoretical’ it is ‘practical’ knowledge that is at the heart of ‘worlding’.  Dasein is a 
creature whose way of being is to participate in ‘worlding’, and if understood in this 
way then questions start to emerge as to the role of nursing homes.  If we are to 
care for the person, should not the emphasis be to support their engagement in 
‘worlding’, which means tending to the frailty of the body in such a way that 
encourages and supports this participation.  This accepts the role for bodily care, 
but in a subordinate role to ‘worlding’.  Placing the primary emphasis on the care of 
the body and sacrificing the participation in ‘worlding’ essentially denies the 
character of Dasein. It compounds the problem of the frail body.  Indeed, if the 
understanding of Dasein is as radical as the understanding of world, then Dasein 
needs to participate in ‘worlding’ in order to continue to be Dasein it is.  To stop the 
‘participation’ may be to stop Dasein being Dasein, it is then, to slightly misapply 
Wolfensberger’s term, ‘death-making’(Wolfensberger, 1992) for Dasein.  This is still 
speculative as, to reiterate, there is no evidence from Heidegger’s work for this as 
yet. 
The priority of the ‘practical’ over the theoretical also has significant implications for 
professions and trades who are directly connected to participation in ‘worlding’.  The 
fundamental guiding principle must be on the evidence of ‘what works’, and not 
persuing practices driven by theoretical based knowledge or even habitual practices 
that continue in the face of evidence to the contrary.  This seems to be the current 
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situation in nursing homes given the evidence of the experiences of the person 
presented earlier. 
Summary 
This chapter has brought the various discussions from the previous chapters to 
inform an interpretation Heidegger’s account of world and the way we dwell ‘in’ the 
world’.   
It inverts our understanding of things from a bottom-up approach to a top-down 
approach, from a focus on the material as primary, to the material as a response, 
from a view of things as static, to one in which they are understood as dynamic.  
This account starts to bring into focus the nursing home which has a structure of 
world.  As large and diverse institutions they have the character of both public world 
and a domestic world for most people who dwell ‘in’ them.  In considering our 
expressed comportments which reflect our ‘know how’ in the participation of 
‘worlding’, the important aspect is the domestic world; this is the ‘space’ associated 
with such dealings.  These are the lived experiences that constitute our existence.  
For example, the nursing home is specifically designed as a work environment for 
the nurses, such that they can engage in dealings which allow them to exercise their 
‘know how’, those expressed comportments that result in lives experiences of being 
a nurse.  The same is true, perhaps for an office worker, maintenance staff and so 
on.  For this thesis, the question is, does it provide such an environment for the older 
people living in the nursing home?  This cannot be answered as yet, but the thesis 
is steadily moving in a way that can address this question. 






CHAPTER 15: THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD 
Introduction 
This is the longest and the most difficult of the chapters in the thesis. The previous 
chapter discussed the world as an entity, and in this chapter, the transition is made 
to linking the structure of world with the structure of Dasein.  In Heidegger’s formal 
indication of being there are two parts, being as determining the entity and being as 
the basis of understanding of an entity. These two aspects collide in this chapter at 
both the ontic and the ontological level.  At the ontological level worldhood in both 
the structure of world and constitutive of the structure of Dasein and this is what is 
termed worldhood. At the ontic level, each individual Dasein’s understanding of 
world is constituted by its understanding of self, and this understanding, in turn, 
provides the basis of a way of being-in-the-world.  It is, however, the collective 
understanding of Daseins reflected in their individual ways of being that brings a 
world into being.  The conclusion from this is that collectively Dasein has the 
wherewithal to change the ontic worlds in which it lives, notwithstanding it cannot 
change the ontological structure!   
All the concepts previously discussed are evident in this chapter, and it is not 
possible to comprehend what Heidegger is discussing without them.  Already 
mentioned are the two aspects of being, there are also the two aspects of perceiving 
and understanding an entity, the concepts of mereology, an understanding of being 
as structural and as a way of being, and so on.  For Heidegger to describe the 
phenomena he finds in the structure, he introduces new terminology the most 
important being projection, assignment and meaning-making, all of which require a 
firm grasp of the prior concepts.  
Key to understanding the chapter is Heidegger’s shift of perspective from describing 
the phenomenon of world in general to the understanding of world from the 
perspective of a Dasein.  We essentially have at play in the chapter both the entity 
world and a Dasein’s understanding of world, and they need not be the same. 
Heidegger does not specifically draw attention to these two perspectives and at 
times switches rapidly between them. 
In discussing and drawing out Heidegger’s descriptive account, I have tried to 
present and make clear all the key concepts carefully, and then to progressively 
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bring out the description of the ontological structure of worldhood.  In doing this care 
has been taken to clarify which perspective of world is being addressed and 
examples are used to illustrate the phenomenon. The understanding of the 
structural relationship between Dasein and Dasein’s environing world is critical to 
understanding the ‘shedding of life’ both ontically and structurally. 
One entry point into the chapter is the recognition of the puzzle of the dual role of 
worldhood that is present in Heidegger’s introduction of the term and it is with this 
puzzle that the discussion commences. 
The Puzzle of Worldhood 
There is a puzzle associated with understanding the concept of worldhood.  First, it 
is the name of an existentiale aspect of Dasein’s structure [BT 92/64] however there 
is also the suggestion that it is, in some way, the ontological structure of world. In 
the setting out of the four concepts of world (refer the last chapter), there is a pairing 
of the ontic concept and the ontological concept of the present-at-hand version of 
the world (numbers 1. and 2.). It is reasonable to assume that the same pairing 
relationship between the ontic concept of the world as the ‘wherein’ Dasein dwells 
and the ontological concept that immediately follows (numbers 3. and 4.).  The 
introduction of Worldhood in point 4. reads as follows; 
4· Finally, "world" designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood 
itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the 
time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general. [BT 93/65] 
Just as there are different modes of world, we would expect the ontological account 
to reflect this, and this is the case. Further just as I argued that the various modes 
of world should be understood within the unity of a larger world, this is reflected in 
the account of worldhood, in that its various modes have the single “a priori 
character of worldhood in general”.  All this point to worldhood being the ontological 
structure of world.  However, the term ontologico-existential, which is only used 
about half a dozen times in Being and Time, is used in reference to structural 
aspects of Dasein’s existence, e.g. discourse [BT 206/163], falling [BT 220/176], 
fleeing [BT 229/184], care [BT 237/192] which supports the statement that 
worldhood is an existentiale.  There is then the suggestion that worldhood is part of 
the ontological structure of two entities, world and of Dasein. 
A world exists prior to a particular Dasein, and if this is the case how can a structure 
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of one entity also be the structure of the other?  Unpacking the apparent dual 
ontological role of worldhood and the relationship at the ontic level between world 
and Dasein will be critical to understanding the structure of worldhood as an 
existentiale.  Certainly, even in this brief setting out of the puzzle, there are 
indications that Dasein and its world are intrinsically bound together, not just 
ontically, but ontologically, just how is still obscure.  If this is the case, then given 
that at the ontic level Dasein’s existence is understood as lived experiences 
suggests that changes in the environment (Dasein’s domestic world) will impact on 
Dasein’s existence. If the changes lead to an adverse impact, this may account for 
the lived experience of ‘shedding life’.  For this to be demonstrated the structural 
relationship between Dasein’s existence and world needs to be disclosed. This is 
the aim of this chapter. 
Part of the answer lies in Heidegger’s formal indication concerning being. The entity 
of world can be understood as both an entity that exists independently of Dasein 
and in terms of Dasein’s understanding of world.  While there will be substantial 
alignment, there is room for discrepancy, leeway for misunderstanding.  This would 
suggest that there are two worlds, the entity itself and the one Dasein interprets, the 
later I take as worldhood.  This approach provides a way of accounting for Dasein’s 
dealings within the world in appropriate ways, and hence participate in the ‘worlding 
of the world’ but also how things go astray.  ‘Worlding’ gets determined by the 
average everyday understanding of all Daseins, what Heidegger refers to as Das 
Man, or the ‘One’ [BT Ch IV] and not the misunderstanding or variant interpretation 
of any particular Dasein.  I discuss the ‘One’ in Chapter 16.  In that Dasein’s 
understanding of world must be structurally equivalent to the being of the entity, his 
accounts for Heidegger’s comments that worldhood has the same ‘modes’ as world.  
In the previous chapter, the description of the world and of the ready-to-hand has 
an objective character about it.  It is from the perspective of the detached observer. 
The discussion on worldhood changes the perspective, it shifts from the entity of 
world to the entity of Dasein and starts to describe the encounter of world from a 
Dasein’s perspective.  The phenomenon associated with Dasein understanding a 
‘relational space’ (a world or the wherein) such that it can live its life in the space 
Heidegger calls familiarity. In turn, familiarity is constitutive of Dasein165,  and 
                                            
165 As I am interpreting the structural aspects of Dasein, this simply means that familiarity is a 
necessary and essential characteristic of Dasein’s existence. See previous discussion on the 
 
429 
Heidegger’s strategy is to analyse and describe the structural aspect of Dasein 
associated with familiarity.  This is given in the following passage; 
… familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are 
constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. However, the 
possibility of giving these relations an explicit ontologico-existential Interpretation, is 
grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein, 
and goes to make up Dasein's understanding of being. [BT 119/86] 
Familiarity is the name given to the ontic phenomenon, and the results of this 
analysis is a description of the existentiale structure Heidegger calls worldhood.   
Following this line of argument then it is Dasein’s understanding of world that is 
constitutive of its existence, and this is what Heidegger repeats in several different 
ways.  This chapter sets out my argument for the interpretation of worldhood and 
the relationship between world and Dasein as outlined above and I commence with 
Heidegger’s remarks that Dasein is its (understanding of) of world. 
Dasein is its World Existingly 
In the following, I lay out what has been developed so far and then extend this to 
make the descriptive claim that Dasein can be said to be its world, by which I mean 
its interpretation of the entity world.   I then use the section to clarify some of 
Heidegger’s other terms for world, ‘there’ and ‘clearing’ which in turn sheds light on 
Heidegger’s intent of connecting the name attributed to us, Dasein, and the 
phenomenon of world.  I then introduce a new concept by Heidegger, that of 
projection, which is a structural element of being-in-the-world.  This structure can be 
understood as projecting the ‘blueprint’ representing Dasein’s interpretation of world 
(i.e. ‘its world’) onto ‘the world’.  The concept of projection is then carried over into 
subsequent discussions. 
Summary to date: 
• Existence can only be understood in terms of our lived experiences or expressed 
comportments towards entities. 
• A Dasein's comportments are based on its understanding of what entities are in 
terms of their practical-bearings (what we do with them, what they do) 
• Entities are understood on the basis of the referential structure by which they 
are constituted (i.e. world) 
                                            
example of describing the structure of language. 
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• Dasein's familiarity, understanding, of a particular set of referential structures 
define its world.    
Another way of saying this is that Dasein’s understanding of ‘the world’ determines 
‘its world’.  In that, it is Dasein’s understanding of world that it the ‘referential space’ 
or world in which it dwells, then it can be said that Dasein is its world, or it brings its 
world with it, etc.  This is the way in which Heidegger occasionally describes it in 
various texts; 
Dasein is its world existingly [BT 416/364] 
Dasein brings its there with it ... [HCT 253] 
Dasein … brings along with it the projection of world ... [OEG 128] 
In these quotes, two new terms have been introduced 'there' and 'projection'.  The 
arrangement of the quotes suggests that they are essentially saying the same thing, 
indicating that the ‘there’ and world are equivalent and the way in which Dasein 
brings its world is as a projection. This proves to be the case, and the following 
sections discuss these concepts in more detail, shedding light on Heidegger’s 
approach and terminology. 
Understand World in Terms of the ‘There’  
The term 'there' is another name for 'referential space', 'world' or the ‘wherein’ that 
is opened by familiarity.   In the following exchange from the 1966/67 Heraclitus 
Seminar Heidegger specifically addresses the concept of the 'there' and how it 
should not be understood. In his explanation, he uses the misunderstanding of the 
French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to help make his point.  The extract also sheds 
light on Heidegger's intent in designating our way of being Dasein.  
PARTICIPANT: The hermeneutic in Being and Time sets out from Dasein, whereby it does 
not understand Dasein in the customary manner as present at hand.  
HEIDEGGER: In French, Dasein is translated by être-là [being there], for example by Sartre. 
But with this, everything that was gained as a new position in Being and Time is lost. Are 
humans there like a chair is there?  
PARTICIPANT: "Dasein" in Being and Time does not mean pure human factual being.  
HEIDEGGER: Dasein does not mean being there and being here. What does the "Da" mean?  
PARTICIPANT: It means what is cleared in itself. Human being, like Dasein's being is no 
pure thing present at hand, but a cleared being.  
HEIDEGGER: In Being and Time, Dasein is described as follows: Da-sein. The Da is the 
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clearing and openness of what is, as which a human stands out. Representation, the 
knowledge of consciousness, is something totally different. [HS. 126] (my underlining) 
The literal translation of the German Dasein is ‘there-being’, Da is the German term 
for there.  In this exchange, Heidegger specifically rules out Da being understood in 
a physical spatial sense (we are not chairs) and provides the equivalent meanings 
of Da (there) as the "the clearing" and "the openness".  As Heidegger uses the terms 
‘world’ and ‘there’ are equivalent and as such Dasein means, being-in-the-world.  
He has given us a name that reflects our essential defining characteristic, just as 
Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes have done. 
In Being and Time Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘there’ and ‘clearing’ in a 
later section; 
… as being-in-the-world [Dasein] is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such 
a way that it is itself the clearing.  Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way 
does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By 
its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not factically 
the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its 
disclosedness. [BT 171/133] (my underlining) 
That the ‘there’ is an essential defining characteristic is clear; no ‘there’ no Dasein.  
The terms ‘world’, ‘there’, ‘clearing’, ‘openness’, and ‘wherein’ are all ways of 
describing the phenomenon of understanding that I have called the ‘relational 
space’, and the structure of this understanding is part of the overall structure of 
being-in-the-word. The ontological structure Heidegger names worldhood.  It is the 
unthematized understanding of this structure (familiarity) that enables us to walk into 
a study as a study, a nursing home as a nursing home, to be-in our world.  Without 
this understanding, every place we found our self would be even more unintelligible 
than the strange physics laboratory.  Things would be just present-at-hand devoid 
of any meaning in a worldly sense.  Hence, we bring with us the understanding to 
enter the study as a study; we bring our “there” with us!   
Heidegger’s technical term for this is that we “disclose” the ‘world’ as the world it is.  
To enter a kitchen as a kitchen does not mean that we must understand every 
version of a kitchen.  The being of the kitchen is determined by a set of the 
necessary, essential and unified involvements that constitute the ‘relational space’ 
or structure of a kitchen.  It is thus a flexible and abstract concept at the ontological 
level, but it is made concrete at the ontic or entity level. The ontological structure of 
kitchen can thus be present in a myriad of ontic examples.  Providing that a room 
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has the structure of kitchen, and further, that we have a prior 
disclosure(understanding) of kitchen we can thus enter the kitchen as a kitchen.  
The phrase entering a kitchen as a kitchen reflects the two aspects or roles of being, 
the entity and the understanding. The phrase, when unpacked, is saying that we 
can enter the kitchen (the entity it is as determined by being) as a kitchen (our 
understanding of the being of a kitchen).  Hence, we bring our ‘there’ with us. The 
same basic concept applies to every ‘relational space’ or world.   
At this point, the similarities with Husserl are evident as are the differences. Husserl 
claimed that we have access to ideal categorial forms that match up with the 
representation of the object to give us understanding.  Heidegger’s version seems 
to be that we have an understanding of ‘ideal relational patterns’ which we match 
up to what we are perceiving.  Heidegger would reject this on two counts, both based 
on the perspective of a strict experiential empiricist. Firstly, there is no evidence of 
‘ideal relational patterns’, all we have is the experience of the ‘there’. Secondly, there 
is no evidence that we have access to whatever it is that is projecting the ‘there’, all 
we experience is what is ‘projected, ’ i.e. the ‘there’.  For Heidegger, Dasein, as 
existence, is constituted by the structure of understanding. Dasein does not first 
exist and then possess understanding.  This does not preclude the possibilities of 
neuroscience finding that the brain has some mechanism for identifying, storing, 
retrieving and applying such relational patterns as part of the structure of Dasein. 
This is a different level of inquiry, but one that would ultimately need to account for 
the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. At all times we must keep the various 
different aspects of the phenomenon in view and not insert unfounded 
presuppositions.   
This approach accounts for why Heidegger will talk about understanding as a 
structure.  However, it can get confusing, for at the ontic level, the structure of 
understanding does give Dasein the ability to understand things. Heidegger uses 
understanding in both these ways in Being and Time, particularly in the chapter 
addressing understanding (Chapter 5). This is part of the difficulty of his naming 
strategy that I have previously commented upon. Understanding is briefly discussed 
in Chapter 17 of the thesis. 
For Dasein, no other entity, neither another Dasein nor even a god (this is the “not 
through any other entity” underlined in the above quote) gives us this world, gives 
us our “there”.  There is also the point that if Dasein “lacks its "there", it is not 
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factically the entity which is essentially Dasein”.  The short version of this is ‘no world 
– no Dasein’. There are three ways in which this can be understood.  Firstly, if an 
entity does not have a structure such that it has a ‘there’ then it is not a Dasein, 
secondly, if the structure is damaged so the ‘there’ is only partially established or 
fails to be established, Dasein as an entity is destroyed, or significantly damaged or 
impaired or thirdly, while the structure is intact the Dasein’s world has been 
removed. In the latter case, the structure of Dasein must ‘work’ to disclose new 
worlds based on its understanding of self, and establish a new way of being 
(involvements) in the new worlds. In this case, ontically the ‘new’ Dasein is different 
to the ‘old’ Dasein. 
In relation to the ‘no world-no Dasein’ claim, I take Heidegger to be concerned with 
the first interpretation as this is all he needs for his inquiry.   However, the second 
interpretation has application to understanding what is happening in a certain 
situation that impacts on a Dasein, e.g. brain injury, dementia, and the third 
contributes to an understanding of what is happening in relocating a Dasein into an 
alien environment. It is this last point that may be informative in understanding 
‘shedding life’. All three interpretations derive from the same understanding of the 
ontological structure.   
The picture that is emerging from a Heideggerian perspective is that we are born 
into a pre-established world of which we initially understand nothing.  We have a 
dynamic structure that slowly discloses aspects of the world such that the ready-to-
hand entities in the world become accessible.  Even when we are older, we can 
disclose new environments, and before we can use the equipment (ready-to-hand) 
within these environments, we must gain the necessary know-how. The process of 
establishing and maintaining our familiarity with a world is thus ongoing and, to 
reiterate, a world is understood at a technical level as the ‘relational unity’. 
Heidegger’s approach in addressing the phenomenon of why we can enter a study 
as study is, using Aristotle’s language, that we have an understanding of the study 
as a species and can recognise a specific instance or member of the species.   What 
Heidegger does not address is that being familiar with a lounge room and being 
familiar with my lounge room are two different, but related phenomenon.  This is 
why, for example, a person with dementia may understand they are in a lounge 
room but cannot recall that it is their lounge room.  Heidegger does not address this 
aspect of the phenomenon in Being and Time, and I am not aware that he addresses 
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it elsewhere.  I suspect that the recognition of ‘my lounge room’ has two aspects, 
one dealing with understanding of the being of ‘lounge room’ which is related to the 
structure of the ready-to-hand and the other dealing the unique categorial 
characteristics of the present-at-hand aspects of the furniture in the room.   There 
may be a third, that of ‘belong -to’.  If this is the case, the ‘myness’ is constituted by 
three aspects indicating that it is a quite a complex structure.  This would account 
for some people being in a room, recognising is as a lounge room but not 
recognising it as ‘their’ lounge room.  I have also encountered situations where 
people with dementia see an item, not belonging to them and not looking like 
something they own and yet claiming it as theirs (i.e. mine or belonging to).  This 
would suggest that the only aspects of the complex structure of recognising 
something as belonging to them is operative.  If the specific areas of the structure 
which are presenting as being damaged can be identified, then responses to support 
the person could be individually tailored, rather than the group communal approach 
that is the norm.  I do not comment further on this aspect of Heidegger’s work, and 
the research possibilities are more by way of indicating a future research agenda. 
Understanding the Multiple uses of World and ‘There.’ 
Heidegger uses the term world in at least three different ways and following this is 
not easy.  I attribute the problem to Heidegger’s naming convention to which I have 
previously referred.   I will unpack this different meaning by using Heidegger’s formal 
indication of being, i.e.as “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis 
of which entities are already understood” [BT 25-6/6]   I will use the example of a 
specific world, my workshop: 
I can go into my workshop, and it is intelligible to me. At the ontic level, the workshop 
as an entity has a certain place; it does not move. As a workshop, this entity is 
independent of me.   When I enter the workshop, I do so based on my understanding 
of it as a workshop. The workshop I understand also has a place, it does not move.  
This can be presented by adapting the Aristotelian formula; 
• The workshop as the entity it is = (material + being)  
• The workshop as understood = (material + understanding of being of workshop) 
There is a relationship between the material (or in Heidegger’s terms, the present-
at-hand) aspects of the entity and the specific location of the workshop in geographic 
space.  This has been discussed. It is also why the workshop world does not ‘move’.  
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However as has repeatedly been argued it is not the material that makes it a 
workshop, it is just the material is part of what is required to bring it into being.  What 
makes it a workshop is the ‘relational unity’ that is associated with it. All this was 
covered in the last chapter. 
World can thus be applied in two ways at the ontic level, to the ‘relational space’ that 
is the workshop, independent of me, and my understanding of the workshop as a 
‘wherein’ I dwell.  It is important to differentiate between the two.  Regardless of 
what the entity is, it is my understanding that is relevant to me, and it may be wrong.  
Recalling that Dasein’s understanding of things is reflected in what Heidegger calls 
familiarity; 
... familiarity with the world …  is constitutive for Dasein, and goes to make up Dasein's 
understanding of being. [BT 119/86] 
This capacity for familiarity to be based on a wrong understanding of being, is I 
believe, what is happening in relation to nursing homes.  Even though it is a wrong 
understanding, it is still “Dasein’s understanding of being”. 
The third way in which world is used is applied to just the understanding of being; 
this is behind the phrase cited above “Dasein is its world existingly” [BT 416/364] 
When used in this way it is referencing the unthematized familiarity we have in 
general.   Providing we understand these different but related ways that Heidegger 
uses ‘world’ everything is fine, but getting that clarity can be a struggle; Heidegger 
doesn’t make it easy. 
The term the ‘there’ seems to be used by Heidegger only in sense two and three, 
i.e. as a ‘relational space’ opened up in which we may dwell and in a more general 
sense as a reference to the fact that Dasein always has ‘its there’.  This was 
reflected in the above passage from the Heraclitus Seminar which Heidegger 
repeats is a different way in 1965, where Heidegger makes the following comment 
concerning the meaning of Dasein; 
To begin with, French existentialists also failed to pay attention to it. That is why they 
translated Da-sein in Being and Time as être-là, which means being here and not there. The 
Da in Being and Time does not mean a statement of place for a being, but rather it should 
designate the openness where beings can be present for the human being, and the human 
being also for himself. [ZP 120] 
In other words, world or ‘the there’ can apply to the name of the structural aspect of 
Dasein, i.e. as an existentiale at the ontological level, or it can apply to the 
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‘openness’ in general experienced at the ontic level. This is consistent with 
Heidegger’s approach to establishing the structure of Dasein which I have 
previously addressed.  
Disclosure, Discovery and Truth 
This discussion helps to clarify two of Heidegger’s terms, at least in a preliminary 
way.  Even though we have a pre-ontological understanding of being there is always 
a possibility that in relation to specific entities this may be wrong.  In his 
phenomenological method, Heidegger is inquiring into entities and describing their 
being, based on the entity and not presumed understandings. The investigation into 
the being Heidegger calls the disclosing or disclosure of being [e.g. BT 32/12 34/14 
49/26].   Being used in this way relates to whatever it is that is prevailing, so in 
relation to an entity ready-to-hand it is the structure of world.  Heidegger also refers 
to Dasein’s initial understanding of being of a world as disclosing, albeit this is an 
unthematized disclosure [e.g. BT 118/86] When a world has been disclosed, and 
Dasein subsequently understands something as something in that world, e.g. the 
object as a coffee cup he refers to this as discovering [e.g. BT 57/34 84/54 89/62].  
The concept of disclosure thus applies both to the unthematized and formal 
approach to understanding being. 
For the most part, Heidegger accepts that in the average everydayness of the 
average Dasein, for the most part, our understanding of world is a ‘true’ 
understanding.   This is the basis on which we have a functional society.  In that our 
understanding is constitutive of the world and Dasein and as such the ‘there’ in 
which we dwell it can, therefore, be said that we live in truth.  This is why in the 
History of the Concept of Time when discussing the phenomenological study of the 
intentional comportment of perception he comments, 
…  the phenomenological sense of saying that in evident perception I do not thematically 
study the truth of this perception itself, but rather live in the truth. [HCT 52] 
If we live in truth, then truth is grounded in being, and a formal inquiry into what is 
true is thus a disclosure of being.  This direction of discussion moves towards a 
detailed look at Heidegger’s conception of truth and his critique of the various 
theories of truth in the tradition. While he covers this in Being and Time a discussion 




The next concept I want to address is projection.  In the discussion on Husserl’s 
work what came to light is that we experience an entity as a unified phenomenon of 
(sensuous intuition + sensuous intuition). Heidegger accepts the phenomenon but 
rejects Husserl’s account.  In the previous section, the concept that Dasein brings 
its world or ‘its there’ with it was discussed, and this is somehow constitutive of 
‘relational space’ or world at the ontic level in which Dasein dwells.  What was also 
pointed out was that the phenomenon seems to comprise the present-at-hand plus 
the understanding of being, or familiarity.  Heidegger provides a descriptive account 
of this two-part structural phenomenon ‘coming together’, and the name he gives to 
it is ‘projection.’ Again, this is a phenomenon associated with the structure, not 
Dasein as such. 
Projection (Entwurf166) is an existentiale [BT 185/145], a structural aspect of being-
in-the-world. As an existentiale the term must be heard as a descriptive account of 
what is happening and not an explanation or inference as to why or how it happens; 
this is part of the method.  In German, Entwurf means among other things a draft, 
blueprint, a sketch, model or a projection. Projection should not be heard in an 
illumination sense but as in lines drawn by a projector. However, there is another 
overlay to this phenomenon that Heidegger is describing that is mentioned in the 
translators’ note (BT 185 Note 1).  In Heidegger’s German, there is the sense of 
‘throwing’ in the word, and there is thus a sense that understanding somehow casts 
its understanding onto the world, allowing the world to show up in accordance with 
that projection.  As a rough analogy, I take it that the relational frame-works that are 
understood as various worlds (study, kitchen, workshop, city, etc.) are projected 
onto to the present-at-hand by understanding and from this Dasein then perceives 
not the present-at-hand, but the ready-to-hand based on this relational structure of 
involvements.  The underlying presents-at-hand is still there which is why it can 
‘poke through’ when there is a breakdown in the structure of understanding.  This 
happens as part of our structure, it is not something we have control over, it is not 
something that we even notice occurring, and it is certainly not a cognitive skill that 
we acquire. It is part of what constitutes Dasein.  This is the sense we have in the 
following quotes relating to projection; 
                                            
166 Remembering Heidegger typically names the structure with the same name as the function of the structure, 
He does this with projection, Entwuf as the noun for the structure, and entwurfen as the verb. 
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As the respective wholeness of that for the sake of which Dasein exists in each case, world 
is brought before Dasein through Dasein itself. ... that which has been projected, this 
projection of world also always casts the projected world over entities. This prior casting-over 
first makes it possible for entities as such to manifest themselves. .[OEG 121] (my underling) 
The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for being-in-the-world .. [BT 
185/145] (i.e. it is part of the structure of who we are) (my underlining) 
The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest the essential peculiarity of the Dasein, 
that it projects a world for itself, and it does this not subsequently and occasionally but, rather, 
the projecting of the world belongs to the Dasein' s being. In this projection the Dasein has 
always already stepped out beyond itself, ex-sistere, it is in a world. [BPP 170]167 (my 
underlining) 
 
In the first quote, the description is from the perspective of Dasein.  In this case 
‘projected world’ refers to the casting of the understanding of the referential 
structure, not literally the world.  It is the casting that brings world before Dasein.  
Albeit as I mentioned the language gets frequently blurred in Heidegger’s work.  In 
the last quote, we get a clearer insight into Heidegger’s intent concerning the 
description.  With the projection, Dasein has “Stepped out beyond itself … it is in the 
world” [BPP 170].  As I stop writing and look around all I see is my familiar world.  
From the stuff on the desk in front of me to the left are the printers, to the right the 
bookcases and behind me, a lounge chair and door leading to the kitchen.  The 
projection operates in all directions; I am in a 3D world, this is the space in which I 
dwell.  I am in the world courtesy, in part because of the structure of projection. This 
is what Heidegger is getting at. 
I mentioned earlier that the nature of the structure allows for a misunderstanding of 
being, in this case, the projection is cast and what shows up as an entity is based 
on the wrong understanding of being. The example of phlogiston is a case in point.  
However, it is possible to have the right understanding of being, but it is misapplied 
(wrongly cast) because what we are trying to grasp is in some way hidden or 
obscured.  For example, we see something in the distance. The projection is cast; 
it shows up as X.  As we walk closer, we discover that the entity is not an X it is a Y. 
The casting is ongoing and has the capacity to self-correct, albeit this does not 
necessarily happen. We may hold on to X by way of a presupposition and turn away, 
ignoring the conditions under which X showed up, and failing to seek clarification.  
                                            
167 exsistere is Latin for existence from ex meaning forth + sistere meaning cause to stand. The purpose behind 
Heidegger presenting the word as ex-sistere seems to be highlighting the root of the word, existence is to cause 
to stand forth.    
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Understanding the character of projection is a pointer to Heidegger's methodology, 
in that it is designed to disclose the being of entities based only on what shows itself 
from the entity itself and not what is projected onto the entity.  
We Exist in the Projection – Already Outside! 
From the above, the experience of perceiving something as something only occurs 
when understanding has been projected upon the entities present-at-hand.   
Remember that perception is an expressed comportment (i.e. it is in the doing) and 
this is the basis of our lived experience of what we perceive and as such forms part 
of our existence.  I suspect, albeit I have not pursued the point, that in breakdown 
cases (refer the last chapter) the understanding of what something should be, 
compared to our experience of what is happening, is disrupted, and the projection 
is ruptured, allowing the present-at-hand on which the world is founded to show 
through. This is not addressed in Heidegger’s work and would be an interesting 
piece of work to pursue at a later date.  
Within the constraints168 of what Heidegger is considering, any expressed 
comportment towards the ready-to-hand requires a present-at-hand object that is 
subject to a projection. It is important to note that the nature of the projection is not 
like a visual overlay, it is placing the understood usefulness of the object within the 
context of a referential unity and from this we see the entity as something; recall the 
example of the font and the birdbath.  The lived experience occurs because of this 
combination of the object and the projection brought together as a unified expressed 
comportment. The lived experience can only occur in the ‘relational space’ 
constituted by the casting of a projection.  This is why Heidegger makes the 
comments that Dasein is not,  
…  encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, … because as 
being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. [BT 205/162] 
The same objection if presented in History of the Concept of Time,  
In directing-itself-toward and apprehending, Dasein does not first get out of itself, out of its 
inner sphere in which it is encapsulated. Rather, its very sense is to be always already 'outside' 
in the world, in the rightly understood sense of 'outside' as in-being and dwelling with the 
world, which in each instance is already uncovered in some way. [HCT 164] 
                                            
168 He is not dealing with the understanding of mythical creatures or abstract numerical concepts, etc 
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This approach destroys the whole basis of the subject-object division between self 
and world and with it the fundamental premises operating with much of the 
psychological and neurological sciences.   
This concludes this aspect of the discussion, and it is a useful segue to the 
discussion on worldhood. 
Free for Us 
Heidegger uses the term ‘dealing’ [Umgang] to refer to general interactions we have 
with the ready-to-hand entities in the world;  
The being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited 
phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday being-in- the-world, which we also 
call our "dealings" in the world and with entities within-the-world. [BT 95/67] 
When we perceive equipment, we don’t see it as present-at-hand, it shows up for 
us on the basis of an understanding projection as equipment ready-to-hand.  This is 
already well explained.  There is another aspect.  We can look around and perceive 
various pieces of equipment, all of them intelligible as equipment. However, they 
are not of interest to us now, and accordingly, they are hardly noticed, if at all. 
However, when we are undertaking a task, dealing with things, we are perceiving 
things or looking for things to be used, i.e. on the basis of wanting to deal with them 
in-order-to-do something.  When we are looking around in these circumstances, the 
equipment we need shows up for us, often very clearly, even if just poking out from 
somewhere. The name that Heidegger gives to this type of ‘looking around’ or 
‘seeing’ is circumspection [Umsicht].   
Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-
order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection. 
[BT 98/69] 
As Heidegger indicates, our dealings with equipment are typically understood as 
part of an ‘in-order-to’ structure, roughly understood as part of a sequence of things 
to be done; I will come back to this point.  When I go into the shed to find the fencing 
pliers to fix the fence, I may be perceiving the various things in the shed, but my 
circumspection is focused on the pliers.  I hardly notice any specific piece of 
equipment unless it is in the way, has to be moved and so on, but the plier shows 
up for me lying ‘over there’ on the bench. This is circumspective sight at work.  We 
direct this sight towards anything we are interested in as part of an in-order-to 
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structure, and this is quite broad.  We look up in-order-to see what caused the noise, 
I search around the desk looking for my notes on a certain topic, I stop at an 
intersection and look for obstructions that may impede my progress, and so on.  All 
this is circumspection169.  
In the way Heidegger is using the word the connection with the in-order-to structure 
and with understanding is thus built in.  When the fencing pliers show up for me, I 
do not see them as a bare present-at-hand object; I see them as fencing pliers in 
terms of the serviceability as 'for mending fences’ and this is only possible on the 
basis that a world has previously been disclosed.  
When Heidegger commences his discussion on worldhood he says, 
Our analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter within-the-world has, in its very 
being, been freed for our concernful circumspection, for taking account. [BT 114/83] 
It is the question concerning ‘being freed’ that Heidegger pursues as a way of getting 
at the constitution of the world.  While there are several related questions the primary 
one concerning equipment seems to be  
How can entities with this kind of being be freed by the world with regard to their being? [BT 
114/83]  
The German word translated as freed is freigegeben which is a verb that can mean 
freed, released, unlocked, enabled and so forth.  There appears to be the notion of 
something bound up and not available that is then somehow released for us.  I take 
this to mean that prior to understanding a piece of equipment, it just shows us as 
present-at-hand, notwithstanding the equipment already exists as equipment in the 
culture as part of the referential unity of a world. The hammer is a hammer, and the 
pliers are pliers long before I understood them, however until understood the 
equipment nature (i.e. readiness-to-hand) is concealed from me.  The equipment 
cannot come out of ‘hiding’ by itself; it must first be freed and only then is it 
accessible to me as equipment.   
Heidegger is now approaching his analysis of the world from the perspective of a 
Dasein dwelling in the world, and it is on this basis this 'freeing' occurs for Dasein. 
As will be discussed in the next section, however, being freed means being freed 
                                            
169 The translators make the note that Um may mean either 'around' or 'in order to' while Sicht means sight and 
such Umsicht "may accordingly be thought of as meaning 'looking around' or 'looking around for something' or 
'looking around for a way to get something done'."[BT 95 note 2]  AS I am interpreting it, the sight is one that 
occurs both in the basis of projecting-understanding and in the context of our activities. 
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for involvements, i.e. we have to be able to deal with them. The meaning of 
involvements is discussed in the next section. 
World from a Different Perspective - Involvement170 
By way of summary from the previous chapter, Heidegger approaches the 
description of the structure of the world from a number of perspectives, as 
• a “unity of equipment” [97/68] 
• an ‘in-order-to-structure [97/68] 
• “the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to' ” [BT 98/69] 
• “referential unity within which the equipment is encountered” [BT 99/70] 
(translation modified) 
All these are describing the phenomenon of world from different perspectives, the 
unity of equipment being the most elementary.  In terms of understanding the world 
as an ‘in-order-to’ structure the two most important types are ‘serviceability’ and 
‘usability’ which, as ‘in-order-to’ contain within them what Heidegger calls an 
“assignment or reference of something to something” [BT 97/68].   
The sequence then, as has been discussed is first world disclosure, then 
discovering the equipment and only then can we encounter it as equipment;  
In anything ready-to-hand, the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the 
world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. [BT 114/83] 
World as a structure of references and assignments is thus also the structure of the 
ready-to-hand within the world.  This is the concept of the prevailing of the world. 
Heidegger expresses it as follows.   
We have indicated that that which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one 
of reference or assignment. [BT 114/83] 
The above few paragraphs are essentially Heidegger’s summary of the analysis to 
date presented in the opening of the section on Worldhood [BT §18].  However, he 
has expressed it specifically in terms of references and assignments and from this 
                                            
170 The German word translated as involvement is Bewandtnis. The translators of BT have an extensive note 
[BT 115 note 2] on the difficulty of translating this word into English for which there is no English equivalent. 
After explaining the root of the word the translators settle on involvement, the translator of BTs notes [BTs xxv] 
that the word could be translated as "relevance" or "situation" and opts for "relevance".  The University of 
Chemnitz online German-English Dictionary, Beolingus, as 'background' or the 'story behind’, while the Google 
Translation service translates it as 'explanation’. All of these have some aspect in common.  I have chosen to 
stay with the BT translation.  What needs to be underscored however is that involvement used to refer to a 
particular activity that is relevant to the entity, it tells what the entity is doing now.  
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aspect, he makes the move that leads to the account of worldhood as part of the 
structure of Dasein. First an observation concerning assignments:  
To say that the being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference 
means that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred. {BT 115/83-4] 
Now comes the next step; 
An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and, referred as 
that entity which it is. [BT 115/84] 
We have now switched over to the perspective of a Dasein.  Remembering that an 
entity already exists in the culture as the entity it is. It already has relational 
connections as part of the structure.  This was part of the descriptive account of the 
entity called world form the previous chapter.  However, for Dasein to discover an 
entity as the entity it is, it must make the assignments.  I take this as Dasein 
‘understanding’ the assignments that constitute the entity and thus understanding 
the entity as the entity it is. Discovery is thus a mode of understanding. Put 
colloquially; we discover what the character of equipment by determining how it ‘fits 
in’ with other equipment to which it relates. The examples of the unfamiliar 
equipment from Chapter 13 demonstrates this phenomenon. 
The following sentence follows on immediately, and with it, Heidegger introduces 
the new terminology, 
With any such entity, there is an involvement which it has in something.  The character of 
being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. [BT 115/84] 
We have switched back to the entity perspective! He is now describing the being of 
the entity reflecting the more dynamic language of involvements. Any suggestion 
that the structure of world is static is now abolished! 
We now switch back to the perceptive of Dasein; 
If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. [BT 115/84] 
The idea of “letting be involved” is related to “freed” and this relates to Dasein’s 
structure.  The language is awkward, but the intent is clear.  Even though there is a 
piece of equipment in the world, we cannot use it; we cannot access it until we have 
discovered it. To use Heidegger’s other language, the equipment must first be freed 
for involvements as the entity it is, i.e. based on its being (place in the referential 




When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its being, that being is 
its "involvement". With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it 
has an involvement is ontologically definitive for the being of such an entity, and is not an 
ontical assertion about it. [BT 116/84] 
In that this reference concerns something “proximally freed” it is from the 
perspective of Dasein. In that Heidegger is carrying out his analysis from the 
perspective of Daseins average everydayness, then Dasein’s understanding of an 
entity will typically be based on the ‘right’ understanding of the being of the entity. 
As mentioned before, if this were not the norm, then the society could not function. 
From this perspective, freeing an entity for involvements is a possibility that is 
ontologically grounded.  
Examples will illustrate the idea that involvements are ontologically determinative. 
The structure allows for the possibility of error and as such a piece of equipment 
used for involvements type X may be misunderstood, and a Dasein happily applies 
it towards involvements type Y.  At that moment, this Dasein’s world has taken on a 
minor variation from the norm of the culture.  Should others follow the example and 
the normative involvement of the equipment shifts to involvement Y, then the being 
of the ready-to-hand has changed. In other words, the involvements are 
ontologically determinative of the entity. This change is the being of a ready-to-hand 
entity occurs in medicine when a drug originally designed for use in one application 
is used in for a different purpose171, e.g. minoxidil was developed as a blood 
pressure medication but has become the hair regrowth treatment called 
Rogaine(Loftus, 2015).  Another example involves the popular Slinky toy; this was 
originally used as a stabilisation device for fragile equipment on ships. An engineer, 
Richard James, knocked one of the springs from a shelf and noticed its ‘walking’ 
behaviour and the observation led to the Slinky. (Townsend, 2011)  Of those who 
have purchased or played with one of the hundreds of millions Slinky’s since sold, 
few would understand it as a piece of stabilization equipment; its being has changed. 
These examples, illustrate what Heidegger is getting at when he says that 
“involvement is ontologically definitive for the being of such an entity”. Care needs 
to be taken in interpreting this, as at the ontological level each of the uses of the 
drugs or the spring still has the same basic structure of the ready-to-hand. The 
                                            
171 There are a number of examples, perhaps the most famous being a treatment for pulmonary hypertension 
becoming and treatment for erectile dysfunction known as Viagra. Loftus’ article, Old drugs, new uses in the 




structure is just made concrete in different modes (specific instances) due to the 
changes in the structure of involvements, i.e. a ‘reposition’ within the world. The 
application of this Heideggerian concept in areas of research and inquiry by 
disciplines such as cultural anthropology and ethnology are self-evident.  I do not 
pursue this line any further in the thesis. 
Having switched the language from references and assignments to involvements 
Heidegger next links the assignments to the ‘in-order-structure and then links 
involvements with world.  
With the involvement of equipment, there are two aspects, what it is involved with 
and the circumstances in which it is involved.  Heidegger names this the 
“relationship of the with … in”.  This relationship will change depending on the 
equipment and the circumstances and that change will be reflected in the references 
or assignments or the nature of the ‘in-order-tos’.  The conclusion then is that with 
any equipment; 
That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of 
usability. [BT 116/84] 
The discussion in the previous chapter concerning one set of Heidegger’s 
descriptors of world consisted of the ‘whereof’, ‘towards-which’ and for-which’.  
Heidegger now presents the description in the language of involvement; 
That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of 
usability. With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with 
this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", 
there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making 
something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad 
weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is 
to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's being. [BT 116/84] (my underlining) 
Together with this change, we should see a shift in the language concerning world, 
and this is what Heidegger next introduces, the “unity of ... involvements” 
Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has 
in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the unity of such involvements.  [BT 116/84] 
(change in translation)172 (my underling) 
In the following page, Heidegger switches the term from unity to “structure of 
                                            
172 The translators interrupt the German word Bewandtnisganzheit as “totality of involvements”.  Bendtis is 
involvements, ganz, to be consistent with prior interpretations I translate as unity, and heit indicates a noun form 
of a verb. Hence I translate this as “unity of involements”. 
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involvements” [BT 117/84]. This just reflects the interchangeability of unity and 
structure which is evident in previous passages. 
In the example that Heidegger provides, keeping in mind that an involvement is 
something that Dasein initiates, then we have a Dasein ‘initiated’ structure that leads 
to one of Dasein’s way of being, in this case providing shelter.  Heidegger’s next 
step is to link the structure not just to a way of being of Dasein, but its being. 
Grounding the Ready-to-Hand in Dasein’s Being 
Now comes Heidegger's decisive move.  
If we accept that the structure of world can be described in terms of the ‘in-order-to’ 
linkages that be traced between all the various ready-to-hand entities from materials 
through to ‘products’ and the way these interconnect, and if we then accept that we 
can understand and describe this same structure in its dynamic, active mode in 
terms of involvements then we must accept the conclusion that in each case, 
 ... the unity of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is 
no further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs 
to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-
in-the-world, and to whose constitution of being, worldhood itself belongs, [BT 116/84]  (my 
underlining) 
All this is saying is that structure of involvements for anything ready-to-hand ends 
up Dasein.  Given the earlier illustrative examples, it is Dasein’s letting things be 
involved that is constitutive of the unity of involvements, i.e. world.  
Looked at another way, if there are no Dasein interested in using a piece of 
equipment, then the practice around it (involvements) will die out. The equipment 
ceases to be part of the structure of involvements. In that equipment is understood 
in terms of its involvements as part of the structure of involvements it will cease to 
exist as equipment.  In practice, this would typically mean that it will also cease to 
be manufactured, i.e. brought into being.  All that will be left will be remnants, 
memories, and museum pieces; VHS players are a recent example173.   
                                            
173 An example of this is the VHS format video tape players are now no longer in production anywhere in the 
world(Pressman, 2016). The practices (involvements) around using VHS tapes have rapidly died out replaced 
by a combination of DVD formats, on-line storage and internet streaming to various devices including TVs, 
tablets, and smart phones. With minimal demand for new VHS equipment manufacturing has ceased.   At the 
same time Dasein’s involvement with internet and associated Bluetooth and Wi-Fi equipment has increased and 
a raft of new products have come into being as part of the unity of involvements as a result; in response to 
Dasein’s way of being! 
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It must always be remembered that Heidegger’s method involves identifying the 
common, essential ways of being associated with Dasein at the ontic level, and then 
classifying them as part of the basic structure he has named being-in-the-world.  
Heidegger started by examining the structure of world as the ‘in-order-to’ structure 
this shifted to examine the same structure from the perspective of involvements.  
The structure of involvements only occurs because of an essential and necessary 
activity (way of being) of Dasein, i.e. letting something be involved and constitutive 
of Dasein’s understanding of world.  This is what qualifies this aspect as an 
existentiale, part of the structure of Dasein. This aspect of Dasein’s structure he 
calls worldhood. 
Coming into Being of an Entity 
Based on the concept of involvements it is now possible to revise the Aristotelian-
Heideggerian account of an entity coming into being given in the previous chapter. 
In the previous chapter, the structure of world and the ready-to-hand were described 
in terms that did not specially refer to Dasein; the end point of the ‘in-order-to-
structure’ was defined in terms of the usability of equipment.  Now the end point is 
Dasein, specifically a ‘fore-the-sake-of’ one of Dasein’s needs or wants, in the 
example shelter (entity) to provide protection (serviceability) from the weather.  The 
revised account is as follows; 
Material: The material from which things are made. 
Formal: The organising principle is the unity of the relational structure understood 
as a structure of involvements. 
Efficient: The production processes 
For-the-sake-of-which: The ‘towards-which’ of usability Dasein’s for-sake-of-
which. 
On this basis, the primary cause for anything ready-to-hand coming into being is 
Dasein, and the organising principle (being) is the structure of involvements as 
understood by Dasein.  This is why it is Dasein’s understanding of world, structurally 
called worldhood, that is the being of world. 
If we apply this to a nursing home then regardless of what is stated as the ‘for-sake-
of-which’ from the perspective of those responsible for constructing and running the 
nursing home, the actual ‘for-sake-of-which’ is reflected in the ‘structure of 
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involvements’.  This suggests a way of researching the ‘being’ of such entities that 
addresses the presuppositions and biases that may be associated with qualitative 
research approaches relying predominantly on interviewing participants.  A line of 
research that would be promising is inquiring from an older people living in nursing 
homes what type of involvements they would prefer in an ‘ideal’ environment174.  My 
own experience would indicate that it would present a different ‘structure of 
involvements’ and as such a different nursing home entity.  
This linking of the structure of involvements back to Dasein's way of being ends this 
stage of the argument and there is now a need to go back and clarify precisely what 
is meant by involvement. 
Understanding Letting Something Be Involved as a Structure 
(Ontologically) 
The key step in the above line of argument was in viewing the references and 
assignments in terms of involvements and then highlighting that this requires letting 
something be involved.  The question that was not addressed is what is meant by 
‘letting something be involved'.  This is what is discussed in this section.  
As has been described several times Heidegger’s approach is to first make 
observations at the ontic level, identify common aspects that appear to be essential 
requirements of Dasein’s way of being.  He then classifies and extracts these 
common aspects to an abstract level (what he calls ontological or structural) and 
analyses the structural relationships between them.  Along the way, he assigns 
names to the structure which often related to the ontic observation of the 
phenomenon. He undertakes a similar approach to the ready-to-hand as has just 
been demonstrated. This approach is also taken in understanding ‘letting be 
involved’ ontologically. 
Everything that Heidegger describes should be able to be identified at the 
observable, ontic, level; this is part of his approach. In the example with hammering, 
there is an involvement with hammering, the involvement with making fast, etc. and 
all these involvements are observable.  At this ontic level, Heidegger defined 'letting 
                                            
174 Similar research may have been undertaken, however I am not aware of this line of research being 
undertaken with a strict Heideggerian framework, by which I mean based on the interpretation of Heidegger’s 
work as I am presenting. 
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something be involved' as  
...  within our ... concern [comportments] we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it 
is already and in order that it be such. [BT 117/85] (my gloss) 
While this is an abstract description, it simply means to use a hammer as a hammer 
to get the job done, but is an observation focused on the what the hammering is 
doing, not the hammer nor the function (hammering) as such.  It also means to sit 
on a chair as a chair, to walk through a doorway as a doorway to leave a room, to 
wear shoes as shoes for walking, smash with a sledgehammer as a sledgehammer 
to break down a wall, etc.   We use the ready-to-hand entity on the basis of its 
‘position’ in the structure of involvements.  
With everything we use we are letting it be involved.  We need to keep in mind that 
Heidegger is talking about the typical everyday use of things.  It is possible, for 
example, to use a long-handled screwdriver to mix a tin of paint but this is not the 
typical use, and Heidegger is not concerned with it.  He focuses on how we 
understand the screw-driver as a screw-driver in the first place.   
It is not the ontic level (i.e. using the entity) but the ontological level of 'letting be' 
that we need to understand.  In moving towards the ontological level Heidegger 
repeats what we have seen before, he peels back the sequence of events that must 
have happened to be able to use the entity, to ‘let it be involved’.  He does this in 
three steps. 
Step 1:  He spells out what ‘letting be involved means’ and this is derived from the 
ontic level of the phenomenon. 
Ontically, "letting something be involved" signifies that within our factical concern we let 
something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such. [BT 
117/84] (my underlining) 
This is the initial step when we first understand the entity in terms of its involvements. 
For example, when we have learnt what a hammer is, such that we can use it as a 
hammer. When this occurs, the hammer is now understood as part of the structure.  
This of course does not mean that a specific Dasein needs to know the entire 
structure from go-to-woe such that it can let something be involved at every step of 
the way.  It is more by way of understanding the particular ‘link’ in the structure.  This 
is part of the differentiation between Dasein’s domestic or work world, e.g. the 
workshop and the larger public world.  
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The phrase “we let” is underlined and Heidegger explains that it means that,  
… something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and 
that we must thus let the entity which has this being be encountered. [BT 117/85] (my 
underlining) 
The ‘must’ is important; it indicates that Dasein has no choice. Once something is 
discovered, this is the basis on which it shows up for us. Note also his comment that 
“something which is already and ‘entity’” as this supports my interpretation that a 
hammer or screwdriver is already an entity in the culture and as such is an entity 
independent of the individual Dasein. 
Step 2: Heidegger then extends this observation and draws the general principle 
that;  
This 'a priori' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering 
anything ready-to-hand, so that Dasein, in its ontical dealings with the entity thus 
encountered, can thereby let it be involved in the ontical sense. [BT 117/85] 
Regardless of the ready-to-hand entity, before we can use it (deal with it) we must 
have first of all ‘let it be involved’.  This is simply stating that we have to learn how 
to use it appropriately, or to use Heidegger’s previous language, free it for 
involvements.  
Step 3: He now performs the analysis and extracts the ontological aspect. 
When the in-order-to structure was discussed using the shoe-maker example, he 
identified the ‘in-order-to’ structure leading back to the farmer and tanner, to the 
needle maker, steel mills and mines and forward towards the users.  The conclusion 
was that the work (shoes) only is, in terms of the context of the structure of reference 
and assignments.  In this current section, Heidegger has switched his language to 
involvements, and we would expect something similar using the new language, and 
this is what we find.  In any prior 'letting-be' then,  
… if letting something be involved is understood ontologically, what is then pertinent is the 
freeing of everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, no matter whether, taken ontically, it 
is involved thereby, or whether it is rather an entity of precisely such a sort that ontically it is 
not involved thereby. [BT 117/85] 
This is straightforward if we consider Heidegger’s method.  For the shoemaker to 
be involved in making shoes, there must be Daseins involved in all aspects of the 
structure that have ‘freed’ the entities with which they are involved.  This is true for 
any involvement structure associated with a ready-to-hand entity, and on this basis, 
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Heidegger lifts it out as part of his ontological description. The same process he 
employs for Dasein.   
We then have the conclusion that in a structure of involvements before a Dasein 
can let the particular ready-to-hand entities be involved, then all the entities ready-
to-hand in the structure must have been freed, so as to constitute the structure of 
involvements!  In other words the world must already exist, the worlding of the world 
must already be in place. 
Apart from the logic behind the statement, it is also made clear by Heidegger’s 
reference to ready-to-hand entities not involved “nearby” that this does not just apply 
to equipment but to anything on which we may be working [BT 117/85]. He has 
completed his task, the ontological understanding of letting something be involved 
has now been described.   
Implications of Understanding Based on Structures of Involvement 
The implication of the analysis is that in a complex structure of involvements, what 
one Dasein frees for involvement is, by and large, dependent all the structurally 
connected involvements having been freed and remaining free for involvements.  In 
that letting something be free for involvements, in a complex society, this requires 
the ‘know how’ of tens of thousands of Daseins in various jobs.  By way of example, 
consider just one job, say a registered nurse in a nursing home. Prior to a nurse 
commencing work the nursing home has to be constructed which is a significant and 
complex project.  In the construction, every type of material and equipment that has 
gone into the building leads back to other business and have associated structures 
of involvement.  The infrastructure system (water, power, gas, communication, 
transport) required to operate the nursing home lead to other networks of 
involvements and so on.  In the running of the nursing home every piece of 
equipment, all chemical supplies, the consumables all lead somewhere and branch 
out to other structures of involvements.  When fleshed out with even minimal detail 
from the perspective of, say, a score of diverse of jobs then what would start to 
emerge is a complex web of involvements linking the entire public world. Some 
involvements, e.g. infrastructure, will be present in all areas of the web, others will 
be common, e.g. office supplies, furniture, while others may have minimal direct 
involvements, e.g. specialist ophthalmology equipment. 
While it is at a high level of abstraction, what Heidegger is describing is the dynamic 
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structural web of involvements that addresses the interplay of people (Dasein), their 
wants and needs (for-the-sake-of-which), the equipment and artefacts used (ready-
to-hand), the materials incorporated into various work activities (ready-to-hand) and 
the associated relational linkages (involvements).  This is a description of the basic 
dynamic structure of a society, from the perspective of the multitude of involvements 
present in the society.  At this level, it is the structure of the public world.  This view 
takes the position that it is not what a society says about itself that is the proper 
basis for understanding. The structure of involvement is its ontological grounding, 
and this is reflected in what it does! Another way of saying this is to base your 
knowledge based on the ‘fruits’ produced (Matthew 7:16). 
We can apply this analysis to examine what is happening within a society.  For 
example, there has been a closure of a significant proportion of the manufacturing 
industry in Australia in last few decades.  The result is that the manufacturing 
industry has lost 270,000 jobs since 1989 and the progressive closure of all motor 
vehicle manufacturing plants due in 2017 with a loss of up to 200,000 more jobs.  
(Dennis, 2016) On the other hand, the aged care sector has grown from 262,000 in 
2007 to 352,000 workers in 2012 and is continuing to grow rapidly.  (Deloitte Access 
Economics, 2016) Viewed from this perspective, something is fundamentally 
changing the character of Australia (the unity) which is flowing through to changes 
in the structural nature of involvements (the structure of the unity) which is seeing 
some involvements pass out of existence (car manufacturing jobs) while others 
increase in quantity (aged care).  The specific nature of involvements that are 
therefore available for a Dasein to discover in Australia have thus significantly 
changed.  I raise this as an example to demonstrate that Heidegger’s approach and 
way of describing worlds have ‘real-world’ applications and relevance175.  
An interesting insight that comes with this approach is that the ‘relational space’ that 
is the modern world is vast and complex and if we compare this to the ‘relational 
space’ that was the world of a villagers deep in the Papua New Guinea Highlands 
in the early twentieth century, prior to contact with Europeans, the difference is 
                                            
175 A dramatic illustration of the web of interconnectivity associated with infrastructure occurred in 2016 in South 
Australia. As a result of one electricity connection with other States being damaged during a storm almost three 
quarters of the State lost electricity and power was not fully restored for a number of days.  (Australian Energy 
Market Operator, 2017)  Given the dynamic nature of the involvement structure this meant that many other parts 
of the ‘in-order-to’ structure came to a halt.  In this case a significant part of the wording of South Australian 
world ceased.  While this is intuitively understood, Heidegger’s analysis provides a way for understanding the 
complex structures of societies from many different perspectives.   
 
453 
stunning.   
It needs to be remembered that Heidegger is not inventing anything, and his 
approach is not hypothesising how societies ‘works’.  Neither is he making causal 
claims that the structure causes a thing to be what it is. He is focusing on the 
observable phenomenon of the ways of being and then identifying and describing 
the underlying structure that is evident (the phenomenon associated with the 
structure of being). If we accept this approach then it can be applied as a powerful 
research tool, not just in qualitative research but in government level planning, as 
an underlying structure of economic analysis, and so on.  This is associated with my 
claim discussed in Chapter 11 that Heidegger understands his work as having 
relevance to the sciences.  
The Connection Between Know-How and Circumspection 
What comes out of this discussion is that there is a progression of understanding, 
albeit this is not that clear from Being and Time.  We can progress from having no 
understanding of what an object is, to having some awareness (understanding that 
is primarily cognitive) of the object in its ready-to-hand mode but lacking the know-
how to free it for involvements, and finally, to having that understanding of the 
necessary know-how.  What is also evident it that we may commence with a 
rudimentary know-how that only allows a minimal involvement, and this 
progressively changes with advances in our ‘know-how’ understanding.  My son has 
been learning the guitar for several years, and the know-how he currently possesses 
in letting the guitar be freed for involvements with the production of music bears little 
resemblance to the first hesitant bars of his first piece, Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’.   
We can thus discover something as ready-to-hand, for example, the lens grinding 
mould, but this does not mean that we have sufficient understanding to let-it-be what 
it is by ‘involving’ it in the task of lens grinding.  This points to understanding as 
having two aspects know-how, or practical knowledge, and know-what or theoretical 
knowledge.  Theoretical knowledge is important, for example using Heidegger’s 
work I may be able to research and gain a ‘theoretical understanding’ of a particular 
world, this doesn’t mean I have the know-how to be involved in that world in a 
competent way.  Theoretical knowledge can be broader than this, but the difference 
is evident enough, and it is this difference that is behind Heidegger’s comment that;  
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'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of "sightlessness" . [BT 99/70] 
The sight metaphor usually relates back to the Cartesian concept of lumen natural 
[CPE, BT] and preferences and values knowledge that is acquired by reason over 
experience.  It is also a general view that preferences cognitive (theoretical) 
knowledge over practical (know how) knowledge.  Even today this priority and 
valuing of ‘know-what’ over ‘know-how’ is evident it in the way Australia is structuring 
its education system and the emphasis on a University education based on ‘know-
what’. There is little evidence, from a policy perspective, that there is an awareness 
of the necessity to ensure this translate to quality ‘know-how’ knowledge that is 
relevant to the Australian society from a long-term perspective.  A failure of ‘know-
how’ in the larger context of a global ‘relational-space’ will have significant 
consequences at the individual Dasein level within the Australian ‘space’ of that 
global web.  This is another example of a line of inquiry that arises from a 
Heideggerian perspective, again outside the scope of the thesis. 
In that Heidegger recognises the importance of know-how he argues that there is a 
‘sight’ associated with ‘know-how’. This type of sight will become increasingly 
relevant as the thesis progresses and will have a direct bearing in understanding 
Marion Miller’s circumstance!  As discussed earlier in the chapter, Heidegger names 
the ‘sight’ associated with know-how circumspection. 
If we note the connection between ‘dealing’, the ‘in-order-structure’ and the context 
of the discussion in terms of ‘involvement’, then the phenomenon Heidegger is 
describing becomes evident.   The ‘sight’ must have the ‘know-how’ as part of its 
structure and that ‘know-how’ is associated with the freeing of the equipment for 
involvements which are made concrete in our actual dealings with them. This occurs 
within the structure of involvements or as indicated here, the “manifold assignments 
of the ‘in-order-to’”. 
When we comport towards something (e.g. dealings) that is ready-to-hand, we must 
first understand what it is.  When we ‘see’ something as something it will be recalled 
that while it is a unified phenomenon, there are two aspects. There is the ready-to-
hand, and there is the projection of understanding.  It is the later that results in an 
object showing up for us as something ready-to-hand, as something with which we 
can have dealings, and we have no choice in this ‘showing up as’.  This is the 
structure at work; recall the ‘must’ mention above. 
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The circumspection is functioning all the time. It is not just doing complex tasks such 
as playing the guitar, it applies to even the simplest of things, sitting on a chair, 
walking through a door, putting on socks, and so on.  It is so pervasive that although 
we can direct it when specifically looking for something, typically we are not even 
aware of it as it guides what we do.  This every present character of circumspection 
as it applies to ordinary, everyday things is evident in the following passage from 
Basic Problem.  Heidegger is delivering a lecture and uses the environment in which 
the lecture as an example; 
The equipmental contexture of things, for example, the contexture of things as they surround 
us here, stands in view, but not for the contemplator as though we were sitting here in order 
to describe the things, not even in the sense of a contemplation that dwells with them. The 
equipmental contexture can confront us in both ways and in still others, but it doesn't have 
to. The view in which the equipmental contexture stands at first, completely unobtrusive and 
unthought, is the view and sight of practical circumspection, of our practical everyday 
orientation. ''Unthought" means that it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking 
about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our bearings in regard to them. 
Circumspection uncovers and understands beings primarily as equipment. When we enter 
here through the door, we do not apprehend the seats as such, and the same holds for the 
doorknob. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, 
avoid them circumspectly, stumble against them, and the like. Stairs, corridors, windows, 
chair and bench, blackboard, and much more are not given thematically. [BPP 163] 
When we are typically just going about our daily activities, we are not thinking “this 
is the doorknob I need to grasp and turn in order to walk through the door”. We 
simply walk through the door, not even particularly being aware of the door as a 
door.  This is what Heidegger means by ‘unthought’.  We simply walk through the 
door.  This can be understood as ‘dealing’ with the door purely on our ‘unthought’ 
involvements with its serviceability and is behind the passage; 
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, 
as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our 
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. [BT 99/69] 
The serviceability of the door is the relational structure that allows us to pass from 
one space to another. We are, as such, not interested in, nor are we really dealing 
with the door as an entity; it is the ‘to pass from-to’ of involvement that arises as a 
consequence of the relationship of the door and the rooms that shows up for us in 
circumspection and with which we are involved.  This relates to Heidegger’s 
comment concerning ‘withdraw’ in the above quote; we don’t even notice the entity 
itself, it is the involvement with which we are concerned! 
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This is a radically different way of understanding our relationship with our environing 
world and the ready-to-hand with the world.  I recall having a conversation with a 
person with dementia. I picked up a piece of equipment. The person named it as a 
control for the TV, indicating one level of relational understanding in terms of the 
ready-to-hand, however when we spoke further there was no recall of how the 
control was to be used.  For this person with dementia, the control had ‘lost its 
freedom’ to be involved, his circumspective sight was failing. 
Circumspection is often misunderstood, for example, Riding refers to it as “that sight 
with which Dasein in its mindful dealings with equipment holds the equipmental 
totality in view.”(my underlining)  (Ridling, 2001, p. 246) The primary misunderstand 
here is the concept of “mindful”; this is contrary to Heidegger’s account.  Gorner 
suggests that circumspection relates to seeing the “the ‘in-order-to’ of things and its 
connection with the ‘in-order-to’ of other things” (Gorner, 2007, p. 43). This implies 
that a theoretical understanding is sufficient for circumspection and misses the 
importance of the ‘know-how’ that frees things for involvement.  Additionally, as will 
be seen shortly, this is explicitly denied by Heidegger. Inwood in his Heidegger 
Dictionary says that circumspection “is looking 'around' to see what one needs, etc. 
'in order to' get something done” (Inwood, 1999, p. 194). While this can be the case, 
there is too much deliberateness in this understanding as a general description. 
Inwood takes the notion of ‘looking around’ based on one interpretation of the 
German translated as circumspection, Umsicht, and it is to that word I now turn, 
Umsicht is a German compound word comprising Um + sicht.  The word sicht is 
straightforward and means sight in English. To get an idea of Heidegger’s intent we 
need to understand the prefix “um-“.  This prefix is typically a directional prefix 
meaning something like around, e.g. to drive around the house is umfahre das Haus; 
to walk around, or bypass, the dog is umgehen der Hund.  One could then 
understand Umsicht as looking around.  There is an element of this at the ontic level, 
however as mentioned it is generally not a deliberate looking around.  Another way 
um is used is in the context of something placed ‘over’ something else, and doing 
so in some way changing it.  One example should suffice to illustrate this; paint the 
fence green is said in German as ummalen den Zaun grün.  The original fence is 
still there, but the paint over it has changed it. This is the way I believe that Umsicht 
should also be heard. In other words, it is the ontic version of projection. 
If we consider the previous discussions on projection and on ‘freeing’ equipment for 
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involvement, then once this has occurred this is how the equipment must be 
encountered.  Umsicht is experienced ontically and describes the phenomenon of 
seeing the entity as the entity in terms of its involvements.  It does not have any 
awareness or access to the structure itself (recall Gorner’s comment above!). This 
is clear from the following 
[the world or the ‘there’] .. is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is 
always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for 
circumspection. [BT 105/75] (my underlining) 
At one level then we must understand circumspection as seeing entities as 
something ready-to-hand in terms of their involvements.  Circumspection is a lived 
experience, and as such it has an intentional structure which involves the 
understanding of the entity. At the technical level (ontological) the structure of the 
understanding of the entity has two aspects; the entity and the basis by which we 
see the entity as something.  This was discussed in earlier chapters.  Umsicht is a 
carefully chosen word that captures both the ontic and the ontological, just as the 
carefully chosen word, Dasein, captures both aspects.  
Our dealings thus subordinated themselves to circumspection (refer above quote) 
because circumspection is what reveals the ready-to-hand to us as things with which 
we can be involved, i.e. dealings.  Rather than circumspection being a description 
of Dasein looking around, i.e. the emphasis on Dasein, circumspection is a gift to 
Dasein.  It is the ontic manifestation (lived experience) of the underlying intentional 
structure of ‘perception’. This interpretation is not evident in most commentaries, 
even if hinted at.  The tendency is to talk about circumspection only in terms of the 
ontic phenomenon.  (Dreyfus, 1991; Gorner, 2007; Mulhall, 2005; de Beistegui, 
2005)   Blatter in his introductory text on Being and Time, makes the observation 
that by circumspection “Heidegger does not mean visual perception” (Blattner, 2006, 
p. 56), and by this I take it he means something similar to Husserl’s sensuous 
intuition, and in this, I agree.  However, he then goes on to say with reference to 
circumspection that he uses “sight as a metaphor for intelligence”. On this point I 
disagree, it strips the term of its ontic intent. If I were to characterise the term in 
another way, I would say that it is ‘the sight that understands’ and this is significantly 
different to sight as a metaphor for intelligence.  
I have spent a significant time on circumspection because I want to set up an 
understanding of the phenomenon as a ‘sight’ which delivers to us an understanding 
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of the world in terms possible involvements.   In Marion’s case, for example, it is 
clear from her account that the nursing home did not show up in this way.   There is 
still more of the structure of Dasein to disclose that accounts for why this is the case, 
this will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
In the next chapter, I want to tease out some more aspects concerning the 
progressive nature of understanding and then discuss Heidegger’s final change in 
orientation in describing the structure of world, that of assignment. 
Progressive Nature of Understanding  
In the previous section, I briefly touched on the concept of the progressive nature of 
understanding.  This is the concept that Dasein’s understanding can move from 
encountering something just as an object present-at-hand to being something 
ready-to-hand and used with some skill, i.e. it is freed for us so that we can let it be 
involved.  The following is a simple example to illustrate this concept more clearly. 
A young child, through many interactions with others gradually comes to understand 
‘ball’ as something to play with, throw, catch and so on.  This shifts to understanding 
the difference between small round balls with which the child can do certain things 
and, say a football176. Games of ‘marking the ball’, ‘handball’ and kicking the ball 
around177 in the backyard move to the child playing in the local junior 'Auskick' 
competition178. By this time, basic language has been acquired, very rudimentary 
skills (know-how) learnt, and by watching a favourite team play on the television, a 
simple structure of involvements developed.  There is no need for a ‘sophisticated’ 
understanding of rules.  The child has 'freed' the football, the game of football, the 
football boots and so on, sufficient for the involvements required for the participating 
in the ’Auskick’ competition. All these are entities ready-to-hand within the world of 
football. 
As the child grows older and continues to play, the skill level increase.  At the risk 
of stretching the metaphor too far, the more skill the footballer acquires then more 
fully is the football released (freed) into its potential of being a football.  When we 
                                            
176 By which I mean Australian Rule Football. 
177 Marking (catching a kicked ball), handball (the style of passing the ball) and kicking are all skills required to 
play football. 




watch any world-class athlete, we will occasionally experience moments when we 
see something so far beyond what a 'normal' person can do we are in awe, "How 
do they do that!".   This is an acknowledgement that the ‘involvement’ the athlete is 
able to achieve is on a level of ‘know how’ far in excess of what we can comprehend.  
The way in which the athlete sees, for example, the involvements unfolding on the 
football field is on the basis of circumspection. For a highly trained athlete, this is 
‘unthought’ circumspection in which involvements just show up as possibilities, and 
they respond, without deliberate thinking, just like I can walk expertly through a door! 
Because this level of proficiency with the world is not cognitive it is not something 
that can be put into words; it is not something that can be taught.  This is the 
phenomenon of mastery and was recognised and described by the ancient Daoist 
Chinese philosophers as can be seen from the following account from the Chuang-
Tzu a highly influential text that dates to around the 3rd century BCE;  
When I chisel a wheel,’ says the carpenter ... ‘if the stroke is too slow it slides and does not 
grip, if too fast it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I feel it in the hand 
and respond from the heart, the tongue cannot put it into words, there is a knack in it 
somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me. 
(Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6) 
In mastery, there comes the point when the understanding is beyond know-how or 
skill in that we do not ‘know-how’ we are doing what we do.  The skills we have 
deliberately learnt and practised are eventually transcended. This is the point behind 
the description of Cook Ting carving an ox, in the Chuang-Tze; 
Cook Ting was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot stamped, 
knee crooked, with a hiss! with a thud! the brandished blade as it sliced never missed the rhythm, now 
in time with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra playing the Ching-shou.  
'‘Oh, excellent!’ said Lord Wen-hui. ‘That skill should attain such heights!’  
‘What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me. When I first began to carve oxen, 
I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I never saw an ox as a whole. 
Nowadays, I am in touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look with the eye. With the senses I 
know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely on Heaven’s structuring, cleave along 
the main seams, let myself be guided by the main cavities, go by what is inherently so.(Zhuangzi, 2001, 
pp. 63-4) 
The above two examples are from a carpenter and cook, to illustrate that the concept 
has broad application. However, as I have indicated, it does apply to athletes, as 
Larry Bird (1956 - ) describes.  He was an elite professional basketballer, now 
retired, for the Boston Celtics team in the USA National Basketball Association and 
provided the following observations in relation to playing; 
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[A lot of the] things I do on the court are just reactions to situations .... I don't think about some of the 
things I'm trying to do .... A lot of times, I've passed the basketball and not realized I've passed it until 
a moment or so later. (Levine, 1989) 
The understanding associated with ‘know-how’ of freeing things for involvements is 
therefore progressive and guided by circumspection.  The more mastery (know-
how) we have, the freer the entity for involvements, the more possibilities are 
revealed for us in circumspection. When we are engaged in dealings at this level, 
then we ‘just do it’, the entities themselves withdraw, we are engaged in ‘unthought’ 
interactions with the involvements themselves.  Even walking through a doorway 
reflects this level of proficiency! 
Basic and Primary Involvements 
In the previous discussion on the progressive nature of understanding what became 
evident is that Dasein has ‘mastery’ in a wide range of areas. However, the 
discussion is also suggestive that the things that Dasein is proficient at are not all 
qualitatively the same, some are basic competencies, and some are primary. 
Our existence is made up of many different types of involvements, some basic and 
apply to almost anything we do, walking on floors, getting dressed, eating, walking 
through doors, drinking coffees and so on.  These are among the basic tasks with 
which one must have proficiency to navigate around most aspect of the public world, 
and thus all environments.  Other involvements have a character that suggests they 
are of primary concern to Dasein, they reflect who we are in a more specific way 
other than just belonging to a larger public world.  For Bird it is basketball, for Ting, 
it is cooking, and for Marion Miller, it is such things as social and political activism 
and collecting pink lustre China. Not all Dasein’s reach mastery in the primary 
involvements, but typically have a sufficient proficiency ‘to be involved’.  Heidegger 
makes no mention of a distinction between what I am calling basic and primary 
involvements, but it is important for the thesis. 
While walking through a doorway, getting dressed and so on are involvements in 
their own right they are typically things we do as part of doing something else.  We 
are not simply going to walk through a doorway as an end in itself.  If we lose our 
job, for example, there are a number of subordinate and basic involvements we 
would cease, e.g. driving to work or catch the bus, getting coffee in the staff room, 
and so on.  There are thus two involvements structures around these primary 
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involvements. The first has been discussed and relates to the integration of, for 
example, making shoes, within the broader public world.  The second is the 
involvement structure that is of a different character and relates activities that while 
not essential to the primary involvement itself, are necessary for a Dasein to be 
engaged in the primary activity, these are what I term subordinate and basic 
involvements, and each requires a certain know-how.  There is a lot more work to 
analysis the character of basic and subordinate involvements and the nature of their 
structure. This is outside the limits of the thesis, and it is sufficing to have brought 
this structure into view. 
Once discovered, for the most part, these basic involvements are taken for granted 
and they only come to notice if they disrupt a primary involvement.  On the way to 
work, should the car fail to work we may take a bus, or seek a ride with a friend.  
While inconvenient, the breakdown of the car was not a material impediment as 
alternatives were available. This indicates the less critical nature of these 
subordinate involvements. 
In the case of Marion Miller, it is her body that is ‘breaking down’.  Marion tells of 
how she addressed this by having someone come in and do the basic tasks that 
needed to be done.  She still directed what was to be done; it is just that there was 
an alternative method.  Marion’s ‘directing the work’ required a certain know-how 
which she possessed.  With the basic or subordinated activities addressed she 
remained living in her home and was able to continue her dealings in the primary 
activities.  By way of summary, in her home environment, her circumspection 
showed up for her basic involvements (e.g. cleaning) which she addressed via the 
home help, and the possibility for involvements associated with the primary activities 
continued to show up, and she continued with them. The move to the nursing home 
affected both the basic and primary aspects of her involvements structures. In 
relation to the basics involvements (e.g. bathing, cooking, dressing, etc.) these still 
show up in circumspection, however, she no longer can direct what occurs in an 
immediate sense; they are otherwise attended to.  The main loss is in the area of 
primary involvements. The entities required for Marion to engage in these activities 
are simply not there. The structure has collapsed.  Her circumspection cannot show 
up for Marion possibilities for engaging in the activities that give her meaningful lived 
experiences because those possibilities are no longer present in her world.   
There seems to be a relationship between a Dasein’s ontic world which is 
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determined by the structures of involvement established by a Dasein’s developed 
know-how and Dasein’s existence, the life Dasein lives.   Further, the structures of 
involvement that determine a particular Dasein’s world, and hence its existence, has 
basic or subordinate involvements aspects and primary aspects.  This would 
suggest that while the basic aspects are ways of being of Dasein, it appears to be 
the primary aspects that are of main concern to the being of Dasein.  The question 
then arises as to what is the basis by which Dasein takes up certain involvements 
and not others.  This is addressed in the following section called the assigning of 
Dasein.  
Rompol World Example 
A lot of ground has been covered.  Before proceeding to the next step, I want to 
pause and give an example to illustrate the concept of worlds as discussed to date.  
A world can be understood as a system comprising a network of interconnected in-
order-to linkages (references, the 'towards-which', involvements, etc.).  We can 
describe the relational system in terms of 'this is what this does' (serviceability) 
because ‘this is what we need it to do’ (usability) or we can describe it in a similar 
but more dynamic way, involvements.   
Once we understand the structure of worlds, we are then able to play with it and 
come up with different arrangements that are essentially the same ready-to-hand 
entity.  There are, for example, many arrangements of furniture and office equipment 
that can be combined to make a study.  There will be thousands of differently looking 
studies, but they are all studies by virtue of the structure of involvements that 
constitute a study.  This is why if we walk into a kitchen and see a chainsaw sitting 
on the kitchen bench it looks out of place.  What a chainsaw is doesn't fit the 
relational structure that determines a kitchen.  What determines a study, or a kitchen 
is, in turn, determined by the larger world structure in which they fit.   A house 
designer may play with the concepts of the spaces we call ‘study’, ‘kitchen’, 
‘bathroom’, ‘bedroom’ and consider combining them in different ways.  Houses with 
‘open plan’ living probably arose in this way. Either the new ‘spatial’ arrangements 
work and are successful, or they fail, the success of the ‘innovation’ will depend on 
the circumspection of the potential buyers. A buyer’s circumspection must show up 
possibilities for living that are intelligible (linked to understanding) and desirable for 
the buyer (linked to the being of the buyer).  This is true for all new innovations that 
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involve restructuring the world by either rearranging the structure of existing 
involvements or by introducing new involvements.  This is demonstrated in the 
Rompol World, an example of the bring into being of a new world. 
The Rompol World 
Person A is visiting some friends, one of their older children, Person B, says 
"Goodbye I'm off to the Rompols179.  The word is a complete puzzle to A and on 
inquiring it is disclosed that it refers to a gaming tournament association for robot 
wars. The idea is to have self-directed robots that compete against each other in 
much the same way as the 'smash-up derbies' work at the speedway.  The last 
operational robot wins.  The competition started between the engineering sections 
of Universities as a way of developing know-how in robotics and has now spread so 
that there are local games and annual national tournaments.  
When a 'new' world has been 'found' Heidegger uses the terminology of 'disclosed' 
[BT 176/137] and when new entities in a world have been 'found' he uses the 
terminology of 'discovered' [BT 84/58]. 
We then have the following: 
Person A - the Rompol world is initially unknown, but there is such a world. 
Person A - the Rompol world gets disclosed to A 
Person A - has a 'vague' discovery of entities, the robots, little else. 
Person B - has previously disclosed the Rompol world 
Person B - has previously discovered the robot entities in the Rompol world.  Based 
on B’s know-how they have been freed for B for involvements in the robot war 
games. 
Before B could disclose Rompol world, it had to have been previously ‘freed’. The 
Rompol world is not just a world it is an entity ready-to-hand in a larger world. At 
one stage, the Rompol world did not exist.  It came into being, at first conceptually, 
the instant the Daseins from the various Universities met and agreed to establish 
the Rompol competition and specified the basic character of the entities that will be-
                                            
179 This is a plausible but fictitious account with a made-up word.  The name comes from bringing together parts 
of two Greek words meaning robot wars; ρομπότ (rompót) translated as robot and πόλεμος (polémous) 
translated as war. 
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in the Rompols. In the specifying, it is the involvement structure that is being 
established, guided by the concept ‘robot war games’. 
Having developed the Rompols conceptually, the group can plan, design and 
establish the Rompols; the Rompol World is brought into being. From previous 
discussions, all these activities will be seen as various forms of comportments 
towards the Rompols.  The group gradually develops the skill in running the 
Rompols, and prior know-how is applied in the development of the war-robots, 
arranging venues, setting up the organisation, and so on.  New know-how emerges, 
and existing know-how is increased as the war robots battle one another, and 
different types of materials, weaponry, tactics, control systems and so on are 
developed.  The nature of circumspection, involvements and dealings are all 
present, these aspects have been adequately covered and are easily applied to the 
Rompols. 
As in the case of any entity ready-to-hand, the structure of involvements for the 
Rompol world ends in the for-sake-of-which of Daseins.  War robots are a new entity 
that has been designed and created to ‘fight’ within the rules of the Rompols.  This 
determines their involvement within the context of the structure of involvements of 
the Rompol World, what they are (as entities) only make sense in the context of the 
Rompols (world).  Should Person B and all the other Daseins involved stop playing 
Rompol then, the world collapses. A world only is in its dynamic form.  Like the 
Rompol world, any world and even large worlds such as civilisations can collapse.  
All the while there are other people (Person C, D, etc.) who are not aware of the 
Rompol world.  The world exists independently of these people.  
The Daseins involved in the Rompol world may make changes, e.g. they may 
introduce a new class of entities, the remote-control robot or robot teams.  These 
new entities will have a mode of functioning and behaving on the arena that is 
determined by the manner of their involvements which is determined by Dasein. 
These changes occur within the broader concept of ‘robot war games’ and as such 
the basic character of the Rompol world has not changed and still ‘guides’ the 
development of the world.  If a new committee introduces the idea of ‘competitive 
soccer’ as the basis of the Rompol world and stops the ‘war games’ then while there 
are many similarities, the old world has gone, and a new world has come into being.  
This is the idea captured by the saying “It’s just not cricket” when proposed rule 
changes or new modes of involvement are introduced that fundamentally change 
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peoples’ understanding of what it is to be, in this case, cricket. 
The Rompol world exists with the larger public world, and I have previously 
discussed how they are interwoven as part of the same web.   The richness and 
complexity of the integrated system that is, for example, the modern city, is almost 
unfathomable, and yet the same structures are evident in the Rompol world.  Thanks 
to Heidegger, however, we can understand, describe its fundamental structure at 
the ontological level and thus apply it at the ontic level! 
Initially, when Person A has the Rompol world disclosed to them, it has the 
characteristic of the public world.  This is a derivative mode of understanding.  
Person A can go and watch and have an understanding of what is happening and 
gain a deeper understanding.  This process can continue, for example by joining a 
team and so on.  Progressively the nature of understanding changes until A has 
freed the robots for involvement in the games.  As a spectator, there is a certain 
level of ‘freeing’ otherwise A could not be involved as a spectator. However, this 
level of ‘freeing’ is insufficient for the Rompol world to survive.  There is no Rompol 
world if the only level of ‘freeing’ is that belonging to the spectator.  This is also true 
on a larger scale.   
For Person B, because they are actively involved in letting the robots be involved in 
Rompol, this world is an environment or environing world, an Umwelt.  It is the 
environing world on which Heidegger is focusing his analysis.  For B, their environing 
world comprises the Rompol environment and any another world in which they are 
letting entities be involved as the entity they are.  Without environing worlds of each 
Dasein, there is no public world, e.g. without people actively engaged in coffee 
shops, there are no coffee shops in the city for me to go to, and so on.  However, 
the public world is the basis on which the domestic environing worlds come into 
being; this is the relationship between ‘wholes and parts’ which threads its way 
through all of the analysis.  
Considering the Rompol world from the perspective of A and B not only assists in 
understanding the character of worlds but of the inter-relationship of a world being 
understood as both public and environment. This distinction between a public world 
and the environing world is very, very important not only in understanding how 
worlds are sustained, but also how a Dasein is sustained.  The question that arises 
and must be addressed is to what extent a nursing home is a public world or an 
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environing world for the older people living in them.  The answer will be based on 
the extent to which the nursing home world has entities within it that can be or have 
been freed by an older Dasein for their ‘for-the-sake-of-which’.  In the case of 
Marion, such entities do not exist in the nursing home, it is, as such a public world 
for her and not an environing world.  In that the environing world is the ‘wherein’ 
Dasein exists, the nursing home is not a world in which Marion can exist as Marion.  
Note, I am identifying primary involvements as being the defining characteristics of 
an environing world. This is based on the previous discussions and supported by 
the nature of Heidegger’s examples (e.g. the workshop as environing).   
There is, however, one aspect to be addressed, and that is the basis on which a 
Dasein ‘selects’ it involvements such that it acquires the know-how to ‘let’ certain 
entities be free for the Dasein to be involved with them.  This is addressed in the 
next section. 
The Assigning of Dasein 
In this section, there is another change in perspective. Heidegger’s analysis has 
progressively moved from a unity of equipment to the ‘in-order-to-structure’, to the 
referential unity of assignments and references, to the structure of involvements.  
The shift has progressively moved from an analysis of world in an ‘objective’ sense 
to slowly disclosing the intrinsic relationship between world and Dasein.  In 
Heidegger’s final shift he analyses the basis by which Dasein takes up the 
involvements it does, he calls this an assignment.  Together with the new but related 
phenomenon he also has, as may be anticipated, the phenomenon of the unity of 
involvements, which turns out to be the worldhood of the world. Worldhood is 
disclosed as part of the ontological structure of Dasein and of world, solving the 
puzzle identified at the beginning of the chapter. 
Before we can have dealings with things ready-to-hand we must first have learnt 
how to use them, this know-how frees the equipment for involvements.  Before this, 
there must also be a disclosure of the various involvements relevant to the dealings 
with a “certain intelligibility” [BT 118-9/86].  Heidegger’s use of the term “certain 
intelligibility” is instructive.  It suggests that extending out from what we are directly 
involved in, while we have to understand how it fits in, we do not need the same 
level of know-how.  To use a nail, for example, we must have the know-how of 
hammering, and of the uses for which nails provide the necessary survivability.  We 
 
467 
don’t have to understand the manufacturing of hammers. Similarly, the carpenter on 
a building site needs to be proficient in what they are doing, but only requires a 
“certain intelligibility” in relation to how the work fits in with the electrician, plumber, 
plasterer and so on.  Further out, the carpenter needs to know very little about the 
local council processes that administer the building approval process. This is the 
interplay between a Dasein’s environing world and the public world referred to 
earlier.  Here Heidegger’s perspective is firmly on Dasein, because for the carpenter 
to do their work the entire ‘in-order-to-structure’ must have first have been freed for 
involvements; this is the world perspective. 
Heidegger is pointing out that while we may have sufficient know-how to let things 
be involved in activities within our environment, we do need a “certain intelligibility” 
to apply that know-how.  For example, we may not have sufficient know-how of the 
environing world of a mechanic’s workshop to make this a place to dwell (be involved 
with it as a mechanic) but we do have to have a ‘certain understanding’ in-order-to 
take our car to the mechanics to get fixed.  The shoemaker will be proficient in 
sourcing supplies but does not need a detailed understanding of the suppliers 
environing world, nor of how the needles are made and so on.  Dasein’s world is 
one of proficient know-how in all relevant areas, and this level of understanding 
typically tapers off as the structure of involvements moves further away, either back 
towards the source of the basic supplies or in the direction of the for-the sake-of-
which.  This is further support for my interpretation of the environing world being 
‘aligned’ with primary involvements. 
In the writings of the U.S. cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) 
comments in his essay on Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of 
Culture that  
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not 
an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.  
(Geertz, 2000, p. 5) (p. 5) 
I take the phenomenon of the relational nature of world that Heidegger is describing 
to be roughly similar in a phenomenal sense to the ‘webs of significance’.  I raise 
this because I want to borrow from Geertz the notion of thick and thin, but apply it 
to the ‘certain intelligibility’ we possess.  I call the ‘certain intelligibility’ that we need 
to navigate the public world a ‘thin intelligibility or know-how’ and the intelligibility we 
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need to let entities be involved in our activities a ‘thick intelligibility or know-how’.   
The concept of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ is clearly a metaphor but it does give a way of 
describing what is required, and a way of qualifying the concept of ‘know-how’.   
A question that can then be asked is: “What is the thick intelligibility we require in a 
specific environing world and what is the necessary, thin intelligibility required to 
support the effective linkages between environing and public world?”   This line of 
analysis would be beneficial, for example, in determining what thick intelligibility is 
required to carry out the work in a trade or profession versus what thin intelligibility 
is required to embed the functioning in a broader environment.  A few years ago, I 
was tutoring in an accounting course at a University.  As a former CEO, what struck 
me was the course was so loaded with ‘thick intelligibility” concerning accounting 
and finance there was virtually no “thin intelligibility” taught.  While there are many 
exceptions, observing the behaviours of accountants over many years in an 
organisational setting, they appeared to operate from the perspective of “thick 
intelligibly” of accounting but very little of the necessary “thin intelligibility” to relate 
to the broader world of the organisation, sometimes with disastrous results. Perhaps 
this all starts with the education.  This silo mentality is not limited to finance 
departments and is still a common structural approach for organisations, i.e. they 
can be viewed as pockets of thick intelligibility with insufficient overlapping thin 
intelligibility to make them a properly cohesive unity.  Management approaches such 
as the Balanced Scorecard have been developed to address this structural 
deficiency by shifting the focus to the processes (the involvement structures) in an 
organisation that run across departments and that link the organisation to the 
customers (for-the-sake-of-which) and back to the suppliers (the where-of) (Kaplan 
& Norton, 2006; Niven, 2006; Rohm, Wilsey, Perry, & Montgomery, 2013).  This 
approach can be seen as reflecting a ‘Heideggerian’ understanding as it argues that 
organisations (environing worlds) should be arranged on the basis of the various 
involvement structures within the organisation that align the organisation within the 
broader world.  This line of discussion, while useful in illustrating the concept of thick 
and thin intelligibility and a broader application of Heidegger’s work, will not be 
discussed further as it leads to topics outside the scope of the thesis. It is, of course, 
relevant to the structuring and running of the nursing home and will be relevant to 
future inquiries. 
All Daseins have a familiarity with their domestic world; this implies a certain level 
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of thick intelligibility. The question that then arises is on what basis does a Dasein 
have the thick intelligibility it does?  Why does Dasein as a Dasein do certain things, 
play football, become an architect, a carpenter, a nurse or collect pink lustre china?  
It is in addressing this that the approach of the experiential empiricist approach is 
again essential.  There are some things for which we cannot answer the “why 
question” in a strictly causal sense. For example, we do not know why the speed of 
light180 is what it is.  All that is available to science in these cases is to describe the 
law like relationships (e.g. E=mc2) or describe the ‘practical bearings’.  This method 
is reflected in Heidegger’s approach;   
... understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned 
itself to an "in-order-to", and it has done so in terms of an ability-for-being for the sake of 
which it itself is -- one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly. [BT119/86] 
(translation modified)181 
The term “for the sake of which” needs to be heard in the right way. It should not be 
heard in a causal sense.  Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, while the term 
‘causes’ is typically used Aristotle does not use it in the way that stipulates an 
answer to a ‘why’ question. Aristotle is giving a descriptive account of the essential 
requirements, as he understood it, of an entity coming into being.  His final cause is 
also referred to as ‘for-the-sake-of-which’.  In relation to the compound entities 
produced by people, i.e. not ‘naturally’ occurring entities, this related to the purpose 
required of the thing being made.  Heidegger takes over Aristotle’s terminology of 
the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and its intent.  Ultimately the ready-to-hand, which 
includes worlds, come into being because of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of Dasein.   
In Heidegger’s description of the ‘in-order-to-structure,’ he traces the structure back 
to a ‘for-the-sake-of’ related to Dasein.  However, what is easy to miss, largely due 
to the English translation is that he presents this twice, with subtly different 
meanings.  Understanding this is essential in understanding the above passage. 
The first description has been presented before and concerns the hammer;  
 … there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making 
                                            
180 The speed of light is 299,792,458 metres/second, just under 300,000 kilometres/second or 1,080million 
kilometres/hour. We can measure it but to date science has not been able to give an account of why it is this 
speed, and not some other speed. 
181 The German word that has been changed in translation is Seinkönnen.  The translators have translated this 
as potentiality-of-being, which does not capture the same sense as my interpretive approach to BT.  The word 
root können has, according to the German-English dictionary Beolingus, meanings of 'to be able' and 'may'.  
The sense of this passage is that Dasein is able to assign itself in a way that is for-the-sake-of itself.  It is 
something done, not a potential waiting to be expressed. 
  
470 
something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad 
weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is 
to say, for the sake of an ability of Dasein's being. [BT 116/84] (translation modified) (my 
underlining) (German in the English original) 
The second description is; 
In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-
hand in its readiness-to-hand, is 'earlier' than any single item of equipment; so too for the 
farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the unity of involvements itself goes 
back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is no further involvement: this "towards-
which" is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within. a 
world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world, and to whose 
constitution of being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary "towards-which" is not just 
another "towards-this" as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary 
'towards-which' is a "for-the-sake-of-which". [BT 116/84] (translation modified) (my 
underlining) (my bolding) 
In the English text, there is a footnote at the end of the second passage which 
indicates that the German word translated as “for-the-sake-of-which” is Worum-
willen.  In the first passage, the German word translated as “for-the-sake-of” is Um-
willen.  We thus have two accounts of the final “towards-which” and understanding 
the difference is instructive. 
The second account refers to the unity of involvements itself, i.e. world or the 
‘wherein’ Dasein dwells. This does not go back to an Um-willen it goes back to a 
Worum-willen.  Following straight after passage 2 Heidegger then tells us, 
But the 'for-the-sake-of' [Um-willen] always pertains to the being of Dasein, for which, in its 
being, that very being is essentially an issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by 
which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein's very being as the sole authentic "for-
the-sake-of-which"[Worum-willen]. [BT 116-7/84] (my gloss) (Italics for issue in the English 
but not in the German) 
What we have is world (unity of involvements) connecting to Dasein’s being (the 
primary for-sake-of-which) (passages 2/3) and the involvements of entities within 
the world connecting as an ability of Dasein’s being, i.e. way of being-in-the-world 
(passages 1/3).  
The way we can understand this relationship is by thinking of a concrete situation.  
One of my sons wanted to be an electrician, this reflects an aspect of his being 
(Worum-willen).  In order to be an electrician, the world of electricians had first to be 
disclosed (passage 2). He then develops the know-how, freeing all the relevant 
ready-to-hand items within the world of the electrician. Once acquiring the various 
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know-hows to be an electrician(Um-willen) he goes out on a job and installs some 
electrical fittings.  The in-order-to structure (or structure of involvements) that is 
associated with this task goes back to a for-sake of him being an electrician (Um-
willen), this, in turn, leads to an aspect of who he is, an aspect of his being.  The 
work is thus structurally connected and undertaken for the sake my son’s 
being(Worum-willen).   Therefore, what is essential to his being who he is, is the 
ability to undertake work associated with his Worum-willen, i.e. his self-
understanding.  The precise nature of the work he engages in will have varying in-
order-to structures and led to various ways of being an electrician (Um-willen).  
Ultimately, however, there must be a connection between the way of being an 
electrician and my son’s understanding of what an electrician is (being) otherwise 
there becomes a disconnect.  Since he started as an electrician my son has changed 
what he does, in that he has moved from being a ’hands-on’ electrician working for 
somebody to now being the owner of an electrical contracting firm.  He is still working 
in the broad world of electrical contracting, but his structure of involvements has 
changed.  I am not going to continue the analysis of this example, the differences 
between Um-willen and Worum-willen have been sufficiently illustrated.  This is only 
one aspect of my son’s understanding of himself; he is also being a husband, being 
a father, being a friend, being a son and being a homeowner.  All these are aspects 
of his Worum-willen (primary for-the-sake-of) which gives rise to various ways of 
being who he is(Um-willen). 
If there was no world of electricians, or if this world were not disclosed by my son, 
he could not be an electrician. This is the case for all the other aspects of being who 
he is.  It is the same situation for any Dasein.  Dasein’s disclosure (understanding) 
of a world is thus a necessary structural element of Dasein as is Dasein’s discovery 
of entities in that world.  Understanding is not sufficient. In that our existence is the 
lived experience of expressed comportments, it is experienced in the things we do 
within the world, i.e. our dealings with the ready-to-hand.  For the sake of my son 
being an electrician there is thus the prior condition of disclosing a world and 
discovering entities, then there is the on-going condition of access to the world itself, 
i.e. access to all the ready-to-hand entities and the ‘in-order-to’ structures that allow 
the involvement of those entities.  
If my son is suddenly denied access to the world of electricians, then his 
understanding of himself is still that of an electrician (ontological), but he has no 
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opportunity, at the ontic level, to be an electrician.  There wold then be a tension 
between his Worum-willen (for-the-sake-of) and his world which can only be 
resolved by a shift in one or the other. 
While I have used a case where someone made a deliberate choice, my son 
becoming an electrician, this choice in itself was an expression of his understanding 
of himself.  Earlier Heidegger used the language of references and assignments in 
relation to the ready-to-hand and in this he spoke about the ‘in-order-to’ structure 
and the relationship between serviceability and usability.  The sense is that a certain 
serviceability is assigned in to order to achieve a certain usability. This relationship 
between serviceability and usability passes along the entire ‘in-order-to-structure’ it 
finally ending with Dasein, either as a final ‘in-order-to’ or a ‘for-sake-of-which’.  The 
language of the ‘in-order-to’ now comes back.  In this case, there is not an 
assignment establishing the relationship pairing of the usability and serviceability of 
two ready-to-hand entities; there is an assigning of Dasein to world.  This can be 
understood in a similar vein to the discussion surrounding the rest of the ‘in-order-
to’ structure. In order to give expression to its understanding of self (i.e. its being), 
Dasein requires a particular ‘usability’ from its world that allows this expression to 
occur, it thus assigns itself to the world that will provide the necessary serviceability.  
This can be understood as follows; 
Dasein’s being needs a world with particular characteristics (usability 
required)     assignment        world understood as having those 
characteristics (serviceability offered) 
Having made the assignment to a world, Dasein then assigns itself to various ‘in-
order-to’ structures in that world that further reflects an understanding of itself.  This 
is the meaning of the passage given earlier;  
understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself 
to an "in-order-to", and it has done so in terms of an ability-for-being for the sake of which it 
itself is - .. one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly. (translation modified) 
[BT 119/86] 
Within the broader world of electrical contracting (a public world) my son has taken 
up specific assignments within that world.  While I have used the specific world of 
electricians, the concept applies to any specific ‘in-order-to’ and must be understood 
broadly.  For example, a person buying particular style clothes may be doing so in-
order-to ‘look fashionable’, ‘have sturdy work clothes’, ‘go bushing walking’, etc. All 
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these reflect different possible ways of being and hence different understandings of 
being.  As mentioned earlier, assigning is not a causal phenomenon it is a 
descriptive account of what Heidegger has observed happens.  
A point that comes up in the next chapter is that a Dasein is born into a particular 
culture and the sub-worlds it contains.  There is no initial choice of where or when a 
Dasein is born. A world of an electrician could not have been disclosed in the 
fifteenth century! There is thus a significant contingent aspect to world disclosure. 
While the world that is disclosed to a very young Dasein happens tacitly as a 
consequence of birth, there is a time at which Dasein may make a deliberate choice 
concerning assignments.  This is what Heidegger is referring to when he says the 
assigning is either explicit or tacitly. 
Why does one person become an engineer, another an athlete or yet another a little 
league coach?  It is possible to say that they followed what was of interest to them, 
but this is not a real answer to why. It merely pushes the question back one level.  
We could say they were influenced by the family situation and followed into the 
family business.  Again, it is not a real answer to the why question. There was no 
answer to the “Why?” question in terms of causality in Heidegger’s day, and the 
various contemporary neurosciences and cognitive sciences still have no answer to 
this question. Heidegger thus puts all speculation concerning why out of court and 
simply refers to …  
 .. the being of Dasein, which is of concern for Dasein in its very being. [BT 160/123] 
(translation modified) 
Why does Dasein make one assignment in preference to another? Who knows!  
There is no law like relationship that can determine how Dasein will assign itself on 
the basis of its understanding of self (being) to a certain way of being.  Heidegger is 
not concerned with why, but with description.  There is an assignment made from 
among different alternatives within the world which implies a choice, but it is not an 
unencumbered choice, it is made by Dasein out of concern for its being. To put this 
another way, who we are matters to Dasein even if Dasein is not explicitly aware of 
the structural processes associates why the mattering takes the specific form it 
does.   
Marion Miller just is Marion Miller. There is no why!  Who she is, finds expression in 
the assignments to certain ‘in-order-to’ structures, and at the ontic phenomenal 
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level, her existence is experienced in terms of the expressed comportments towards 
the entities that are determined by those structures.  This means that who Marion 
is, is determined by such things as know-how and comportments towards pink lustre 
china collecting and a concern with political and social activism. Just as worlds 
collapse if the dynamic nature of involvements ceases, Dasein’s existence, 
understood as the concrete expression of Dasein’s way of being, starts to collapse 
when its primary involvements cease.  The structural connection between these two 
forms of collapse is revealed in the following section. 
Heidegger’s Conclusion Worldhood as the Structure of World 
Now comes the concluding step in Heidegger's line of argument. Firstly, a 
restatement:  
Dasein always assigns itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" to the "with-which" of an 
involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as 
ready-to-hand. [BT 119/86] 
Heidegger, by and large, is talking about a Dasein182 in its ordinary everyday 
dealings.  In other words, it has already disclosed a world on the basis of a “for-the-
sake-of-which” and it is from this that it assigns itself to involvements such that it 
can encounter the ready-to-hand in the world.  This has been explained in detail 
above. 
This leads Heidegger to conclude; 
The "wherein" of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that on the basis of which 
one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this 
"wherein" is the phenomenon of the world. [BT 119/86] (translation modified)183 (Heidegger’s 
italics) 
To reword this in a less compact way: The dynamic structure of being-in-the-world 
which is determinative of any Dasein’s being, has as part of that structure a process 
of assigning itself to involvements (i.e. ‘in-order-to-structures’) based on its 
understanding of self (what it requires in order to give expression to itself) and 
                                            
182 He is referring to a person who has already developed sufficient thick intelligibility to have an environment 
on an ordinary everyday basis. 
183 The German word the translators have translated as "act of understanding" is Verstehen. This is a noun 
that means understanding and there is no 'act'.  The term act is a technical term used by Husserl and refers to 
an act of consciousness. The term act also implies an actor. On both accounts this interpretation would not fit 
with Heidegger's approach.   All that can be said is that the assigning occurs within an understanding.  The BTs 
translation has understanding and not act of understanding.  
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understanding of world (what will enable the expression of self).  The unity of the 
involvements to which Dasein assigns itself is Dasein’s world, the ‘wherein’ it lives 
its life. This describes the phenomenon of world. 
The second part of his conclusion is;  
 
... the structure of that on the basis of which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the 
worldhood of the world. [BT 119/86] (translation modified) 
It is the structure itself that is the basis by which the assignments take place that 
Heidegger calls worldhood.  This is part of Dassin’s structure, it relates to the world 
part of being-in-the-world.  For a particular Dasein, we thus have the case that if 
there is no structure of assigning (worldhood), there is no assignment to a world.  If 
there is no assignment, there is no basis for dealings with things in the world; there 
is then no existence. On this basis, as previously indicated, there is no Dasein.  
However, if we extend this to all Daseins, if there are no longer assignments, there 
are no longer any dealings by any Dasein, there is, as has been previously laid out 
no world.  Worldhood is not only the structural basis by which an individual Dasein 
gives itself its world but collectively, it is the structure which is determinative, on the 
basis of Dasein’s collective activity, of the world.  There is a reflexive relationship 
between the Dasein and world; they require each other!  
The preceding is a technical description of why worldhood is both determinate of 
Dasein’s world and of the world in general.  This is an account that I have developed 
as Heidegger does not address this relationship explicitly in Being and Time, and I 
have not found it addressed in other of his works.  The following is a more 
generalised account of the dual role of worldhood. Dasein is born into an extant 
world understood in the broadest possible way as per Chapter 14.  As Dasein grows 
into the culture ‘sub-worlds’ are disclosed on the basis of its ‘for-the-sake-of-which’.  
In turn, assignments are made, and with them, ready-to-hand entities are freed for 
involvements. Dasein engages with these entities (dealings) as part of who it is. The 
dealings are made possible because of Dasein’s thick intelligibility, or know-how that 
it has acquired as part of how Dasein understands itself. These ‘wherein’ where 
these dealings occur is the world Dasein is familiar with, its environment as opposed 
to the public world.  However, Dasein’s active dealings in its world contribute to and 
maintain that part of the broader world into which it has been born and this process 
is happening tens of thousands of times across the broader world.  The structure 
that is the basis by which Dasein assigns itself and in so doing gets its world is the 
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same structure in every other Dasein!   World in the broader sense thus arises from 
the interactions of all the Daseins in the world, all of whom have the same common 
structure.  Hence worldhood is both the structure of Dasein’s world (singular) and 
on a collective basis the structure of the broader world.  
Heidegger’s language of assigning is a technical language and just because a 
Dasein may be attracted, say to an aged care job, does not mean that they are 
aware of the structure of the world; 
This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are 
constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. [BT 120/86]  
The structure of worldhood is active even at an early age, and this was illustrated in 
the example of the young person assigning themselves to the world of football.   
This completes the discussion on worldhood.  
The Context of Dasein's Assigning Itself – Meaning Making 
There is one final step that Heidegger address, that of assignment as the basis of 
meaning-making. 
As I look around my workspace, where I am writing this thesis, there is a deep sense 
of familiarity. I have spent hundreds of hours here.  I know exactly where everything 
I use is located. I know exactly how to use them and to what end they should be 
applied.  On the computer, I can pull up the various software programs and move 
around them almost without looking.  Each software program is a ready-to-hand 
piece of equipment, and I have the know-how to let it be involved as I go about my 
work. There are also the more mundane things, the desk, chair, the desk lamp, the 
pens and so on, I am familiar with them all.  All of these things are part of my 
assignments, assignments made for the sake of my understanding of who I am.  
There was a time when I was not familiar with all these things.  There was a time, 
maybe long ago when I first had to acquire the understanding of ‘study space’.  
There have been more recent changes to my world, for example, I now use the 
program 'Evernote' to keep track of incidentals things, this is a new addition.  But it 
is something that makes sense to me in this space; it fits within my workspace, it 
has a place within my world. 
Having disclosed the world of my study space what keeps it 'open' for me?  Why 
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doesn't it just close up, become alien, unfamiliar?  Why don’t I have to re-learn this 
every time?   For Heidegger, it is understanding that must hold open all these 
relationships.  
... understanding holds [these relationships] in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them with 
familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them before itself, for it is in these that its assignment 
operates ... [BT 120/87]  
What is important in this passage is that the assignments take place within our 
understanding of the world.  While the entity of the world, understood in the broader 
sense, may remain relatively constant, at least in the short term, Dasein’s 
understanding of itself may change, this, in turn, may result in a change in the 
assignments. This results in a change in Dasein’s world.   I recently met a young 
lawyer who started out as a defence attorney in criminal law and found he did not 
like it (too many crooks he told me).  He shifted to employment law.  This requires a 
new set of assignments and the relinquishing of old assignments.  Dasein’s world 
has changed but changed as a result of either a clearer or a new understanding of 
self.  The world of criminal law is still there, but the understanding of this world in 
terms of his understanding of being has shifted. 
Breakdown examples are found concerning people with dementia.  Sometimes the 
complex understandings of things remain, but little is left by way of assignments.  
One of the people living in the ‘dementia’ area of a nursing home I once managed 
used to be a professional singer, but there was little evidence of this know-how.  
One day some music came on triggering this skill, and she burst into song!  Similar 
things have happened with people who played the piano. A person regularly passed 
the piano and appeared to have no interest in it.  One day they were attracted it by 
someone playing the piano, and with a little encouragement, sat down and played.  
But when they walked away there was no recognition of what a piano was!  It was 
as if the involvement itself was the basis of understanding, and this showed up in 
the playing, not the entity itself.  In this case, the person’s circumspection was not 
operative (not recognising the piano by its appearance) pointing to the role of both 
the present-at-hand and the structure of involvement in circumspection.  As 
Heidegger noted, the structure of understanding holds open the understanding of 
Dasein’s world and I would suggest, that when this structure is damaged, the world 
is no longer held open. There are fragments that remain, triggered in other ways 
and this is what is witnessed in the above examples.  At the moment when there 
was an expressed comportment (singing, piano playing), these lived experiences 
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resulted in expression of delight and joy. There is much to commend itself to 
research that results in supportive strategies that result in identifying and enabling 
a higher incidence of these “fragments”.  Another indication of the way 
understanding holds open the world by way of a breakdown case also come from 
my experience with people who have dementia.  Often, even cutlery and other 
common everyday things became mere present-at-hand objects as the 
understanding drops away.  However, in some instances, once a person is placed 
at the table with a meal and the cutlery, the small contained set of relationships thus 
revealed is enough for the person to eat their meal with the cutlery.  
Bound up, with the structure of involvements, understanding and the assignment is 
the concept of meaning: 
The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and 
of them.  The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take 
as one of meaning-making[be-deuten]. [BT 120/87] (translation modified, see note below) 
What something means then is based on its place in the referential unity, and the 
understanding we have of it reflected in the assignments, i.e. the basis on which 
entities are freed for us for our involvements.  This process is what gives the 
meaning of the entity to us.  Again, this opens the way for room for error, in that we 
may have the wrong meaning compared to the rest of the culture.  It is also the basis 
by which the meaning of an entity may change in the culture or the basis by which 
a ready-to-hand entity may have one meaning in culture A, but a different meaning 
in culture B.  Within a culture, the meaning of something will then be reflected on 
the basis of its involvements in the referential unity.   
Translation and Interpretation Note 
In the English translation, the term signifying is used rather than meaning-making. 
To explain why I have made the change to this important concept I need to address 
the German word that is being translated, be-deuten. 
Typically, the German word is presented as bedeuten, but Heidegger hyphenates 
the word in this instance, he doesn't elsewhere, i.e. be-deuten.  Bedeuten can mean 
'to mean', 'to signify', 'to stand for', etc.  However, the word is a composite of be + 
deuten, and it seems to be that this is what Heidegger wants to emphasise.  The 
prefix 'be' typically indicating a working on something, changing something or 
touching something in a manner indicated by the verb; roughly understood there is 
a sense of 'inflicting' something on something. By way of example, the verb malen 
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means to paint so, 
• 'Ich male mein Haus' is translated as 'I paint my house.' but in the sense of doing 
a painting of my house, whereas  
• 'Ich bemale mein Haus' is also translated as 'I paint my house.' However, this 
means that I put paint on my house. 
The verb deuten can mean 'to indicate', to point to [something]', 'to construe', 'to 
interpret' e.g. ausdeuten means to translate and can be used in the same sense as 
verstehen, which is to understand.   
The word be-deuten can thus be understood as 'imposing or inflicting' meaning on 
something, and it is in this sense that I take Heidegger to be using the word.  The 
crucial German sentence; 
Den Bezugscharakter dieser Bezüge des Verweisens fassen wir als be-deuten. [BTg 116/87] 
Which is translated in the English translation as  
 
The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of 
signifying. [BT 120/87] 
does not reflect this active sense of imposing meaning and so I translate this 
passage as184 
We take the relational character of these relationships of assigning as meaning-making.  [BT 
120/87](my translation) 
When Heidegger uses the German word bedeutet, I typically translate this as 
signifies for the sake of simplicity in terms of sticking with the standard English 
translation. It does have the meaning of implies, signifies, meant and so forth. 
Meaning and Meaning Making 
The conclusion of the above analysis of what I have identified as a key passage is 
that it is in the assigning that meaning arises.  This is the basis of Dasein’s 
existence as meaningful.  If we take the assignments of all the various Daseins, 
then, of course, we have all the networks of interrelationships that give rise to entities 
ready-to-hand; but it is the structure of Dasein that gives meaning to the world.  In 
discussing meaning, Heidegger says a little later in Being and Time, 
                                            
184 The word "possess" which is the BT translation is not indicated in the German.  The BTs translation also, in 
my view misses the point: 
"We shall call the relational character of these referential relations signifying [be-deuten]." [BTs 85/87. 
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The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily 
belongs to that which an understanding interpretation Articulates.  Meaning is the "upon-
which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; [BT 
193/151] 
Remember the Rompol world example, if everyone stops playing and does 
something else, i.e. there are no longer assignments, then the world collapses.  The 
assigning is thus meaning-making for the Dasein as it is the basis by which it 
understands itself, and it is meaning-making for the entities in the world and hence, 
ultimately for any particular world.  Towards the end of Being and Time, this is what 
Heidegger is getting at when he summarises, 
Taken strictly, "meaning" signifies the "upon-which" of the primary projection of the 
understanding of being. When being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and 
understands the being of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the being 
of entities discovered within-the-world ... [BT 372/324] 
Meaning then arises with the projection of understanding. In the disclosure of world 
that accompanies projection Dasein’s being and the being of world are discovered 
at the same time. Simply put we can only understand our self as the being we are 
on the basis of our assignments to the involvement structure (world) whose meaning 
is disclosed in the projection of understanding. 
It is thus as a result of its familiarity with the relationships that Dasein "gives itself" 
its individual way being Dasein. This is the way Dasein gives meaning to itself.  
Within the Rompol world, Person B can understand themselves as a robot war 
gamer through its assignment to various involvement in robot war tournaments, etc. 
and can do this because Person B has a familiarity with the Rompol world, i.e. as 
being-in-the-Rompol-world. In the assignment, B gives meaning to itself and the 
entities in the Rompol world. 
Heidegger brings all this together in a pithy summary; 
The "for-the-sake-of-which" signifies [bedeutet] an "in-order-to"; this, in turn, a "towards-this"; 
the latter, an "in-which" of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the "with-which" of 
an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial unity; 
they are what they are as this meaning-making [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself 
beforehand its being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational unity of this 
meaning-making we call "meaningfulness". [BT 120/87] (translation modified)185 
                                            
185 The German word translated as meaningfulness is Bedeutsamkeit.  In the English text this is translated as 
significance.  Support for this translation can be found in the English translation of History of the Concept of 
Time translated by Theodore Kisiel. 
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Meaningfulness186 then represents the unity of all the involvements to which a 
particular Dasein has assigned itself, and this reflects the understanding Dasein has 
of itself, at that time, and is the basis by which Dasein gives meaning to itself. 
If then an assignment is meaning-making in terms of the existence of Dasein this is 
the key to understanding the shedding of life.  In Marion Miller’s world within the 
nursing home, there appears to be nothing to which she can assign herself that 
reflects her understanding of who she is. At home, her life had meaning. In the 
nursing home, her life has lost meaning. This I take as a preliminary understanding 
of the of ‘shedding of life’.   
Summary 
This ends the inquiry and discussion into the worldhood of the world.  The 
interconnected character of Dasein and world at the ontological and ontic level have 
been brought into view.  
Dasein’s structure is meaning-making, in terms of its self and world.  In average 
everyday situations, this is based on the possibility of involvements with the ready-
to-hand that show up in circumspection as meaningful.  In the case of a move into 
a nursing home, a Dasein has typically already made assignments within a different 
world.  It is not surprising then that for many people the world of the nursing home 
is shown up by circumspection as being meaningless. 
If Dasein is to continue with its existence, then after the relocation the environment 
must contain possibilities for involvements reflecting Dasein’s prior assignments. To 
live meaningfully, Dasein needs the possibility of meaningful involvements where 
meaningful is understood as having meaning to Dasein’s existence.  The connection 
between the lack of opportunities for involvements relevant to a person’s life and the 
shedding of life have been made on a number of occasions, and this has now been 
brought to light structurally. 
The discussion to date has focused on Dasein’s dealings with the ready-to-hand.  
                                            
186 In the History of the Concept of Time Heidegger acknowledged that using 'meaningfulness' in this way 
leaves the term open for misunderstanding.  He specifically states that it "says nothing about meaning in the 
sense of value and rank" and is not to be understood as the "meaning of a word" albeit he acknowledges there 
is a connection.  That he has to make such delimiting comments he recognises points to a, 
“ ... certain embarrassment in the choice of the right expression for the complex phenomenon which we want to 
call meaningfulness. And I frankly admit that this expression is not the best, but for years I have found nothing 
better ...” [HCT 202] 
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CHAPTER 16: CULTURE AND BEING-WITH  
Introduction 
To this point, I have gone into considerable detail enquiring into the basis of 
Heidegger’s work and into his analysis of worldhood.  Once this is grasped together 
with Heidegger’s basic methodology the remainder of the Dasein analytic becomes 
a little more, albeit still challenging, accessible.  While it is possible, on the 
framework I have presented to date, to undertake a preliminary analysis of the 
shedding of life the analysis would be deficient without first understanding Dasein 
as part of the culture and its relationship with other Dasein’s which I address in this 
chapter, of understanding the character of being-in the world in terms of Dasein’s 
understanding and receptivity which is discussed in the next chapter. 
In the previous chapter concerning the worldhood while other Daseins are evident 
in the analysis they do not have a prominent role.  It was clear that in some way it 
is the collective action of many Daseins that brings a world into being, but there was 
no account given of the relationships between Daseins that could account for this.  
In Chapter 4 of Being in Time Heidegger discusses the nature of the relationship 
with other Daseins and addresses what he calls ‘the who’ of Dasein.  The ‘who’ of 
Dasein refers to the source of Dasein’s understanding of itself and world.  To put 
simply, Heidegger indicates that we can think of the culture as being the ‘average 
everyday’ way that the Daseins in a particular cultural world understand things and 
on the basis of that understanding that the ready-to-hand shows up for involvements 
and so on.  When we grow up in a culture, it is this average everyday way of 
understanding and being involved that we learn as a functional member of the 
culture.  While we may have some different understandings, by and large, when we 
grow up in a culture we reflect aspects of the cultural norms.  Heidegger refers to 
this average everydayness as the ‘One’, and his conclusion is that, by and large, 
who we are is the ‘One’.  Heidegger then identifies practices in the culture that 
operate to ‘enforce’ conformity with the ‘One’.  Heidegger recognises that the ‘One’ 
and its way of being has positive aspects, for without it there is no world.  However, 
he also points out downsides in that Dasein can become absorbed in the 
understandings of the ‘One’ and not seek to pursue its own understanding of self, 
nor its own understanding of world.  The first section of this chapter addresses the 
concept of culture and the power of the one. 
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The second section of the chapter discusses the concept of Dasein-with and being-
with, and this addresses more directly the interactions between Daseins.  In this 
section, I also discuss the concept of “leaping in” and “leaping ahead” which is a 
rare example where Heidegger introduces a topic that could be considered to have 
ethical import. This discussion has implications for the running of nursing homes as 
the discussion concludes that the way nursing homes are currently run is a taking 
away of a person’s being.  
In this chapter, I do not follow Heidegger’s discussions as closely as I have in the 
preceding in two chapters.  The phenomenon of culture is one that has been widely 
studied and in bringing this phenomenon into view I rely more on the work of other 
writers and examples than on Heidegger’s account.  His main technical areas are 
around the power of the ‘One’ to enforce conformity, and even here it is almost 
treated simply by listing the practices. I follow suit as it is not critical to the thesis to 
fully investigate and discuss this aspect of his work.  A discussion on the concepts 
of Dasein-with and being-with provides a basis for discussing how the self-
understanding of a nursing home187 can lead to an impoverished environment 
lacking the wherewithal for an older Dasein to live their life.  This is related to a mode 
of care delivery, leaping-in, which exacerbates the impact of the environment by 
creating the conditions for institutionalization.  Once the impacts of that arise from 
the structural relationship between the nursing home and the older person are 
clarified, then this provides the basis for a change in practice based on 
reconceptualising the role of care workers in a nursing home. 
Section 1: Culture – The Power of the ‘One’ 
Acquiring an Initial Understanding 
Heidegger’s starting point in Being and Time is a normal, fully functional Dasein 
doing average everyday things.  In Chapter IV of Being and Time Heidegger is 
addressing ‘the who’ of Dasein, i.e. who is the Dasein that is “in-the-world”.   Almost 
immediately, one is confronted by what appears to be some outlandish statements, 
denying that it is itself but rather is ‘the other’, e.g. 
When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern-that is, at the same time, in its being-
                                            
187 The nursing home understood as a unity of ‘behaviours’ has the same manner of being as Dasein.  This 
claim is made on the basis of a similar assertion by Heidegger in relation to science; “As ways in which man 
behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity - man himself-- possesses. “[BT 32/11] 
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with towards Others - it is not itself. [BT 163/125] [my underlining] 
Proximally, factical Dasein is in the with-world, which is discovered in an average way. 
Proximally, it is not 'I', in the sense of my own Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose 
way is that of the "One". In terms of the "One", and as the "One", I am 'given' proximally to 
'myself'. Proximally Dasein is the "One", and for the most part it remains so. [BT 167/129] 
[my underlining]  
What Heidegger is doing is his standard approach of ruling out the most likely 
common understandings that may be present when one is engaging in Being and 
Time.  We are forced then to put on hold any presuppositions and keep an open 
mind to what he is going to present by way of the identification of phenomenon and 
analysis of structure. This approach has been encountered before; it is part of his 
method. Similarly, we have to work hard at bringing into view what he means by the 
‘One’.  
I have already indicated in the introduction that this chapter deals with the Culture 
and the way we acquire the cultural norms. The cultural norms are described as the 
‘One’, and in a real sense, we become part of the ‘One’ by becoming part of the 
culture.  This is the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing. The German 
translated for this term is simply Das Man. Man is the plural form of a personal 
pronoun that can mean you, we, they, or one. The English text translates it as “the 
They” but this does not feel right.  Every Dasein is part of the culture, and so the 
translation should be either “the We” or the ‘One’.  There is an expression in the 
language, to the effect that we do something because it is what “one does” and this 
reflects the ‘proper’ way things are done in the culture. In that this captures a sense 
of what Heidegger is after I interpret the expression as the ‘One’. 
Heidegger’s analysis commences from the perspective of a Dasein already going 
about its affairs in the culture. He says very little concerning the way in which we 
are socialised into a culture, and the most we get are along the following lines;  
Dasein, which 'has come into the world' through birth, grows up in and grows into such 
interpretedness. This interpretedness entails a self-interpretation of Dasein. It delineates 
'what is appropriate', 'how to behave', 'what one has to do in particular situations'. …. 
Inscribed in the public realm are instructions for encountering the world in a particular way. . 
[CT 28] (my underlining) 
We grow up within such a world-view and gradually become accustomed to it. Our world-
view is determined by environment - people, race, class, developmental stage of culture. 
[BPP 5] 
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown 
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in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all 
genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and 
appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by 
this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-
itself, so that it just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of the public way in which 
things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the … basic way in which 
Dasein lets the world "matter" to it. The "One" prescribes one's disposedness, and 
determines what and how one 'sees'. [BT 213/169-70] (my underlining) 
When the passages a read together, the descriptions provide a strong claim that as 
we grow up and into a culture, the culture (or the ‘One’) determines our 
understanding of the world.  This means, based on the last chapter, that it also 
determines how the things in the world show up for us in our circumspective 
concern; hence “determines what and how one ‘sees”.  These statements simply 
place before us the logical conclusions of the last chapter.  When we grow up into 
a particular world, it is the only world our structure has as the basis for understanding 
and assigning itself.  What is perhaps most surprising is that Heidegger claims that 
it prescribes our “disposedness”. I address this concept in the next chapter and 
translate it as affective-attunement.  This concept covers our affective responses to 
the world, and so Heidegger is claiming the ‘One’ also shapes our emotions!  I do 
not address this aspect in any detail in this chapter, but I do discuss and support the 
claim in the next chapter. 
Apart from the claims concerning “disposedness” Heidegger’s claims are consistent 
with accounts given by other scholars.  The main aspect of the concept of the ‘One’ 
is that the socialisation that occurs to us is an all-pervasive one that covers ways of 
being of Dasein in all its aspects, small and large. In the following, I will provide 
some descriptions of the phenomenon from the accounts of other scholars that I 
believe are consistent with Heidegger’s view. 
There is an example of child rearing that was introduced into this literature by 
Dreyfus(Dreyfus, 1991) and now used more widely as the case example(Aho, 2009; 
White & Dreyfus(Forward), 2005) 
A Japanese baby seems passive .... He lies quietly ... while his mother, in her care, does [a 
great deal of] lulling, carrying, and rocking of her baby. She seems to try to soothe and quiet 
the child, and to communicate with him physically rather than verbally. On the other hand, 
the American infant is more active ... and exploring of his environment, and his mother, in her 
care, does more looking at and chatting to her baby. She seems to stimulate the baby to 
activity and vocal response. It is as if the American mother wanted to have a vocal, active 
baby, and the Japanese mother wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles 
of caretaking of the mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want .... A 
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great deal of cultural learning has taken place by three to four months of age ... babies have 
learned by this time to be Japanese and American babies. (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 17) 
In this description, we have an account of how a baby born into a Japanese culture 
becomes a passive baby or that born into American culture an active baby and in 
so doing the baby is already reflecting being Japanese or being American based on 
the interactions with their mother188. The process starts young! 
The anthropologist, Jared Diamond, in his book The World Until Yesterday, gives 
similar examples, first citing Nurit David Bird,  
At a time where in modern societies children begin schooling, say at age 6, Nayaka children 
independently go hunting small game, visiting and staying with other families, free from 
supervision by their own specific parents, though not necessarily from adults.…  Teaching, 
additionally, is done in a very subtle way.  No formal instruction and memorising here, no 
classes, no exams, no cultural sites [schools] in which packages of knowledge, abstracted 
from their context, are transmitted from one person to another.  Knowledge is inseparable 
from social life." (Diamond, 2012, p. 205) 
Then citing the work of Coin Turnball concerning Africa’s “mobile pygmies”,  
For children, life is one long frolic interspersed with a healthy sprinkle of spankings and 
slappings.…  And one day they find that the games they have been playing are not games 
any longer, but the real thing, for they have become adults.  The hunting is now real hunting; 
the tree climbing is in earnest search of inaccessible honey; their acrobatics on the swings 
are repeated almost daily, in other forms, in the pursuit of elusive game, for avoiding the 
malicious forest buffalo.  It happens so gradually that they hardly notice the change at first, 
or even when they are proud and famous hunters their life is still full of fun and laughter. 
"(Diamond, 2012, p. 205) 
These examples highlight that becoming a Nayaka adult or an African hunter is not 
one of specific acquisition of knowledge determined by a curriculum of formal study, 
it is the inculcation of a way of being that commences from the time they are babies.  
They are acquiring know-how, the ability to use the various tools of the culture so 
as to participate in the various involvements that form the cultural practices. The 
children are learning to understand their world based on the underlying, hidden 
structure of involvements relevant to their specific cultures. However, as earlier 
discussed, there is a complex set of interconnections that mesh together to form the 
cohesive unity of the cultural practices, the unity of involvements, which is world.  
However, we typically are not aware of this ‘unity’, and it is not, as was addressed 
last chapter, accessible to circumspection. Sometimes Heidegger refers to this as 
                                            
188 Whether this is an accurate depiction concerning Japanese an American child rearing is, to a degree, 
irrelevant. It is the account of the phenomenon that is important in this example. 
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the background;  
The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a unity of involvements. This unity need 
not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an 
interpretation, it recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the 
background. [BT 191/150] (my underlining) 
Being-in-the-world. We had to assure ourselves in the beginning that the structural unity of 
this phenomenon cannot be torn apart. The question of the basis which makes the unity of 
this articulated structure possible, remained in the background. [BT 402/351] (my underlining) 
The German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920) in describing the phenomenon 
that is the basis of culture commented: 
"Culture" is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on 
which human beings confer meaning and significance. (Weber, 2015, k. 1897-98) 
The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain 
culture or any "culture" in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural 
beings endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world 
and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain 
phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or 
negatively) meaningful.  (Weber, 2015, k. 1902-07) [my underlining] 
It is clear from these remarks by Weber that he regards the background of the 
“infinity of the world process” as something meaningless against which the person 
carves out meaning.  Weber concludes that whatever this “significance may be” it is 
what results in our making judgements “in its light”. While there are some similarities 
to Heidegger’s position there is an important difference in that for Heidegger “only 
Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless” [BT 193/151].  Given the importance of 
Weber in the development of sociology, exploring the relationship between Weber’s 
and Heidegger’s positions on culture, meaning and on such common views that we 
have the “capacity and the will to take deliberate attitudes”189 would be of interest in 
terms of researching the philosophical foundations of sociology. 
The power of culture to shape us was identified, albeit not developed, over two 
hundred and fifty years ago in the work of Blaise Pascal190 (1623-1662) a French 
philosopher and polymath.  Contrary to the thinking of his time for Pascal we are not 
shaped by some innate human or 'natural' nature (e.g. rationality) but that "custom 
                                            
189 This remark by Weber reflects Heidegger’s comment that; 
“Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods …” [BT 
175/136] 
190 Pascal was a contemporary to René Descartes (1596-1650) but unfortunately his philosophical insights 
were not published during his life time nor were they presented in the systematic way that Descartes presented 
his influential philosophical ideas.    
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is our nature"(Pascal(Author) & Elliot(Introduction), 2013, k. 957).  As such, rather 
than making decisions based on rational judgement, or on revealed truth, it is 
custom that determines the truth of a person's faith and so.  In his Christian world 
environment, it is because of custom, and by implication, not the grace of God 
arising out of faith that people "no longer fear hell" and on the other hand are unable 
to believe in anything else (k. 958).  However, it is not just religious 'truths' that are 
determined by custom, but even "natural principles":  
What are our natural principles but principles of custom? In children they are those which 
they have received from the habits of their fathers, as hunting in animals. A different custom 
will cause different natural principles. This is seen in experience; and if there are some natural 
principles ineradicable by custom, there are also some customs opposed to nature, 
ineradicable by nature, or by a second custom. This depends on disposition.  (Pascal(Author) 
& Elliot(Introduction), 2013, k. 969-71)  
In a move that is reflective of Heidegger’s account, which I will address shortly, but 
one which is still contested, Pascal goes further and states that it is not just our 
understanding but our emotions that are shaped by the company we keep. For 
Pascal, even "[m]emory, joy ... even mathematical propositions" are intuitions that 
are determined and erased by education. (k. 981-2)   
The Austrian born philosopher and contemporary to Heidegger, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889- 951) claimed that human behaviour in its broadest sense is only 
intelligible against the incredible intertwining complexity of collective human action, 
what I would take as being in a similar vein to Pascal's reference to culture:  
How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing the actions of a variety 
of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one man is doing now, but the whole 
hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our 
judgment, our concepts, and our reactions. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 108e) 
For Wittgenstein, it is the “whole hurly-burly” of the background in which we are 
raised and live. It is the 'whole hurly-burly' that is the basis on which we understand 
the world and respond to it, however, Wittgenstein never presented an analysis of 
this background, notwithstanding its importance. This background is so pervasive 
that it simply becomes so familiar to us that we do not see it, it is literally hidden in 
plain sight, as Wittgenstein comments elsewhere,   
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity 
and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) 
The real foundations of their enquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some 
time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking 
  
490 
and most powerful.  (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 56) [underlining mine] 
Again, notice the similarity with some of Heidegger’s language, and the way 
Wittgenstein, perhaps the most influential philosopher in the Anglo-analytic tradition 
of the twentieth century, is describing the phenomenon.  This description could 
almost have been written by Heidegger.  As Dreyfus notes (Dreyfus, 1991), 
Wittgenstein does not believe that this background can be explicated commenting 
that "Not to explain, but to accept the psychological phenomenon - that is what is 
difficult. '' (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 97) 
I have drawn on these accounts from anthropology, sociology, and philosophy to 
demonstrate as forcefully as I can that the phenomena that Heidegger is describing 
are and have been acknowledged in various ways by highly respected and 
influential scholars extending back over 200 years.  Clearly, there are differences in 
accounting for the phenomenon as was seen by the remarks of Weber.  Interesting 
whereas Wittgenstein recognised that this phenomenon could not be explained, but 
must be accepted, Heidegger’s approach as a strict experiential empiricism also 
discarded the explanatory approach but manages to describe in extensive detail the 
structure associated with the phenomena of the background, i.e. world. 
Heidegger calls the collective practices of the culture, the ‘One’ (Das Man) and we 
can think of the way this is maintained is akin to somebody chastising a child saying, 
“That is not what one does!”.  It might be observed that my actions are not precisely 
the same as everybody else’s, but it is the averageness Heidegger is concerned 
with and with this averageness there is a certain tolerance,  
One' is the subject of everyday being-together-with-one-another. The individual differences 
that persist in this situation exist within a certain average set of customary practices - the 
done thing, that which one does or does not tolerate. This well-worn averageness, which, as 
it were, quietly keeps at bay any exception or originality, pervades the 'one'. It is within the 
'one' that Dasein grows up. [CT 20] (my underlining) 
One gets the impression that Heidegger is not worrying about trivial differences, for 
example how I make my bed.  If I reflect on my circumstance we can get at the level 
of the phenomenon that is important:  I speak the language of the culture, I drive 
cars in the same way, on the same side of the road with the average understanding 
and compliance to the accepted rules and protocols for driving, I use shops and 
lawn mowers, phones and televisions, stoves, and bedrooms, and so on, all within 
this averageness as exhibited in the culture.  My cultural proclivities as a South 
Australian are reflected in my liking Australian Rules football rather than rugby, albeit 
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like other Australians I like sport in general, although I don’t watch ice hockey. I 
prefer our country’s governance system to that of the USA, Russia or China and so 
on.  While I have an adventurous diet, I do not regard fried tarantulas a delicacy, 
and cannot stand Chinese opera.  The list of preferences and the way I do things 
has a remarkable similarity to other Australians of my vintage, and this is what 
Heidegger is getting at.   
Heidegger’s claim that our “disposedness” is determined by our cultural or social 
context is supported by work over the last few decades in philosophy (Appiah, 2011; 
Nussbaum, 2001), anthropology (Lutz, 1982; Silva, 2012) and psychology(Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1994; Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014). This body of work is indicating 
that at least to a certain extent even the emotions we exhibit are determined by our 
social context and, further, that they play a role in cognition. While there may be a 
base set of core emotions that are cross-cultural, (Ekman, 1992), the research 
indicates that there are distinct cultural differences.  Both the cultural influence and 
the role of emotions in understanding are recognised and addressed by Heidegger 
(refer specifically Chapter V of Being and Time) and I discuss this further in the next 
chapter. 
Establishing Cultural Norms 
Without normative behaviour, there is no culture, nor functioning society.  This 
normative behaviour is based on the way in which we conform to the 
understandings, practices and disposedness of the group in which we are born and 
raised.  Heidegger’s view is that the conformity we exhibit is not something that we 
simply decide to take up it is part of our structure.  Heidegger calls this structural or 
ontological aspect of Dasein “the ‘One’”.  At the ontic level “the ‘One’” refers to the 
normative practices of the group which each Dasein also exhibits. (This is another 
example of the practice of labelling the ontological structure and the ontic 
manifestation of that structure by the same name.).   
The "One" is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive 
constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something 
characteristic of Dasein. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit 
may change in the course of history. [BT 167/129] 
Just as the world191 and its ontic structure can change over time so too can the 
                                            




various aspects of the culture, as is reflected in the above quote.  The reason should 
be clear enough by now; they are simply different aspects of the same structures. 
In view of this, underlying Heidegger’s approach is the same basic understanding 
that he applies to world. There is a unity, in this case, the ‘One’ and this is 
determinative of the individual ‘parts’ of the ‘One’, in this case, each ontic Dasein.  
The basic structure of the ‘One’ must, therefore, be evident in each Dasein.  The 
principles that are evident in both world and the ‘One’ are consistent with those 
identified in the earlier discussions concerning Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Greeks and the concept of nature as prevailing.  
The implication of this is that Dasein can never come into being as an individual by 
itself, it requires a cultural group to bring it into being. To be clear, this is a structural 
claim about Dasein.  If this is the case, then what research should find is that adult 
Daseins will reflect the environment into which they are born and raised.  As such, 
by and large, children raised in dysfunctional families where they are subject to 
neglect and abuse will develop understandings of self and their world that reflects 
their upbringing. The comportments they exhibit towards things (concernful 
dealings) and towards others (solicitudinous behaviour) will be based on the 
understandings shaped by the initial environment.  Under Heidegger's descriptive 
account of being Dasein, it is the community (the ‘One’) that is responsible for 
determining the outcome of child raising, not the child.  Holding the child 
accountable for the understandings acquired as a result of being a structurally 
normal Dasein growing up in a detrimental environment is nonsense.  It is then 
equally nonsense to hold the child solely accountable for the actions and behaviours 
that flow from that understanding. The conclusion then, is that if there is a perceived 
social issue with ‘problematic behaviour’, juvenile delinquency, youth gangs and so 
forth seek answers in the structure of the ‘One’ in which the young Daseins were 
raised and not in their ‘psychology’.  This is a radically different approach to that 
reflected in contemporary Australian culture.  The ‘One’ is complex and is not 
uniform across a large society, and further work is necessary to identify the 
relationship between the ‘One’ and the child.  As a rough indication, I would expect 
the aspects of the ‘One’ most relevant to a child to be found where the child’s ‘thick’ 
intelligibility is acquired.  I come back to this concept in Chapter 20 where I discuss 
some applications of Heidegger’s work.   
In the discussion of world there was then the notion of the larger public world that 
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when viewed from one aspect was a ‘unity’, but when viewed from other aspects 
reflected variability within the ‘unity’.  The same basic structure, however, is 
applicable across the unity and thus within its variability.  This is the concept of 
prevailing discussed earlier.  The same applies to the ‘One’.  Within Heidegger’s 
account, based on his methods, we should then find generalised ontic observations 
that are applicable to the way of being of the ‘One’; this is what we find.  Throughout 
the chapter are scattered observations concerning the practices of the ‘One’ that 
related to establishing and maintaining conformity with the ‘One’.  The following is a 
list of such practices from the chapter [BT Ch IV]. I have provided examples to 
illustrate each practice as there are none supplied by Heidegger; 
• Determining what is valid behaviour and what is not. (e.g. being openly gay vs 
heterosexual)192 
• Determines what constitutes success in the culture and what is to be denied 
success. (e.g. Achievements by sports people abound, readily identified, and 
lauded, those of the local church minister overlooked.) 
• Determines priorities in terms of what can and must be undertaken (e.g. Funds 
must go to the military, and reduced in the area of arts and welfare). 
• Keeps watch over anything exceptional that thrusts itself above the norm (e.g. 
Called the ‘tall poppy’ syndrome in Australia)  
• Quickly absorbs and diminishes anything original, treating as common 
knowledge (e.g. Many decades of scientific effort finally confirmed the existence 
of gravitational waves in 2015. Within the larger community, it quickly becomes 
another science fact; ‘gravitational waves exist’. There is little accompanying 
understanding of what gravitational waves are.) 
• Everything gained by struggle quickly becomes something to be exploited and 
used (e.g. The internet has been rapidly absorbed into the culture and exploited 
by those whose actions could previously be controlled, e.g. purveyors of 
pornography, gambling, violence and destructive gossip.) 
• Suppresses priorities not those of the group (e.g. Action to reduce global 
warming was not seen as a priority for many decades.) 
It is easy to get a jaundiced view of culture from the above list or when Heidegger 
says such things as  
 … the real dictatorship of the "One" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as 
One take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as One see and judge; 
likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as One shrink back; we find 'shocking' what 
                                            
192 The examples are mine not Heidegger’s. 
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One find shocking. [BT 164/127] (translation modified) (my underlining) 
Earlier Heidegger talks about the “dominion” [BT 167/129] of the ‘One’, and here it 
is the “dictatorship”.  However, in amongst the chapter, he talks about such things 
as using “public means of transport” and “in making use of information services such 
as a newspaper” [BT 164/ 126] and earlier Heidegger calls the ‘One’ part of Dasein’s 
“positive constitution”.  The section [BT §27] seems to be conflicted between 
recognising the structural necessity of the ‘One’ in determining Dasein, the benefits 
of the conformity for such things as transport against the consequences of the 
‘dictatorship’ of the ‘One’. I don’t want to underplay the negative aspect of the ‘One’, 
and there are dramatic examples in history where the ‘One’ exhibits its dictatorial 
character. I include examples related to recent honour killings and the hanging of 
African Americans early last century in the following chapters. While I have used 
these examples to illustrate different aspects of Dasein, they are equally illustrations 
of the ‘dictatorship’ of the ‘One’.  
While Heidegger acknowledges that the ‘One’ is what gives us our everyday 
possibilities of being [BT 164/126] he does not highlight in Being and Time that which 
gives us culture is the basis of being able to create, to build, to do science and so 
on.  There is acknowledgement of this in a passage from Heidegger’s discussion on 
Hölderlin's poem The Ister; 
 ..... humans indeed dwell. In what they effect and in their works they are capable of a fullness. 
It is almost impossible to survey what humans achieve. The way in which they establish 
themselves upon this earth in using and exploiting and working it, in protecting it and securing 
it and furthering their "art,'' ...  none of this reaches into the essential ground of their dwelling 
upon this earth.  All this working and achieving, this building and cultivating is merely ... 
culture.  Culture is always already only the consequence of a "dwelling" ... [HHI 137]  
In this passage, he is identifying culture at the ontic level but emphasising that what 
is of importance is the ‘dwelling’.  The lecture course on Hölderlin's poem from which 
this passage was taken was given in the Summer of 1942, by which time Heidegger 
had shifted the way he was investigating being.  This was as a result of what 
Heidegger called the ‘turn’ [MWP], which saw him leaving behind the constraints of 
philosophical metaphysics. The term ‘dwelling’ still relates to the dynamic structure 
of Dasein’s being-on-the-world. Unfortunately, however, perhaps because of the 
historical era in which he was writing Being and Time, the attention Heidegger 
places on the negative, without emphasis on crucial and cultural creating positives, 
leaves his analysis lacking and more than a little confused. This, however, does not 
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negate the thrust of his argument in terms of the role of culture. 
Heidegger recognises that the ‘One’ creates a tension for Dasein in that while it is 
constitutive of Dasein, it also continues to ‘pull’ Dasein into conformity with itself in 
all aspects, and this ‘pull’ is also part of Dasein’s structure.  In a later chapter 
Heidegger associates, this with what he calls ‘falling’ [BT Ch 5].  When the ‘One’ 
exerts its full influence, it determines the being of the individual Dasein (i.e. at the 
ontic level) in virtually all respects. This is the dictatorial tendencies of the ‘One’.  
However, Heidegger also recognises that Dasein has, also as part of its way of 
being, the potential to throw off the interpretations of how the world ‘is’, as 
determined by the ‘One’, and arrive at its own disclosures, both in terms of itself and 
world.  Heidegger calls the taking up, in an unquestioning way, the understanding 
of being established by the ‘One’ as an “inauthentic” mode of being for Dasein, and 
where Dasein determines its own understandings an “authentic” mode of being.  
This, in turn, will be reflected in the way Dasein assigns itself to an ‘in-order-to’; 
In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned 
itself to an "in-order-to", and it has done so in terms of an ability-to-be for the sake of which 
it itself is--one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be 
either authentic or inauthentic. [BT 119/86] (my underlining) (translation modified) 
This does not mean that Dasein takes a stand that automatically rejects the 
understandings of the ‘One’, rather it means that Dasein exercises its own judgment.  
When this is done, Dasein is being ‘authentic’.  Nor does this mean that the Dasein 
acting in an ‘authentic’ way is doing so on the basis of a ‘correct’ understanding of 
being, this is made clear by Heidegger; 
… authentic understanding, no less than that which is inauthentic, can be either genuine or 
not genuine.  [BT 186/145] 
This has a direct relevance to this thesis.  Every time an aged care organisation, 
teaching organisation or a health professional simply takes over the understanding 
of being of Dasein from the culture it is acting in an inauthentic manner.  This thesis 
is motivated by the observation that ‘something is wrong’ in the way aged care is 
conducted and further, that this ‘something wrong’ is grounded in a wrong 
understanding.  To this extent, the thesis is an expression of an authentic mode of 
my being.  The ‘genuineness’ of the findings of the thesis is a different issue. My 
claim is that at the very least it moves understanding to a ‘more’ genuine 
understanding of Dasein’s being and that practices based on this understanding will 
thus result in less harm and better outcomes. The challenge for others is to consider 
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the findings compared to the account of the ‘One’ in a robust manner and derive 
their own understanding, and structure their ‘assignments’ accordingly. If this 
occurs, then they are acting ‘authentically’ from a Heideggerian perspective. 
Consistent with his method, Heidegger develops a three-part structure based on his 
observations, and with it a technical language to describe the structure.  The first 
aspect is the structure relating to the “everyday undifferentiated” character of the 
‘One’, the cultural norms, which he calls “averageness” [BT 69/43].  This next aspect 
is the concern that is exhibited by the ‘One’ in variations by others from 
averageness, which he calls “distantiality” [BT 164/126] and finally there is the action 
to bring behaviours that are too far (i.e. too distant) from averageness back to 
averageness, Heidegger calls this “levelling down” [BT 165/127].  This three-part 
structure constitutes what Heidegger refers to as ‘publicness’; 
Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of being for the "One'', constitute 
what we know as 'publicness'. Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world 
and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right-not because there is some distinctive and 
primary relationship-of-being in which it is related to 'Things', or because it avails itself of 
some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it 
is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart 
of the matter' [BT 165/127]  (my underlining) 
Publicness is part of our structural relationship with other Dasein and at the ontic 
level manifests as what could be termed ‘group think’. In this mode of being the main 
focus is maintaining the averageness of ‘group think’ and it, for this reason, it is 
“insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness” in relation to 
understanding.  The term “levelling down” is interesting in that Heidegger is 
suggesting that while the group will focus on bringing down those who stray outside 
the group norms in terms of improving themselves, including improving their 
understanding that the group will not, by and large ‘level up’ those who are below 
the group norm.  Heidegger does not engage in an extensive discussion on the 
various aspects of ‘publicness’ and does not address the absence of ’levelling up’.  
There is more work to do on these phenomena from a Heideggerian perspective; 
however, it is not required for this thesis. 
A simple example of the functioning of publicness was seen in the above example 
relating to the African children, where for these “children, life is one long frolic 
interspersed with a healthy sprinkle of spankings and slappings” (Diamond, 2012, 
p. 205).  Road rules are another example. The specification of acceptable 
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behaviour, the speed past school crossings, etc., (averageness), monitoring by 
police (distantiality) and fines (levelling down). Other examples include 
organisational policies and procedures and even quality assurance programmes.  
The three aspects, setting the norm, monitoring variations from the norm, and 
corrective action to bring behaviour back to the norm are ubiquitous in all aspects 
of our life in both informal and regulated modes, it just that most of the time we do 
not notice it for what it is, e.g. when a mother corrects a young child’s pronunciation 
of a word.   
These are structurally part of who we are.  To varying degrees, we have already 
been absorbed into the cultural norms as we grow up, and in order to continue as a 
functional member of the society, we must continue to conform to much of what our 
culture has determined.  So, while there are negative aspects, it is the very basis of 
the average everydayness by which societies function.   On a broad scale, there is 
only the world in which we live and to this extent, there is a sense in which the ‘One’ 
“is always right” [BT 165/128].  Again he is not saying the ‘One’ is right in terms of 
having a ’true’ understanding of ‘Things’.  For example, ancient cultures that made 
human sacrifices to the gods to appease them did not necessarily have a ‘true’ 
understanding of nature, but in that the norms determine what is ‘right’ as 
characteristic of that culture, there is only one ‘right way’ for that culture to be the 
culture it is.  Otherwise, it is a different culture!  The issues concerning the ‘One’ 
changing the understanding of itself is another topic that is worth exploring form a 
Heideggerian perspective.  
The question that this thesis is raising and addressing is whether the existing culture 
of aged care is founded on a ‘genuine’ understanding of what it is to be a person, or 
on unfounded presuppositions.  If not so founded, and the aged care culture 
subsequently embraces change based on a new grounded understanding it does 
so by a change in its culture. 
Research: The Cultural determination of Emotions 
As part of Heidegger’s description of the ‘One’, there is a strong claim that it even 
determines the character of our emotions. There is now a significant body of 
research supporting the view that many of our emotions are culturally determined.  
Cathy Lutz, an anthropologist, investigated the structure and meaning of emotions 
among the Ifaluk, who live on a tiny atoll in the Pacific(Lutz, 1982; Nuckolls, 1996). 
For the Ifaluk the most valued emotion is fago which appears to have elements of 
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love, compassion and sadness and relates to the emotion one feels towards a loved 
one in need and acts in a way that binds the people and promotes harmony.  The 
Baining people of Papua New Guinea who live in the rugged and almost 
impenetrable highlands, experience Awumbuk, an oppressive heaviness when 
visitors depart.  Awumbuk is understood as a heaviness shed by the visitors so that 
their travels are lighter. The experience may linger for up to three days with such 
intensity that the family is unable to tend to its normal tasks, tending crops, and so 
forth.  The remedy is a simple ritual of placing a bowl of water near the door overnight 
and ceremonially throwing the water away. (Fajans, 1983; Smith, 2015)  In The Book 
of Human Emotions (Smith, 2015), Smith provides many such examples of mood 
and emotions that appear to be shaped by culture and in turn influence behaviour. 
In summary, there is mounting support in the research literature in relations to this 
aspect of Heidegger’s work. 
Section 2: Dasein-With and Being-With 
The more original part of Heidegger’s analysis in this chapter of Being and Time is 
§ 27 which describes what he calls the structure of Dasein-with of Others and 
everyday being-with.  Dasein-with of others is how we see, i.e. understand the way 
of being, of the other in our dealings with them, while being-with is the basis on 
which we are relating to others.   
In introducing the discussion on Dasein-with/being-with of others, Heidegger goes 
back to a description of the work world (i.e. the environment), this time from yet 
another perspective:   
In our 'description' of that environment which is closest to us -  the work-world of the 
craftsman, for example, the outcome was that along with the equipment to be found when 
one is at work, those Others for whom the 'work' is destined are 'encountered too'.  If this is 
ready-to-hand, then there lies in the kind of being which belongs to it (that is, in its 
involvement) an essential assignment or reference to possible wearers, for instance, for 
whom it should be 'cut to the figure'. Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its 
producer or 'supplier' as one who 'serves' well or badly. When, for example, we walk along 
the edge of a field but 'outside it', the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a 
person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-so's 
shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is 
assigned in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but even if 
it is a 'boat which is strange to us', it still is indicative of Others. [BT153-4/118] (my 
underlining) 
What he is doing here is indicating that in the various activities which we are typically 
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engaged we encounter other people. Previously Heidegger had referred to the ‘for-
sake-of-which’ of Dasein, and so in one respect people were present in the previous 
discussion.   However, here he sharpens the focus, we encounter other people from 
a particular perspective, as a customer, as a supplier and so on.  Again, his 
examples are only indicative, and he could have expanded this even more.  What 
Heidegger is indicating it that we tend to understand other Dasein in terms of what 
they do in the world, and then from the perspective of how we encounter them.  
Because of our understanding of world, other Dasein become intelligible to us in 
their various roles and thus available to us to interact with them, or in Heidegger’s 
jargon, they become freed for us;   
Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but 
which also-in accordance with their kind of being as Dasein themselves are 'in' the world in 
which they are at the same time encountered within the-world, and are 'in' it by way of being-
in-the-world. [BT 154/118] 
Just as in the earlier work there are two levels of the analysis, the ontic and the 
ontological, the same approach is reflected here.  Once we understand what an 
“owner of a farm” or supplier or customer, is in terms of those structural relationships 
(ontological), we can apply the concept to individual Daseins (ontic).  From this 
perspective, the world is not described from the perspective of involvements with 
entities ready-to-hand but rather as the relationships between Daseins; it is a with-
world [BT 155/118].  Being-in which is the mode of projected understanding of 
equipment becomes being-with, the mode of projected understanding of the social 
interconnections that form the with-world, and the specific way that a Dasein is 
encountered is as Dasein-with. [BT 155/118] This, of course, is not describing two 
different worlds, it is one world from two different perspectives. 
Individual Daseins will have many possible ways of Dasein-with for example, a 
parent, life partner, soccer coach, music lover, bookkeeper, car driver, shopper, 
scientist, Internet user, movie go, homeowner, reader, nurse, ‘exerciser’ (e.g. 
walking for fitness), dog owner, football club member, restaurant diner, radio 
listener, and so on.  By way of example, while Person A may have a number of 
modes of ‘Dasein-with’, other people will typically encounter Person A in just one or 
two of these modes.  Our understanding of others is thus typically deficient, and we 
never really know the ‘whole’ person.  This point will be of critical importance later 
in the chapter when the encounter of the older person with the nursing home is 
discussed. We tend to know when we are not understood, and this is reflected in 
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Regina’s cries reported in the introduction; “They don’t know the meaning of me! 
They don’t know the meaning of me.” (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)193 
Shifting the focus back to Dasein, from the perspective of the analysis that 
Heidegger is undertaking a Dasein can only properly understand who they are, 
only when it looks away from 'Experiences' and the 'centre of its actions' [BT 155/119] 
This is because, 
Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids -- in those things 
environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned. [BT 155/119] 
To understand this passage, we need to recall the discussion in Chapter 12 of the 
thesis concerning the two meanings of experience. He is not interested in “inner 
experiences” that are the focus of Husserl’s research, nor is he interested in the 
location of some inner self, a “centre of action” that is responsible for what we do.  
This is the Cartesian perspective that Heidegger is seeking to overthrow and is a 
position for which Heidegger claims there is no phenomenal evidence[BPP].  For 
Heidegger, we find our self in the expressed comportments that constitute our 
existence.  While we may often identify particular “felt experiences” we rarely have 
an understanding of what motivates us, what drives us to do the things we do, as 
Heidegger notes we do “not ... ‘see’ them at all” [BT 115/119].  All these things are, 
nonetheless, part of the structure of our individual Dasein and it is out of all of these, 
not just the ‘felt’ experiences, that what we do, use, expect, avoid and so on 
emerges.  
This approach is reflective of the approach by Peirce that all that is required to 
understand something is to know all the modes of behaviour that have ‘practical 
bearing’. Heidegger’s claim concerning Dasein is the same.  He is not concerned 
with how we scratch our self, that has little ‘practical bearing’, but if we pay attention 
to our various ways of being-in-the-world, we will ‘find’ our self. For Heidegger, the 
starting point for any Dasein to understand itself is thus to observe its actions and 
non-actions in the world.  This approach follows on from the previous chapter, and 
the discussion that Dasein assigns itself to an in-order-to is based on its 
understanding of self.  This assigning was not, however, necessarily explicit to 
                                            
193 Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was like for her to be 
at the facility. She cried out, “They don’t know the meaning of me! They don’t know the meaning of me.” Her 
comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new neighbourhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38) 
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Dasein.  By focusing on the ‘in-order-tos’ to which we have assigned our self, we 
can work backwards to interpret that understanding of self that accounts for these 
assignments, or lack of assignments, i.e. find out who we are.  This points to an 
important aspect of interpreting Heidegger’s work.  His Dasein analysis is a 
description of a unified phenomenon and is undertaken from different perspectives, 
and this indicates a way of ‘testing’ one’s interpretation of different sections.  If an 
interpretation of one perspective of the phenomenon ‘fits’ with an interpretation of 
another perspective, then it is an indication that it may be fair interpterion. If the 
interpretations conflict it is an indication that there is, perhaps, more work to do.  
Reciprocal Relationships 
The structure of the with-world has reciprocal relationships just as the structure of 
the unity of equipment has reciprocal relationships associated with serviceability – 
usability.  When we go to a restaurant, we encounter the Dasein-with of others as 
other diners, waiters, chefs and so on.  We see these reciprocal relationships more 
clearly when we think of such pairings as doctor-patient, teacher-student, mother-
child, police officer-wrongdoer, entertainer-audience, shopkeeper-customer and so 
on and on.  There is no need to go into detail as to how this constitutes the with-
world as it is essentially the same line of argument as is applied to the constituting 
the world in terms of the unity of equipment.  The nature of the reciprocal relationship 
is such that in the structure of being-with has the character of “being-with towards 
Others”. [BT 163/125] 
Heidegger’s terminology of our relationship with others is similar to that of our 
relationship towards the ready-to-hand, albeit this is not noticeable in English.  
Whereas Heidegger calls the various ways in which we can interact with equipment 
concern(Besorgen), the name for the various ways in which we can interact with 
people he calls solicitude(Fürsorge) [BT 159/121]. The relationship between the 
terms is evident in the German suffixes. The German word Sorge means care, which 
is Heidegger’s name for the being of Dasein, and the being of Dasein is reflected in 
its ways of being towards the ready-to-hand (Besorgen) and towards other Dasein 
(Fürsorge). Understood in this way Heidegger's device of linking concepts at the 
grammatical level by his choice of words becomes more readily evident. The same 
device is also evident in Heidegger’s careful choice of the word Dasein, the meaning 
of which has already been discussed. 
Another similarity that we need to bring across from this previous discussion is the 
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way people show up for us.  For the most part, we will see people as people and not 
as objects present-at-hand.  This is true even though we have little knowledge of 
the majority of people whom we pass-by and in whom we have no interest. 
Heidegger calls this a deficient or indifferent mode “that characterize everyday, 
average being-with-one-another” [BT 158/121].  When we have specific encounters 
with people this changes. Even if we do not know somebody personally, when we 
enter a shop we will look around to identify the shop assistant and will then approach 
them on this basis.  On occasions, our projecting/understanding of a particular 
person as a shop assistant may be wrong, causing a little embarrassment.  I recall 
approaching a person in a department store dressed and groomed similarly to the 
way the staff of the store typically presented.  When I asked for assistance, he 
politely responded that he will if possible, but he doesn’t work in the store! On 
another occasion when walking down the street with my son, all I saw was a bunch 
of other people, he, however, saw his “teacher”.  This reflected the ‘Dasein-with’ 
relationship that existed between student and teacher.  
In the earlier discussions, Heidegger talks about, the prior disclosure of world, 
subsequent discovery of the ready-to-hand and the progressive nature of 
understanding that frees the entity for our involvement.   These same elements are 
present in the structures of Dasein-with and being-with.  Heidegger does not go into 
any detail in relation to these aspects; I presume because it is self-evident and 
repetitive.  There are however subtle differences. The main one is that whereas a 
ready-to-hand entity will typically have one meaning in a culture, this is not the case 
with Dasein. Dasein may have multiple meanings reflected in the various modes of 
‘Dasein-with’ and while this aspect has been touched upon, I want to present a case 
study by way of illustrative example.  
Jesse & Frank James (ontic) example194 
Other people show up for us on the basis of our understanding of their Dasein-with 
based on our understanding of the with-world. We do not encounter the person 
based on understanding the rich complexity of the various modes of the Dasein-with 
of the person. For example, Person A is perceived to have done the wrong thing to 
Person B, with serious consequences.  From that time on A is understood in a ‘dark 
                                            
194 This account is compiled from a range of sources and what is presented is generally consistent with the 
historical facts as known.  My intent, however, is not to present an historically accurate account but rather a 
plausible set of circumstances so as to illustrate the flexibility of Dasein-with.  
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light’ by B and perhaps others, notwithstanding it may have been an aberrant event 
or A has subsequently changed. There are many other aspects to Person A (Dasein-
with ways of being) to take into consideration before forming a judgment on ‘all of’ 
A, but this rarely happens.  There are others who may hold Person A in high regard 
for various reasons, either with or without the knowledge of A’s involvement with B.  
A striking real-life example of the phenomenon of Dasein-with and being-with is the 
story of Jesse James and his brother Frank James. 
Jesse James (1847-1882) and his brother Frank James (1843-1915) were notorious 
outlaws operating for a brief period mainly in the West Missouri, Kentucky region 
following the Civil War. The James Brothers were ex-Confederate 'guerrillas' who 
rode with the notorious Quantrill 
raiders, a unit of Confederate soldiers 
who were responsible, as were similar 
units on the Union side, for brutal 
raids and massacres of opposing 
forces and civilians.  After the war the 
James' gang, led by Jesse, committed 
a number of bank and train robberies 
until Jesse was shot in the back, while 
unarmed, by a recently joined gang 
member, Robert Ford (1861-1892); 
allegedly after the reward money.  
Frank ceased his outlaw ways and 
lived a law-abiding life until his death 
at the age of 72. 
The James Brothers eluded capture 
for so long with the help provided by 
ex-Confederate soldiers and people 
in the 'South' still sympathetic to the 
idea of secession.   A 'Robin Hood' forced to a life of crime by the occupying 
oppressors was the image developed around Jesse James thanks, in the main, to 
the newspaper editor John Edwards, the founder of the Kansas City Times, former 
Confederate Calvary Officer and a secessionist.  At one stage, the local legislature 
even restricted the amount of the Government reward offered for Jesse James, and 
 
Photograph 8 Jesse(25) and Frank(29) James, 1872 
(U.S. Army Corps Digital Library, public domain) 
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the railways had to subsidise it.  
In 1876 Jesse and Frank James settled down in Nashville, Tennessee with their 
families (both were married, Jesse had two children, Jesse jnr and Mary) under the 
names of Thomas Howard and Ben Woodson respectively. Frank took up farming, 
and Jesse is reported to have successfully raced horses and become a Methodist 
Sunday School teacher.  Both lived a life as a respectable citizen and were 
acquainted with a number of the town’s leading citizens including magistrates and a 
law officer, all of whom were oblivious to their backgrounds. This ended in early 
1881 when a former gang member who did some occasional work for them on the 
farms had too much to drink, talked about the past and was arrested. Taking no 
chances, the James brothers left town.  Frank went on to a law-abiding life, tried for 
some of his crimes, but never convicted. He died at the age of 72 in 1915.  Jesse 
started a new gang and two years later, in 1882, was murdered, shot in the back, 
by Robert Ford, aged 34. 
In considering this account, we can ask, “Who is Jesse James?” When viewed from 
the perspective of encounters of the Dasein-with of others, he is a brutal murder, a 
thief, a hero, a father, a Sunday School teacher, respectable citizen and so on.  For 
ex-Confederate supporters, the knowledge of his robberies, etc. makes little 
difference, whereas for the Sunday School the understanding of his past may thrust 
him into a new light.  Frank moved on to various jobs, and his past eventually 
became more something of a novelty, a curiosity.  The way in which the James 
brothers show up is determined by the nature of the understanding of the Dasein-
with relationships, which in turn, prescribes the appropriate responses to them, i.e. 
ways of being-with.   
The Sight by Which People Show up For Us: Considerateness & Forbearance 
As we move about our world what enables things to show up for us as the entities 
they are (ready-to-hand) such that we can have concernful dealings is 
circumspection. This is how Heidegger relates this structure to people; 
Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, 
solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance. Like solicitude, these can range 
through their respective deficient and Indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness 
or the perfunctoriness. [BT 159/126] 
Rather than just one mode of ‘seeing’ in relation to Dasein-with Heidegger 
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introduces two, considerateness (Rücksicht195) and forbearance (Nachsicht).  We 
need to recall the earlier discussion concerning the two aspects of the phenomenon 
of circumspection(Umsicht), the sight which presents the ready-to-hand to us on the 
basis of their involvements.  Considerateness and forbearance refers to the sight 
that ‘sees’ Dasein on the basis of a certain being-with (equivalent to involvement) 
with the context of Dasein-with (equivalent to the structure) Accordingly, a Person 
A may show up completely differently for two other people because of a difference 
in the ‘sight’ with which they see A. 
The German word Rücksicht (considerateness) has the sense of respect or regard, 
whereas Nachsicht (forbearance) a sense of allowance of leniency.  It is not clear 
why Heidegger splits this concept into two, and he offers no clear examples to 
illustrate the difference nor any elaboration.  Following on from the earlier discussion 
it may be that considerateness relates to people with whom we are familiar in terms 
of one or more Dasein-with aspects whereas forbearance relates to people for 
whom we have no clear understanding of their Dasein-with, i.e. a deficient mode.  If 
this is the case the considerateness should not be heard solely in a positive light but 
refers to the various ways in which we may understand a Dasein-with; the James 
case study is an example of this. 
Just as circumspection relates to the ready-to-hand, considerateness and 
forbearance are related to ways in which we can deal with Dasein.  As such, the 
deficient and indifferent mode seems to indicate that while we see people as people, 
nothing shows up for us in any definite way concerning a being-with, or a 
comportment with them.  This does not mean an absence of comportment, for we 
may move out of the way, pick up a dropped item for another and so on.  The 
comportments are only of a trivial nature and not reflective of a specific Dasein-with 
understanding that in turn would inform a specified set of being-with behaviours 
associated with that understanding.  The similarities in the structures of concern and 
solicitude are mapped out in Figure 16. 
Just as our comportments with equipment first require that we understand the entity 
as what it is and then develop the know how to let it be involved, there is a similar 
structure in terms of dealing with Dasein-with.   Just as the nature of the entity as 
                                            
195 The German sicht means sight, and the connections between the words as different modes of ‘sight’ is 
easier to observe in the German. 
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the entity it is, is determined by the relational network which in turn is determined by 
the nature of involvements so to the Dasein-with.  We can, for example, have a 
certain understanding of what a Sumo wrestler is even if we do not live in Japan, 
but to fully comprehend the nature of Sumo we would have to know-how it fits into 
the culture and we would certainly not be able to be a Sumo wrestler in Australia, 
where there is not the referential context (with-world) to support the Dasein-with of 
a Sumo wrestler.  Put another way, the Dasein-with of Sumo has not been fully freed 
for us. 
Not only is a particular Dasein-with, determined by its place in a with-world, that 
with-world also determines what the range of the appropriate behaviour (concernful 
solicitude) is towards particular Dasein-with.  This is what is discussed in the first 
part of this section concerning the ‘One’.  We can see this in relation to the James 
example where the range of behaviour towards Frank is, by and large, determined 
by his Dasein-with.  Frank James, born and raised in Missouri, surrendered himself 
to the Governor of Missouri, a State in which he was considered a ‘war hero’ by 
many. Frank had a ‘show’ trial during which he faced only a few charges. A character 
reference was provided by a former Confederate General, support was given by the 
local media and Frank was found not guilty. The Missouri State also refused to allow 
him to be extradited to other jurisdictions.  It was how the Dasein-with of Frank 
James was understood by those in Missouri that resulted in this outcome.  Had he 
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been captured in another State, then his Dasein-with understood in terms of robbery 
and murder would have resulted in the appropriate response from that perspective 
and he would have been tried, and no doubt found guilty and executed.  The way in 
which Frank was ‘seen’ by the residents of the various States was different, and the 
‘sight’ which is the basis on which Frank was ‘seen’ sight [considerateness] also 
‘showed’ the possible ways in which it was appropriate to deal [solicitude] with 
Frank. 
Nursing-homes 
Within the world of a nursing home, the ways of dealing with older people living in 
the home will be determined by the understanding of the Dasein-with of the older 
people by those delivering care. The way in which older people are ‘seen’ will be 
based on ‘considerateness’.  
Regardless of the debates around the appropriate name to call the older people in 
nursing homes, e.g. patients, residents, consumers or care recipients, and I have 
heard all these terms used, as well as a host of others, it is the understanding of the 
Dasein-with that will determine how the sight of considerateness shows the older 
person to the care workers.  A change of name may be motivated by the right intent, 
but unless the structure of involvements of the with-world of the nursing home is 
changed, there will be little impact from a name change. 
If the Dasein-with of the older person is framed, even if tacitly, primarily as a ‘frail-
sick’ old person in need of care and support then the nature of the concernful 
solicitude will be shaped by this understanding; as will the majority of the practices.  
This narrow framing of the older person on this basis places in front of itself a 
monocular vision that only allows the Dasein-with of the older person to be seen in 
one light, a person in need of care and support.  It actively precludes seeing, for 
example Marion Miller, in the richness of her variety of Dasein-with modes.  In turn, 
this means that the Dasein-with understanding of the nursing home can be framed 
such that its modes of being-with in terms of the provision of care can include, at the 
same time, ways of being that improve the efficiency of service delivery, e.g. 
reducing costs by streamlining services, using low-cost labour, cutting out activity in 
other ‘non-related’ areas.  All this activity is consistent with a narrow understanding 
of the older person and the role of the nursing home that established the Dasein-
with reciprocal relationship.   While there is generally either individual or collective 
ability present on both sides of a reciprocal relationship to re-structure the modes of 
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being-with or even re-frame the Dasein-with, this is not the case in nursing homes.  
Nursing homes as currently determined have the support of the Government, the 
medical professions and the common understanding of the culture.  There are 
virtually no alternatives for older people who because of their frailty, require a degree 
of nursing and personal care to get on with their life.  As Marion Miller found, the 
ability to have ‘a life’ in a nursing home is virtually impossible and had she realised 
this she would never have moved in, preferring an alternative course of action; most 
probably ending her own life on her terms. 
A nurse or a personal carer may have a different understanding of the person’s 
Dasein-with and wants to interact with them on this basis, i.e. take more time with 
them, understand the nature of their other modes of Dasein-with, encourage people 
to be involved in activities based on their interests and so on.  However, this 
approach is out of kilter with the culture and does not reflect ‘efficient’ care delivery 
and either the person will be brought into line (‘levelled-down’), struggle or torn 
between compliance and understanding or leave.  I have experienced and observed 
the actions of ‘levelling-down’ within both public company and non-profit owned 
nursing homes; it is not uncommon.  In these instances, the organisations had 
structured their relationships with the older person based on the very narrow 
understanding of the Dasein-with of the person as ‘in need of care’ and was 
convinced it was delivering quality care in an economically efficient manner and had 
an explicit view that it was ‘right’.   
If then the structure of the nursing home is determined by the Dasein-with 
understanding of the operators of the nursing home then change will only come 
about with a change in that understanding.  This, in turn, is tied to the broader 
understanding of the being of Dasein, such that Dasein is understood as having 
other important modes of Dasein-with. 
Leaping In and Leaping Ahead196 
The section on the concepts of ‘leaping in’ (einspringen) and ‘leaping ahead’ 
(vorausspringt) [BT 158/122] is brief and not well explored in Being and Time, and I 
                                            
196 The German word translated for 'leap in' is einspringen. In the translators' note #1 (BT 158) the comment 
suggests that in common usage this may be interpreted as 'intervene for him', 'stand in for him' or serve as 
deputy for him'.  To this we could add 'to take somebody's place', 'to substitute for somebody' and so on. For 
the German word vorausspringt there is no common usage, it is Heideggerian neologism.  Literally translated it 
means to leap/jump/spring forward.  The translators note that to retain the German etymological connection 
they have translated einspringen the way they have. 
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have found little in any of Heidegger’s other writings to clarify what he means.  It is 
almost as if it is a throw-in titbit, a tasty morsel, to show how his work can be 
applicable, but we will never know.  The basic intent, however, is clear enough and 
it has relevance to this thesis.  This is how he introduces the concept; 
Everyday being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive 
solicitude-that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates. It 
brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe these and classify them would take us 
beyond the limits of this investigation. [BT 159/122] 
‘Leaping in’ is a mode of solitude that can "take away 'care' from the Other". [BT 
158/122], i.e. take away their being.  Heidegger does not introduce the meaning of 
the technical term ‘care’ until Chapter 6 but it is the name given to Dasein’s mode 
of being.  ‘Leaping in’, then, is to take over another person's life for them such that 
the  
Other is thus thrown out of his own position. [BT 15/122].   
As would not be unexpected if we take over from another those things which they 
should be dealing with for themselves, from the small and seemingly insignificant to 
the more significant, then they  
can become one who is dominated and dependant, even if the domination is a tacit one and 
remains hidden from him. [BT 158/122].   
An example of this phenomenon has entered the common parlance such that there 
is an Oxford Dictionary entry for it: Institutionalized. The entry in the dictionary states 
that it refers to a person "adversely affected, especially made apathetic or 
dependent by prolonged institutional confinement."   
Heidegger’s comments in relation to ‘leaping’ in makes sense when we consider his 
descriptions of Dasein.  Dasein’s mode of being is existence, which are the lived 
experiences associated with comportments, those concernful dealings, with the 
things in the world, as part of letting them be involved in the various things we have 
assigned ourselves to, i.e. the things that matter to us.  Our life then is in the doing 
of those things that are of concern to us.  If somebody ‘leaps in’ and does things for 
us, they are literally taking our life away.  Understanding ‘leaping in’ is thus crucial 
for any organization which is involved in 'caring for' others to ensure that they do not 
unduly infringe upon or dominate the very lives for which they are caring.  This, of 
course, requires a profound understanding of what it is to be a person, the way of 
being of Dasein. 
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The idea of ‘leaping ahead’ is, as Heidegger suggests, the opposite to ‘leaping in’. 
It is a mode of solicitude that moves to assist gain an authentic understanding of 
themselves.   In this mode, we are assisting the other,  
 … not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him … This kind of solicitude 
pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a "what" 
with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care 
and to become free for it. [BT 159/122] 
The extreme mode of ‘leaping ahead’ is to help the person understand who they are 
in themselves so that they can become free for their own existence in an authentic 
way, rather than simply taking up the understanding of the ‘One’. 
As Heidegger mentions, these are the two extremes and clearly how one supports 
another depends on the circumstances.  The implication however is pretty clear we 
should not just rush into ‘leaping in’ on the basis that it is more convenient for us, if 
we want to participate in “authentic care” our interventions must be measured at all 
times avoiding unnecessary ‘leaping in’ and acting in such a way that is more 
towards the ‘leaping ahead’ end of the spectrum.  This is only possible of Dasein is 
understood, even if unthematically, as being-in-the-world. 
This is virtually as close as Heidegger comes to making statements that can be 
interpreted on an ethical or moral basis.  To take away the opportunities of a person 
to participate in the range of lived experiences, small to large, associated with their 
existence, is to take that very existence, the very life, from the person. It is a 
domination and is dependency creating.  Heidegger’s language indicates his 
position on this matter.  
To be sure there are circumstances in which ‘leaping-in’ may be necessary, and in 
the discussion chapter, I explore the concept of the somatological contract that is 
entered into when a person requires hospital care. This contract gives permission, 
for a short duration, for ‘leaping in’ in order to ‘fix the body’, in return for the prospects 
if a return to one’s life. However, the point I make in the discussion is the 
somatological contract entered into in relation to the modern nursing home, based 
on the hospital model, is fundamentally flawed. 
Case Example: Power of Publicness to Impede Scientific Revolutions 
The being of the ‘One’, publicness is a powerful structure that establishes and 
maintains with-worlds.  All three descriptors I have covered in the discussion apply 
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to Thomas Kuhn’s account of paradigms or the disciplinary matrix and are the basis, 
in my view of why scientific revolutions are so difficult.  (Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012)  I do not want to go over this but do want to draw 
attention to one comment by Kuhn,    
Though a generation is sometimes required to effect the change, scientific communities have 
again and again been converted to new paradigms. Furthermore, these conversions occur 
not despite the fact that scientists are human but because they are. Though some scientists, 
particularly the older and more experienced ones, may resist indefinitely, most of them can 
be reached in one way or another. Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last 
holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be practicing under a single, but now a 
different, paradigm. (p. 152) 
An example of the difficulty in bringing about change, even in highly educated and 
professional areas occurred in relation to the treatment of peptic ulcers late in the 
twentieth century. The accepted genesis of the ulcers was a combination of stress 
and diet, i.e. lifestyle. It was believed that this led to an increase in the acidity of the 
stomach which attacked the lining of the stomach resulting in the ulcers, which could 
be life-threatening.   
The accepted practice was to treat peptic ulcers with a range of interventions 
generally involving a radical change in a patient’s lifestyle plus medications and in 
more chronic cases surgical interventions.  In the mid-1980s Robin Warren and 
Barry Marshall discovered that rather than lifestyle causes, the bacterium 
Helicobacter pylori (H.pylori) was the ‘cause’ of most peptic ulcers and could be 
effectively treated (Marshall, 2002; Robin Warren & Marshall, 1983; Tan & Wong, 
2011), a discovery for which they received the Nobel Prize in 2005.   
The treatment for H.pylori related ulcers is now a course of antibiotics, and it has 
since been discovered that the reduction in stomach acid associated with previous 
treatments made the environment less amenable to H. pylori, reducing the 
aggravation.  Notwithstanding that the treatment developed by Warren and Marshall 
was ‘scientifically’ supported in a relatively short time it took the medical specialists 
involved in treating the ulcers nearly two decades to fully accept the new approach 
and implement it. (Malfertheiner et al., 2002, 2007; Marshall, 2002)   
The with-world of the specialists made in difficult to understand the Dasein-with of 
being a specialist within another structure. An acceptance of the ‘discovery’ would 
have entailed a change in understanding of ‘ulcers’, a change in understanding of 
treatments and a change in understanding of the being-with relationship with 
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patients.  All this could only take place with a re-assignment to a ‘different world. 
This proved extremely difficult. Exploring case studies such as this from a 
Heideggerian perspective may provide important insights concerning the 
implementation of significant changes in health care the fundamental change 
understandings.   
Summary 
The chapter commenced with a discussion of the phenomenon of the ‘One’ 
understood both as an ontological structure of Dasein and as the basis for culture.  
As part of the this the phenomenon of being born and raised in a culture was brought 
into view.  The main aspects associated with the structure, the with-world, Dasein-
with, being-with and the ‘One’ with its structure of publicness were then presented 
and discussed.  It provides an understanding of the multi-faceted aspects of Dasein 
in terms of its rich mixture of modes of Dasein-with and how each of these makes 
sense and is sustainable only in the context of the particular with-world that sustains 
it.    
Based on the discussion, the issue was raised that if nursing homes understand the 
Dasein-with of older people in the very narrow framing of ‘sick, frail older people in 
need of nursing and personal care’ then this establishes the nature of the reciprocal 
relationship.  The nursing home then understands itself (Dasein-with) as the supplier 
of that care to the older person. This is the same basic structure that applies to the-
ready-to-hand that establishes the in-order-to structure on the basis of serviceability-
usability.  
Once the relationship of   
Older person as Dasein-with (in need of care)  Nursing home as Dasein-with (provider 
of care)  
is established then the character of the being-with (the ways of solicitude) between 
the two parts is defined.  
The mode of being-with as determined by the reciprocal relationship of Dasein-with 
results in the removal of any non-essential ways of being of the nursing home as 
part of efficient care delivery.  Because of the residential nature of nursing homes 
and the ‘efficient’ care delivery environment, the with-world of the older person in 
the nursing home has been effectively eviscerated of meaningful opportunities to 
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engage in activates reflecting their multiple modes of Dasein-with. Marion Miller is 
the example case for this evisceration of a living environment.  In addition, based 
on my experience the nature of the care delivery services within nursing homes is 
characterised by ‘leaping-in’ and not ‘leaping ahead’, and this will have the mode of 
service delivery bring with it the negative consequences associated with 
institutionalisation. 
In the next chapter, I address the way in which Dasein is in the world, which 





CHAPTER 17: BEING-IN: RECEPTIVITY AND UNDERSTANDING  
Introduction 
Chapter V of Being and Time finalises the substantive part of Heidegger’s Dasein 
analytic, i.e. describing the structure of being-in-the-world. In the chapter, titled 
Being-in as Such, Heidegger returns to explore the phenomena of being-in, or the 
constitution of the ‘there’, in greater detail.  The primary aim of the chapter is to 
describe what holds the ‘there’ open for us. To put it another way, to describe the 
basis on which things show up as mattering to us and in so doing provide 
opportunities for the things we do as part of our life, what Heidegger often calls our 
dealings. 
He approaches the analysis in stages the first being to describe the constitution of 
the ‘there’ in terms of its three basic structural aspects (existentialia), receptivity, 
understanding and discourse. He illustrates receptivity using fear and then develops 
the concepts of interpretation and assertion as derivative of understanding.  The 
second part is an enquiry into the structure of the everyday being of the ‘there’ 
discussing the phenomena of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity and their relationship 
to the phenomena of falling. Falling is the phenomenon previously described in the 
thesis as the ‘pull’ of the world and is associated with the structure of the ‘One’. 
The relationships between the different phenomena Heidegger is describing is not 
easily discernible and Figure 17 sets out the structure of the chapter and the 
relationship between the phenomena discussed. The chapter is the longest in Being 
and Time and comprises over sixty pages of dense description and logical analysis. 
Consistent with other chapters, the English translation, Heidegger's language and 
his naming conventions contribute to the challenge of understanding what he is 
describing.  
This thesis chapter does not attempt a detailed explication of Heidegger's full 
account of Being-In.  The guiding principle has been to identify and present those 
aspects that are essential for understanding the meaning of ‘shedding life’ and the 
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conditions that make it possible. Accordingly, the emphasis is on the structural 
aspects of understanding and receptivity and only a brief account of discourse.   This 
chapter is divided into three sections, one for each of the three aspects of the 
structure. Each section comprises two parts, the first describes the phenomenon, 
and the second provides illustrative examples.  The first section introduces the first 
significant discussion on receptivity, the aspects of Dasein dealing with such things 
as mood, emotions, motivation and so on.  This section is the most challenging as 
it addresses Heidegger’s claim that understanding is inextricably linked to 
receptivity.  While oversimplified, Heidegger’s claim is that if things do not, in some 
way, matter to us then we do not have access to them.  More time is spent in this 
section exploring Heidegger's language than in any other in the thesis, and this is 
directly related to the challenge associated with the character of the phenomena 
discussed. It is in this section that the structure of falling is also discussed. 
The concept of understanding has already had a presence in the thesis via its 
incorporation into the formal indication of being and projection. The section on 
understanding adds clarity to the way Heidegger conceptualises the concept as a 
structural aspect of Dasein. What comes as a surprise in the chapter is the 
association between understanding and the being-possible of Dasein and this 
phenomenon becomes central to understanding the structural basis of ‘shedding 
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life’. The section also sees Heidegger introduce the last of his ways of describing 
world, this time as the unity-of-meaning. As part of this discussion, Heidegger’s 
concepts of meaning and interpretation are introduced and discussed.  The section 
on discourse briefly discusses the structure and introduces the connection between 
meaning, discourse and language.  The phenomenon of idle talk is discussed both 
as an essential mode of being associated with ‘thin intelligibility’ but also how it is 
the basis by which cultures can acquire a groundless intelligibility about things. 
In the descriptions of all three aspects of the structure in this chapter, it can be 
difficult to follow the discussion, primarily because Heidegger does not move 
carefully and slowly from the ontic to the bare structure.  In part, this is because the 
‘there’ lies behind the comportments of daily life, but primarily it is due to Heidegger’s 
approach.  There isn’t the same careful identification of ontic observations and then 
the slow process of identifying and classifying structures as is evident in the chapter 
on worldhood.  The dense language and his shifting from one level of analysis to 
another, often within the same paragraph, makes following his work even harder.  
There are three levels of analysis for each structure, the same, as for world, and for 
some aspects of the structure, all three levels have the same name while for others 
the ontic name is different.  The three levels of analysis are the bare ontological 
structure that is applicable to all Daseins, the ontological structure as ‘filled in’ for an 
individual Dasein and then the ontic expression arising from a particular Dasein’s 
structure.   I will make reference to this structure in each section. 
As discussed in Chapter 12, one the interpretive approaches of this thesis is that 
Heidegger’s work in Being and Time is informed by the prior scholarship of Brentano 
and Husserl on intentionality.  While the term is virtually absent from Being and Time 
and there is no hint of it in the chapter on Being-In, in Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology Heidegger describes the structure of the ‘there’ as a “more radical 
interpretation of intentionality” [BPP 161].  Having this understanding is useful and 
before commencing the discussion on the structural aspects of the ‘there’, the 
concept of intentionality is revisited, this time incorporating the framework from 
Being and Time. 
Intentionality Revisited 
As discussed in earlier chapters Heidegger transformed the initial conception of 
intentionality to the structure of comportments. In Being and Time the concept of 
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comportment is not as evident as Heidegger introduces two sub-classifications of 
comportments, concern and solicitude, and the general description of ‘dealings’.  It 
is from the basis of our ‘concernful dealings’ that he initially identifies and describes 
the structure of world and worldhood. The discussion progressed through 
descriptions of the unity of equipment, to the unity or the in-order-to-structure, to the 
unity of involvements and the connection between involvements and the for-the-
sake-of-which of Dasein.  Neither in Being and Time nor in the thesis discussion 
was this structure expressly related to the structure of intentionality. Based on these 
earlier discussions, the structure of intentionality is set out in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18 Intentional structure of lived experience 
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The structure is a unified phenomenon comprising two aspects, the mode of 
directedness, that is termed ‘dealing behaviour’ in the diagram and the 
understanding of the entity. The ‘dealing behaviour’ is to be understood very broadly 
and covers every way we can relate to an entity, 
The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, 
producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, 
giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, 
considering, discussing, determining, … [BT 83/56] 
Furthermore, these dealing behaviours have deficient and detrimental modes [BT 
83/56].  The basis of understanding ready-to-hand entities was the subject of 
Chapters 14 and 15 on world and worldhood. Understanding as know-how is 
required to free the ready-to-hand for our dealing with them, and the type of know-
how varies depending on the nature of the entity and dealing behaviour, e.g. the 
know-how to design a house is different to living in a house.  Once freed, ready-to-
hand entities are not understood as something categorial but on the basis our 
possible dealings (comportments) with them, which in turn in based on the unity of 
involvements.  When we engage with something, there is an in-order-to structure 
that leads towards the final ‘towards-which’ which is a purpose of Dasein (Um-
willen), e.g. providing shelter from bad weather. Dasein assigns itself to the in-order-
to structure necessary to achieve what it wants as part of its understanding of its 
own being (self) (Worum-willen).  Figure 18 provides a schematic presentation of 
the basic structure associated with Dasein’s dealings with the ready-to-hand and 
how it connects to its understanding of being.   The concepts of world and projection 
could be added, but this would make the Figure too confusing.   
At the ontic level, our lived experiences are expressed comportments, i.e. they are 
dynamic. The conclusion is that if there are no expressed comportments, there are 
no lived experiences.  In that, the “the unity of the understanding of being and the 
comportment towards entities” “belongs to the Dasein’s existence” [BPP 319] the 
schematic can be taken as a depiction of Dasein’s existence. In other words, 
Dasein’s existence, as expressed comportments within the world has a basic 
intentional structure. However, this occurs within the ‘there’ and as such the 
structure is incomplete. 
Recalling the discussion Brentano’s depiction of intentionality, it was, roughly 
speaking, depicted as the way in which the mind is directed towards objects. The 
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directing of the mind was always guided by various mental phenomena, e.g. 
In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  (Brentano, 1995, p. 68) 
Brentano went on to classify three main classes of mental phenomena which he 
called presentations, judgements and the third by either emotion, love or interest 
(Brentano, 1995, p. 152). While Husserl develops and refines the concept of 
intentionality, this basic concept of a directedness remained. 
While Heidegger’s concepts of concern and solicitude are clearly within this broad 
depiction of intentionality what they contain are only behavioural responses, 
dealings, concerning the entities. What is missing from Heidegger’s 
characterisations of concern and solicitude are the emotional aspects.  The aspects 
associated with judgments are split out and incorporated as part of the structure 
understanding as something necessarily prior to a comportment, this has already 
been dealt with.  In Chapter V of Being and Time, the aspects of ‘emotions’ are 
introduced, but not as in the work of Brentano and Husserl, i.e. as part of the 
structure of an intentional comportment, but as part of an even more basic 
intentional structure, which precedes the comportments he calls ‘dealings’.  For 
Heidegger, we are first receptive to things in the world showing up as frightening, 
desirable, curious, lovable, shameful, friendly, vulnerable, soft, loud, hot, and so on 
and then it is the mode of receptivity that determines the character of response.  The 
mode of receptivity is how something shows up as mattering to us, and by and large, 
the ‘One’ has a significant role in shaping how things matter.  Implicit in something 
mattering to us is that it has the possibility of becoming an entity with which we may 
have dealings. A holiday may show up as ‘desirable’, and we may then dream about 
the holiday, even though the holiday may never eventuate.  The mode of ‘mattering’ 
is indicated by being ‘desirable’. 
However, as an intentional structure, these various modes do not stand alone and 
have an understanding of the entity with which it is associated. For example, a 
frightening dog, a huggable child, an evil outlaw, a heavy hammer, a hot stove, 
urgent work, and so on.  The adjectives are not to be understood in these cases as 
attributes of the entity they are modes of receptivity. For example, of Jesse James 
shows up for us an ‘evil outlaw’ then implicit in this is the appropriate response to 
‘evil’.  Similarly, when a loose screw shows up as in need of tightening ‘loose’ is not 
a predicate of the screw, it is a mode of receptivity that indicates a response because 
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‘loose screw’ matters to us. We can of course neglect the screw, and this then 
becomes a deficient mode of dealing as earlier discussed. 
Receptivity is then a form of directedness, but, it is a directedness towards Dasein 
and opens up the possibility of a response (dealing) from Dasein to the entity.  This 
bi-directional and sequential character of the structure of intentionality is presented 
in Figure 19. 
However, the structure of receptivity is a little more complicated.  For example, we 
don’t just see a frightening dog, we experience fear, and it is the fear that then 
accompanies the comportments.  The phenomenon that results in us feeling fear in 
response to something fearful Heidegger calls attunement.  Thus, in the face of the 
fearful dog, we feel fear for our wellbeing, this is something that matters to us.  In 
response to this we have a number of options, run away, cross the road and so on.  
A full description of this is given by Heidegger in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
the numbering relates to Figure 20. 
I can comport toward entities only if those entities can themselves be encountered in the 
brightness of the understanding of being. This is the necessary condition. In terms of 
fundamental ontology it can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is essentially 
related to a receptiveness [1] which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively-attuned 
is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect,[2] and the like, which are 
constitutive for all comportment toward entities,[3] although they do not by themselves alone 
make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its 
light to each mood, each passion, each affect. [BPP 281] (translation modified) (my 
underlining and numbering) 
 









When we perceive what is occurring around us through our various sense things 
are generally intelligible. However, we do not perceive just individual things. We see 
a field of intelligible things, and they present with varying modes of receptivity. For 
example, I am listening to music on Spotify, looking at the screen, sitting on the 
chair, aware of my wife at the desk next to me, the coffee cup and I can see the 
shed, the paddocks and the hills in the distance.  They are all intelligible to various 
degrees.  However, the perceptions, in being intelligible, all offer various modes of 
positive, detrimental and deficient modes of receptivity.  This is the basic structure 
of the ‘there’.  Within this ‘there’, a tune comes on that I find intrusive, I hit the skip 
button.  I’ve been sitting too long and feel uncomfortable, I move.  I’ve made a 
spelling mistake (again!) and hit the backspace button.  I glance at the coffee cup 
and am prompted to have another cup.  These are all examples of comportments 
concerning entities that have an intentional structure as previously discussed.  
However, all this takes place within the broad structure of the ‘there’ which is an 
even more basic intentional structure.  This is what Heidegger is getting at in the 
following passages 
"I-here" does not mean a certain privileged point-that of an I-Thing - but is to be understood 
as being-in in terms of the "yonder" of the world that is ready-to-hand-the "yonder" which is 
the dwelling-place of Dasein as concern. 1[BT 155/119] 
The entity which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 
'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 
'yonder'. There 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-
 











hand, in the sense of a being towards this 'yonder'- [BT 171/133] 
The ‘there’ is thus constituted and held open by this ‘more radical’ structure of 
intentionality comprised by the structures of receptivity and understanding.  
Understanding and receptivity are, because of the nature of intentional structures, 
described as being “equiprimordial” in constituting the “there”. This structure is 
presented in Figure 21. Within this structure, Dasein is then attuned to things in the 
‘there’, and that attunement shows the entity as mattering to Dasein and indicates 
the appropriate responses; this is the phenomenon of being-in.   
Having provided an overview of the structure of being-in and its relationship with 
intentionality I now shift to a more detailed discussion the structure of receptivity and 
understanding. 
Section 1: Receptiveness  
Heidegger opens Section 29, Being there as Receptiveness with the following;  
What we indicate ontologically by the term receptiveness (Befindlichkeit) is ontically the most 
familiar and everyday sort of thing; our affective-modes (Stimmung), our affective-attunement 
(Gestimmtsein). Prior to all psychology of affective-modes, a field which in any case still lies 
fallow, it is necessary to see this phenomenon as a fundamental existentiale, and to outline 
its structure. [BT 172-3/134] (German added) 
This is a complex opening paragraph made all the harder by the choice of the 
 
Figure 21 Constitutive structure of the "there" 
receptivity  
understanding  
Dasein  "yonder"  the "there"  
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translators to interpret Heidegger’s German name for the structure, Befindlichkeit, 
as “state-of-mind” and which I translate as receptivity or receptiveness.  What 
Heidegger has outlined is the following; 
• The structure of receptivity is an equiprimordial ontological structure (a 
fundamental existentiale) that constitutes there. 
• At the ontic level, we experience it in terms of our various affective-modes, 
roughly understood as our moods and emotions. 
• Our being is attuned to things by way of our affective-modes 
• Scholarship at the time had not properly explored the field associated with 
moods. 
Even if we are not sure what he means by ‘attuned’ these claims are stunning, even 
when considered within the context of contemporary scholarship. Heidegger’s 
account of the ontological structures of the ready-to-hand and how understanding 
relates to these structures is already a radical departure from the tradition. However, 
this next step thrusts Heidegger into an even more radical position.  The tradition 
has typically separated the concepts of cognition, our rationality and the various 
affective experiences we have (emotions, moods, desires, etc.).  Typically, the 
affective aspects of being human have been identified as something to be overcome 
in that they lead us astray and are the enemy of a rational approach to decision-
making.  This approach is to be found in both philosophical and theological traditions 
of the West. Heidegger throws the approach out the window!  Not only is our 
receptivity a necessary part of our ontological structure but understanding requires 
receptivity, this is the implication of the following; 
Receptivity(Befindlichkeit) is one of the existential structures in which the being of the 'there' 
maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this being is understanding. 
Receptivity(Befindlichkeit) always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it 
suppressed. Understanding always has its affective-attuning (gestimmtes). [BT 182/142] 
(German added) 
In the above two passages, there are three key technical terms; these are indicated 
by the German words included in the passage.   The translations of these words 
vary from the original English text.  The following table (Table 6) shows the changes, 
and the rationale for the changes is discussed in a way that brings out the 
phenomenon being described and named.  The approach taken in the interpretation 
is based on the view that Heidegger will typically try and capture in the German word 
for the structure a sense of the phenomenon experienced at the ontic level. 
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The name of the basic structure is receptiveness(Befindlichkeit), and it has two 
aspects, the range of possible affective-modes (Stimmung) by which an entity can 
be encountered and the particular way an entity is being encountered, the affective-
attuning (gestimmtes).  The first term to be discussed is receptiveness 
(Befindlichkeit) 
Interpreting Befindlichkeit as Receptiveness  
Befindlichkeit is a Heideggerian neologism, and the difficulty of translating it into 
English is reflected in the range of English words used to capture their interpretation 
the world.  Examples include  
• attunement [BTs], (Polt, 1999),  
• affective self-finding [BPP],  
• state one finds oneself in [CT],  
• ontological disposition [ZS],  
• disposedness and disposition [HCT] (Blattner, 1999),  
• situatedness [WM],  
• affectedness (Dreyfus, 1991; Gorner, 2007), and 
• state-of-mind [BT] 
These various attempts indicate that Befindlichkeit relates in some way to how one 
is feeling in oneself or how one is currently disposed. “Situatedness” captures a 
sense of ‘there’ and being-in, while “attunement” carries a sense of ‘alignment’.  
In the introductory passages quoted the structure of the ‘there’ can be characterised 
as being ‘intentional’ in nature, as is discussed above.  This does not come through 
in most of the translations.   
German  BT (English text) BT (thesis) 
Befindlichkeit noun state-of-mind receptiveness or 
receptivity 
 
Stimmung noun mood affective-modes (when 
applied generally) 
mood (as case 
example) 
Gestimmtsein noun being-attuned affective-attunement 
gestimmtes verb mood affective-attuning 
Table 6 Changes in translation. 
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The German word Befindlich is a general locational term relating to being sited or 
situated and can be used in various grammatical modes, e.g. noun, verb, adjective.  
By way of example the phrase ‘in der Luft befindlich’, is translated as ‘in the air’ or 
‘airborne’, but its literal translation is ‘situated in the air’.  The common German 
greeting phrase ‘Wie Befinden Sie sich?’ means ‘How are you?’, ‘How are you 
doing?’, etc.  This is not an inquiry into the state of affairs of one’s share portfolio, 
or what tasks one is currently engaged. The question is an inquiry into how one is 
experiencing the world at the moment in a global sense.  Typical responses may be 
‘not bad’, ‘good’, ‘a bit challenging at the moment’, ‘on top of the world’ and so on. 
These are all responding from the perspective of our ‘feelings’, how the world is 
showing up for us at the moment.  
Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit is one of his neologisms, and it captures two aspects of 
the phenomenon he is describing, the ‘there’ and the ‘affective-attunement’ with the 
world.   I could think of no English word that captures this dual sense, and so a 
decision has to be made as to either emphasise one aspect or the other or perhaps 
develop some compound word that captures the dual notion. 
When Heidegger is dissatisfied with the naming of a structure, he will often search 
for a replacement. This was illustrated in the discussion of meaningfulness. It would 
seem that Heidegger was dissatisfied with Befindlichkeit and following Being and 
Time, the term virtually disappears from Heidegger’s lexicon.  In the Zollikon 
Seminars, over fifty years later, it makes only a brief reappearance, where it is 
interpreted as “ontological disposition”, but the term most commonly used in the 
Seminars, is Vernehmen (the capacity to receive-perceive) and this is how it is 
described; 
… the basic constitution of human existence may be called Da-sein, or being-in-the-world. 
Of course, in this context the Da of this Da-sein certainly does not mean what it does in the 
ordinary sense—a location near an observer. Rather, to exist as Da-sein means to hold open 
a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive (Vernehmen) the significance of the things 
that are given to it [Da-sein] and that address it [Da-sein] by virtue of its own "clearing" [ZS 
4] (my underlining – German added 
Heidegger, in looking for an alternative to Befindlichkeit he made his choice to 
emphasise the aspect relating to ‘feeling’, not situation. The term perception relates 
to all our experienced sensory modes, not just ‘moods’ and I will address this shortly.  
The idea of “receive” contains the directional aspect of intentionality.  In view of this, 
I simply interpret Befindlichkeit as receptivity or receptiveness to indicate what 
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Heidegger had described in the Seminars. What should also be noted is that it 
relates to what is ‘received from’, and this will also be discussed. 
The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Befindlichkeit, state-of-mind, is wrong 
on two counts.  Firstly, it refers to an entity, mind, a position rejected by Heidegger’s 
research stance and secondly, ‘state’ is a predicate of an entity and thus also 
rejected.  The basis for this rejection has been covered previously. The term also 
fails to carry with it the sense of the phenomenon Heidegger is describing. 
Receptiveness as a Broad Concept 
In that receptiveness is one of the most basic structures constituting the ‘there’ 
suggests that it must refer to a broad classification of a certain type of capacity.  This 
is consistent in understanding Heidegger’s method as identifying, classifying and 
naming very broad structures which can then be further analysed as sub-
classifications.  This is the sense we get from Inwood’s Heidegger dictionary in 
relation to Befindlichkeit when he refers to it as being affected in “certain ways”. 
Befindlichkeit attunes DASEIN to being affected by things and affected in certain ways. 
Unless I am in a mood I will not be 'affected', touched or interested … by anything, nothing 
will 'matter' (angehen) to me (BT, 137). Only in a certain mood can I be affected in certain 
ways. (Inwood, 1999, p. 132) 
This covers things that psychologists would normally attribute to such things as 
moods, emotion, motivation and so on.  This range of the way in which we may be 
affected is described by Heidegger in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics; 
To be affectively self-finding197 [Befindlichkeit] is the formal structure of what we call mood, 
passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings…. 
[FCM 281] (my underlining) 
The broad nature of receptiveness is hinted when Heidegger notes that there are 
different modes of receptiveness [BT 178/138] that have been studied since 
antiquity under the ontic heading of “feelings and affects” [BT 178/138].  He later 
comments that they include moods that are “indifferent or fleeting” [BT 172/135], 
and I take ‘fleeting’ to refer to the short duration of emotions compared to moods.  
In his analysis of fear, he makes comment that it is because we have the capacity 
to fear that it can also be experienced in different derivative modes such as alarm, 
as dread, and as terror [BT 182-2/ 142].  
                                            
197 I have not changed the translation from self-finding. 
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The concept of receptiveness is, however, broader still, in that Heidegger refers, in 
Being and Time, to the capacity to be affected through the senses, i.e. to feel the 
warmth of a touch;  
And only because the 'senses' [die "Sinne"] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of 
being is being-in-the-world with a receptiveness 198, can they be 'touched' by anything or 
'have a sense for' ["Sinn haben fur"] something in such a way that what touches them shows 
itself in an affect. [BT 177/138] (translation modified) 
It is not physiological aspects of the sense of touch he is interested in.  It is the 
capacity to sense our environment in various ways such that we can respond to 
what matters to us.  This aspect is not elsewhere commented on in Being and Time 
but it is an indication that this view was present as he writes the book.  I have pointed 
out and discussed passages from later works in which thesis ideas are present 
elsewhere in the thesis, e.g. Chapter 8 on Dasein. 
The Whole Body is Engaged 
Apart from the comment on ‘senses’ the extent of out receptivity is hard to identify 
in Being and Time. In the following account given by Heidegger in the Zollikon 
Seminars in March of 1972, he clearly states his support for the view that while the 
senses are founded on the body, they must be, can only be, properly understood 
with respect to the constitution of Dasein.  
… everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most 
hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically not 
inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-
perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. This 
bodily [nature] develops in such away that it can be used in dealing with the inanimate and 
animate "material things" which are encountered. Yet, in contrast to a tool, the bodily spheres 
of existing are not set free [entlassen]from being-human. They cannot be cared for in a 
toolbox. Rather, they remain in the sway of being human, held in it, and belonging to it so 
long as the human being lives. Of course, in dying this bodily domain changes its way of 
being into that of an inanimate thing, into the substance of a corpse, which drops out 
[herausfaUen] from existence. [ZS 232] (my underling) 
Heidegger is describing the human Dasein as an entity, not only founded on the 
human body but one whose entire bodiliness, is attuning it to its environment if the 
various capacities to receive-perceive.  The vast scope of receptivity stays active, 
most probably, from before our birth until the moment the physical body ceases and 
involves all the body.  
                                            
198 ‘befindlichen In-der-Welt-seins'. 
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If we are considering the range in which Dasein senses its environment, then we 
have to move past the five basic senses and include such things as equilibrioception 
(balance), thermoperception (temperature), proprioception (movement and relative 
position), nociception (pain), and chronoception (passage of time).  There is also a 
range of senses that related to the internal states of the body known as 
interoceptions that are associated with the experience of hunger, thirst, respiration 
(e.g. suffocation), gag reflex, emptying the bladder and so on.  All of these things 
have a role in orienting Dasein to its world, disclosing the world in a way that matters 
to it and eliciting an appropriate response. If we feel thirsty, we will start to look 
around for something to drink, and the thirstier we get, the more focused we will be 
on this behaviour and the mattering that discloses the world in other ways will drop 
away until the thirst has been satisfied.  If I am tightening up a screw, it is the ‘feel’ 
of the screwdriver as it tightens the screw that lets me know if it is too loose or 
perhaps on the verge of being overtight. 
The main thrust of this section has been to highlight the pervasive nature of the 
structure our receptiveness as something that shows up the world as mattering to 
us.  While the examples of thirst and tightening a screw are part of the structure, in 
Being and Time, Heidegger’s main emphasis is on the more substantive aspects 
that are associated with Dasein’s primary involvements.  It is on the basis of the 
structure of receptiveness that Dasein assigns itself to the various ‘in-order-to’ 
structures because these show up as mattering to Dasein. 
Receptiveness is a far broader concept than is indicated by mood or disposition and 
this understanding should carry over into the ways the aspects of the structure are 
interpreted. 
By way of note, this line of argument would suggest that simply equating Dasein 
with conscious or sub-conscious awareness, i.e. something that equates to mind, 
is, from a Heideggerian perspective, wrong.  Dasein is a far more complex entity 
than this and must be understood in relation to our entire bodiliness.  This would be 
an interesting area to explore post thesis as it pushes the boundary of how we 
understand being a person even further than is presented in this thesis.  
Affective-modes and Affective- attunement 
The German word Stimmung is typically used in two ways; in music to denote 
‘tuning’ and as a ‘tuning’ metaphor referring to how people feel.  This is captured by 
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a description of the word by German composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen, who 
commented that Stimmung 
    means "tuning," but it really should be translated with many other words because 
Stimmung incorporates the meanings of the tuning of a piano, the tuning of the voice, the 
tuning of a group of people, the tuning of the soul. This is all in the German word. Also, when 
you say: We're in a good Stimmung, you mean a good psychological tuning, being well tuned 
together. (Cott & Stockhausen, 1973, p. 162) 
The idea of Stimmung is not the act of tuning something to something, it is a noun 
and refers to the tuning something has by reference to something else.  For 
example, while there is a standard tuning on a guitar there are at least a score of 
alternative tunings such as ‘Open D’ tuning often used in Delta Blues and ‘Dropped 
D’ which is common in heavy rock music.  When a guitar is tuned to ‘Dropped D’ the 
strings have been adjusted to take on the tuning of ‘Dropped D’.  The tuning is 
imposed on the guitar.  In relation to people, the term relates to the current mood or 
temperament, either for an individual or a group as the above quote indicates.  In 
that moods of crowds and individuals change there is also the sense that the mood 
is something taken up or imposed. Furthermore, in both examples, there is implicit 
in the concept that there is more than one tuning.  Understood in the broadest 
possible way as indicated by the discussion on receptivity, Stimmung refers to the 
possible ‘attunements’ that may be experienced, and for this reason, I interpret the 
word as affective-modes. 
Whereas I interpret Stimmung as affective-modes when used in a general sense, 
there are other places in the chapter where Heidegger is using Stimmung where it 
should be translated as mood.  For example, he refers to bad moods (Verstimmung) 
[BT 175/136] and a mood of elation (gehobene Stimmung) [BT 173/134].  He 
appears to be using Stimmung, understood as mood as his case example.  When 
mood is the case example, I will follow suit. However, this should always be 
understood as a case example of the broader concept of affective-modes.  
The German word Gestimmtsein is a composite of Gestimmt + sein, where 
Gestimmt typically means ‘in tune’ and sein means being. The connection to 
Stimmung is self-evident.  The verb gestimmt means exhibiting a tuning, for 
example, the guitar playing in accordance with a particular tuning, or a person 
experiencing a Christmas mood.  An analogy would be a radio (which used to be 
called a radio receiver!).  Affective-modes relate to the range of stations that the 
radio can receive.  The affective-attunement is the particular station that it is 
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currently receiving.  The response to this affective-attunement is to play the sounds 
associated with that station; the radio-receiver has no choice in this once the 
affective-attunement is determined. 
Dasein has a receptivity that reflects the capacity to receive a broad range of 
affective-modes.  For example, we experience a frightening dog and depending on 
the situation we may experience fear, anxiety or terror depending on the encounter.  
It is only a small dog on a leash, so we are attuned to the situation in the affective-
mode of anxiety.  In response, we steel ourselves, walk to the edge of the footpath 
and walk carefully past. If it were a large dog, the attunement might have been one 
of fear, and we respond by crossing the road to keep the source of the fear as far 
away as possible.  The dog matters to us and the mode of attunement discloses in 
what form this mattering takes, and this, in turn, indicates a range of possible 
comportments we may take up in relation to the dog.  If dogs do not matter to us, it 
may even pass without much notice. 
Affective-Modes ‘Happen’ to us – But we can Control Them 
Neither the radio receiver nor the guitar chooses its tuning from the various 
alternatives; this is imposed on them. Similarly, for the most part, we do not choose 
the affective-mode (mood, emotion, etc.) that we receive, it is something that just 
happens to us, and we have no notion of where they come.  Heidegger describes 
this in the following way,  
An affective-mode [e.g. a mood] assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', 
but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being. [BT 176/136] (my gloss) 
The German word for assails is überfällt, and while assails is reasonable, it's more 
typical interpretation is more along the lines of attacks, assaults, mugs and so on.  
Heard against the background of these words, we have a more vivid description that 
typically these various affective-modes are aggressive, they are out of our control, 
and they win; the assault typically succeeds.  We are literally tossed around by our 
various emotions, moods and so on.  The most extreme case that Heidegger gives 
to demonstrate this is bad moods; 
… bad moods. In these, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment with which it is 
concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern gets led astray. [BT 175/136] 
Anyone who has experienced being gripped by anger that lets loose, uncontrolled 
behaviour, at least for a moment, would relate to this description of Heidegger.   We 
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are not only blind to our self, but to the things about which we are concerned, and 
in the grip of anger, we can do harm to both.  
However, we should not think of affective-moods as only being unpleasant, the 
range of affective-modes includes joy and pleasure. These too, have the same 
character of being outside our control.  This, however, need not be the case for 
Heidegger tells us that,  
Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its affective-
modes …. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; 
we are never free of moods. [BT 175/136] 
Affective-modes are part of our very structure, and as such we cannot escape them, 
we can learn about them and then make decisions to be “in control” of them.  This 
is similar to what was discussed in relation to the ‘One’, in that we either take over 
the way of being in an unquestioning manner or be more discerning in what we do 
and do not take over, i.e. be in either inauthentic or authentic modes.  On this basis, 
Dasein has a way of understanding itself in new ways and the capacity to change 
its ‘there’ (the disclosure of the world) based on that understanding.  At a collective 
level, this means that Dasein has the capacity to change the character of its world 
and this was evident in the discussion on Chapter 11 on Heidegger’s 1954 lectures 
The Question Concerning Technology [QCT].  This understanding of the relationship 
between affective-modes and behaviour and the ability to control behaviour by 
changing the affective-mods we experience is reflected in Tibetan Buddhist 
psychology where the emphasis is on cultivating ‘right thinking’ (“through knowledge 
and will”) to let go of negative emotions and cultivate a mode of behaviour 
characterised by compassion(His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama, 2001).  I make this 
point only to highlight that this aspect of the phenomenon has been recognised and 
received considerable attention in other traditions. 
Why the Word Affect? 
In the above discussion, I did not address why I used the word ‘affective’; it comes 
from its use in psychology. The field of psychology is roughly divided into the study 
of affect199, cognition and motivation.  Within the field of the study of affects the 
‘feeling’ realm is divided into fleeting changes at the autonomic level (e.g. being 
startled), emotions (from minutes to hours), moods (from hours to months), 
                                            




emotional disorders (months to years), personality traits (years to lifetime) (Keltner, 
Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014).  The way affect is used in psychology is incorporated 
within Heidegger’s concept of receptivity, provided we let go of any psychological 
presumptions. There was no point in inventing a new word, and no existing word 
has this same meaning as such I use ‘affect’ roughly in line with this understanding 
but also to explicitly include the way we experience a ‘hot’ day, or the screw ‘feeling 
too loose’.  
Interpreting “matter” (angegangen) 
Another word that needs to be addressed is ‘mattering’, which is the ontic level of 
the phenomenon. That something showing up (encountering) for us on the basis of 
mattering is indicated in the following example: 
 …. to be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of that which is 
ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as being-in as such has been 
determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-
world can "matter" to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can "matter" to it is grounded 
in one's receptiveness ...  [BT 176/137] (translation modified) (my underlining) 
Heidegger is making the point that to be affected by an event at the ontic level it 
must ‘matter’ to us; otherwise, we would be completely indifferent.  Mattering is the 
ontic phenomenon that is grounded in our receptiveness, the capacity to be affected 
in some way and reflects the broad understanding of receptivity.  A good illustration 
of this is provided by Haugeland;  
... Heidegger’s contrived word “Befindlichkeit.” This bizarre term names the feature of human 
life that it is always responsive to what matters in its current, concrete situation — it finds the 
situation as thus mattering to it. For instance, if I am absorbed in hammering, I will be 
responsive to the heft and recoil of the hammer, the fit and integrity of the boards, the position 
and angle of the nail; these all matter to the hammering.  But I am likely to be oblivious of the 
sawdust on the floor or the flicker of the lamp (unless, of course, they interfere with the work). 
(Haugeland, 2013, k. 4797) 
The German word translated as “matter” is angegangen which has various 
meanings such as tackled, approached, involved, concerned, accosted and so on.  
Mattering captures the same sense as ‘assails’.  It is something that happens to us, 
and in this, we have no choice; we may only choose how we respond to what 
matters. For example, while my wife doesn’t get the broom the messiness of the 
sawdust still accosts/approaches/encounters her based on her receptivities and at 
that point in time she has no choice.  The direction of mattering at the ontic level is 
the same as the structural level; it is towards Dasein. 
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In the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing it is not that there is an encounter 
and mattering is subsequently determined by Dasein.  ‘Mattering’ happens to us, we 
are confronted by ‘a mattering’.  Dasein is confronted by a frightening dog, the 
annoyance of the machine breakdown and so forth, and the encounter calls from us 
a possible response. This is not dissimilar to the phenomenon the Gestalt 
psychologist Kurt Koffka is describing when he comments;  
 … in the prescientific stage man behaves in a situation as the situation tells him to behave. 
To primitive man each thing says what it is and what he ought to do with it: a fruit says, “Eat 
me”; water says, “Drink me”; thunder says, “Fear me,” and woman says, “Love me.”  (Koffka, 
2005, k. 234-6)  
While Koffka is talking about the basic emotions (receptiveness) of ‘primitive man’, 
the phenomenal description still holds, the responses we make are in relation to the 
mattering that encounters us in a situation.   When we enter the room of a dying 
friend, we typically encounter a sombre room which draws from us the appropriate 
behaviour.  A few years ago, I entered the local library for the first time to pick up 
my son and was taken aback. I encountered a boisterous place with young children 
running around and calling out, whereas I was expecting a studious place where 
appropriate behaviour was characterised by quiet movement and hushed tones. The 
library was the same space, understood as a library by all, but it resulted in a 
different encounter for me than it did for the children and consequently resulted in 
different behaviours; the library ‘mattered’ in different ways.  
In relation to ‘mattering’ I do not change the translation, I have been unable to find 
an alternative English word that captures this sense of ‘encountering’ Dasein.  
However, I make the strong point that when I use ‘mattering’, it should be heard in 
the way I have described; as something that encounters Dasein, not something that 
Dasein imposes on an object after some consideration. 
Summary Description of Receptivity and the ‘There’ 
Before discussing Heidegger’s concepts of thrownness, facticity and fallenness a 
summary of the structure of the ‘there’ is set out, as the terms are used in relation 
to the ‘there’. 
When we look around, we see the world laid out before us in a rich mosaic of thick 
and thin intelligibilities and textured by various modes of mattering.  What we are 
experiencing is our ‘there’.  Three of my children live with their families some 
distance from me. However, I am familiar with them, their homes and they matter to 
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me. Even at a distance, they are part of my ‘there’.  As I look out the window, I know 
there is a shed out of view, and I do not give it much thought; it is where we store 
our firewood for the winter.  If it were to be destroyed by a tree branch falling on it, I 
would be troubled by the loss and need to do something.  Out of view, out of 
conscious awareness, this shed is still part of my ‘there’.  We do not have to have 
things being present to us all the time for them to be part of our ‘there’.  They simply 
have to form part of our public world (thin intelligibility) or domestic environment 
(thick intelligibility) and be something that matters to us.     
The ‘there’ is structured by our understanding and receptivity. It can be thought of 
as the unity of our world, as we understand it, that matters to us in various positive 
and detrimental ways.  The possibilities of us doing things in our ‘there’ are, to a 
large extent already determined by our structure of understanding and our structure 
of receptiveness.   Over time the structure of our understanding and receptiveness 
changes and when this does our ‘there’ changes.  When this occurs, the range of 
our possible involvements also changes.   While we cannot change the structure or 
the way it operates we can make deliberate changes in the content of our 
understanding and in the way things matter to us, albeit, for the most part, Dasein 
is oblivious to this possibility.  When Dasein seizes hold of the possibility of directing 
its understanding and receptiveness on its own terms and not merely following the 
course determined by the ‘One’ Heidegger calls this an authentic mode of existence.  
However, Heidegger does not believe it is possible to do this in all aspects of 
understanding and receptivity, and so the normative mode for all Dasein is a 
normative one determined by the ‘One’.  The Dasein that operates within its ‘there’ 
is thus not an authentic self but, by and large, a manifestation of the ‘One’. 
Our ‘there’, the wherein we exist, is thus constituted by our ontological structure. It 
is determinative of what we understand, how we experience things in the world as 
mattering and determines, to a significant extent, the behavioural responses, large 
and small, material and insignificant, that we take up in our dealings. That existence 
is experienced in the expressed comportments associated with our various dealings 
in the world, the structure of our ‘there’ is the structure of our existence. The 
structure of the ‘there’, to give it its technical name is being-in-the-world.  
This is a summary of the work to date.  As we have seen in prior discussions, 
Heidegger will often come back to phenomenon he has previously described, but 
from a different perspective, to draw out new aspects and follow them.  This is what 
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he now does, and this leads to several new concepts, thrownness, facticity and 
falling.  These now become the focus of the discussion. 
Thrownness and Facticity 
Dasein’s ontological structure and Dasein are not the same.  This is no more than 
the restatement of the ontological difference [BPP, ZS, MFL] previously discussed. 
The ontological structure of understanding and receptivities is what determines the 
‘there’, and this is the ‘wherein’ Dasein dwells.  It is because of this that Dasein has 
no access to the source of the ‘there’ and simply finds itself in its ‘there’.  It is as if 
Dasein is arbitrarily ‘thrown’ into its ‘there’. This is what Heidegger is getting at in 
the following; 
This characteristic of Dasein's being - this 'that it is' - is veiled in its "whence" and "whither", 
yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the "thrownness" of this entity into its 
"there''; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as being-in-the-world, it is the "there". [BT 
174/135] 
However, we need to keep in mind that while an entity and its ontological structure 
are different, they are inseparable, just for the bronze sphere, the sphere cannot be 
separated200 out an examined as an independent thing. The same is true for Dasein, 
this would make it an entity and Heidegger, as has been discussed, rejects the 
notion of being as an entity. This is part of the challenge of an inquiry into being that 
was discussed earlier. 
The term “that it is” needs explaining and Heidegger’s use of it is instructive in terms 
of his approach.  If we look at a tree, we can ask the question “What is that?”.  This 
is a question as to the nature of its being.  A community of people can simply classify 
these types of entities in a certain way and call them whatever they like, in English 
it is trees.  Anything that conforms with the classification is thus a tree. Naming 
allows us to talk with each other about entities and we can be reasonably confident 
we have the same entity in view.  We can also ask “Why is it a tree?”. This question 
can be heard two ways. Firstly, as a question of identity.  This relates to the naming 
protocol, i.e. it is an entity that meets the characteristics that the community has 
decided will be called a tree.  Secondly, it can be heard as “Why is that entity we 
are calling a tree, the entity it is?” or simply “Why is a tree a tree?”. This question is 
                                            
200 In Plato’s philosophy the forms have a separate existence, this is not the case for Aristotle. In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle presents the form as a ‘formula’, what I referred to as an organising principle, and is 
separable only on ‘account’.  The same concept is present in Heidegger’s work in that the ontological structure 
is a dynamic organising process that is responsible for the unique character of the entity, Dasein.   
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asking why do trees exist.  Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, he dismissed this 
type of question as nonsense from the viewpoint of ‘science’ or ‘metaphysical’ 
inquiry.  We cannot address the question of why ‘trees’ came into existence in the 
first place just as we cannot address why something didn’t! To answer the ‘why 
trees’ question properly, we must be able to answer the ‘why didn’t’ question and 
we can’t.  Even theories of evolution can’t address this question; rather they give an 
account of the conditions and processes by which natural entities come into being. 
Aristotle’s starting position is to accept that the tree is. Further, there is the 
acceptance that a tree has to be a tree.  If trees suddenly started being birds or 
rocks, then the world would be unintelligible.  It is this acceptance of the constancy 
of being that underpins both Aristotle’s philosophy and science.  Aristotle addresses 
himself to three basic questions, determining the organising principle (the form) that 
determines the tree, accounting for how it comes into existence given the organising 
principle (the four causes) and how to properly classify a tree according to its 
categorial characteristics.  That any entity simply is the entity it is, and that there is 
the constancy of it being this entity and no other is captured in the phrase “‘that it is 
and has to be”. 
Heidegger takes the Aristotelian position in relation to Dasein. He rejects the “why 
Dasein” question and simply states “that it is”.  There is, however, a significant 
difference, the characteristics of Dasein’s being (the ‘that it is’) are not determined 
categorially but rather by the manner of the “"thrownness" of this entity into its "there'' 
“[BT 174/135] 
Having linked the language of “that it is” to our thrownness into the ‘there,’ Heidegger 
then links the same language to Dasein’s receptiveness, the structure of the ‘there’. 
The 'that it is and has to be' which is disclosed in Dasein's receptiveness is not the same 
'that-it-is' which expresses ontologico-categorially the factuality belonging to presence-at-
hand. This factuality becomes accessible only if we ascertain it by looking at it. The "that-it-
is" which is disclosed in Dasein's receptiveness must rather be conceived as an existential 
attribute of the entity which has being-in-the-world as its way of being. [BT 174/135] (my 
underlining) 
Heidegger is again reiterating that the ontological structure that is disclosed by 
receptiveness is not the same type of ontological structure associated with present-
at-hand objects.  We can determine the structures of the latter by looking at it and 
making judgments about its categorial properties.  This approach cannot be taken 
with Dasein given its structure is being-in-the-world.  To be able to talk about the 
 
537 
different types of characteristics associated with the being of the present-at-hand 
and the being of Dasein he introduces two collective terms. Factuality, introduced in 
the above passage, refers to those characteristics belonging to the present-at-hand 
and facticity applies to the characteristics of Dasein.  This is how Heidegger 
introduces facticity,  
The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of being delivered over. [BT 
174/135] 
Then he clarifies the term, 
Facticity if not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a 
characteristic of Dasein' s being - one which has been taken up into existence, even if 
proximally it has been thrust aside. The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes something that 
we can come across by beholding it. [BT 174/135] (italics in English text) 
Whereas factuality refers to the phenomena that are categorial facticity refers to the 
dynamic phenomenon. Facticity relates to the way we are delivered over to the 
‘there’, i.e. our thrownness.  Again, Heidegger is using language that indicates that 
we are not in control of how the structure operates, we are “delivered over”.  This is 
a crucial aspect associated with the structure that we must take into consideration.  
To be clear, there is a lot of force in what Heidegger is claiming. If we take a present-
at-hand entity, say a cube of silver 3cm x 3 cm x 3 cm then it can be described by 
reference to its size, shape, colour, texture and so on. These characteristics related 
to its factuality, they are categorial in nature.  This is an account of what the entity 
is, a silver cube. Heidegger’s claim in relation to what Dasein is made with the same 
force, except it is a Dasein’s facticity that determines the Dasein.   The way in which 
the ‘there’ is opened for Dasein is an account of that particular Dasein!  If one could 
set out a comprehensive account of a Dasein’s thick and thin intelligibilities together 
with the positive, detrimental and indifferent matterings concerning those entities 
about which Dasein has an understanding then one has given an account of that 
Dasein. 
If some external agent changes the factuality of the silver cube, say hitting it with a 
hammer, then the cube itself is damaged.  If some external agent changes the 
physical environment in which Dasein is living such that its ‘there’ shows up fewer 
things that matter to it is a positive way, and more things that are either indifferent 
or detrimental then there is an impact of Dasein in terms of what and how things 
show up as mattering which leads to different possibilities.  The ontological structure 
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is not damaged, it continues to operate normally, but the entity itself that is 
determined by the structure can no longer have lived experiences that reflect, in a 
positive way, the understanding of self.  The nature of Dasein is revealed by the 
‘there’ disclosing the deficient or detrimental nature of the circumstances Dasein 
finds itself.  If Dasein, by virtue of an ‘imposed’ environment, is unable to be the 
Dasein it is, then this restriction, even if temporary, of the dynamic process of a 
Dasein being the entity it is, is damage caused to Dasein, just as surely as a hammer 
strike to the silver cube damages the cube. This is the conclusion of Heidegger’s 
strong claim! 
Accounting for Facticity 
Dasein’s facticity is by and large arises from another part of the being-in-the-world 
structure, the ‘One’.  While it is not clear from the previous chapter, the ‘One’ is not 
determinative for Dasein in a blanket uniform way, just in a structurally consistent 
manner.  Otherwise, we would all be identical in terms of understanding and 
receptivity, and this is not the case in a modern society201.   
When Dasein is born, there are a number of characteristics that are given and can 
be considered as part of the factuality of Dasein’s body. These would include such 
things as sex, height, skin colour, physical appearance, age, any innate dispositions 
and so on.  The ‘One’ has established interpretations of these attributes in terms of 
the culture.  For what it means to be a woman in a conservative area of Afghanistan 
is significantly different to the way of being a woman in a Scandinavian country. How 
the self and world are understood, and the receptivities will be different. (This is 
illustrated in the examples at the end of this section in a dramatic way.) This is what 
would be expected. However, there are cultural variations that play out based on 
the factuality of the body even in the same culture.  For example, a white male in 
Sydney’s affluent area will be interpreted differently by the ‘One’ to a dark skin 
indigenous woman born in a remote area of Australia. These different 
understandings of Australianness by the ‘One’ will influence how these two people 
will understand themselves.  However, the variations in both inherited dispositions 
together with the inconsistencies in the immediate social and family surroundings 
will all result in significant variations in facticity.  The averageness of the ‘One’ has 
                                            
201 A possible way to explore this would be to carry out anthropological research among small, isolated, 
traditional villages.  My hypothesis would be that there would be a higher congruence among both understanding 




both local environment and a broader public way of being.  
One way of understanding Heidegger’s work on the ‘One’ is that this is his account 
of how a specific entity comes into being. The Dasein moves from having essential 
a bare structure when it is first born, and then this structure is filled out by the ‘One’ 
and the characteristics of this ‘filling out’, in terms of understanding and 
receptiveness, is Dasein’s facticity. In this chapter, this is referred to as Dasein’s 
thrownness. 
Facticity, Finding Itself and Research 
If the ontological structure of Dasein determines the Dasein itself, and further if the 
ontological structure is largely hidden from a Dasein, how is a Dasein to ‘find’ itself, 
to become aware at the ontic level of who it is? The answer lies in the connection 
between the factical character of the structure and Dasein’s way of being in its 
‘there’.  While Dasein does not have access to the structure, it does have access to 
the way the structure is exhibited in what it does.  This is the basis of the following 
account by Dasein in Basic Problems of Phenomenology; 
Dasein finds itself primarily and constantly in things because tending them, distressed by 
them, it always in some way or other rests in things.  Each one of us is what he pursues and 
cares for.  In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of activities 
we peruse and the things we take care of.  We understand ourselves by starting from them 
because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things. The Dasein does not need a special kind 
of observation ..., rather, as the Dasein, gives itself over immediately and passionately to the 
world itself, its own self is reflected to from things. This is not mysticism and does not 
presuppose the assigning of souls to things.  It is only a reference to an elementary 
phenomenological fact of existence, [BP 159] 
Heidegger, here, is again reiterating his basic research stance.  Put aside 
presuppositions concerning what we think Dasein is, simply make the observations 
of the “elementary phenomenological fact(s)” associated with the type of entity it is, 
do the logical analysis and layout the findings. Treat Dasein with the same rigour as 
anything else.   On this basis, Dasein can be understood in terms of what it does 
and the ‘passions’ with which it does them; remembering that Heidegger includes 
actions and ‘passions’ in all modes. 
In the previous chapter, the distinction between primary and subordinate 
involvements (for-sake-of (Um-willen)) and the difference between the for-sake-of 
and the for-sake-of-which (Worum-willen) was discussed.  In that “we understand 
ourselves and our existence by way of activities we pursue and the things we take 
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care of” [BP 159], then through carefully attending to these we can gain significant 
insight into “who we are”.  This approach can disclose a rich understanding of those 
primary understandings of self and of our receptivities that organise other activities. 
It may also provide insight into those understandings and receptivities which, while 
important are largely subordinate in nature, as well as other things that matter in a 
significant way either positively and negatively.  By and large, however, Dasein does 
not make such observations, and the understanding of self that is shaping their 
involvements remains hidden from them.   For example, a person who, in a veiled 
way, understands themselves as a sacrificial mother may not be aware that this is 
shaping the way the world shows up for them and determining the what they 
‘choose’ to do.    
This approach also offers the possibility of a research methodology into 
understanding the basic characteristics of a person. Care would be required in 
developing the associated methods as often the understanding associated with the 
various ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of a person is often veiled within the structure.  
Developing and refining the methods in a manner that they remain grounded in the 
philosophical research is a task post thesis. 
Falling and Fallenness 
To complete some terminology, Heidegger calls exhibiting the average every-day 
being of the ‘One’ ‘falling’ (BT §38).  This is not a physical falling but rather, 
… it has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to its being. Falling is a definite existential 
characteristic of Dasein itself. [BT 220/176] 
This term was briefly touched upon in the discussion of the ‘One’ and the three-part 
structure by which the ‘One’ sets, monitors and enforces compliance with the norms 
of the ‘One’.  Falling is characterised by fallenness;  
“Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another. [BT 220/176]  
Thrownness, as reflected in our facticity, is what we have taken up in terms of 
understanding and receptivity. In as much as this has been determined by the ‘One’, 
then our fallenness indicates the way this plays out in our daily lives.  We do “what 
one does”, we “judge as one judges” we “desire and recoil” as ‘One’ desires and 
recoils and so on.  The phenomenon of ‘mob’ rule and other crowd-based 
behaviours are just a small part of this phenomenon that is studied by sociology, 
particularly in the sub-field of social cognition(Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 
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2006; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). 
Falling then describes that aspect of the structure that is associated with being 
absorbed in the world as determined by the ‘One’ whereas our thrownness, or 
facticity, relates to understanding and receptiveness.  While different they are, as 
part of the same unified structure, closely related. This can be seen in the following 
quotes; 
[Dasein] In its projection reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been 
thrownly abandoned to the 'world', and falls into it concernfully. [BT 458/406] 
The being of Dasein is care. This entity exists fallingly as something that has been thrown. 
[BT 465/412] 
The language reflects the nature of the phenomenon. Dasein is “something that has 
been thrown” and as such it “falls into” the world. Any process must have a temporal 
structure, and we see this starting to emerge.  Thrownness reflects something in the 
past that has happened falling represents something that is happening now; i.e. past 
and present.  All that remains the future aspect, and this will be discussed later in 
the chapter. 
Summary: Receptiveness and Openness to the World 
As I interpret Heidegger, there are three broad levels associated with receptiveness 
and the same would apply to understanding. The first is a basic formal structure 
applicable to any Dasein, regardless of culture.  Heidegger refers to this as the 
primordial level202 [BT 171-2/133] The second is how the structure is ‘filled in’ for a 
Dasein.   Recalling the previous chapter on the ‘One’, it is this structural aspect that 
is responsible for this task and Dasein’s receptiveness is largely determined on the 
basis of the culture into which it is born and raised [BT CH 4], and the third is the 
entity that gives ontic expression to the ’filled in’ structure. It is the ontic level and 
the expressed comportments that give rise to the lived experiences of living our life. 
The first two are ontological levels, and the third is the entity level. 
There are three key statements by Heidegger that sum up the structure of 
receptiveness (affective-modes and their tuning or affective-attunement). 
The tuning of affective-modes is the existential constitution of Dasein’s openness to the 
                                            
202 Heidegger will often the term primordial to indicate a basis level or terms such as “more primordial” [BT 
50/27] to indicate a move to a more basic level.  For example, even though he talks about a structure being 
primordial in Dasein, an even more primordial structure is based on time [BT 40/19]. 
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world. [BT 137] (my translation) 
An affective mode has already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole, and 
makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. [BT 176/137] (italics in 
English text) 
Existentially, receptiveness implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can 
encounter something that matter to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as 
a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. [BT 177/137-8] 
(italics in English text) 
There is an overlap in these three summary statements, but the two fundamentally 
points are that firstly the structure of receptiveness, together with understanding are 
constitutive of the ‘there’.  Secondly, it is our receptivity that makes possible the 
discovery or world and discloses things in the world as mattering to us and hence 
makes possible our directedness towards things.  These characteristics can be 
illustrated by the breakdown case associated with serious clinical or morbid 
depression. In these circumstances, virtually nothing in the world matters to the 
person, and they find themselves confined to a bed or simply sitting in a chair at 
home, doing nothing.  Incapable of doing anything. The world is still intelligible; it 
just doesn’t show up as mattering.   A necessary condition of a person’s being-in-
the-world, of having a ‘there’ has thus collapsed, and this structural breakdown has 
its ontic expression in what we observe as the clinical depression. 
For Dasein, at the ontic level, receptivity discloses the ‘there’ in the way it matters 
to Dasein, notwithstanding the nature of the understanding and receptiveness may 
be concealed from Dasein.  The mattering can be positive, negative, or deficient in 
terms of showing up things relevant to a person’s existence and the person’s 
structure is the sole arbiter in this regard. No other can determine what will show up 
as ‘good for another’.   
Earlier in Being and Time Heidegger describes this by simply saying that our being 
(who we are) is an issue for us [BT 32/12], this has now been filled out.  
Receptiveness then is Heidegger’s technical term for the structure that grounds 
mattering or those things that are an issue for us.  Receptiveness should be heard 
as a broad, all-encompassing concept that opens up every possible way in which 
something can ‘matter’ to us, including all the diverse ways we receive perceptions 
from the world from our diverse array of senses.   
Examples of mattering include being bothered by a crooked wall hanging, the joy of 
a newborn and ongoing concern for its welfare, a frightening dog, desiring a 
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particular style of shoe, the dislike of brussels sprouts, the motivation to be a doctor, 
the interest in knowing something, the desire to change a Government policy, the 
love of one’s partner, the worry about the looming storm, tightening a screw too 
much, and so on.  How something matters to us then determines the range of our 
responses.   The James case study illustrated this.  Everything we do then, from 
assigning our self to meaningful in-order-structures, to ensuring we do not over 
tighten a screw can only occur because of the structure of receptivity by which things 
matter to us. 
The way things matter to us (our affective-attunement) is outside our control.  
Mattering is given to Dasein in encountering things in the world; we have no choice.   
Nor does mattering and the associated response, if any, always happened with 
conscious awareness or direction; arriving home having little recollection of the 
routine journey from work is an example. 
Individually Dasein assigns itself to an ‘in-order-to’ structure on the basis of 
mattering.  If taken collectively, Dasein’s mattering thus determines the structure of 
its world.  By working backwards, examining the nature of the involvements and the 
associated modes of mattering it is then possible to gain an understanding of the 
Dasein, or for Dasein to ‘find itself’.  In that this would represent the full account of 
those matters which have a practical bearing for Dasein’s existence, then from 
Peirce’s perspective, there is nothing further to know concerning the Dasein that 
would have a material consequence. 
The method of ‘working’ backwards applies to any world and as such also applies 
to the world of the nursing home.  By observing the average, everyday activities of 
the nursing home, the way the entities in the nursing home are understood and show 
up as mattering will be disclosed.  Specifically, the way in which the older people in 
the nursing home are understood in their Dasein-with and the mode of mattering in 
which they show up to the nursing home would be disclosed.    The understandings 
and associated modes of mattering in relation to the Dasein-with of staff, the 
government (e.g. compliance requirements), shareholders and so on, as well as the 
money generated by the nursing home, would also be disclosed.  This would then 
enable an analysis the character of the being of the nursing home and its primary 
for-the-sake-of-which, i.e. an understanding of what a nursing home is.  This 
suggests another possible type of research that is applicable to any world.  This 
thesis is not specifically addressing itself to this line of research and is something to 
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be pursued post thesis. 
This ends the main discussion on receptivity, and in the next section, some 
examples and case studies are presented to illustrate the phenomenon in the lives 
of Dasein. 
Receptiveness: Illustrative Examples 
Case Study: Shame and Honour Killings 
When read together the Sections on the ‘One’ and Receptiveness present a strong 
claim by Heidegger that the innate capacity for affective-modes is shaped by the 
culture which in turn determines in what way we encounter entities in the world, i.e. 
how they show up and matter to us. This is illustrated in the following account of an 
actual event, the honour killing of a daughter organised by her Mother(Appiah, 2011; 
Fisk, 2010): 
Samia Sarwar was born in 1970 into a 
wealthy and influential family in the 
Pakistan city of Peshawar203 and 
educated at the best private English 
school in the province. Samia’s father 
was a university graduate, a 
successful industrialist and a 
President of the provincial Chamber 
of Commerce, and her mother was a 
doctor with a successful medical 
practice in Peshawar.  This was a 
sophisticated, educated and 
influential family.  
Samia had married a cousin, her 
Mother’s sister’s son, only to separate 
sometime later, apparently due to the husband’s violence. Samia and her two 
                                            
203 Peshawar, where Samia is born and raised, is the capital of the Pakistan province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
situated in the north-west frontier area of the country near the Afghanistan border.  It is the administrative centre 
for what is known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas which lie between the province and Afghanistan. 
Peshawar has a history dating back more than two and half thousand years placing it among the oldest in the 
Asian region. 
 




children were subsequently supported by her parents.  Sometime later she wanted 
to divorce her husband to be free to marry another man she had fallen in love with, 
a Pakistani Army officer.  She had the right to do so under both Islamic law and the 
laws of Pakistan.  Her parents denied permission for the divorce, and on finding out 
about her relationship the parents, brothers and an uncle expressed anger and 
violence against her for bringing shame on the family.  
Refusing to give up the relationship Samia fled with her lover, leaving her children 
behind.  After a difficult period financially, during which her lover left to return to the 
Army, Samia ended up in women’s shelter.  Her mother contacted her daughter 
ostensibly to reach out to her and to express concern for her well-being.  A meeting 
was arranged in the offices of Samia's lawyer, Ms Hina Jilani, on the 6th April 1999.  
Arriving late to the meeting, after normal office hours, her Mother entered the office 
together with her chauffeur.  On entering the chauffeur drew a gun, shot and killed 
Samia.  
The lawyer worked hard to have the chauffer and Mother prosecuted for murder, but 
the case failed. Under various Pakistani laws murder is a crime against the family 
and not the State and there is the facility for the family to forgive ‘the accused’ or to 
receive recompense in lieu of prosecution.  In this case, Samia’s father, the head of 
the family, forgave the chauffeur and the Mother.  The judge accepted the family 
arrangement and the case was then dropped.  While there was public outrage and 
there was an attempt by a small group in Pakistan’s national parliament to change 
laws surrounding honour killings it was not widely supported and did not succeed.  
In the parliamentary debate not only did most politicians support the status quo 
some "praised her family’s sense of honour" (Appiah, 2011, k. 2381).  
Samia’s story is not an aberration, it is a not uncommon phenomenon of the power 
of shame to drive a parent to kill their child. Honour killings quite rightly attract 
condemnation, and there are attempts to stop them.  However, they continue to 
happen in many parts of the world. In 2000 the United Nations issued a report which 
included a section addressing the issue of violence against women and girls in which 
it was estimated that across the world some 5,000 honour killings occur each year. 
(Chesler, 2010)  Such killings are not confined to developing countries and there is 
an increasing numbers of such killings in both North America and Europe, including 
cases where the mother is involved(Chesler, 2010).  Chesler makes the point that 
honour killings are a distinctive type of killing with a different genesis and should not 
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be confused with acts of murder, rage or domestic violence, even when masked as 
an ‘honour killing’.(Chesler, 2010) 
What it is to hold a daughter lovingly in one’s arms as a parent and then within days 
that daughter shows up as the source of shame and dishonour in the face of which 
the appropriate response is killing her is alien to me, I belong to a different culture. 
However, if Heidegger’s analysis is correct, then, as Dasein, our underlying 
structure functions such that a culture can shape the receptiveness of a person such 
that in one instance a parent would sacrifice themselves to help their daughter and 
in another the same parent would kill that same daughter.  This seems unpalatable, 
but the phenomenal evidence and Heidegger’s research supports the view.  This 
example also sheds some extra light on what Heidegger means by the ‘One’ is 
always right. 
In a 2016 Blog in the Pakistan Newspaper, The Express Tribune, a Pakistani-
American psychiatrist discussed three honour killings that had occurred in Pakistan 
in the month prior to the blog post as well as the high-profile Samia killing. (Tariq & 
Bahatti, 2016)  There was a tone of urgent outrage in the writing and a call to have 
‘honour killings’ stopped, that “They must be exposed for the inhuman, senseless 
horror that they are”  (Tariq & Bahatti, 2016)  Again, if Heidegger is right, then such 
killings are not ‘inhuman’ but rather reflect the very fact that we are human, and that 
understanding and experiencing the world in this way is just one of the many 
possibilities of the human way of being.  If we understand and accept this, then this 
provides a way forward for different cultures to choose a different way of being.  In 
other words, honour killings must be understood and analysed primarily at the 
societal level, not the individual level.  How the culture understands itself must first 
change if these killings are to stop. 
A Lesson from Mary Guy 
In 2003, I had an encounter with a remarkable woman, Mary Guy204, who opened 
my eyes, concerning the depth to which care services should understand a person’s 
facticity. This example also illustrates the differences in care delivery between 
leaping-in and leaping ahead. 
                                            
204 Mary Guy was inducted to the Tasmanian Honour Roll of Women in 2005 and died in 2010.  The citation 
that accompanies her induction to the Honour Roll can be read at 
http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/csr/programs_and_services/tasmanian_honour_roll_of_women/inductee
s/2005/mary_phyllis_guy (accessed 16/3/2016) 
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Polio had profoundly impacted Mary’s body when she was eight years old resulting 
in quadriplegia, confining her to a wheelchair and being dependent on a full-time 
carer. Notwithstanding this, she gained qualifications in several areas, became an 
advocate for change in disability services, served as Chairperson of a national 
disability organisation, was elected and served on her local council for almost twenty 
years and raised a family.  I got to know Mary while I was working in Tasmania with 
Strathcare and it was as a result of that association that Mary accepted an invitation 
to join the Board of Strathcare.  While we had numerous conversations about how 
communities, and institutions, can better support people with disabilities, including 
aged related disabilities it was one conversation in particular that forever shaped my 
understanding. We were discussing the model of care I had developed for 
Strathcare and how it could be improved. After a little while she leaned back and 
looked at me and said that this was all pretty good stuff (at which I was more than a 
little pleased as I regarded her views highly), then she said, “but you are missing 
something fundamental in your understanding”.  She tried to explain her point to me, 
but I missed it, so she said, “Let me give you an example.”  and this is the gist of 
what she said: 
Everything you have said is O.K., but it misses something fundamental, let me explain it to 
you this way.  I have considerable difficulty getting dressed.  I cannot get up and go to the 
drawers and get my underwear or to the wardrobe to get the clothes I want wear. My hands 
and arms are such that I cannot even put the clothes on and do up the clips and buttons.  
When my carer comes in they can assist in getting me washed and dressed but it is in the 
way that it is done that makes all the difference.  I have had carers who will come in, check 
what I want to wear and then proceed to dress me in a way that suits them.  They quickly 
learn that this is not the way the relationship should be.  People take for granted and do not 
recognise that even something as simple as dressing themselves is an expression of who 
they are.  What I look for is someone who can help me even in this fundamental way. To ask 
me how I want to be dressed and to work with me so I can live my life in the way I chose to 
live it, even in these small, important things. 
 
I am sure this is not a verbatim account, but I am sure that it is pretty close and 
every point in it is what Mary clearly and articulately made; more than once in 
subsequent conversations. Her words hit me like a sledgehammer!  I had not even 
heard of Heidegger at the time, but Mary’s account had nailed the concept of service 
delivery based on responding to a person’s being, how they understood themselves, 
their facticity. 
Mary went on to give me examples of how she had carers who, although good 
people and motivated to be a 'good carer', never got this fundamental point. They 
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would often make a lot of small decisions for her, without first clarifying with Mary 
how she wanted things done.  One of her ‘pet peeves’ was when carers thought 
they could make decisions about the clothes that would be suitable for her to wear. 
They only made this mistake once!  Her basic approach was to work with a carer, 
and all she asked was that the carer understood what her (Mary's) routines were, 
how she likes to do things and then to support that where possible. Of importance 
to Mary is that they did not even take this routine for granted, and as they did things 
just to check, often with a subtle pause, or confirming question if the routine was to 
be followed or changed.  This approach enabled Mary to have control over the 
“doing of her life” in much the same way as others who could tend to their own daily 
needs. To put this in the language of the last chapter, Mary was defining the Dasein-
with relationship on the basis that the carer understood they were helping Mary with 
her life, that in their being-with Mary that carers avoided leaping-in and operated 
more from the perspective closer to leaping ahead in their solicitudinous actions with 
her.  To respond to Mary’s facticity and not to respond to the factuality of her physical 
condition.  Mary was highly skilled and very competent. She could stipulate the way 
care should be delivered, and she had the forcefulness of character and the skills 
to both ensure that a carer complied as well as to provide the carer with the skills 
and knowledge to do the work in the manner provided. As in any employment 
relationship, if the carer did not do what was required then the consequences were, 
eventually, loss of the job.  What struck me at the time, and still does, is the utter 
simplicity of Mary’s request, the ease with which it could be fulfilled and the benefits 
that can flow.  It is not, however, reflective of the normal approach taken in the 
delivery of services in either community or residential aged care.   
Examples of the Range of Receptiveness 
The Carpenter205 
Honour killings are confronting examples of the way that our affective-tuning is such 
that even a daughter can be encountered as something shameful to be killed.  
However human receptivity is extremely broad, and I want to provide different types 
of examples to demonstrate this.  In the early part of the chapter it was mentioned 
that all the senses are part of the structure of receptiveness and this example from 
                                            
205 I have used the story of the carpenter and the cook earlier, but this time I am highlighting different aspects 
in the story relating to Heidegger’s work. 
 
549 
the writings of Zhuangzi206 (370BCE-287BCE), a Chinese Daoist, demonstrates this 
point; 
When I chisel a wheel,’ says the carpenter ... ‘if the stroke is too slow it slides and does not 
grip, if too fast it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I feel it in the hand 
and respond from the heart, the tongue cannot put it into words, there is a knack in it 
somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me.  
(Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6)  
The thing to note is the descriptions associated with the ‘sense’.  In learning to use 
the chisel, to be a worker with wood, the skill is not cognitive; it is a know-how that 
is associated with how things ‘feel’.  Whereas we can ‘teach’ facts, transmit them so 
to speak, the ‘feel’ that is required to become a carpenter is not something that can 
be passed on or taught, it something that arises out of the engagement by the 
person themselves in the task and learning what the ‘feel’ is telling them.  The skill 
itself is of value to the culture, it is needed to produce wheels and wagons. To be a 
carpenter is to be concerned about what is being produced and this, in turn, requires 
that how the chisel shapes the wood matters to the carpenter.  This is an example 
of affective-tuning that arises between the carpenter and the wood.  Together with 
the referential unity of equipment, there was the unity of involvements, and all of 
these have their ‘mattering’.    
The Cook 
This aspect of affective-tuning can be extended into mastery in that striving to be 
excellent at something becomes part of what matters.  Another example from 
Zhuangzi, this time a description of a master cook cutting up an ox; 
Cook Ting was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot 
stamped, knee crooked, with a hiss! with a thud! the brandished blade as it sliced never 
missed the rhythm, now in time with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra playing 
the Ching-shou.  
'‘Oh, excellent!’ said Lord Wen-hui. ‘That skill should attain such heights!’  
‘What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me. When I first began to 
carve oxen, I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I never saw an 
ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am in touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look with 
the eye. With the senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely 
on Heaven’s structuring, cleave along the main seams, let myself be guided by the main 
cavities, go by what is inherently so.  (Zhuangzi, 2001, pp. 63-4) (my underlining) 
                                            
206 Zuangzi is also known as Zhuang Zhou and Chuang-Tzŭ  
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We see in this a phenomenological description that foreshadows the much later 
work of the Dreyfus brothers in describing the progress from novice to mastery in a 
skill acquisition.  (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Dreyfus, 2004)  Cook Ting no longer 
needs to think about what he is doing; he proceeds by sensing, guided by the ox 
itself.  However not only is there the receptiveness of the sense evident but the 
overarching affective-mode “cares about the Way” and the desire to let the 
daemonic in him “run its course”.   In this example, receptivity and know-how 
(understanding) are very clearly inseparable, as Heidegger suggests should be the 
case.  In mastery, the receptivity working with know-how shows up only the 
involvements as mattering, and the appropriate responses are drawn from Cook 
Ting without him having to make a decision. In other words Cook Ting responds 
without conscious thought. 
The Soccer Player 
Merleau-Ponty described the relationship of a soccer player while playing a game 
as follows;  
For the player in action the soccer field is not an ‘object’. It is pervaded with lines of force (the 
‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the ‘penalty area’) and is articulated into sectors (for 
example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries), which call for a certain mode of action. 
The field itself is not given to [the player], but present as the immanent term of his practical 
intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the ‘goal’ for example, 
just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body…At this moment 
consciousness is nothing but the dialectic of milieu and action. Each manoeuvre undertaken 
by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes new lines of force in which 
the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field (Merleau-
Ponty, 1965, pp. 168-9)  
While Heidegger splits his discussion on the two aspect that hold open our ‘there’, 
receptivity and understanding, he makes it clear at the beginning of the discussion 
that they are bound together, each receptivity has its understanding and vice-versa 
[BT 172/134]. Just as this ‘working in unison’ was evident it the Daoist examples it 
is also evident it Merleau-Ponty’s description of the soccer player notwithstanding 
his use of different metaphors.  
Heidegger mentioned that we have a receptivity to all our senses and in the case of 
a professional soccer player at work are probably the senses of proprioception 
(spatial) and equilibrioception (balance) that are operating.  We all develop these 
senses as we learn to walk and ride a bike. When riding a bike one of the things that 
matters to Dasein is staying upright, and our structure constantly adjusts the way 
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we are riding to ensure this occurs.  Our body does this without any conscious effort 
on our part once we have learnt to ride; indeed, it is better if we do not consciously 
try to maintain balance, we are liable to fall.   
Typically, once we have learnt to walk or ride ‘mattering’ is not readily evident to us, 
but it suddenly gets thrust to the fore if we become worried about tripping e.g. 
walking on a slippery, rocky path, or the bike moves awkwardly under us.  As soon 
as we sense that our body is no longer responding appropriately to keeping us 
upright, we may throw our arms out, squat down or in some other way move our 
body because we sense the looming fall and staying upright matters. 
Mattering Drops Away 
We can occasionally observe the dropping away of mattering, and when this occurs, 
we can notice that the world that was once held open, is now closed off. The 
philosopher Havi Carel gives an account of her experiences after being diagnosed 
with Lymphangioleiomyomatosis (LAM) a degenerative lung disease.  Confined to 
a wheelchair, she was forced to live only downstairs in her house.  Not being able 
to access the upstairs she slowly lost interest in being able to go upstairs, and with 
this loss of interest, the upstairs ceased to matter to her. When going upstairs 
ceased to matter it then disappeared from her environment, and she hardly noticed 
its presence. (Carel, 2008) 
Section 2: Understanding 
This chapter is discussing the two equiprimordial structures that maintain Dasein’s 
openness to the ‘there’, receptiveness and understanding.  
In understanding and receptiveness, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the 
"there"; and these are equiprimordial. [BT 171-2/133] 
A receptiveness always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. 
Understanding is always affectively-attuned. [BT 182/143] (my translation) 
In the previous section on receptivity it was identified that it could be considered at 
three ‘levels’, the bare structure of receptiveness (Befindlichkeit) that underlies all 
Daseins, the structure as it is made concrete in a particular Dasein, predominately 
through the actions of the ‘One’ and then when it is expressed, i.e. the basis for 
showing up an entity in the way it matters to Dasein.  The structure of receptivity 
can also be considered from two perspectives, firstly the various modes of 
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receptivity that may impact on Dasein, the affective-modes (Stimmung) and the way 
in which Dasein is currently experiencing an affective-mode, Dasein’s affective-
attunement (Gestimmtsein). While receptivity embraces all types of affective-modes 
from feeling hungry, to feeling the tightness of a screw, to wanting to care for 
someone, or engaging in some pink lustre china, in Being and Time Heidegger is 
primarily concerned with the affective-modes that related to Dasein’s primary ways 
of being, and his case example is what he calls moods.  Heidegger’s claim is that 
something must first show up for us as intelligible and in a mode of mattering to us 
before we can make any actions towards that entity. This is the case for both 
comportments towards the ready-to-hand (concern) and comportments towards 
other Dasein (solicitude).  The confronting example provided that illustrates the 
power of receptivity was the case of Samia Sarwar’s honour killing by her mother.  
In this section, the discussion shifts to the structural aspect of understanding. 
What is essential to grasp that is contrary to the ordinary conception of 
understanding is that, as Heidegger uses the term, understanding reflects who we 
are.  Understanding is therefore ontological, and should not be viewed as something 
we have. Heidegger makes this point very early in Being and Time, 
The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the 
ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that 
structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structures 
we call "existentiality”.· Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not 
existentiell, but rather existential. [BT 33/12] 
To put this a different way, Heidegger does not deny that we have the experience 
of understanding something, just that it is primarily an expression of who we are.  
How Samia’s mother understood what was happening with her daughter was not 
something that existed separately to herself, it was an expression of who she was, 
based on the deeper understanding of the world in which she lives and her place in 
that world.  The development of the understanding of world and self that determines 
who the Mother is, is a complicated process and making fundamental changes to 
that understanding essentially means a self-transformation, i.e. the structure of 
understanding associated with world and self must undergo a radical change.  Along 
with this, the affective-capacities that accompany understanding must also change. 
The same three levels of analysis that applied to receptiveness are applicable to 
understanding; understanding as the bare structure applicable to all Dasein, 
understanding as the structure ‘filled in’ or made concrete in a particular Dasein and 
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understanding expressed in a comportment.  Similarly, to other concepts 
understanding must be understood very broadly and covers a range of modes which 
Heidegger designates as falling under this broader use of the term understanding, 
e.g. 
If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental existentiale, this indicates that this 
phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's Being. On the other hand, 
'understanding' in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as 
distinguished, for instance, from 'explaining'), must, like explaining, be Interpreted as an 
existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the 
being of the "there" in general. [BT 182/143] 
Heidegger’s method, albeit not always clear, is to move from the ontic (existentiell) 
expression of a phenomenon to the ontological account. However, when he 
discusses understanding, it is often difficult to know which level he is referring. The 
following is an example; 
Understanding constitutes rather the being of the "there" in such a way that, on the basis of 
such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of 
looking around, and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that 
which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein's primary 
understanding. 
If the term "understanding" is taken in. a way which is primordially existential, it means to be 
projecting towards an ability-to-be for the sake of which any Dasein exists. [BT 385/336] 
(translation modified) 
All the various ‘levels’ of understanding are displayed in this passage, and unless 
one grasps this in terms of Heidegger’s basic approach, then it is almost 
incomprehensible.  Heidegger will often use the designator “primordial” when 
referring to the bare structure, “primary” when referring to it at the Dasein-ontological 
level and simply as something understood, interpreting, explaining, etc. when it is 
an expression of an ‘action’ at the ontic level.  As the above passage indicates, 
understanding is a necessary a priori structure for Dasein to have an existence; this 
will be addressed below. 
In the discussion of being-there as understanding (BT §31), Heidegger’s primary 
emphasis is the role structural understanding plays in the structure of existence of 
an existing Dasein and does not bother explicitly identifying when he shifts between 
the primordial and primary modes of understanding.  Providing that there is 
awareness of this, it makes little difference to what he is presenting, and I will not 
comment on it specifically unless there is an essential point to make.  Heidegger 
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commences his work on understanding where he left off in his analysis on 
worldhood.  He equates being-there to being-in; 
To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there", is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; 
its being-there is being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there', as that for the sake of which 
Dasein is. [BT 182/143] 
We need to recall that Heidegger differentiates the entity that is world with Dasein’s 
understanding of world which is the ‘there’ of Dasein.  In that understanding is a 
structure of the ‘there’, Heidegger is clarifying that he is talking about Dasein being-
in its understanding of world, its ‘there’; hence the equivalence of the term being-
there. Being aware of this shift is crucial to following his argument.  Being-in-the-
world, then, refers to Dasein’s understanding of world.  
In the prior analysis, Heidegger concluded that it was on the basis of the “for-the-
sake-of-which” that a Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is disclosed and it is this 
disclosure that Heidegger calls understanding. [BT 182/143] Heidegger now 
restates this in a series of important points. Firstly,  
In the understanding of the "for-the-sake-of-which", the significance which is grounded 
therein, is disclosed along with it. [BT 182/143] 
He then makes a statement that summarises all his previous work on worldhood, 
The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" and 
of meaningfulness equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of being-in-the-world. 
Meaningfulness is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such. To say that the 
"for-the-sake-of-which" and meaningfulness are both disclosed in Dasein, means that Dasein 
is that entity which, as being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself. [BT 182/143] (translation 
modified) 
This can be mapped out as per Figure 22.  At this level, we need to forget any notion 
of understanding pertaining to understanding anything in particular, e.g. 
understanding your way around the house.  The function of structure understanding 
is to disclose Dasein’s understanding of the world (meaningfulness) and its ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ at the same time.  Using the language of the earlier section, Dasein 
assigns itself to involvements on the basis of what ‘matters’ to it, this is the relevance 
that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is an issue for it, i.e. it is what it is concerned about, 
what matters to it.   Again, recalling the above section, this typically has nothing to 
do with any conscious decision, albeit it could.  
Quick Move to Ability-to-be 
Recognising the possibility of confusion Heidegger clarifies the way he is using the 
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technical term ‘understanding’ compared with its common usage. 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' 
with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a match for it', 'being 
competent to do something’.[BT 183/144] 
However, he retains the essential meaning of the word when using it to describe the 
ontological or constitutive structure. 
In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a 
"what", but being as existing. The kind of being which Dasein has, as an ability-to-be lies 
 
Figure 22 Disclosedness of understanding 
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existentially in understanding. [BT 183/144] (translation modified) (my underlining) 
Even though we do have the ability (understanding or competency) to do something, 
this is not a possession, it is, along with all the other abilities, the necessary condition 
for Dasein’s existence, its being.  Heidegger is making the claim that understanding 
is determinative of Dasein, i.e. it is ontological. To test this, it can be asked if it is 
possible for Dasein to exist if it has absolutely no ability to involve itself with things 
ready-to-hand.  In such a case the entity would not be a Dasein.  This is the point 
made at the beginning of the chapter. If then Dasein is constituted, at least in part 
by understanding, then Dasein is definitely not … 
… something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an 
extra … [BT183/143] 
This point is crucial. He is stating very clearly that we are not some entity (soul, ego, 
I, self, mind, body mechanism, etc.) that then learns to do various things.  Along with 
this the idea that we are some ‘seed’ that tended well will grow into the full potential 
already in the seed and actualise into a person is also rejected; this approach 
assumes that Dasein is already in existence as potential.  The similar notion that we 
are a ‘tabula rasa’, merely requiring the ‘right’ material to be ‘written’ within us, is 
also rejected. This is the model that Dasein and its understandings are two separate 
things.  For Heidegger, as ability-to-be, Dasein finds itself in what it does, which 
arise from the involvements to which it has ‘assigned’ itself’, which are on the basis 
of what ‘matters’ to it.  Who we are is our ability-to-be.   
From Ability-to-Be to Being-Possible  
While the move to describing Dasein as ability-to-be is logical and flows from the 
preceding discussion, it is nonetheless swift and passes-by almost without notice.  
It is the crucial move that allows Heidegger to take his descriptive analysis into a 
new direction, that of possibilities.  At any one time, as ability-to-be, Dasein has 
before it possibilities in dealing with people, equipment and so on that must be taken 
up in order for its ability-to-be to be expressed.  
Dasein is not something present-at-hand … it is primarily being-possible. Dasein is in every 
case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. The being-possible which is 
essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern with 
the 'world', as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to 
Dasein's ability-to-be towards itself, for the sake of itself. [BT 183/143] (my underlining) 
Dasein turns the possibility-actualised relationship of present-at-hand entities on its 
head.  When something is being built, the object shifts from being possible to being 
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actual and it is only the entity it is when completed. Even something like common 
salt only becomes useful when it’s potential is actualised, e.g. when added to food.  
The priority of the present-at-hand lies in being actualised.  For Dasein to have an 
existence it must at every moment be-possible, the priority lies in the potential for 
taking up possibilities. Once we have completed the current activity, we must always 
have something else to move on to, or else we cease being Dasein. Such is the 
nature of a dynamic structure. 
Do we have before us a virtual smorgasbord of unlimited possibilities as the self-
help books portray?  No, Heidegger rejects this notion, what he calls a “free-floating 
ability-to-be in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’”. [BT 183/144] Where do 
these possibilities come from? The answer lies in our receptiveness, 
In every case Dasein, as essentially having affective-modes, has already got itself into 
definite possibilities.  As the ability-to-be which it is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is 
constantly waiving the possibilities of its being, or else it seizes upon them and makes 
mistakes. [BT 183/144] (translation modified) 
Things matter to us, and it is on the basis of mattering that we have already assigned 
our self to in-order-to structures.  For example, Marion Miller was a collector of pink 
lustre china and before moving into the nursing home possibilities for engaging in 
the activities associated with being a collector would have shown up for her.  But 
possibilities for being are broad.  If a dog shows up as frightening, this opens up 
possible ways of comportment towards the dog.  We can move away, or perhaps 
steel our self and walk past at a small distance and so on. This could not happen if 
we did not have an understanding of ‘dog’ and did not have ‘being frightened’ as the 
affective -mode associated with dogs, i.e. we could not be attuned to the dog in the 
mode of being frightened, the dog would not matter to us.  If we are on the way for 
an appointment, we may see a friend who suggests we have a quick coffee, but we 
let this possibility ‘pass by’ because we have something of a more pressing concern.  
Whether it is being a collector, a person frightened of dogs, a friend and so on, 
possibilities for being the Dasein with these characteristics already exist because of 
the structure of Dasein’s ‘there’, i.e. understanding and receptivity. 
We have a rich mixture of receptivities which determine how things show up as 
mattering to us, and it is because of that rich mixture that we will often have multiple 
and competing possibilities.  It could be something as simple as waiting at the café 
counter trying to decide between two favourite menu items.  A young person having 
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done well at high school may have multiple possibilities in terms of which university 
to attend and which course to study.  In one’s employment, there are choices 
between working late and spending time with the family.  Because of our 
receptivities, a significant number of options that are more broadly available do not 
even show up as possibilities for us.  What does show up are the “definite 
possibilities” that we have “already [got] our self into” because we have affective-
modes associated with certain understandings.  In making choices we have let other 
“possibilities pass by” and in those choices, we sometimes make mistakes.  
In that our receptivity is the basis of our thrownness into the world, when described 
using the phenomenon of possibilities this means that 
 … Dasein is being-possible which has been delivered over to itself - thrown possibility 
through and through. [BT 183/144] 
Because it is our receptiveness as affective-modes which allow what matters for us 
to show up as possibilities, then we are our self,  
 … the possibility of being-free for [our] ability-to-be. [183/144] 
This is the same language that Heidegger used in relation to the ready-to-hand 
being freed for involvements and the Dasein-with of others being freed for our 
dealings with them.  It is thus the structure of Dasein (ontological) that is the basis 
of freeing Dasein itself (as the entity) such that possibilities to be the Dasein show 
up and can be either seized upon or passed by.  Whereas the entities ready-to-hand 
and the Dasein-with of others must be freed by Dasein before it can engage with 
them, Dasein is freed for its own being only as long as possibilities exist, i.e. possible 
involvements not yet taken up.  Those possibilities are not just any possibilities they 
relate to its for-sake-of-which.  Possibilities have a future orientation and completes 
the temporal characteristic of the dynamic process. Dasein’s thrownness represents 
the past in which understanding, and receptivity are established, possibilities occur 
as a result of thrownness and represents the future, and fallenness is the taking up 
of possibilities and represents the present.  For a Dasein to be itself, it must be 
continually moving into possibilities, based on its receptivity. 
Heidegger's description relates to Dasein in its average everydayness.  Dasein is, 
as thrown-possibility, going about its daily activities in an environment in which 
possibilities for being will be encountered, almost as a matter of course.  By and 
large, as Marion Miller attests, this is not the case in a nursing home.  Marion is still 
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structurally Marion, she has no choice in this, but to be Marion requires possibilities 
that can be taken up that reflect her primary understanding of herself. These 
possibilities are associated with such things as her social and political involvements, 
pink lustre china collection and so forth.  The possibilities for these encounters do 
not exist in the nursing home, and the detrimental mattering arises from the absence 
of such possibilities.  If this is the case, the ‘shedding of life’ that Marion describes 
is associated with the absence of possibilities for her to be Marion. 
Ability-for-being-in-the-world and possibilities 
As an ability-to-be, any being-in must be ability-for-being-in-the-world.  Looked at 
from this perspective, then the entities that are ready-to-hand within the world and 
which are freed for Dasein when disclosed by Dasein’s understanding, are  
 … freed for its own possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its 
serviceability, its usability, …. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole 
of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand. [BT 184/144] (emphasis in the English 
text) 
This is another example of Heidegger cycling back to describe earlier dealt with 
phenomena from the current perspective.  This time Heidegger emphasises 
explicitly the suffix, -ability, of these words drawing the connection with Dasein’s 
own ability-to-be.   
We need to be careful at this point for Heidegger is not referring to the world in a 
detached sense as he was when he was describing the unity of equipment and 
relational unity.  Heidegger is describing the world, or more particularly the entities 
in the world from the perspective of an existing Dasein in terms of that Dasein’s 
discovery of the entities such it can have involvements with them.  In other words, 
Dasein’s understanding of them in terms of being able to be involved with them; this 
is know-how not know-what understanding. 
Just as we can understand Dasein in terms of its ability-to-be or it's being-possible 
we can understand ready-to-hand entities, from the perspective of Dasein, not in the 
language of involvements, but as abilities to be taken up as part of Dasein’s ability-
to-be.  If we were to review the world of the nursing home in terms of its suitability 
to sustaining the worlding of the older Dasein’s world, we could simply inquire from 
the perspective of each older Dasein as to the accessibility to ready-to-hand entities 
that match the ability-to-be of the older Dasein and that show up as mattering.  I 
think the results of the review are self-evident for most of the older Daseins. 
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Proximally and for the most part things do not show up for us as mattering in terms 
of their abilities (e.g. serviceability) but rather in terms of their possibilities (i.e. 
usability).  When I’m in my shed and the tools are lying around I tend to ignore the 
hammer until I need it.  What I am engaged in at the time, (the ‘in-order-to’ for the 
sake-of), reflects who I am, (my for-sake-of-which) and this opens up the 
possibilities associated with that task.  If that task does not require the hammer, it 
does not show up in terms of its possibilities, notwithstanding I understand what it 
is.    
On this basis Heidegger observes that regardless of what is possible for 
understanding to disclose, it will “always press forward into possibilities” and it does 
so because of its existential structure “projection” [BT 184-5/145]. What was the 
projection of understanding in terms of involvement has now been clarified as the 
projection of understanding onto possibilities disclosed in the world on the basis of 
their mattering to us, i.e. receptiveness.  At the same time understanding 
… projects Dasein's being both upon its "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon meaningfulness, 
as the worldhood of its current world. [BT 185/145] 
Understanding brings together for Dasein the understanding of Dasein’s being-
possible, which is based on its ability-to-be, and the understanding of the entities in 
the world as meaningful in terms of their possibilities for Dasein’s being-possible.  It 
is our ‘understanding’ (i.e. the structure as filed in) that understands what is 
meaningful for Dasein in terms of possibilities and projects itself upon these 
possibilities when they show up in the world.   
Recalling the nature of the reciprocal relationship of serviceability and usability of 
the in-order-to structure and the reciprocal relationship of the Dasein-with structure, 
we have the same basic reciprocal relationship occurring with possibilities.  Dasein 
is always being-possible understood in terms of its ability-to-be. Those possibilities 
must be expressed for Dasein to be the Dasein it is.  Dasein, therefore, needs 
possibilities within the world that match its being-possible; this is the reciprocal 
relationship.  Only insofar as understanding can project itself on possibilities that are 
in the world does Dasein have the possibility of taking them up or passing them 
over.  If those possibilities are not in the world, then nothing shows up as mattering 
to Dasein in terms of how Dasein understands itself.  In effect, its ability-to-be who 
it is remains un-expressed.  If unexpressed then there are no meaningful 
comportments, no meaningful lived experience. 
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Because the projection of understanding can only take place on the basis of 
Dasein’s thrownness,  
And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of being which we call "projecting". [BT 185/145] 
If the structure of Dasein is one of projection, then the following conclusion is 
reached; 
…. any Dasein has, as Dasein already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting.  
As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms 
of possibilities. [BT 185/145] 
Heidegger has already used the concept of projection and understanding, that was 
in relation to understanding the ready-to-hand.  This time he extends the idea. In 
that we are understanding, we project our self not onto the ready-to-hand entities as 
such, but onto the possibility that these entities hold for us and our ability-to-be. 
We can only project our self onto possibilities on the basis of having already 
understood our self and assigned our self to the various in-order-to structures based 
on our concern for our own being.  In other words, the possibilities onto which we 
will project our-self have already been determined.  In effect, the projection has 
already occurred, it is not arbitrary.  
This brings us back once more to the environment of the nursing home.  The 
question to ask is: What are the possibilities that arise that match the being-
projected of Dasein?  The older Dasein can look around all it likes, in most instances, 
the projecting will fall fallow. Possibilities that allow the being-possible of Dasein will 
not show up. What Dasein’s projecting reveals is a mostly meaningless world.  In 
the main, the only substantial possibility is to take up an understanding of self 
(primary for-the-sake-of-which) as the Dasein-with of nursing home resident and the 
Dasein-with as a fellow resident.  While some may do this, I suspect the majority do 
not.  In that, the living environment into which the older person is thrust is almost 
exclusively determined by government regulation, the nursing home operators and 
staff, the moral and ethical question that arises is the sufficiency of that environment 
provided, such that this minimal mode being-possible is virtually all that is left to the 
older person. 
Heidegger’s work in terms of the Dasein analytic continues a little further, primarily 
exploring being-there as the basis for language, the derivative character of 
interpretation and the beginnings of an inquiry into logic, i.e. the basis of assertion.  
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I do not intend to follow the rest of the analysis in detail as my aim in laying out the 
basic structure such that a structural understanding of shedding of life is disclosed, 
and this has been achieved.  In the following, I briefly discuss only those concepts 
that may be useful in filling out the Dasein analytic. 
Interpretation 
At the opening of the section on Understanding and Interpretation (BT §32), there is 
a useful summary 
As understanding, Dasein projects its being upon possibilities. This being-towards-
possibilities which understands is itself an ability-to-be, and it is so because of the way these 
possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust [Rückschlag] upon Dasein. The 
projecting of the understanding has its own possibility - that of developing itself. This 
development of the understanding we call "interpretation". [BT 188/148] 
There are two points in this I want to note, firstly the comment on counter-thrust and, 
secondly, the distinction between understanding and interpretation.  The idea of a 
counter-thrust is that there is a projection from Dasein on to the possibilities and a 
movement from the possibility back towards Dasein.  This is similar to my 
interpretation of ‘mattering’ as being a movement towards Dasein in the encounter 
and Heidegger’s description that moods assail us.  In this case, it is the phenomenal 
description at the ontic level that it is the things themselves that hold the possibility 
and ‘offer’ them to Dasein. Note, however, that the first movement in relation to 
understanding and possibilities is from Dasein's structure outwards.  
Heidegger is not suggesting that somehow the hammer understands its own 
possibilities and then thrusts (projects) this possibility-for-being on us; this is 
nonsensical. As a philosophical strict empiricist Heidegger is not trying to account 
for the physical mechanism that does the work, he is describing the empirical 
observations in the context of the logical sequence of events that are occurring. In 
the description, there are events occurring at the ontological level and the ontic level. 
The ontological level involves understanding projecting itself towards possibilities, 
and this is “disclosed” to Dasein by way of experiencing the awareness of the 
possibility; such experiences appear to come from the world and not from its 
structure.  By way of example: I am doing some woodwork and need to hammer a 
nail into the wood.  I have the ability to use a hammer, and because of this, the 
hammer has been previously freed for involvements in hammering.  However, in this 
section, Heidegger refers to this as the hammer now holds possibilities for me, in 
this case the possibility for hammering a nail.  As I need the hammer, my (prior) 
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understanding (ability to use the hammer) projects itself onto the hammer 
understood as a possibility for hammering.  This is the reciprocal relationship.  This 
is then experienced as the hammer being-possible for hammering for me; this is the 
counter-thrust.   
What Heidegger does not make clear is that all this may occur either below the level 
of conscious awareness or with varying degrees of awareness. For example, once 
when I was repairing a small wooden toy I needed to hold several things in place 
and then nail in a brad (small thin gauge nail). As I was doing this my hand reached 
out for the tack hammer, and I started hammering. The reaching for the hammer 
was done with no deliberation or conscious awareness; my entire focus was on 
holding the pieces together.  The descriptions of the cook carving the ox have this 
element. 
This example also illustrates Heidegger's two levels of intentionality.  There is the 
more ‘radical’ intentional structure of the ‘there’ this time discussed on the basis of 
disclosing the possibilities being offered by the hammer, and the second level of 
intentionality, the concernful dealings with the hammer, i.e. the hammering.  Unless 
there is the prior disclosure of possibilities, then there is no hammering!   
If the idea of a ‘counter thrust’ is understood as experiencing opportunities 
(possibilities) of involvement with an entity, either as concern or solicitude, then this 
provides a way to gain useful insights for Dasein.  If there is little or no positive 
‘counter-thrust’ experienced by a Dasein in its environment, then what is being 
encountered holds little in the way of possibilities for Dasein’s ability-to-be.  In that 
in “every case Dasein … has already got itself into definite possibilities” [183/144] if 
Dasein is to have the possibility to “be-itself” such a circumstance can only be 
addressed by a change in environment or by Dasein making a deliberate change in 
its understanding of self to match the possibilities for being offered by its 
environment.  In the case of living in a nursing home, or any institution both 
alternatives are problematic. The latter option is one that I would tentatively 
associate with the phenomenon of “institutionalisation”; this would need further 
investigation to reach a more definite conclusion.  
I now address the second part of the passage, understanding as interpretation. For 
Heidegger interpretation is the moment when the ontological understanding of an 
entity (at the abstract level) is applied to a specific ontic thing (the entity level);  
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The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It 
constitutes the interpretation. In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by 
interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge. [BT 
189/149] 
For Heidegger then an interpretation is not  
… the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of 
possibilities projected in understanding. [BT188-9/148] 
Interpretation then only occurs when we encounter (deal with) an entity and 
understanding it in terms of the possibilities it offers as the entity it is.  In that 
Heidegger has already stipulated that our dealings can take many forms, e.g. 
planning, the entity does not have to be physically present.   Given this, 
interpretation is grounded in understanding, not the other way around.  To reinforce 
the point that we ‘never’ simply interpret something by ‘adding’ some function to an 
object Heidegger states; 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘meaning’ over some naked thing which is 
present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is 
encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in 
our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the 
interpretation. [BT190-1/150] (translation modified) 
This passage contains three ways in which ‘involvements’ is applied.  The first is 
that before we are aware of an entity in the world it “already has an involvement”. 
This is a statement of Heidegger’s view that entities are what they are irrespective 
of an individual Dasein, i.e. it is a realist position. The second is the ‘involvement’ as 
“is disclosed in our understanding” and the third is this ‘involvement’ as understood, 
which “gets laid out by the interpretation”.  That we do not “throw a ‘meaning’ over 
some naked thing” is also a clear statement by Heidegger against understanding 
his work as a species of neo-Kantian constructivism. While Dasein is the only entity 
that can understand the meaning, the meaning is derived from the world, not 
imposed on the world.  This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of error, 
however, by and large, as was discussed in the chapter on culture, the ‘One’ works 
in a way that tends to ‘correct’ wrong interpretations. 
Interpretation occurs whenever we deal with anything as something.  However, the 
last thing we need when interpreting a cup of coffee, a spoon, the table it is standing 
on and so on is to have all the ‘inter-relationships’ that constitute this particular unity 
of equipment to be glaring at us; we would never see the entities we are dealing 
with!  From an ontic perspective, all this takes place in the background;   
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The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a unity of involvements. This totality need 
not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an 
interpretation, it recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the 
background. And this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday 
circumspective interpretation. [BT 191/150] (my underlining) 
So just like the light in the room discloses what is in the room but in so doing recedes 
into the background unnoticed, so it is with our understanding of the background 
unity of involvements and interpretation. 
Meaning 
Once the structure of being-in-the-world is understood, Heidegger’s concept of 
meaning is relatively easy to grasp.  Heidegger’s first step is to re-present a 
description that was used in the chapter on worldhood, i.e. that worldhood can be 
understood as the unity of what is meaningful to Dasein. 
Entities within-the-world generally are projected upon the world - that is, upon a unity of 
meaningfulness, to whose reference-relations concern, as being-in-the-world, has been tied 
up in advance.  [BT 192/151] 
The next step is to indicate that when an entity is understood on the basis of being 
part of that unity, it is said to have meaning. 
When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the being of Dasein - that is, when 
they have come to be understood - we say that they have meaning [Sinn]. [BT 192/151] 
The phrase “along with the being of Dasein” refers to the basis by which Dasein 
assigned itself to a particular ‘in-order-to’ (meaning) structure in the first place, i.e. 
on the basis of its for-the-sake-of-which.  Meaning then is the name attributed to the 
understanding of an entity in the context of its place in the referential unity of a world, 
i.e. its being.  
It is at this point that Heidegger introduces another one of his wordplays that will 
carry over to another concept, discourse.  
That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "meaning". 
The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily 
belongs to that which an understanding interpretation Articulates207. [BT 193/152]  
There are two ways in which ‘articulated’ can be understood; the first is as a joint in 
                                            
207 The translators note [BT 195 note 1] indicate the German words artikulieren and gliedem are virtually 
synonymous.  The emphasis on artikulieren (Articulate) appears to be on the joints on which something gets 
divided, and gliedem (articulate) emphasis on the parts or members of the joint.   
However, the verb artikulieren, is also used in speech as in “He went on to articulate his position”.  It is this 
linkage that Heidegger is drawing. 
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some structure, e.g. the articulate joint of a skeleton, and the second is in speech.  
Heidegger will use this as a pun when he discusses discourse.  In the case of 
meaning, he is applying the first use of the world.  The meaning of an entity can be 
envisaged as the ‘joint’ at which the ‘in-order-tos’ meet, e.g. the junction of a 
serviceability and usability.  This is what gets “Articulated” in understanding, i.e. the 
emphasis is not on the ‘connecting’ aspects of the structure but rather the entity 
itself understood as something.  The ‘connecting’ aspects are what recedes into the 
background.  It must be kept in mind that it is not the physical present-at-hand aspect 
of the entity that gets ‘Articulated’ it is the entity understood in terms of its 
involvements, its serviceability or usability or its possibilities.  What has been 
‘Articulated’ can then be ‘articulated’ in speech; the pun laid out!208 
Heidegger carries over the language of ‘articulation’ into his discussion on discourse 
which I address in the next section.  He also uses the terminology of meaning and 
meaningful to describe the same phenomenon he has been addressing and 
describing in different ways throughout his analysis of Dasein’s structure: 
Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible 
as something [BT 193/152] 
Meaning, however, is what is ‘Articulated’ by Dasein as part of the unity of 
meaningfulness, i.e. worldhood. In that worldhood is an existentiale of Dasein, i.e. 
part of Dasein’s structure, then one would expect that meaning must also be 
understood as part of Dasein’s structure, and this proves to be the case; 
In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential constitution of the being 
of the "there", "meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the 
disclosedness which belongs to understanding. Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a 
property attaching to entities, [BT 193/151] (translation modified) 
In that understanding, along with receptivity, holds open the ‘there’, the structural 
process by which understanding discloses entities is called ‘meaning’.  So, while 
meaning may be derived from the world, meaning itself is something that belongs 
only to Dasein.  The conclusion then is that Dasein itself  
… only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by 
the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful or 
meaningless. That is to say, its own being and the entities disclosed with its being can be 
appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding. [BT 193/151] 
                                            
208 While it is a pun, it is also another example of Heidegger’s use of the same of similar words or similar 
meaning words to describe different levels of Dasein, i.e. the structural and the ontic. 
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Dasein’s meaning then is dependent on discovering entities in the world (the ‘there’), 
and this only occurs on the basis of its own understanding of self (i.e. its being) 
which is the basis by which it assigns itself to meaning structures in the world.   
If we place this in context of the rest of the chapter, then Dasein’s meaning is found 
in its ‘there’, i.e. it is to be found in the way that entities in the world show up as 
mattering for Dasein.  Dasein’s meaningfulness can be envisaged as the articulation 
point between being-possible and the possibilities-for-being disclosed in the world.  
Dasein’s meaning then is found in the unity of reciprocal relationships between 
Dasein’s ability-to-be and those entities upon which Dasein’s possibility-for-being 
are projected.  In other words, there must be entities in Dasein’s environment which 
can be “appropriate in understanding” for the sake-of-which Dasein is; only then is 
Dasein meaningful. 
If we take “being meaningful” as a positive expression of Dasein’s ability-to-be who 
it is, i.e. an expression of what it means to be a particular Dasein, then “being 
meaningful” is not a static characteristic, it is dynamic.  This reflects the dynamic 
nature of Dasein’s structure, being-in-the-world.  In that Dasein has always already 
taken up a certain ability-to-be then there are two possible breakdown cases that 
are relevant to aged-care.  Firstly a ‘breakdown in world’ and secondly a ‘breakdown 
in Dasein’s structure. 
I take a ‘breakdown’ in world to occur when entities which have the possibility for 
being “appropriated in understanding” for the sake-of Dasein’s being are absent.  
This has already been discussed.  However, in the language of this section, if 
entities do not show up as meaningful, then, in turn, Dasein does not have the 
possibility for “being meaningful”, and as long as this circumstance prevails then 
Dasein is “meaningless”.  This is a structural description, not a value judgement.  
However, as a description of the structural aspect, it should have an ontic 
manifestation, and this becomes the experience of the world losing its meaning, or 
of life losing its meaning.  I take this to be an alternative description of ‘shedding 
life’, the movement from “being-meaningful’ to “being-meaningless”. It is also 
reflected in Regina’s cries quote earlier, “They don’t know the meaning of me!” 
(Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38) 
A ‘breakdown of Dasein’ would indicate a breakdown at the structural level.  For 
example, if a Dasein has dementia and consequentially, the ability to discover 
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entities in the world in their ready-to-hand mode is diminished, then the 
meaningfulness of lived experiences will also be diminished.  The challenge for care 
providers then is to ensure environments contain the greatest chance of presenting 
possibilities for a person with dementia are created and sustained.  Removing 
people to bland, institutionalised, ‘safe’ dementia units, heavily populated and 
devoid of meaningful entities for the person exacerbate the impact of dementia and 
do not support the person’s residual abilities. Hope for a meaningful existence, even 
if not at the same level experienced in the past, is potentially crushed by such 
environments from a Heideggerian perspective.   The same applies, of course, to 
people who retain their full capacity to project their understating in a meaningful way. 
Heidegger’s analysis of meaning has the potential for grounding the research that 
links a Dasein with its environment in terms of meaningfulness.  This is an area of 
research that urgently needs to be pursued in relation to the provision of aged care 
services.  
This completes the discussion of understanding, possibilities and meaning. 
Understanding: Illustrative Examples 
When unpacking Heidegger’s work, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that he is 
presenting a description of a person engaged in the activities of life, i.e. their 
existence.  This being the case at every point we should be able to identify examples 
or provide ways of illustrating the phenomena that Heidegger is presenting.  I have 
been doing this periodically, and the following are provided in relation to 
understanding. 
Chinese room 
In the discussion on understanding it can be difficult to grasp the idea of 
understanding at the phenomenal level. When we engage with the current computer 
programs such as Siri, it is easy to be seduced into thinking that the device 
‘understands’ what it is being asked. That the computer, at least sometimes, 
understands is indicated by the circumstances when it ‘misinterprets’ a question and 
we judge that it has given the wrong answer.   
This same point comes up in discussions concerning the games played between 
artificial intelligence (AI) machined and humans.  In 2016 a computer developed by 
Google, AlphaGo, defeated the eighteen times GO world champion, Lee Sedol, in 
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Seoul South Korea in a five-game tournament.  GO is regarded as the most difficult 
of all strategic board games to master and no previous computer had managed to 
win a game at world class level. The expected outcome was human 5 - computer 0. 
The outcome was 4 – 1 in favour of AlphaGo.  (Zastrow, 2016)  The question is, did 
AlphaGo understand?   
A second, related, aspect is whether or not rule following constitutes understanding.  
When explaining a new concept, we would typically describe the parts that comprise 
the concepts and how they relate to each other.  This general approach applies to 
such things as solving a quadratic equation in algebra or even tying shoelaces.  The 
fundamental question is that if you can follow the instructions and do the work does 
this equate to understanding?   
The US philosopher, John Searle, developed a thought experiment, ‘The Chinese 
Room’(Searle, 1980) specifically to address the question concerning the nature of 
understanding by a machine and understanding as rule following.  It also provides 
insight into the phenomenon of understanding as a lived experience.  
The Chinese Room has become one of the most famous thought experiments in 
contemporary philosophy(Cole, 2014).  I am not going to go into the full details of 
the thought experiment, the many attempts at rebuttal and Searle's subsequent, and 
in my view, successful replies209. For the purposes of the thesis, a brief description 
                                            
209 There are numerous articles and books on the debate that this thought experiment initiated. A good account 
 




• A person who does not speak Chinese is locked in a room with a small opening 
to allow written questions to be passed in and written responses returned.  
• All the questions passed into the room are written in Chinese. 
• When a question is passed to the person, the marks (shapes) on the page look 
like, in Searle's terms, squiggles. (Recall the earlier examples of foreign scripts).  
• There is an extensive rule book written in English that gives no indication as to 
the meaning of the squiggles but merely indicates that if a certain squiggle or 
series of squiggles is received then the person is too respond by drawing the 
designated squiggles (shapes) in response. 
• The written response is then passed back out.  
• A person who reads and understands Chinese does not know what is happening 
in the room, just that questions are written in Chinese and passed, and correct 
answers, written in Chinese, are passed out. 
When the person inside the room leaves, those outside may very well say, "Wow, I 
didn't know you spoke Chinese so well!"  To which the person simply responds, “I 
don't".  This is the point.  If the person does not understand Chinese nor does a 
computer!   
The person inside the room may become so familiar with the squiggles, that on 
looking at them, they immediately go to the right page for the instructions.  They 
may even ‘memorise’ the required responses alleviating the need to go to the book; 
a possibility allowed in thought experiments!  They still do not understand Chinese.   
For Searle, a computer is like the person in the thought experiment (Searle, 1980). 
It received symbols with no associated meaning. It follows externally given rules to 
produce the output of symbols to which there is no meaning.  The computer is 
neither ‘thinking’ nor does it have understanding. It is blindly stepping through a 
logical set of rules, which could also be a set of mathematical functions.   
From a Heideggerian perspective, the Chinese characters do not themselves 
contain the meaning.  The meaning is located in an understanding of world, which 
in turn is based on the actual structure of world.  For example, if the person in the 
room recognised the squiggles, 书桌210 as ‘writing desk’, and he understood the 
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writing desk on the basis of a referential unity, then he could be said to understand 
书桌.  Understanding language from a Heideggerian perspective is not having an 
understanding of the unity of the language itself but rather the relationship between 
the words and the unity of meaning by which the world itself is understood.  The 
words are the way in which the meaning of the world is articulated.  For the person 
in the room the squiggles are not attached to the associated unity-of-meaning, and 
as such, the person has no understanding of Chinese.  The same thing applies to 
undertaking quadratic equations.  If the meanings to which the algebraic 
expressions attach, even in an abstract way, are not understood then neither is the 
solving of the algebraic equation understood.  Even if the teacher drills the students 
in solving algebraic equations until they follow the steps perfectly in each case this 
still does not mean the students understand.  This is akin to the person in the 
Chinese room memorising the books.  Following instructions and understanding are 
two different phenomena and two different experiences as demonstrated in the 
Chinese Room case. 
The phenomena of meaning suddenly arising is reflected in the language when we 
say, “something clicked”, or “to fell into place” and similar phrases, this is when 
something acquires meaning for us, as opposed to merely being familiar. The idea 
of what is to be understood as having a place in a broader context is even present 
in these phrases we use to express the phenomenon.  
When Heidegger had finished his analysis and description of world and worldhood, 
he acknowledges that structure 
of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive of worldhood, can be 
taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT121/88]   
However, he warns that when we formalise it as such  
the phenomena get levelled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, 
especially in the case of such 'simple' relationships as those which lurk in significance. The 
phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata' - the "in-order-to", the "for-the-sake-of'', 
and the "with-which" of an involvement - is such that they resist any sort of mathematical 
functionalization; nor are they something thought, first posited in an 'act of thinking'. They are 
rather relationships in which concernful circumspection as such already dwells. [BT 121-2/88] 
Heidegger is saying the same thing as Searle (only more than fifty years earlier and 
before computers), that converting something to “mathematical functionalization” 
does not give understanding.  This is something that only belongs to Dasein. As the 
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Chinese carpenter said of chiselling wood, 
 …  there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son 
cannot learn from me (Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6) 
Interestingly the case of tying up shoelaces is different.  There is no symbolic 
representation standing between the person and tying up the shoelaces.  When a 
child learns by following instructions, the child has ‘hands-on dealings’ with the 
entities in the world. The relationship between putting on shoes, shoelaces, the 
shoes themselves and walking are all transparent.  When the child learns to tie their 
shoelaces, there is a direct world connection in that the child is freeing the shoes for 
involvements. 
The Case of Dr P:  When the sight belonging to circumspection breaks down 
One of Heidegger’s claims is that the way we see things changes when we have 
acquired the meaning of the thing. This was the phenomenon behind the examples 
given in Chapter 13.  Heidegger calls the sight by which the ready-to-hand shows 
up on the basis of its possibilities circumspection and the sight that discloses the 
Dasein-with he calls considerateness211.  One of the benefits of breakdown cases 
is that they help to identify essential elements of more complex systems. In the 
following, I present a breakdown case that illustrates the relationship between 
circumspection and understanding.  The case study comes from the book A Man 
Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat(Sacks, 1985), by the US psychiatrist Oliver Sacks.  
In the book, Sacks describes the case concerning Dr P. 
Dr P was a talented musician and music teacher who had lost the ability to recognise 
the meaning of objects that were previously understood. There was no indication of 
dementia or other cognitive impairment.  Here is an account of Sack's initial meeting 
with Dr P, I take up the account towards the end of the meeting;  
I tried one final test. It was still a cold day, in early spring, and I had thrown my coat and 
gloves on the sofa.  
‘What is this?’ I asked, holding up a glove. 
‘May I examine it?’ he asked, and, taking it from me, he proceeded to examine it as he had 
examined the geometrical shapes.  
                                            
211 In writing this passage, it occurs to me that there must be two aspects of the meaning structure, one related 
to the ready-to-hand and on to Dasein.  This is why they have two separate names.  This is something I have 
not previously mentioned and will not pursue in this thesis. Heidegger has a heavy focus on the structures 
associated with the ready-to-hand and there is a need to develop a parallel inquiry into the structures of Dasein-
with, unedifying similarities and possible differences.  
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‘A continuous surface,’ he announced at last, ‘infolded on itself. It appears to have’ – he 
hesitated – ‘five outpouchings, if this is the word.’  
‘Yes,’ I said cautiously. ‘You have given me a description. Now tell me what it is.’  
‘A container of some sort?’  
‘Yes,’ I said, ‘and what would it contain?’  
‘It would contain its contents!’ said Dr P., with a laugh. ‘There are many possibilities. It could 
be a change-purse, for example, for coins of five sizes. It could . . .’  
I interrupted the barmy flow. ‘Does it not look familiar? Do you think it might contain, might 
fit, a part of your body?’  
No light of recognition dawned on his face.   
No child would have the power to see and speak of ‘a continuous surface . . . infolded on 
itself’, but any child, any infant, would immediately know a glove as a glove, see it as familiar, 
as going with a hand. Dr P. didn’t. He saw nothing as familiar. (Sacks, 1985, k. 298) 
Another way of describing this phenomenon is that in some way the network of 
relationships that gave meaning to this object for Dr P had vanished, or at least 
receded. World is the unity of these relationships and part of Dr P’s world had moved 
from discovered and returned to being concealed.  The object as a ready-to-hand 
thing had lost its meaning (place in the referential unity) and was now a present-at-
hand object that can be stared at, described but not understood.  Sacks even used 
some of the same language as Heidegger in describing the phenomenon, “He saw 
nothing as familiar”. 
Dr P stared at the glove and could not see what a child saw, the “glove as a glove”. 
This is reflected Heidegger comments in relation to the hammer, 
… the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, 
the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is - as equipment. [BT 98/69] 
But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and stared at as something present-at-
hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-
hand of equipment. [BT 104/74] 
As if to demonstrate this point Sacks adds a footnote to the above story,  
Later, by accident, he got it on, and exclaimed, ‘My God, it’s a glove!’  (Sacks, 1985, k. 298)  
Dr P had rediscovered the meaning of the glove. 
Dr P. was diagnosed with associative visual agnosia. With this impairment, people 
are able to see and describe objects in front of them, in their present-at-hand mode, 
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but they are unable to recognise what the object is as a ready-to-hand entity; even 
though at some time in the past they had such an understanding.  In a person with 
associative visual agnosia212, there is no deficit in the vision system or evidence of 
any impairment in language or cognitive recall (memory).  (Delvenne, Seron, 
Coyette, & Rossion, 2004)   
That people can have associative visual agnosia demonstrates that there are two 
parts to our seeing, there is the aspect given by our visual apparatus and there is 
the meaning.  This ‘seeing as’ that discloses the thing as something ready-to-hand, 
a glove, for instance, is what Heidegger refers to as circumspection.  While not for 
this thesis this supports the view that our ‘seeing’ things (perception) has an 
intentional structure. The other aspect is that when the ‘there’ breaks down, 
demonstrated by the fact that the glove could not show up as a glove, then this rules 
out the possibility of comportments, dealings, with the glove as a glove.  This support 
Heidegger's claim of the structure of the ‘there’ as being both essential and prior to 
any comportments. 
To repeat the point, the failure, or break down, that leads to cessation or other 
change to an otherwise normally operating function indicates the existence and 
necessity of what has ‘broken’ down, even if we do not know how the system itself 
is constituted.  Dr P’s circumstance is such a breakdown case that illustrates 
circumspection, and more importantly the aspect of the ‘there’.  The holding open of 
the ‘there’ to allow comportments with the ‘glove’ has broken down. As indicated 
earlier, there are other break-down cases which can be used to demonstrate other 
parts of the being-in-the-world structure, for example aphasia and dysphasia, 
impairments associated with the comprehension or formulation of words and the 
connection between words and the meaning. These are important phenomena to 
understand and lend themselves to an inquiry from a Heideggerian ontological 
perspective. 
Alice213 
When the being-in-the-world structure breaks down, something that typically 
                                            
212 Two broad categories of visual agnosia have been identified, the associative visual agnosia that I have 
mentioned and apperceptive visual agnosia in which a complete visual perception of the object fails to occur. 
(Farah, 2004)  It is possible that apperceptive visual agnosia lends support to Husserl’s work, in that it suggests 
a separate system associated with perceptual object formation, i.e. seeing entities in their present-at-hand 
mode. 
213 Not her real name. 
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happens for people with dementia, the situation can be extremely frightening.  One 
example that comes painfully to mind occurred when I was on a temporary 
assignment as a CEO in a small nursing home in the mid-north of South Australia a 
few years ago. 
Alice was a lovely woman in her eighties, born and raised on the family farm in the 
northern counties of England.  While she had been in Australia for many decades, 
her distinctive north country accent still shone through with an appealing lilt.  Alice 
had a warmth and innocence about her. She also lived in a world that I cannot fully 
comprehend, that of deep dementia.  Alice would navigate around the facility 
pushing a walker, the type with brakes, seat and a small storage area under the 
seat.  On the walker, she carried her farm animals.  To me, they were small plastic 
figurines, a cow, some sheep, a lamb and a horse.  To Alice, they were her animals, 
real creatures for whom she cared with a deep affection that was moving.  I 
remember once, when a staff member, probably out of fear and ignorance, cruelly 
took them from her, telling her they were not real, but that's another story.  
As part of my regular walk around the facility, I would turn down the corridor towards 
her living area and usually see Alice sitting at a small table with a few others.  When 
I first met her she was very reserved, but over time as we had small chats, spoke 
about how her animals were going, and so on, her disposition towards me changed.  
When she caught sight of me walking down the corridor, her face would light up with 
a magical smile, and I would get a coy little wave.  Truth be known I think I walked 
down the corridor more frequently just to receive the blessing of that smile; it was a 
gift that used to brighten me up. I am not saying that Alice understood who I was as 
such, or my role, but she did include me as part of her world.   
One evening, well after mealtime when most of the people who lived in the facility 
had settled into their rooms, I was walking down the quietly lit corridor.  I saw Alice, 
her dressing gown held tightly around her and her pyjamaed legs scurrying on 
slippered feet towards me.  A little moment of joy I felt was quickly whisked away, 
for as Alice approached, I could see she was clearly distressed, with an anxious 
look on her face. Moving rapidly towards me Alice grabbed my upper arms in a firm 
grip and stared straight into my face.  I saw terror in her eyes. "Where am I?" she 
pleaded.  "What is this place?" she begged.  "I don't know where I am!" she said in 
such a distressed voice I still recall it.   Alice had lost virtually all the meaning in her 
world, even the understanding that she managed to hang on to in her dementia had 
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fled from her. All that was left at that moment was the terror of being-in some alien 
place, not knowing how she got there or how to get out.  Her ‘there’ had collapsed 
in terms of whatever familiar understanding she had.  What took its place was some 
abyss which showed up as terrifying.  I held her tight for a few moments, then talking 
with her and comforting her the terror receded.  The next day walking down the 
corridor I got the smile and wave, but I have not, nor will ever forget the face of sheer 
terror when Alice's understanding failed to hold open her world in a meaningful way.    
Section 3: Discourse 
As has been discussed, Heidegger is often describing the same phenomena of 
being in the world from different perspectives, and this is the case in the section on 
discourse and language [BT § 34].  When we interpret something as something it is 
the ‘meaning’ of the entity that is being interrupted, and in relation to this, as noted, 
Heidegger introduces the term Articulation; 
That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, 
is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive 
Articulation, we call the "unity-of-meanings" [BT 204/161] (translation modified) 
If we take the unity of the skeleton and see that it is something that can be broken 
down into meaningful pieces joined together we can point to both the joints and the 
parts and give them names, i.e. put them into words.  Using this analogy, this is 
what Heidegger is saying in the following:  
Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with receptivity and understanding. The intelligibility 
of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative 
interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both 
interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even 
more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated 
as such in discursive Articulation, we call the "unity-of-meaning”. This can be dissolved or 
broken up into meanings.  Meanings, as what has been Articulated from that which can be 
Articulated, are always meaningful. If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the 
"there", is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily 
constituted by being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of being 
which is specifically worldly. The intelligibility of being-in-the-world- an intelligibility that goes 
with receptivity - expresses itself as discourse.  [BT 204/161] (translation modified) 
The clue to this passage is understanding discourse as part of Dasein’s existential 
structure.  It thus has the same three levels that I have previously identified in 
relation to other parts of the structure, that associated with the bare ontological 
structure, the ontological level of a Dasein as it gets filled out and then what is 
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expressed ontically by a Dasein.  All Heidegger is doing is now describing the world 
a unity-of-meanings rather than, say, a unity-of-involvements. Just as an entity can 
be understood in terms of its involvements in the structure, it can be understood in 
terms of its meaning within the unity-of-meaning.  
Something is intelligible when it is capable of being understood, i.e. having meaning. 
Meaning only arises when something has been Articulated, i.e. placed in the 
structure.  At the structural level discourse is the placing of the entity in its Articulated 
context, which is the basis of its intelligibility. (“Discourse is the Articulation of 
intelligibility.”) Discourse then is the name that Heidegger gives to the basis by which 
we understand the structure of the ‘there’ in terms of its Articulated structure, i.e. on 
the basis of the ‘meaning units’ that make it up.  In other words, at this level 
discourse is not referring to the ontic activity of discussion something. It is because 
of this that Heidegger identifies discourse as an essential part of the structure of 
Dasein; 
Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with receptivity and understanding. [BT 203/161] 
This leads Heidegger to his next step that our intelligibility of being-in-the-world is 
expressed in discourse, and it can be put into words. When we are in conversation, 
sitting on the chair and sipping from a cup of coffee, we do not need to be aware of 
the coffee cup or the chair. However, by merely sitting and drinking, we are 
expressing our understanding of the intelligibility of the cup and the chair. That 
intelligibility reflects their meaning in the unity-of-meanings.  By sitting and drinking 
we are expressing our understanding of the intelligibility of the chair and cup and 
Heidegger calls this mode of expression discourse; it is not talking or putting into 
words. 
Structurally, discourse involves the unity-of-meaning and the intelligibility of the 
various parts of the structure, in terms of involvements, etc. and the modes of 
engaging with them.  At the ontic level, a discourse will involve a series of dealings 
with entities based on the intelligibility of the entities as disclosed to those involved. 
Two or more Dasein’s can thus be involved in the same discourse without uttering 
a word. Words then follow; 
The unity-of-meanings of intelligibility is put into words. To meanings, words accrue. But 
word-Things do not get supplied with meaning. 
The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a unity of words - a 
unity in which discourse has a 'worldly' being of its own. [BT 204/161] 
  
578 
For Heidegger, words do not carry the meaning; this point was made earlier.  The 
meaning is in the unity-of-meaning and words ‘attach’ to those meanings’.  Our 
various dealings with the ready-to-hand entities and other Dasein is what Heidegger 
refers to as discourse, and in that the discourse can be broken down into meaning 
units, and words attributed to those units we thus have the basis for various modes 
of ‘talk’ that reflect our modes of discourse; 
Such being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or 
warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in 
the way of 'giving a talk'. [BT 204/161] 
When we are talking with one another about something it is not in the Cartesian 
sense of transmitting something which is inside us to the inside of another (mind to 
mind),  
In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated 
as something 'internal' over against something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it 
is already 'outside' when it understands. [BT 205/162] 
Furthermore, our understanding and affective-attunement, as being-in  
… are made known in talk and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of 
talk, 'the way of speaking'. [BT 205/162] 
Language exchanges with others are comprised of far more than just words! This is 
only possible because of the underlying structure. 
The relationship between things understood in their present-at-hand mode, ready-
to-hand mode, in terms of possibilities for Dasein’s being and language is a complex 
arrangement of structures comprising understanding, receptiveness and discourse. 
In observing people with dementia, breakdowns in each of these various structures 
can sometimes be identified, while at the same time the remaining structures are 
intact.  For example, a person may not be able to recognise the present-at-hand 
presentation of an entity, and therefore it does not show up as holding possibilities 
as something ready-to-hand, however once engaged with the entity they use it 
appropriately.   This is a promising line of research and inquiry to understand the 
various ways in which dementia can impact on somebody and in turn provide clues 
as to how best to support the person. 
I am not going to pursue the discussion on discourse further. The overview provided 
is sufficient for the thesis.  The only aspect of discourse to be explored further is 




As part of his work on understanding Heidegger briefly deals with the everyday 
being of the ‘there’ and the manner in which we are absorbed in our understanding 
of the world based on the disclosure of the ‘One’.  He deals with three aspects, idle 
talk, ambiguity and curiosity and I am only going to give a brief account of idle talk 
as it touches on the thesis. 
Idle talk relates to the way we communicate with others and is primarily a “positive 
phenomena” which is constitutive of Dasein’s everyday “understanding and 
interpreting”.  [BT 211/168] We have already seen in the chapter on the ‘One’ that 
approximately and for the most part our understanding and receptiveness are 
determined by the ‘One’, and Heidegger repeats this point here.  [BT 211/168] 
In an earlier chapter dealing with the background to Heidegger’s work I presented, 
by way of a ‘mini demonstration’, some items of equipment most which would have 
been unfamiliar.  When I described what these items were, my explanation probably 
made some sense, at least for a couple of them.  On making sense, the meaning of 
the entity was disclosed.  This is how Heidegger describes such circumstances 
In the language which is spoken when one expresses oneself; there lies an average 
intelligibility; and in accordance with this intelligibility the discourse which is communicated 
can be understood to a considerable extent, even if the hearer does not bring himself into 
such a kind of being towards what the discourse is about as to have a primordial 
understanding of it. [BT 212/168] (my underlining) 
A primordial understanding refers to having freed the entity for involvements, 
however when we do not understand or fully understand the entities we  
 … are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets 
understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. [BT 
212/168] 
This is the phenomena of idle talk.  Note that in the first passage, the phrase “the 
discourse which is communicated”, this is a reference to talking about the entity in 
terms of its intelligibility based on its place in the unity.  In the passage, Heidegger 
acknowledges that this does provide a level of understanding, just not primordial. It 
is what I have termed a “thin” intelligibility. 
By and large, ‘idle talk’ is an essential part of our everyday communication.  When I 
take my car to the mechanic, and he tells me that there is a particular problem with 
the transmission we can have the same thing in view. I can understand, with a 
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certain averageness, so as to make a decision and perhaps communicate the 
problem to my wife.  However, this level of understanding is far removed from having 
the same primordial understanding of the transmission as does the mechanic; I can’t 
fix it.  This type of circumstance repeats itself over and over again in our average 
everydayness.  It is the way our understanding of the broader public world is filled 
out, and one of the ways our ‘thin’ intelligibility is established. 
Idle talk, however, has a dark side, and this takes up most of Heidegger’s 
discussion.  For example, gossip, ungrounded explanations, get past along in 
“gossiping and passing the word along” [BT 212/168].  Whereas my understanding 
of the car transmission has a reasonable connection with the being of transmission, 
gossiping is the spreading of information that is groundless.  Another common 
English term for this, other than gossip, is “hearsay”.  We hear something and 
mindlessly say it to someone else. It refers to the same phenomenon as gossip but 
catches aspects of the ontic phenomenon in its name.  Tabloid magazines and 
social media are full of stories and accounts that have more in common with fantasy 
writing than actual events in the world, and yet they are typically reported and 
passed along as fact.  Heidegger observes that this is a common trait in the culture 
and that gossip spreads in wider circles until it  
 … takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. [BT 212/168] 
We tend to believe what is continually circulated in the community, and fail to check 
the facts.  Heidegger notes that this type of idle talk is not confined to gossip that it 
also spreads in what he calls “scribbling” which I take to be a veiled description to 
what I have referred to as tabloid magazines, but also includes radio talkback 
programs and so on.  As Heidegger notes 
The average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn 
from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip.  [BT 212/169]  
The recent debates that have arisen around social media and news reporting over 
allegations of “fake news”, reports made without a basis in ‘fact’ would be a 
contemporary example.  That idle talk is groundless, i.e. with no foundation in 
primordial understanding is no barrier to it entering the public domain.  Heidegger 
notes that the ease with which idle talk can be listened to and passed on 




In idle talk, everyone can have an opinion on anything, and speak authoritatively 
because the opinion is based on ‘what everybody knows’.  One of the serious 
consequences of idle talk is that once something has been understood on the basis 
of idle talk, no matter how groundless, it closes off and covers up a primordial 
understanding of entities within-the-world.  
 … idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a peculiar way 
suppresses them and holds them back. [BT 231/169] 
It is however impossible in the complexities of today’s world for Dasein to have the 
necessary primordial understanding (“thick” intelligibility) of the way the public world 
works and to a significant extent, Dasein must rely on idle talk (“thin” Intelligibility).  
Ontologically this means that much of the disclosed understanding of the world and 
the receptivity that goes along with it means Dasein is not grounded as such but 
rather “floating unattached” and by and large 
the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been 
interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing 
groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their 
protecting shelter. [BT 214/170] 
The way in which things have been interpreted is by the ‘One’. This “floating 
unattached” can occur in any community of people even to the extent that what is 
understood, interpreted and agreed to by the community has no grounding 
whatsoever. The consequences of this can be tragic as the Salem Witch trials of the 
1690s attest as does the contemporary vilification of people of perceived Islamic 
faith in some Western countries.  Typically, however, there will be a mixture of 
grounded and ungrounded interpretations even within scientific communities, the 
issue, however, is whether or not those which are ungrounded are recognised as 
such.   
Contemporary understandings about the nature of the person would be an example 
of ungrounded interpretations within the community where the community is 
oblivious to the ungrounded status of such interpretations.  The interpretations have 
been passed down via the tradition and accepted without further question. For 
example, from discussions with a medical student in their final year, it is evident that 
no serious consideration was given in the curriculum as to the ontological nature of 
the person.  A reductionist, materialist account is assumed and informs the teaching 
of the medical school.  
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While I do not think the labelling of this phenomena as idle talk is overly helpful, 
albeit it does suit Heidegger’s negative commentary concerning it, it is a genuine 
phenomenon, and its implications, especially in professional and work-based 
communities are worth exploring.  
Discourse: Illustrative Example 
I am only going to give one example associated with Discourse, and it concerned 
the Dasein’s ability to Articulate things, name that which is Articulated and then 
communicated what has been Articulated. 
Naming Surgical Incisions 
We can engage with things only on the basis that they have been identified as part 
of the referential unity and in the way they matter to us.   Once they have been 
differentiated (Articulated) and placed into a context (discourse) they have meaning. 
To those Articulated meaning, words can then be assigned, and this forms the basis 
of communicating.  The degree to which we are able to make such differentiations 
(Articulations) will depend on our familiarity with the referential unity out of which 
such a differentiation can be made.  An example can be found in the field of surgery. 
In surgery, there is a multitude of incisions that surgeons can make depending on 
the task at hand, the location of the body, the part of the body being cut and so on.  
In one article Patnik, Singla and Basal (Patnaik, Singla Rajan, & Bansal, 2001) 
discuss the anatomical basis of the choice of incisions in relation to the abdomen.  
They identified three key characteristics associated with an incision, accessibility, 
extensibility and security, which sound very much like they form part of an in-order-
to-structure.  The incision being part of the ‘work’ in-order-to undertake a repair of 
the body.  Here is the description of one particular incision and the accompanying 
diagram; 
Kocher subcostal incision: The subcostal incision is started at the midline, 2 to 5 cm below 
the xiphoid and extends downwards, outwards and parallel to and about 2.5 cm below the 
costal margin. Extension across the midline and down the other costal margin may be used 
to provide generous exposure of the upper abdominal viscera. The rectus sheath is incised 
in the same direction as the skin incision, and the rectus muscle is divided with cautery; the 
internal oblique and transversus abdominis muscles are divided with cautery.  (Patnaik, 
Singla Rajan, & Bansal, 2001, p. 173)  
For the Kocher subcostal incision to be meaningful as something ready-to-hand, 
there is a significant amount of other understandings that are first necessary.  For 
 
583 
example, each entity named in the brief passage is intelligible only on the basis that 
it refers to a specific feature of the body.   When I look at the abdomen, this makes 
little sense to me, as I cannot see the 
differentiations being made.  Even if I spent the 
time looking at my medical reference books and 
gained a certain understanding, it is the 
understanding that is gained only by way of 
reading a communication. What is missing is the 
primordial understanding that comes with years 
of surgery.  With this level of primordial understanding not only do the words have 
a different depth of meaning, but the experienced surgeon brings the understanding 
of ‘cutting flesh’, the tasks that are to be undertaken as part of this cutting and so 
on.  From this perspective, the communication is grounded, and the surgeon is in a 
position to form a judgement as to the benefits of using the Kocher subcostal 
incision.  If I were to pass along the information about the incision to someone else, 
perhaps in a BBQ conversation it can only be by way of idle talk.  
This example illustrates the concept of naming and discursive text that can speak 
to another surgeon on the basis of a primordial understanding (thick intelligibility). 
When I read the text, however, it is idle talk, and if I start discussing these incisions, 
then all I am doing is engaging in gossip.  Another aspect that is illustrated is that 
the meaning is not in the text, it is within the understanding of the reader214, from 
which the Articulated interpretations concerning the incision are made.  This leads 
to the area of textual hermeneutics and with this the boundary of the thesis scope 
has once mode been reached.  
This ends my discussion on understanding. 
Chapter Summary 
The chapter on Being-In [BT] is the longest and perhaps the most complex 
associated with Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of Dasein.   The chapter 
presents a number of original positions that shake up traditional and long-held 
philosophical positions. For the first time in Western philosophy, Heidegger elevates 
our receptiveness, our affective-capacities, to a place of pre-eminence as part of the 
structure of the ‘there’.  The reciprocal relationship between Dasein and its 
                                            
214 This is based on Heidegger’s position that “only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless” [193/151].  
 
Figure 23 Abdominal incision 
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environment as the basis of its meaningfulness radically eliminates the subject-
object divide that has plagued philosophy since Descartes.  The two levels of the 
intentional structure, the first associated with the ‘there’ and the second associated 
with affective-attunements and comportments have pushed the initial formulation of 
the concept by Brentano almost beyond recognition.  Putting forward the tentative 
beginnings of a theory of language based on the structure of world is also a position 
that went against the mainstream approach, mainly championed by analytic 
philosophy, that was dominant for most of the twentieth century.  There are other 
points, but these four make this chapter alone a significant one.  
It is easy to be seduced and focus on these scholarly innovations. However, this is 
not the point of the thesis.  Of even more importance is that Heidegger is putting 
forward a radical new understanding of what it is to be something, it is a ‘new’ 
ontology.  This was already seen in relation to the ready-to-hand and world, and 
now it comes starkly into view in terms of Dasein. In relation to Dasein any notion of 
Dasein being some static tangible entity, e.g. the body, has to be discarded.  
Heidegger’s Dasein has several salient characteristics that make it distinctive from 
anything that has hitherto been proposed, all of which have been discussed in the 
thesis:  Firstly, Heidegger rejects any conception of Dasein as something present-
at-hand.  Secondly, Dasein’s ontological structure is dynamic.  Thirdly, Dasein the 
entity is constituted by a complex unity of processes (the structure) that constitutes 
its meaningfulness only “within” a world meaningful for Dasein.  Fourthly, related to 
the third point, Dasein’s existence as the Dasein it is (i.e. being-meaningful) is 
dependent on its movement into possibilities for being itself. Fifthly, Dasein’s 
ongoing meaningfulness requires entities in its world that offer possibilities for 
Dasein’s ability-to-be the Dasein it is.  Sixthly, Dasein ability-to-be is determined by 
its understanding and receptivity, which in turn limits the range of possibilities 
appropriate for Dasein’s being itself. Seventhly, Dasein’s understanding and 
receptivity are determined, to a significant extent, by the averageness of the social 
milieu in which it was born and raised. Eighthly, it is Dasein’s receptiveness that is 
primary opening up Dasein’s world and disclosing possibilities not understanding. 
Ninthly the structural processes that constitute Dasein, functions in a consistent and 
ongoing manner (this is the constancy necessary for being Dasein), albeit with 
“knowledge and will” [175/136] some mastery over such its affective-capacities can 
 
585 
be achieved, and in what Dasein understands215. 
While all Daseins have the same dynamic structure, the picture we have is that once 
a Dasein is ‘thrown’ into the world the functioning of the structure builds up a 
particular set of understanding and receptivities that gives the Dasein its meaning 
in the context of that world.  This makes the Dasein species highly adaptive to a 
range of possible worlds, and this is what is revealed by even a cursory survey of 
the anthropology literature.  However, once Dasein’s facticity has developed in its 
world, it requires the ongoing possibilities in that world for Dasein to continue to be 
who it is. This does not mean that Dasein fails to adapt and change over its life, 
Heidegger does not specifically deal with this, but it is implicit in his description of 
the structure. Dasein’s understanding and receptivities change over time, but the 
change arises from the possibilities taken up on the basis of the then existing 
understanding and possibilities.  By and large, then change typically occurs at a 
pace determined by the rate of change in understanding and receptivity.  In other 
words, once a Dasein is caught in the ‘throw’ of its facticity within its world, its scope 
for change and adaptation is typically restricted by its ‘thrownness’.   
Based on the structural analysis of Dasein, once Dasein has meaning in the world, 
i.e. who it is has been determined, then it must have an ability-to-be who it is.  
Daseins meaningfulness arises from the taking up of possibilities appropriate for the 
expression of it ability-to-be, and those possibilities are provided by specific ready-
to-hand entities216.  Dasein’s being meaningful thus requires the ongoing movement 
into possibilities. If those possibilities are not present then Dasein is no longer 
meaningful in terms of who it is, Dasein becomes meaningless.  This analysis relates 
back to the previous discussions in that Dasein can be said to assign itself to certain 
in-order-to structures for the sake-of-which it is; this is just another way of describing 
the structural process. Dasein typically is a mixture of meanings, i.e. it has a number 
of different aspects that constitute its for-the-sake-of-which or meaning.  Should 
access to the entities that hold the possibilities for a Dasein’s ability-to-be slowly be 
removed from Dasein’s world then progressively Dasein’s being-meaningful 
diminishes and its being-meaningless increases.  I take this to be the structural 
                                            
215 This is summed up in Heidegger’s phrase “that it is and has to be” [BT 174/135]. 
216 What Heidegger does not specifically address in the chapter but is implicit from his previous discussions is 
that in accessing the possibilities associated with the ready-to-hand entities we are also encountering the 
Dasein-with of other Dasein. 
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account of ‘shedding life’. 
At the ontic level possibilities show up as part of Heidegger’s concept of mattering.  
Mattering can be in a positive, detrimental, deficient or indifferent mode. When 
Marion Miller entered the nursing home, she had no control over the way she 
encountered the various situation in the nursing home as mattering to her. The 
receptivity that constitutes Marion is out of her control, and it presents what matters 
based on who Marion is.  The nursing home did not show up as mattering in a 
positive way for Marion, it showed up, by and large, as mattering in a detrimental 
way. Marion chose behavioural responses that reflected who she was, writing letters 
of complaint seeking changes, and so on, but to no avail.  To put this another way 
the nursing home environment was meaningless for her and as a consequence, her 
life continued its shift from “being-meaningful” to “being-meaningless”. To use 
Marion’s language, she ‘shed life’.   
The concepts of choice and autonomy are held to be important in the running of a 
nursing home. However, these concepts do not change what shows up 
predominantly as mattering in detrimental or indifferent ways into possibilities for 
being who one is, i.e. transform the world of a nursing home as mattering in a 
materially positive way.  Marion exercised her choice to participated in the monthly 
discussion groups for example, but she would, instead, have been doing something 
different, something that ‘matters’ to her.  There is implicit in the current approaches 
to running nursing homes that the agency of the person is maintained by such 
concepts as autonomy and choice. This stance reflects an adherence in the 
ontology of the person as being separate and distinct to the world in which they live, 
and the exercise of choice becomes a key defeminated of personhood in this model.  
If Heidegger’s alternative ontology is a more accurate description of what it is to be 
a person, and I accept this, then choice in and of itself is insufficient.  What is 
required is choice in taking up, or letting pass, possibilities appropriate to who 
Dasein is. Only then can choice contribute to the meaningfulness of Dasein.  To 
construct and run nursing homes that are stripped of possibilities for Dasein to be 
meaningful is created environments that relegate Dasein to “being meaningless”.  It 
is to fail to care for Dasein, for the person, notwithstanding that the care of the body 
may be excellent.  
This completes my inquiry into the Dasein analytic for the purposes of this thesis. In 
the next section, I will finalise this aspect of the work by linking the structure of 
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CHAPTER 18: CARE: THE BEING OF DASEIN 
Introduction 
In this section, I complete my enquiry and interpretation of Heidegger’s Dasein 
analytic by addressing the being of Dasein, Care.  The structure of Dasein’s way of 
being is named being-in-the-world, and it is this structure that has been the focus of 
discussions.  Having described the structure on the basis of its constitutive aspects 
Heidegger essentially stands back and interprets the structure itself as a unified 
phenomenon and the name he gives to this interpretation is Care.  The structure of 
Care literally falls out of the work that has been done to date and other than 
presenting the structure little time will be spent pursuing Heidegger’s various 
discussions concerning Care as they do not advance the aim of the thesis. 
On first stepping back and looking at Heidegger’s structure of Care there is almost 
a letdown, after all this work that’s it!  However, after a brief reflection, the 
implications are confronting, and this will be discussed in the final section of the 
chapter. 
Evidence for the structure of being-in-the-world and evidence  
At the beginning of his analysis of care Heidegger provides a succinct summary of 
the ordinary way in which Dasein is; 
Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its 
ownmost ability-to-be is an issue, both in its being amidst the 'world' and in its being-with 
others.  [BT 226/181] 
This is a summary statement of all of Heidegger’s preceding work, and every term 
has its specific meaning based on Heidegger’s interpretation of being-in-the-world.  
Before proceeding Heidegger presents a phenomenological analysis of the 
affective-capacity of anxiety as supporting evidence for this unitary structure.  
Heidegger’s reasoning seems to be that if he can identify a breakdown mode that 
brings to the fore the phenomenon of world itself, then the very fact that this occurs 
supports the normative case.  Heidegger uses a similar strategy in relation to world 
when discussing various ways in which ‘break-downs’217 with equipment disclose 
                                            
217 These were the phenomena of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy. 
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the referential totality by disrupting the dealings with the equipment.   
There is some debate as to whether Heidegger is actually describing anxiety or 
depression (Blattner, 2006; White & Dreyfus(Forward), 2005) and Heidegger’s 
description contains elements of both.   In that both anxiety and depression are often 
present at the same time I take Heidegger to be describing the phenomena of 
anxiety and depression as a single affective-tuning and so there is no need to enter 
this debate.  The key descriptive passage is the following; 
That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.  Not only does this 
indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but 
it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not 'relevant' at all.  Nothing which is ready-
to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious.  Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand 
discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world 
has the character of completely lacking meaningfulness.  In anxiety one does not encounter 
this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement.  [BT 
231/186] (translation modified) (my underlining) 
When Heidegger analyses the phenomena more closely he identifies that there is 
no specific thing about which a Dasein is anxious 
That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is 
nowhere. Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. [BT 231/186] 
The nowhere to which Heidegger refers does not signify that there is nothing, but 
given that whatever it is that is causing the anxiety is in no particular place does 
mean that it cannot approach from a specific direction, and yet it is there 
nonetheless.  Heidegger’s conclusion is that in the face of the persistency of anxiety 
and  
… of the obstinacy of the "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon 
that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. [BT231/187] 
We are faced with the situation in which the entities within-the-world are still there 
but “are of so little importance in themselves” that rather than being faced with 
entities having meaning to us we are confronted with 
 .. the complete meaninglessness of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all 
that still obtrudes itself. [BT231/187] 
We must always keep in mind that, by and large, since Heidegger completed his 
initial analysis of world from a detached standpoint that when he refers to world in 
the context of being-in-the-world, he is speaking about the world as it shows up for 
  
590 
Dasein and this is the case here in his conclusion; 
Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein's being as being-in-the-world. 
So if the "nothing" - that is, the world as such exhibits itself as that in the face of which one 
has anxiety, this means that being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious. [BT232/187] 
As the anxiety/depression descends upon Dasein 
 …. what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-
the-world.218 The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. 
Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms 
of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. [BT 232/287] 
My use of this case is simply to support Heidegger’s work in terms of the structure 
of being-in-the-world.  In the anxiety/depression that Heidegger describes the 
entities in the world are still there, they are still understood as what they are, i.e. the 
world is still there as the public world.  But the entities in the world have lost their 
meaning in terms of the possibilities they hold for Dasein.  They no longer matter for 
Dasein.   
Just to be clear. To use the analogy of circumspection which had both the visual 
presentation of the object plus the meaning to give us the ready-to-hand, this is on 
the basis of world.  Dasein’s environment is the ready-to-hand as disclosed in the 
way it matters. This example also illustrates the importance of the structure of 
receptivity in holding open the ‘there’, Dasein’s world, as something that matters to 
it. 
In anxiety/depression, the world has become meaningless, and Dasein is no longer 
faced with the encounters that matter to it.  The consequence of this is that Dasein 
itself become meaningless, in which case there is nothing ‘to live for’, a not 
uncommon response to depression.  Just as visual agnosia reveals to us in our 
experiences the two aspects that makeup circumspection, anxiety/depression 
reveals for us the two aspects that makeup Dasein’s environment, a pre-existing 
world and meaningfulness to Dasein.   
I am not going to pursue Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety/depression any further.  He 
argues that there are modes of anxiety, albeit rare, in which Dasein’s 
individualisation from the ‘One’ is disclosed to it.  In these cases Dasein then has a 
                                            
218 As a point of interest this is one of the few places in which Heidegger includes in the same sentence the 
concepts of environment and within-the-world more generally.  This is the distinction between the public world 
and Heidegger's environmental world which holds meaning for it. 
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chance to claim itself, i.e. live in authentic existence on the basis of one’s own 
understanding and affective-capacities as opposed to those dictated by the ’One’.  
Exploring this is outside the thesis boundaries. 
Care structure 
The ontological structural whole of Dasein’s being, Care, is described as follows;  
 … the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst 
(entities encountered within-the-world). This being fills in the meaning of the term “care”. [BT 
237/192] (brackets in the English text) 
Being-ahead-of-itself 
This aspect relates to Dasein as ability-to-be in that it is always projecting itself onto 
possibilities which it does ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ it is.  
Already-in 
This aspect describes the fact that Dasein has already understood and been thrown 
into a world.  This aspect also includes Dasein’s falling in which it is part of the ‘One’. 
Being-amidst 
This aspect refers to Dasein’s concernful dealings with the entities present-at-hand 
and encounters with others on the basis of solicitude. 
 
It does not take much to see that this condensing to a three-part structure has with-
in it the structure of a temporal movement (refer Figure 24).  Another way of 
presenting the diagram in the language of the earlier analysis i.e. thrown, projecting, 
falling is shown in Figure 25. 
In my interpretation of being, this is the structure that every Dasein will have that 
determines it as an entity.   Once a Dasein is born and being ‘raised into’ a culture 
the bare structure starts to fill out and provides the basis on which Dasein is able to 
live its life.  This operative structure is shown in Figure 26.   
A Dasein develops its understanding of world and self within the context of the 
culture. Its understanding then projects itself onto possible involvements that show 
up in the circumspection of concern with the ready-to-hand and the considerateness 
of solicitude towards other Daseins.  Out of the things that show up as mattering 
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Dasein chooses which possible involvements are taken up in terms of dealing with 
those entities. This is the ontic level and is shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 24 Care Structure (all Daseins) 
 
Figure 25 Alternative Presentation 
 
Figure 26 Structure – Operative in Dasein 
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Final Comments on Care Structure 
In that the being of an entity is not itself an entity how then are we to understand the 
structure?  An indication is how Heidegger treats the ready-to-hand.  While the 
ready-to-hand is founded on the present-at-hand what makes it a ready-to-hand 
entity is its place in the referential unity, i.e. it is its place in the world.    
On this basis, what an entity is physically made of and its form is contingent only on 
it being able to provide the necessary serviceability, usability and so on needed to 
satisfy the demands of the structure. This was covered at length in the earlier 
chapter on Worldhood.  
It is thus possible for the physical aspect of an entity to be replaced by something 
radically new in terms of its matter+ form but still be the same entity.  An example 
of this is the phone.  When I was younger, a telephone was a large, black Bakelite 
looking object with the phone earpiece/microphone attached by a relatively short 
cord.  Today I have a plastic and metal receiver in one room with several wireless 
handpieces in other rooms.  Both are phones, both fill the serviceability – usability 
junction, but the later models have better manipulability and functionality. To be a 
phone is not determined by the physical aspect of the entity. The more radical 
change is, of course, the smartphone which is a device that contains not just the 
serviceable-usability of the phone but other ready-to-hand equipment as well, e.g. 
 
Figure 27 Ontic level – Being-in-the-world 
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camera, voice recorder and so on. 
In relation to Dasein, if we push Heidegger’s anxiety/depression demonstration a 
little further, we can ask what happens if other key facets of this unified structure 
collapse or breakdown, is there a Dasein as we know it?   To put this another way, 
would Dasein, as we understand it, be Dasein if any of the following were not part 
of the structure: 
• The ability to acquire an understanding of the practices of the culture including 
such things as language, basic know-how in terms of dressing, eating, social 
norms, and etc. (i.e. the ‘One’) 
• The ability to understand ready to hand entities and to acquire the know-how to 
use them. 
• The ability to understand itself in terms of its own for-the-sake-of which, not 
primitive reflexive responses, but what matters in terms of being a parent, 
looking after others and so on. 
• The ability of the sight of circumspection which enables us to see things in terms 
of their being ready-to-hand and not just as mere objects. 
The list goes on. 
Our lived experience arises in the flow of encountering what matters to us, our 
concernful dealings with the ready-to-hand and our solicitudinous encounters with 
others.  If you stripped all those lived experiences away in principle all that would be 
left is a poor version of an organic-based robot.  Like the robot, we would be devoid 
of experience.  I say poor version because without the gift of mattering what would 
direct our actions?  At least a robot would be programmed to do things. 
The being of Dasein, what constitutes Dasein, is not the flesh and blood of the 
present-at-hand body, it is not the way of being of Dasein that is observable and 
often reported on in qualitative research.  It is the underlying structure that gives rise 
to all of this.  The same structure is responsible for every Dasein.  But the dynamic 
structure together with genetic bundle X in the social milieu of environment A will 
result in a Dasein that is in many ways different to the same structure together with 
genetic bundle Y in the social milieu of environment B and so on.  What 
characterises the individuality of each Dasein as an entity is in each case is its 
facticity, and this will depend on the initial environment.  What drives this dynamic 
ontological structure is most probably some aspect of the genetic structure itself, 
however, this is speculative. 
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In that Dasein is initially based on the ‘One’ (the average everydayness of the 
culture) and in turn becomes part of the ‘One’ there is a powerful reflexive feedback 
process occurring.  The ‘One’ as the ‘collection’ of all Daseins determines world 
which in turn determines the individual Dasein and so on.   This has all the hallmarks 
of a self-organising system, and if that is the case communities are not collections 
of independent co-operative individuals, rather Dasein is part of a we-world. It is an 
entity that is spawned and part of the group itself, and if it is to be-itself and not 
simply a representative of the ’One’ it needs to differentiate itself to the extent 
possible, this is the thrust of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. For Heidegger, 
Dasein has the ability to be authentic, and this is the subject of the first part of 
Division II of Being and Time.  
While its ontological origins are not necessarily understood thematically by an 
individual Dasein, Dasein emerges as part of a we-world that by and large 
determines the range of possibilities for a meaningful existence onto which Dasein 
projects itself in a way that matters to it.  This is what it means to be a Dasein.  
Dasein is its understanding as disclosed in its receptive-capacities. In other words, 
Dasein is only in its various expressed comportments to a world of possibilities that 
has meaning it and in so doing sustains it.  These expressed comportments are built 
on an intentional structure are the basis of the lived experiences that constitutes its 
existence. There is nothing more to being Dasein, and nor need there be.  Almost 
in anticipation of the affront that this understanding presents Heidegger writes; 
 ….. the ontical approach with which we have tried to Interpret Dasein ontologically as care, 
may appear farfetched and theoretically contrived, to say nothing of the act of violence one 
might discern in our setting aside the confirmed traditional definition of "man". [BT 227/183] 
In the next section, I provide a brief introduction to how Heidegger’s work can be 
understood in relation to contemporary work being undertaken in the field of 
emergence and complex self-organising systems. The aim of this approach is to 
help shift an understanding of Heidegger’s work from his abstract level of thinking 




CHAPTER 19: INTERPRETING HEIDEGGER WITHIN AN 
EMERGENTISTS & COMPLEX SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Heidegger’s account of his analysis of the structure of Dasein is difficult to follow.  
As the discussion has revealed there are a number of reasons for this, he uses 
terminology associated with the discipline of traditional ontology, e.g. being; he 
assumes prior knowledge of the philosophical tradition, including the work of the 
ancient Greeks; his writing style is dense;  the real-world phenomenon he is 
describing are often elevated to abstract concepts with very little in the way of 
explanatory examples; he uses concepts from previous work without any 
acknowledgement or explanation, (e.g. intentionality and mereology); he will often 
use the same name for the different levels of his analysis without making clear which 
level he is discussing, (e.g. understanding); he changes the typical meaning of 
words, (e.g. concern, care); neologisms are introduced without explanation, and his 
research stance is not clearly articulated.  In addition, there is the challenge of 
accessing Heidegger’s work via the English translation which inevitably throws up 
translations that do not quite capture in English what Heidegger may have been 
intending.  Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that, as I interpret, Heidegger’s ontology 
it is based on what I would term an emergentist ontology that has its nascent origins 
in the work of the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, certainly as Heidegger interprets 
them.  This, however, is never addressed in Being and Time.  The length of the 
thesis is, to a significant degree, shaped by these various challenges as I lay out 
and argue for my interpretation of his work in a way that tries to avoid replicating 
many of these same challenges.  
In this section, I want to take a step back and place Heidegger’s findings in the 
context of examples of contemporary scholarship.  My claim is that Heidegger is a 
scholar engaged not in abstract thinking, with little relevance, but rather his work 
should be seen as having wide applicability as part of the gritty work of contemporary 
inquiry, science as broadly understood.  My view has always been informed by this 
perspective.  This being the case then the phenomena that Heidegger is observing, 
and interpreting must also be among the phenomena observed and interpreted by 
other scholars. The radical difference is not in what has been observed it is in the 
interpretation. This is no different to what happens elsewhere in science.  If 
 
597 
Heidegger's reported observations are consistent with what is available for others 
to observe, if his interpretive account provides deeper insights into phenomena than 
existing interpretive accounts and further if they can form the basis of asking new 
questions about, for example, Dasein, then his account must be given serious 
consideration.  My position is clear.  I accept Heidegger's work as meeting all three 
criteria and as such is a viable alternative to the reductionist ontological account of 
the person. Indeed, it is the only serious alternative I am aware of. 
This chapter is divided into two sections.  The first draws parallels with the work of 
Albert Einstein in his breakthrough work on Special Relativity. It argues that there 
are similarities in the approaches taken by Einstein in that he took observations that 
were readily available to others, but he put aside the restrictions of entrenched 
presuppositions and dealt in a logical manner with what was observed. The results 
were revolutionary and highly contentious and took decades to be fully accepted.  
The other significant similarity is that Einstein, as does Heidegger, ignores the 
physical aspects of the entity and focuses on the observed effects that have 
‘practical bearing’ on the inquiry.   Heidegger's work is just as radical and 
revolutionary as Einstein's, just in a different field. As part of this, I provide a 
summary overview of my interpretation of Heidegger’s work and conclude that to 
embrace his work Heidegger is asking us to make a conceptual leap in relation to 
Dasein as significant as that of Einstein’s leap that time is not a universal constant. 
The second section is to consider Heidegger’s work in terms of contemporary work 
on emergent, self-organising complex systems.  I explored this line of thinking about 
Heidegger’s work once I started to think about Dasein as a dynamic system. It was 
the interplay between my (limited) prior knowledge of emergence and chaos theory, 
the reading of Heidegger's account of the early Greeks and then revisiting my 
thinking around Heidegger’s account of world and Dasein in Being and Time that 
shifted my interpretive stance of Being and Time. 
In this section, I look at some of Heidegger’s comments in relations to systems, 
introduce the concept of emergence and self-organising systems and indicate the 
relevance to Heidegger’s work.  I then look at a specific and widely used application 
of systems model developed by Argyris in the area of organisational learning and 
development and compare this to a Heideggerian model that I develop.  I then 
propose an emergent model for the entity Dasein. 
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My conclusion is that not only should Heidegger be considered as a strict empiricist 
but that he should also be considered within the broad camp of emergence theorists.  
I present a schematic of an emergence model of Dasein that proposes the concept 
of considering Dasein as a higher level (emergent) aspect of a lower level biological 
system. I then apply this model in the final part of this section as a method of 
research and inquiry, within both the biological and social sciences.  I provide 
examples of how Heidegger's work has applicability in various social-science areas 
in the following chapter, followed, in Chapter 21 by an application developed to 
investigate ‘shedding life’. 
Einstein, Time and Heidegger 
I want to briefly revisit the scientific breakthrough that thrust Einstein into the 
spotlight as an innovative thinker of the highest order and draw some parallels 
between Einstein’s approach to that of Heidegger’s. Specifically, I look at Einstein’s 
theory of special relativity which was published in 1905 as part of a series of five 
papers published by Einstein in that year that “changed the face of physics” 
(Stachel, 2005).  
At the turn of the twentieth-century physicists held, and still hold, that the 
fundamental behaviours of present-at-hand entities in nature are constant in 
character and that the pattern of the those behaviours reflect what are often called 
the ‘laws’ of nature219. The task of the physical sciences is to identify, at the 
appropriate level, these fundamental patterns of behaviours and describe them, 
typically as a mathematical formula.  At the turn of the twentieth century physicist 
was facing a problem in relation to the speed of light.  Given the acceptance of 
constant behaviour, the measurement of the speed of light should be constant, but 
constant relative to the position and speed of the observer.  The problem was that 
the experimental results for measuring the speed of light (approx. 300,000 
kilometres per second (kps)) held constant regardless of the point of measurement, 
i.e. the relative position and speed of the observer.  It appeared to disobey one of 
sciences most fundamental axioms. The following illustrates this. 
Consider the situation of person A moving in space at 100kph and they the shoot a 
bullet that travels at 200kph.  For a stationary person B watching, they see A moving 
                                            
219 Laws of nature understood as descriptive not prescriptive.   
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at 100kph and the bullet moving at 300kph with the relative motion (between A and 
the bullet) being 200kph. Just to recap, for person A the bullet is travelling at 200kph, 
and for person B it is travelling at 300kph.  This is presented in Figure 28 
All this is straightforward and is predicted from the formula Speed = Distance/Time 
Interval.   The time interval is simply the time period over which the distance travel 
by an object is measured, let’s assume it is TX or the difference in time between 
observation 1 (T1) and observation 2, (T2).  
The speed as determined by A (SA) = Distance travelled as measured by A (DA) ÷ 




 .   From A the speed of the bullet was found to be, 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴=200𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ  





   and the speed of the bullet was calculated as  𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵=300𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ 
As can be seen, the distance travelled by the bullet as measured by A is less, 
because A is travelling in the same direction as the bullet.  The smaller distance 
 
Figure 28 Speed of bullet is relative to the observer 
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travelled over the same time interval accounts for the lower relative speed.  
This is all consistent with the physics. Depending on the relative position from which 
the measurement is taken, the speed of the bullet is different. Speed is relative to 
the observer.  
Just as the speed of the bullet varies relative to the point of measurement (i.e. 
200kph vs 300kph scenario), the speed of light should also vary.   Here is where the 
problem was discovered.  Various experiments measured the speed of light from 
differing positions which should have resulted in different relative speeds.  However, 
the speed of light, regardless of the relative position of the measuring point, remains 







 = 300,000kps  
The only way this result works is if the distances travelled by light in the time interval 
Tx are the same, i.e. DA = DB.  This can only occur if A and B are in the same relative 
position to the light being measured, and this was not the case.  The maths doesn’t 
work!   
The science community held that there must be some fundamental flaw in the way 
the experiments were designed and implemented or there was some other as yet 
unknown influence on the light. There was no other way to explain the results.  One 
factor influencing this was that light was understood to be a wave and as such 
required a material substance to transmit it. Physicists believed that there was some 
undiscovered, imponderable substance that filled space which was called ‘ether’ by 
the science community, i.e. space was not empty.  The search was on to discover 
‘ether’ and then to investigate if there was something about this substance that was 
contributing to the findings concerning the behaviour of light.  This hypothesizing of 
an unknown substance is no different to the concepts of phlogiston or caloric that 
were developed to explain heat, and like them the concept of ether was proved 
wrong. 
Einstein’s genius was to accept both the basic axiom and the results of the empirical 
findings concerning the speed of light but to jettison the assumptions concerning the 
nature of light itself and the existence of ether.  He turned his attention solely on the 
observations concerning light. His approach was to ignore unfounded 
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presuppositions about the characteristics of the entities, light and time, regardless 
of how ‘intuitive’, or self-evident those presuppositions appeared. 
Einstein accepted that the equation   𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 
𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋 
 = 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 
𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋 
 = 300,000kps may be correct and 
then followed the logical implications of this.  Both these steps are similar to 
Heidegger’s approach.   
The next step, also similar to Heidegger’s, is the one that seems to me to be the 
most difficult.  For the mathematics to be correct, there must be some fundamental 
assumption being made about space (distance) or time that is wrong.   Just how 
difficult the next step is can be gleaned by considering the following thought 
experiment:  The instruments used to measure the distances and the time intervals 
are very accurate and checked such that there is no error in the taking of the 
measurements.  Providing there is agreement on what constitutes a unit of distance 
or a unit of time what measurement system used is irrelevant.  At the turn of the 
twentieth century everyone accepted space and time as constants.  My question is 
that faced with the results, how would you change your understanding of the 
equation such that it is correct, and at the same time accept the legitimacy of all the 
measurements? This is the challenge that faced Einstein. His answer revolutionised 
physics. 
Einstein’s conclusion was that the time interval measured at A (TX) was not the same 
time interval measured at B (also TX) even though they were accurately measured 
by high precision instruments and there was no error in reading.  Einstein argued 
that time itself slows down the faster you travel, and this slowdown is experienced 
by everything travelling at that speed, including the measuring instruments.   
If you could stand back and observe both A and B, then the passing of time would 
be faster at A than B. The period of time, TX, at A is not equal to the period of time 
a B, TX. Time itself is relative. This change of time that Einstein ‘discovered’ is known 
as the ‘time dilation’ effect and has been confirmed by many experiments over the 
last century.  The effect is not theoretical and has real-world implications. For 
example, it has to be taken into account in the GPS (global position system) network 
to ensure that the positions calculated by references to the various satellites moving 
in orbit are correct. 
The presupposition that time is the same regular ticking-off of one second after 
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another at a steady rate throughout the universe regardless of where you are and 
how fast you are travelling was false.  Time is not the universal constant in the 
universe, light is.   The physics community did not recognise that they were holding 
fast to an assumption about time as a universal constant.  I don’t think I would have 
realised this either. It is an extremely difficult assumption to let go of, in the first 
instance because it is hidden or taken for granted presupposition220.  There was 
significant opposition to Einstein’s work when it was published and even as late as 
1931 there was a book published in Germany under the title A Hundred Authors 
against Einstein (Goenner, 1993) , however over time opposition died out as results 
of experiments confirmed Einstein’s work and the explanatory power of the theory 
was recognised.  This is another example of the difficulty of shifts in fundamental 
beliefs associated with Kuhnian scientific revolutions! 
A critical aspect of Einstein’s method relates to presuppositions.  Even though the 
pull of the belief concerning the entities themselves is very strong, by putting aside 
unfounded presuppositions he frees himself up to play with different alternatives. In 
the above example, the constancy of time was relinquished, and soon after, as part 
of his work, the constancy of space itself is relinquished. This led to Einstein's 
Theory of General Relativity, and the concepts dealing with the inter-relationship of 
space and time, the warping of space around objects and so on. Describing this is 
not within the scope of this thesis. 
There is another point worth noting.   Recalling Peirce’s injunction to look at the 
effects which have a practical bearing, what is important to recognise is that the 
experience associated with the perceived meaning/understanding of time itself is 
not an effect. It is something concerning the entity itself which had been assumed 
and not been conclusively proven.  Yet, it had been taken up as part of our 
understanding based solely on its assumed self-evident character.  By focusing on 
‘effects’ and using mathematics and logic, Einstein was able to make his 
breakthrough. 
In Einstein’ 1905 work all the elements he used were known by science at the time.  
His genius was in his methodology and his willingness to take a different interpretive 
                                            
220 It is of course possible that Einstein’s view of space and time are wrong and will eventually be displaced by 
another descriptive account.  This may occur when the riddle of dark matter and dark energy are solved or if 
quantum physics comes up with an account of gravity. 
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stance, and this brings me back to Heidegger. 
From Einstein to Heidegger 
Heidegger’s methodology is similar to Einstein’s except applied in a different 
domain.  He accepts the basic axiom concerning constancy of being, he focusses 
on the empirical phenomenon, most of which were already documented, he discards 
long-held presuppositions, he discards prior attempts at interpreting the 
phenomenon, and he follows the logic.  
That he accepts the basic axiom of constancy is implicit in his pursuit of ontological 
structures.  One fundamental difference is that the natural scientists are looking for 
constancy that is timeless.  In that Dasein is an emergent being and can become 
extinct, the constancy is relative to the ontological domain. This does not mean he 
must accept the dogma of the reductionist account.  This is equivalent to the hanging 
onto the constancy of time because of its self-evident character and the support of 
the tradition.  He jettisons the view of the natural sciences that ‘constancy’ must only 
be found in simple, measurable relationships between physical entities and that an 
entity must be constituted from the physical.   
Some of the fundamental presuppositions Heidegger sets aside are the entrenched 
idea of a self as a substantial entity; the idea that entities are only understood in 
terms of their physical nature; that the person is understood in terms of its mind or 
consciousness; and that all entities are constituted in the same way.   This is 
extremely hard to do, at least on a par with Einstein’s leap concerning the nature of 
time.  Even the founder of the phenomenology movement, Edmund Husserl, could 
not drop these basic presuppositions even though to do so was indicated by his 
methodology. Heidegger does acknowledge the phenomenon of consciousness but 
puts it aside for the purposes of his inquiry. He firmly rejects the concept of ‘a self’ 
that is somehow in control of our life because he concluded, there is just no 
phenomenological evidence for it; just as Hume had concluded.    
In looking for ways to bring the phenomenon into view without the overlay of 
interpretations imposed by the culture Heidegger not only takes up the basic 
discoveries of Husserl but returns to the ancient Greeks for inspiration.   His 
approach seems to be to engage with the brightest minds of this earlier era before 
the powerful influence of the later eras.  He looks past the descriptive language used 
by the Greeks to try to interpret what it is they are ‘seeing’ and describing, not unlike 
604 
one must do with Heidegger.  In other words, he was looking for, as much as it is 
possible, descriptions of phenomena themselves rather than theoretical accounts of 
phenomena. 
As discussed, Heidegger’s conclusion is that the being of the entity, Dasein, is the 
dynamic structural process he calls being-in-the-world and that while this may 
necessitate being founded on a physical body, it is the dynamic reflexive relationship 
of this process with the world and other Daseins that constitutes Dasein, not the 
physical.  As discussed, if you take the same initial genetic bundle (renata infans or 
newborn baby) and place it from the outset in a different cultural context you get a 
completely different set of lived experiences based on different understandings and 
different affective-capacities: you get a different Dasein.  The outcome of this is that 
not only does Dasein change depending on the circumstance but a different Dasein 
will possibly see things differently (circumspection and considerateness).   They may 
not only see the entity itself differently as a result of differing understandings but in 
terms of how it matters.  As a consequence, this influences our actions towards 
entities, even to the extent of killing a daughter!  There is no sense in which Dasein 
acts as a rational agent in than manner, for example, assumed by traditional 
economic theory.  
Dasein is neither the body nor the systems; these are the necessary aspects, the 
ontological structure, that constitutes Dasein.  Dasein is the bundle of 
understandings and affective-capacities that determine its actions in the world that 
are the outcome of the dynamic nature of the structure, what Heidegger collectively 
calls Daseins facticity.  
There are feedback elements all through this dynamic process.  In becoming a 
Dasein, Dasein is first shaped by social milieu at the same time becoming part of 
the social milieu itself, in turn shaping other Daseins.   Becoming part is not a part 
in the sense of one marble among many in a tin.  Dasein becomes a constituting 
part of the culture itself. In taking up the practices of the culture Dasein becomes 
part of what sustains the culture.   If this is the case, then there is a basis for arguing 
that the person is not an independent creature that grows up in a culture. Rather 
that cultures are self-organising entities of which Dasein emerges as a constitutive 
part.  This is related to the earlier discussion on wholes and parts that the whole 
constitutes the part and Heidegger’s notion of being. 
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Dasein is then a highly social member of the mob, and its sense of independence 
is, to a large extent, an illusion.  The independent Dasein approach is one most 
notably adopted by Western cultures.  Alternative understandings based on a sense 
of a cultural-unity, of one people, seem to be more the norm in many other cultures 
and this seems to reflect more closely the ontological structure than does the 
individualistic stance of the West.  In that, the Old Testament had a ‘one-people’ 
view of community, and this is a fundamental part of the Western Christian heritage, 
an interesting line of research would be to trace the origins of the individualistic 
stance in the West and the manner of its split from its Judaic roots.  I suspect it is 
with Paul’s split with the founding group of apostles who retained an allegiance to 
the Judaic tradition while Paul relinquishes the hold on this tradition as part of his 
evangelical push into the Greco-Roman world, which subsequently embraces Greek 
philosophical concepts into its theology, rather than Judaic; but that is purely 
speculative.  The point is that Heidegger’s philosophical research has findings 
consistent with other significant traditions. 
The stark conclusion to this is that the cultural environment, being the mix of the 
various overlays of country, ethnicity, social-economic, religious, immediate 
community, peers and family factors will shape the facticity of the young children 
and as such have a significant bearing on the nature of their future existence as a 
Dasein.  Each Dasein, in turn, influences the future of the culture, and significant 
gatherings of new understandings of young Daseins will eventually flow through the 
culture.  Cultural values and norms are inherited, moulded and ‘bequeathed’.  This 
approach has characteristics that are found in dynamic, complex, self-organising 
systems.  
These are the conclusions Heidegger reaches by adopting a strict experiential 
empiricist approach.  By observing, as far as is possible, the way in which Dasein 
interacts with the entities in its world (effects of practical bearing), putting aside 
unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the nature of entities, and following the 
logic.  He is not, as he repeats several times, doing a philosophical anthropology of 
all aspects of Dasein’s various ways of being, just the basic structural framework of 
what it is to be Dasein, being-in-the-word.   That he has done this is quite an 
achievement; never before or since attempted in Western scholarship.  In so doing 
he also establishes the possibility of a research agenda to finish the ‘philosophical 
anthropology.’  In my view, his achievement is as ground-breaking as Einstein’s, just 
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in different domains.  The question is, can we let go of deep-rooted beliefs about 
what we are as an entity, beliefs that have no basis in empirical evidence? 
Systems Approach 
In this section, I look at Heidegger’s work from a systems perspective starting with 
Heidegger’s comments that point to this understanding.  I then consider his work in 
the light of the emergence and self-organising systems and learning systems. From 
this, I develop two key models as ways of understanding Heidegger’s work and 
apply them it.  The account is only a basic and preliminary account so as to present 
the basic concepts.  A more comprehensive account of complex systems theory and 
its relationship to Heidegger’s work is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Heidegger’s Comments on Systems 
Heidegger refers to his structure of worldhood as a system; 
The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, 'is constitutive for 
worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT 121/88] 
He then clarifies what he means.  He rejects the notion of a system as it applies to 
Dasein that can be understood mathematically, 
The phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata' - the "in-order-to", the "for-the-sake-
of", and the "with-which" of an involvement - is such that they resist any sort of mathematical 
functionalization; [BT 122/88] 
If this approach is taken aspects of Dasein existence is lost, this was discussed 
earlier.  Instead, 
They are rather relationships in which concernful circumspection as such already dwells. [BT 
122/88] 
As such this type of system is   
… so far from volatilizing the being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood 
of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as 
they are 'substantially' 'in themselves'. [BT 122/88] 
The sort of system he is referring to is not that which constitutes ‘systems of colours’ 
or a ‘system of philosophy’ which refers to a cohesive set of ideas of principals. He 
is referring to a dynamic system, one that exists as a dynamic process.   This is 
evident in that it is only the ongoing ‘living’ involvements of the many Daseins that 
constitute and maintain the world.  
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We can think of an electronic system, say an alarm system, which can be put down 
in a mathematical form which accurately represents the built form.  Heidegger is not 
referring to this type of system either. He is referring to a system in which the 
‘signals’ cannot be put into strict mathematical form without losing the basic 
character of the system itself, that which understands meaning.  For example, a 
chicken casserole is in the oven cooking away in the family’s favourite sauce.  As 
you enter the front door the aroma strikes you, and a flood of affective-tuning passes 
over you, the sense of familiarity, the feeling of warmth, comfort and belonging, the 
anticipation of the meal and so on.  How do you put this type of system into 
mathematical form and yet it has all the attributes of a system?  Surely as signals 
are passed around an electrical system and can trigger responses, so in Dasein, 
there are signals initially picked up by the senses that are understood as having 
meaning, and show up as ‘mattering’, and in turn, there are responses. Both are 
systems, just different types.  This is what Heidegger is getting at. 
In an exchange in the Heraclitus Seminars, we also get the insight that Heidegger 
understands being-in-the-world as incorporating its environment as part of a living 
system. In this, his reference to Uexkülls’ ecological work is particularly illuminating. 
Fink was Heidegger’s assistant;  
PARTICIPANT: Wittgenstein says an astounding thing in the Tractatus. Language is the 
extension of the organism. 
FINK: The only question is how "organism" is to be understood here, whether biologically or 
in a manner that human dwelling in the midst of what is essentially determined and bodiliness. 
HEIDEGGER: One can understand organism in the sense of Uexkülls or also as the 
functioning of the living system. In my lecture, which you mentioned, I have said that the 
stone is worldless, the animal world poor, and the human world-forming. 
FINK: It is thereby a question whether the world-poverty of the animal is a deficient mode of 
world-forming transcendence. It is questionable whether the animal in the human can be 
understood at all when we see it from the animal's viewpoint, or whether it is not a proper 
way that the human relates to the dark ground. 
HEIDEGGER: The bodily in the human is not something animalistic. The manner of 
understanding that accompanies it is something that metaphysics up till now has not touched 
on. [HS 146] (my underling) 
The lectures being referred to are the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, in 
which Heidegger address the world of animals.   Heidegger accepts that all animals 
are part of a living system. However, he differentiates between the living system for 
animals and that of humans, in that the world for the human is one that is meaningful 
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for Dasein in the sense that he uses the word.  The idea that Dasein is world-forming 
relates to the idea that world is based on worldhood and hence Dasein’s ongoing 
involvements. While animals have their ecological system, Dasein has its world. 
The idea of systems, however, should not be understood as being one in which 
‘feelings’ are substituted for some other form of information, or of understanding 
entities as things with functional relationships, this would still have the character of 
a mechanical system which Heidegger rejects, 
The phenomenon of the body is wholly unique and irreducible to something else, for instance, 
irreducible to mechanistic systems. One must be able to accept the phenomenon of the body 
as such in its intact being. I cannot "understand" something merely causal. That means that 
I can have no insight into how one thing is derived from something else, that is, how it 
originates out from it [ZS 186]  
It is a system whose constitutive aspects are essentially beyond our understanding. 
This, of course, does not prevent him from describing the characteristics of the 
system; it is just that all the individual, relational aspects cannot be comprehended, 
it is too complex.  He also rejects the concept of a human as a complex system in 
equilibrium.  In the Zollikon seminars he was commenting on a World Health 
Organization's report on psychosomatic disorders as reported by Schwidder in 
Journal of psychosomatic medicine (vol 11, no. 2 (1965): 146 ff.) The text reads:  
The individual is to be understood as a complex, dynamic system in an unstable state of 
equilibrium, acting and reacting to changes in the environment and in its own system ... 
If psychological and physiological processes are distinguished, one would be speaking about 
different aspects of one phenomenon... 
…. the double meaning of the adjective "psychosomatic,"... On one hand, it refers to the basic 
conception in medicine that an interaction of body and soul is fundamental for the study of all 
diseases. On the other hand, the same adjective describes how the influence of 
psychological factors is predominant in certain disorders. 
' "Stress". . . being burdened by events in the environment ... the decisive point is always the 
relationship, which exists between being burdened and the individual's inner capacity to deal 
with it. [ZS 199] 
Heidegger’s response is both decisive and informative, 
In such a conception being human is not there at all. Everything is switched over to a system 
of processes, to a state of equilibrium of such processes, determined by the environment and 
by a so-called inner [subjectivity]. The relationship between the environment and one's own 
system is not reflected on. [ZS 199] (my underlining) 
And the final quote; 
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In any case, one must by no means expect an understanding of the human being and his 
world from modern systems theories. In their essence, they all remain bound to the principle 
of causality, and thus they go along with the objectification of everything that is. In this way 
they have already blocked forever the view of the human being's proper being-in-the-world. 
[ZS 233] 
On the one hand, while Heidegger acknowledges in Being and Time that what he is 
describing can be understood in some way as a system, and his various comments 
over the next fifty years clarified this.221 On the other Heidegger is clear that it is not 
a mathematical system, it is not a mechanical system, it is not a closed bodily system 
reacting to the environment, and it is not some form of causal system.  
It is not clear from Heidegger’s comments to which ‘systems theories’ he was 
referring as even in the early part of last century the field was very broad.   However, 
since Heidegger’s time, there has been significant progress, albeit only among a 
minority of scholars and certainly not mainstream, in systems thinking that may be 
moving in a direction left open by Heidegger’s prohibitions and it is to these I now 
turn.  
Complex Systems: Emergence & Self Organisation 
One area of systems theory that is coming back into vogue is that of emergence. 
The concept of emergence is that there are emergent entities that "‘arise’ out of 
more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. " 
(O'Connor & Wong, 2016) 
While the idea of emergence is not new, it has generally received relatively little 
attention in the scientific or philosophic tradition.  Aspects of emergence are 
however evident in the early work of Husserl under the concept of founded modes 
of existence and the idea that a part is determined by the whole.  The language of 
Heidegger is also suggestive of emergence concepts.  For example, in some of his 
descriptions of Dasein; 
[Da-sein is] not something that could be simply found in extant man [CPE 207] 
Does the realm of the extant, the at-hand, coincide with the realm of entities in general? Or 
                                            
221 In this discussion I have not included the work from Chapter 7 covering aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the Greeks and the concept of prevailing, which I take as an early description of describing Nature in terms 
of emergence.    Two relevant quotes are as follows; 
“We speak of the nature of spirit, of soul, of the nature of the work of art, of the nature of the matter. Here φύσις 
does not mean that which prevails itself, but its prevailing as such, the essence, the inner law of a matter.” [FCM 
31]  
“The prevailing of what prevails here can be grasped as that which determines whatever prevails as an entity, 
that which makes entities.” [FCM 33] 
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is there any entity that, precisely due to the sense of its being, cannot be conceived as being 
at hand? In point of fact, the entity that can least of all be conceived as extant, at hand, the 
Dasein that in each instance we ourselves are. [BPP 119] [translation modified] 
I take it that Dasein is an ‘emergent entity’ whose structure is being-in-the-world, 
which in turn is founded on the body.  In the sense that emergence is understood 
there is no causal relationship, and Heidegger specifically talks about emergence in 
the sense I am using the term, for example, this from the Zollikon Seminars,  
However, with all these statements, the phenomena of memory and recalling are not touched 
on. All these [chemical-physical] things are merely conditions for the emergence of the 
phenomenon. They are not causes, and surely not memory itself. [ZS 202] (my underlining) 
An earlier type of emergence theory was known as process theory, and Alfred North 
Whitehead (1861-1947) was perhaps the best-known proponent in the early 
twentieth century.  Hegel can also be interpreted as having a process view 
underpinning his concept of dialectics. (Seibt, 2016)   Additionally, while not aligned 
with process philosophy, an emergence view appears in the work of the early 
atomists, and the concept of self-organization in nature is a philosophical position 
adopted by Kant.  I discuss these views in more detail below.  Heidegger is familiar 
with all these sources. He gave courses and seminars on Hegel's philosophy [HPS, 
HCE] as well as Kant’s philosophy [KPM, PIKC], I have already discussed his 
knowledge of the early Greek philosophers, and he was also familiar with 
Whitehead's work referring to him in passing several times in his work [BH, WCT, 
BCAP].   It is inconceivable that Heidegger was not aware of and familiar with these 
ideas.   
Seibt tells us that Process philosophy, 
… is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should 
be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place 
within it. 
 … While process philosophers insist that all within and about reality is continuously going on 
and coming about, they do not deny that there are temporally stable and reliably recurrent 
aspects of reality. But they take such aspects of persistence to be the regular behavior of 
dynamic organizations that arise due to the continuously ongoing interaction of processes. 
(Seibt, 2016, p. 1) 
The process view of the reality of the world stands in stark contrast to the substance 
or materialist view of the world, and this process view has an intellectual tradition 
going back to Heraclitus (circa 560 BCE) (Seibt, 2016).  Like most philosophical 
areas, there is no single agreed view concerning a process view other than the 
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common tenet that being is dynamic and that it is this dynamic nature that should 
be the primary focus of the way we understand the reality and our place in it. There 
is a strong resonance, at least conceptually, between the process view and aspects 
of Heidegger’s work.   
While the materialistic, reductionist approach has been dominant in most areas of 
scholarship during the twentieth century there is a contemporary resurgence 
occurring in the idea of emergence that is typified by the Philip Clayton and Paul 
Davies edited volume, The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist 
Hypothesis from Science to Religion in 2006(Clayton & Davies, 2006).   Emergence 
can be understood as the ‘scientific’ version of process philosophy. 
One of the leading scholars behind this re-emergence was Donald Campbell (1916-
1996), and one of his influential papers was on the concept of downward causation 
in hierarchical systems published in 1974 (Campbell, 1974).  The importance of this, 
is the idea that not only can one system emerge from another but that it can then 
influence the system from which it emerged(Campbell, 1974) a concept that is now 
generally accepted amongst emergence theorists(Clayton & Davies, 2006).  Why is 
this important?  To use a simple example, this argument supports the view that 
Dasein, as founded on the body can decide to raise its arm, and it goes up! In other 
words, Dasein, an entity with a mode of being that is not that of a material entity, is 
controlling the physical body!  The relationship between Dasein and the culture is 
another example. 
Paul Davies sets out the basic belief stance of the reductionists;  
Many physicists are self-confessed out-and-out strong reductionists. They believe that once 
the final building blocks of matter and the rules that govern them have been identified, then 
all of nature will, in effect, have been explained. This strong form of reductionism is 
sometimes known as ontological reductionism: the assertion that the whole really is, in the 
final analysis, nothing but the sum of the parts, and that the formulation of concepts, theories, 
and experimental procedures in terms of higher-level concepts is merely a convenience. 
(Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xi ff) 
In contrast to this majority view, he comments that a minority of scientists, 
emergentists, are challenging this account of nature and that many are what he calls 
strong emergentists a position in  
…  which it is asserted that the micro-level principles are quite simply inadequate to account 
for the system’s behaviour as a whole. (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii) 
This view recognizes that,  
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 … in practice the only way that the behaviour of many complex systems may be determined 
is by direct inspection or by simulation. In other words, one may not deduce merely from the 
principles that govern a class of systems how a specific individual system will in fact behave.  
Human behaviour, and even the behaviour of a simple organism such as a bacterium, 
probably falls into this category.  (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii)  
This sounds very much like Heidegger’s view of Dasein. He is determining the 
behaviour of the complex system, being-in-the-world, by direct inspection, an 
approach that Davies recognises as appropriate. 
A commonly accepted definition of emergence has developed by el-Hani and 
Pereira and includes four characteristics associated with emergent systems.  
1. Ontological physicalism: All that exists in the space-time world are the basic particles 
recognized by physics and their aggregates. 
2. Property emergence: When aggregates of material particles attain an appropriate level of 
organizational complexity, genuinely novel properties emerge in these complex systems. 
3. The irreducibility of the emergence: Emergent properties are irreducible to, and 
unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge. 
4. Downward causation: Higher-level entities causally affect their lower-level constituents. 
(Clayton, 2006, p. 2) 
Apart from the first point, this is consistent with Heidegger’s account.  The first point 
harks back to the very first Greek natural philosophers who argued from the position 
that all there is are basic elements. Heidegger's account supports the view that if 
something emerges, that is irreducible to and unpredictable from the lower level 
then this constitutes a genuine entity and not merely a property.  As such it can be 
considered as having its own ontological basis.  However, I suspect that the 
difference also relates to a different conception of ontology, in that Heidegger has 
split the entity from the ontological structure and conceives of the ontological 
structure as an organising principle, in line with the Aristotelian view. 
Clayton and Davies argue that the physicalist or reductionist accounts fails to 
adequately address many questions that scientists are raising particularly in the 
biological sciences but also to some extent in the physical sciences, answers that 
seem to be open to an emergentists approach.   (Clayton & Davies, 2006) . I would 
support this view and argue that the reductionist account fails to adequately address 
the phenomenon of ‘shedding life’, something that is accounted for in Heidegger’s 
work. 
I am not going to pursue this line any further. My aim was to raise the view of the 
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process philosophers, and the emergentists approach being adopted by some 
contemporary scientists and to indicate that Heidegger’s position is not as radical 
as it may first appear, and that it is both a plausible and accepted approach, at least 
in principle by many eminent scholars. 
Self-organising Systems 
The ‘One’ can be understood as the cultural norms.  It is not just the practices 
understood as the average everyday way of doing things, but it also refers to the 
averageness of the understanding and affective-capacities that underpins those 
way of doing things.  In that Heidegger states that he is describing Dasein in its 
average everydayness this can be understood as Heidegger describing “Mr or Ms 
Average Dasein” or the culture itself.  This is the approach taken by Haugeland, 
We are at last in a position to address the fundamental question for any interpretation of 
Being and Time: What is Dasein? According to the text, the anyone (pp. 126-30), the world 
(pp. 64, 364, and 380), language (p. 166), and even the sciences (p. 1 1) all have "Dasein's 
kind of being." We can make sense of this astonishing diversity if we understand Dasein to 
be the anyone and everything instituted by it: a vast intricate pattern-generated and 
maintained by conformism - of norms, normal dispositions, customs, sorts, roles, referral 
relations, public institutions, and so on. On this reading, the anyone [the One, or Das Man], 
the (every-day) world, and language are different coherent "subpatterns" within the grand 
pattern that is Dasein; they have Dasein's kind of being because each of them is Dasein 
(though none of them is all of Dasein). Within the anyone and all it institutes, the science of 
chemistry is a coherent subpattern: chemistry is Dasein-and so are philately, Christmas, and 
Cincinnati.  (Haugeland, 1982, p. 19)(my underlining & gloss) 
In this account, the culture itself is Dasein and is a complex and vast self-organising 
system (a pattern “generated and maintained by conformism”) and within this 
Dasein and its various worlds are different levels of sub-patterns or sub-systems 
that constitute the whole.  This interpretation has much going for it, but in the end, I 
don’t think it is valid, Heidegger, as I have shown throughout the work to date, makes 
too many references based on the actions of the individual Dasein. A better 
description, by way of analogy, is the relationship between the tribe or hive and the 
tribe member or individual bee.   
What Haugeland’s interpretation is suggestive of is the concept of self-organising 
systems, an approach now widely accepted in many fields of sciences, and one 
consistent with Heidegger’s comments on systems and his description of being-in-
the-world. Smith provides an introduction to chaos theory and self-organisation in 
his introductory book (Smith, 2007) and the following description has been largely 
drawn from this account.  The general concept of self-organization is the emergence 
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of order from a disordered group or mass of interacting parts. The order arises as a 
result of the interacting relationships between neighbouring elements, which in turn 
effect other neighbouring areas. The self-ordering occurs spontaneously, often 
precipitated by a random event in that there is no outside agency, no central 
controlling element and the ordered system is maintained by feedback loops 
throughout the system.  Once stabilised self-organising systems can be quite 
resilient with the system having a capacity to respond to damage by a ‘repair’ 
process that returns its stable self-organised state.   Chaos theory describes initial 
chaotic (complex, non-predictable) circumstances in which an ‘attractor’ 
spontaneously forms and around this ‘attractor’ an organised structure emerges.  
This organised structure is the self-organising system. 
This idea of order out of a sea of chaos is an idea that dates back to the early Greeks 
and is found in Heidegger’s reading of them as I have previously addressed.  
Heidegger is not the only philosopher to be influenced by this aspect of early Greek 
thinking.  Palmer(A. Palmer, 2012) has explored how the Renaissance thinkers read 
and were influenced by the work of the Roman philosopher and atomist, 
Lucretius(94-55/51BCE).  His work On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura) is 
the largest and most complete surviving record of the ancient atomists theories that 
extends back to Leucippus and Democritus (460-370BCE) and was taught by 
Epicurus (341-270BCE). The atomists argued that the universe was comprised of an 
infinite number of small particles (atoms) in chaotic motion that, over time, arranged 
in various ordered forms some of which emerged as stable entities, without the need 
of a grand designer or God.  This included the formation of a “wide variety of 
creatures, but that only those suited to their environments survived to the present” 
(A. Palmer, 2012, p. 395) 
Descartes discusses the concept of self-organisation in his posthumously published 
book The World(Descartes & Gaukoger(editor), 2004)without specifically referring 
to the term.  The phenomenon was first called “self-organisation” by Immanuel Kant 
(Keller, 2008) in his 1790 book Critique of Judgment. Kant was addressing the 
question of what is a living organism in terms of the special characteristics that 
distinguish them from inanimate objects.  He established a maxim that defines an 
organism as follows: 
 … an organized natural product is one in which every part is reciprocally both end and 
means. In such a product nothing is in vain, without an end, or to be ascribed to a blind 
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mechanism of nature. (Kant, 2007, p. 376) 
An important point in this maxim is that the end is not outside the organism, it is not 
serving some external purpose. This has important implications for science as he 
goes on to argue that in science teleology can only be considered a meaningful 
concept if it can be found in nature and that organisms provide such a case. They 
are beings,  
… first afford objective reality to the conception of an end that is an end of nature and not a 
practical end. They supply natural science with the basis for a teleology  .. a way of judging 
its objects on a special principle that it would otherwise be absolutely unjustifiable to introduce 
into that science. (Kant, 2007, p. 376)  
In comparing the production of a natural product, an organism, to that of a tool, Kant 
argues that there is a fundamentally different process, and it is here that the term 
self-organising is introduced,  
In such a natural product as this every part is thought as owing its presence to the agency of 
all the remaining parts, and also as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, that 
is as an instrument, or organ. But this is not enough—for it might be an instrument of art, and 
thus have no more than its general possibility referred to an end. On the contrary the part 
must be an organ producing the other parts—each, consequently, reciprocally producing the 
others. No instrument of art can answer to this description, but only the instrument of that 
nature from whose resources the materials of every instrument are drawn—even the 
materials for instruments of art. Only under these conditions and upon these terms can such 
a product be an organized and self-organized being, and, as such, be called a natural end. 
(Kant, 2007, pp. 373-4) 
Keller notes that on Kant’s account an organism “is not merely self-steering, self-
governing, and self-maintaining; it is also self-organizing.”  (Keller, 2008, p. 49) Not 
only are natural organisms things of this world, not requiring a creationist 
explanation, but they are also “both cause and effect of itself” (Kant, 2007, p. 370), 
in other words self-generating.  Further, in the opening lines of the above-quoted 
passage, there is a description of the concept of the whole determining the parts.  
As such, what we have is a description of the being of living organisms with many 
of the characteristics that Heidegger calls upon in his account of Dasein. 
In the generations following Kant, the phenomenon of emergence is evident in the 
work of a number of philosophers. O’Connor and Wong argue that the British 
empiricists John Stewart Mills (1806–1873), is referring to this phenomenon when 
he is describing the difference between living and nonliving things.  The following is 
a passage from Mills from his A System of Logic quoted by O’Connor and Wong,  
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All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, 
and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, 
which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any 
of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances 
considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge 
of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it 
is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever 
amount to the action of the living body itself. (O'Connor & Wong, 2016, pp. 2-3) 
What is evident in Mills account is that he argues that all organised bodies are made 
of the same stuff, however, in the “phenomena of life” it is the arrangement of the 
material that produces life. However, what emerges in ‘life’ does not resemble the 
physical material from which it is comprised.  it is not on the basis of a “mere 
summing up” the basic material from which the entities of living things is constituted.  
In other words, ‘life’ is founded on the ready-to-hand but the ready-to-hand cannot 
account for life.  Mills position reflects Heidegger’s account that everything is 
founded on the ready-to-hand, but this is not an ontological founding. 
It was a contemporary of Mills, the nineteenth-century British philosopher George 
Lewes (1817-1878) who first used the term emergent.  Lewes first used the term 
when drawing the distinction between actions that produce a result (resultant) that 
is simply the sum of the acting forces and components and cases where the result 
cannot be explained by a tracing back (i.e. a reductionist process) to these 
components, in which case he refers to the result as an ‘emergent’;  
Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their 
directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every 
resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and 
commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion 
to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-
operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these 
are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. (Blitz, 1992, 
p. 80)(my underlining) 
In summary, the concepts of emergence, chaos and complex self-organising 
systems are not new and have a long intellectual heritage, grounded not in other 
world metaphysics but in serious scholarly attempts to make intelligible the 
processes of nature in a logical and coherent manner that reflects what is observed 
in nature.  The issue is not the credibility of this line of thinking it is why it still 
continues to dwell outside, as Davies has indicated, the mainstream thinking of most 
physicists.  Notwithstanding this, the approach is now widely used in areas of 
science where complexity and apparent non-linear relationships give rise to new 
 
617 
emergent phenomenon and where the characteristics of the phenomenon cannot 
be explained by a reductionist account based on the constituting elements.    
Perhaps the most well know applications are in the development of neural networks 
in information technology which is now the main approach in artificial intelligence 
and in the study of weather formation and prediction (Smith, 2007), however the 
applications are found in almost every field of science, chemistry (e.g. formation of 
crystalline structures), biology (e.g. evolutionary biology, social behaviour of insects 
and mammals, population collapses, vision systems, etc), physics (e.g.  
thermodynamics, astrophysics), human behaviour sciences (e.g. market 
economics, crowd behaviour, culture, learning, etc), neuroscience (e.g. function of 
neural processes, consciousness), theology (e.g. process theology, divine action.)  
(Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Clayton & Davies, 2006; Feltz, Crommelinck, & 
Goujon, 2006; Orsucci & Sala, 2009; Smith, 2007).  There are many other examples, 
but this is sufficient to illustrate the relevance to these theories.   
Using the concept of emergence and self-organising systems, it is possible to talk 
in broad terms of the higher emergent level and the lower or apriori level from which 
it emerges.  An important aspect of the phenomenon is the notion of downward 
causality which is an essential feature if the system is to be self-organising.  
Downward causality refers to the phenomenon that not only does the higher level 
emerge from the lower level but that there are feedback mechanisms from the higher 
level back to the lower level which changes the functioning of the lower level, which 
in turn affects the higher level.  Downwards causality has been the subject of 
scholarly inquiry, especially in biological systems, for more than forty 
years(Campbell, 1974). While this it is still outside the normative position of science 
understood strictly in physicalist terms, work is being done to understand the 
implications of downward causality in areas such as cancer biology(Soto, 
Sonnenschein, & Miquel, 2008)and its implications are being explored more widely 
in physics(Davies, 2006b). 
Without reference to the concepts of emergent systems one aspect of systems 
theory that has been widely accepted and used, perhaps since before written 
history, is the idea of a feedback mechanism.  A thermostat on any heating system 
is an example of a simple feedback mechanism.  Any mechanism that regulates the 
functioning of a system in some way, based on monitoring an aspect of the system 
itself, or the status of the what the system is influencing (e.g. temperature, water 
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levels, price changed, pressure, etc.) are feedback mechanisms.  An ancient flood 
irrigation system using water channels and sluice valves is another example. In this 
case, a human agent does the monitoring of the water flow and then opens or closes 
the valve to alter the flow of water.  The concepts of system monitoring and 
regulation are ubiquitous in nature, and most of the human senses are designed for 
this purpose.  Once understood along these lines, we are linking back to Heidegger's 
concept of the receptive-perceptive capabilities and the way he describes Dasein’s 
relatedness to the world.  The ’One’ also acts as a feedback mechanism in 
Heidegger’s work, maintaining a particular conception of world. 
While the philosophers I have referred to identify the phenomenon, there was no 
substantial philosophical investigation carried out.  One of the problems arising from 
Kant’s work is that while it addresses the character of organisms and together with 
his earlier work in the Critique of Pure Reason, it provides an account of living and 
nonliving entities it did not address the apparent difference between humans and 
other living things.   The German philosopher Friedrich Shelling (1759-1805) 
identified this problem in Kant’s work and referred to it as the problem of human 
freedom, and he sought not only to address this but the other great legacy problem 
from Kant, the nature of the relationship of the subject with the object world.  
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1846), a German poet and friend of Schelling’s, argued 
that this relationship could never be understood from only one side and that the 
subject-object relationship in consciousness is grounded in “a whole of which 
subject and object are parts” which Hölderlin termed ‘being’.   (Bowie, 2016) This 
idea remained influential for Schelling throughout his career. 
Schelling’s philosophy is almost as difficult to access as is Heidegger’s but his 
argument, in simplified terms, is that all of nature is one unity within which all else 
are parts. It is the essence of nature itself that has produced human subjectivity that 
enables it to not only understand itself but other things in nature.  In Schelling’s work 
nature can be thought of as a form of ‘super-subject’ of which all else is a 
part.(Bowie, 2016)Bowie cites a passage from Schelling’s work discussing the 
nature of human identity, and in it, we see similar ideas to that of Heidegger, “for 
being, actual, real being is precisely self-disclosure/revelation” (Bowie, 2016, p. 14). 
In a 1936 lecture series on Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom 
Heidegger clarifies Schelling’s concept of human freedom; 
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Schelling's treatise has nothing to do with this question of the freedom of the will, which is 
ultimately wrongly put and thus not a question at all. For freedom is here, not the property of 
man, but the other way around: Man is at best the property of freedom. Freedom is the 
encompassing and penetrating nature, in which man becomes man only when he is anchored 
there. That means the nature of man is grounded in freedom. But freedom itself is a 
determination of true being in general which transcends all human being. Insofar as man is 
as man, he must participate in this determination of being, and man is, insofar as he brings 
about this participation in freedom.  (Key sentence: Freedom not the property of man, but 
rather: man the property of freedom.)  [STHF 9] (gloss in the orginal) 
Reading this carefully, the way Heidegger is interpreting Schelling is that freedom is 
what constitutes the essence of ‘man’, and as such ‘transcends all human being’, 
and it is on the basis of participating in freedom that in turn, we experience our own 
freedom.  This phenomenon is precisely the phenomenon that Heidegger is 
addressing in his Dasein analytic.  Schelling never proceeded down the path of an 
analysis of the structure of freedom, this does not occur until Heidegger’s work, and 
then with different labels and metaphors.  What we have in Schelling is a clear 
transition from simply recognising the phenomenon of emergence as the basis for 
distinguishing the living (organisms) from the nonliving, he is applying the same idea 
to distinguish the human experience of living, from living things of nature.  The link 
between Schelling and Hölderlin also helps shed light on Heidegger’s engagement 
with Hölderlin in the later part of his career when he gave three separate lecture 
courses on Hölderlin’s poems222. 
The two Kantian problems that Shelling is addressing are dealt with by Heidegger, 
not directly but as a consequence of his ontological research.  His premise, as will 
be recalled, is that we first need to start with a clarification of the meaning of being.  
By being, he refers to whatever it is that both determines an entity as the entity it is 
and is the basis of our understanding entities.  The results of his investigation into 
the being of Dasein also addresses the subjective-objective divide by demolishing 
the validity of the very question and putting in its place the unity of being-in-the-
world, which on my interpretation is an emergent entity. 
At the start of the thesis, it was evident that Heidegger is influenced by the Ancient 
Greeks, particularly Aristotle and the work of Husserl223. However, in terms of 
                                            
222 The three lecture courses are the Winter 1934/35 course on Hölderlin’s hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”, 
the Winter 1941/42 course on the hymn, “Remembrance” and the summer 1942 course on the hymn, “The Ister”. 
All courses explored Hölderlin’s understanding of being as reflected in his poetry. 
223 There are influences, for example Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Kant (Dreyfus, 1991; Kisiel, 1995) however 
there has been no need to explore these philosophers to shed light on Heidegger’s work.   
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Heidegger’s systems thinking it is evident that it is not only the Greeks that may 
have been influential.  Heidegger was not working in a vacuum, and the concepts 
he has been drawing upon are evident in the philosophical literature with which he 
was familiar and with which he engaged.  Like Einstein, his originality may not be in 
the observations or some of the concepts but the way in which he pulled them 
together and then pushed them to their logical conclusion using a robust strict 
empiricist method. This is not to minimise the intellectual effort involved; the result 
is remarkable and genuinely novel. 
In this next section, I will discuss one example of feedback systems that introduce 
what is called a double loop mechanism.  The example is Argyris’ model of double-
loop learning and its application to individual and organisational level behaviour.  
(Argyris, 2004; Argyris, 2004)  I have chosen this example as it is a systems model 
that addresses the aspects of understanding and decision making and I can use the 
model to draw comparisons to Heidegger’s account.  Having described Argyris’ 
model, I then present an alternative ‘Heideggerian’ model which I contend is a better 
descriptive account of the phenomena and has wider application.  This model is one 
practical aspect of my interpretation of Heidegger’s work.  Following this, I present 
a simple schematic account of being-in-the-world from a higher-level – lower-level 
perspective which complements the more detailed model. 
Learning Systems 
The Argyris double-loop learning model is based on the premise that there are 
underlying values and beliefs, what are termed mental models or theories-in-use224, 
that inform decision making and behaviour.  The idea is that decision making, and 
behaviour is based on the mental-models and will continue in the same consistent 
way (first loop) until there is some change in the underlying mental-model (second 
or double-loop).  This is represented in Figure 29.  To bring about conscious change 
in decision making so as to change (improve) the outcome of those decisions the 
second loop has to be deliberately initiated.  In this model, the person is a self-
contained and independent actor receiving information about the consequences of 
actions in relation to an independent world.  
In Figure 30, I have presented a model based on being-in-the-world, a Heideggerian 
version.  Significant differences include the addition of the influence of the culture 
                                            
224 Sometimes referred to as the theory in action. 
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(the ‘One), the inclusion of receptivity, the identification of possible responses (which 
exist even within a given ‘mental model’), and the removal of the concept of a model 
which Heidegger rejects.  For Heidegger, the encounter with the world itself is the 
basis of ‘the model’. Accordingly, Argyris’ mental model (Figure 29 Loop 2) is 
removed and replaced by the structures of understanding and affective-capacities 
as part of the main Loop 1 (Figure 30).  Based on Heidegger’s analysis the process 
will include a review against the norms of the culture and is not one that typically 
takes place in a deliberate, conscious fashion (Loop 2).  This reflects the conforming 
process of Dasein within a culture.  Loop 3 relates to deliberate review processes 
which typically does not happen, but which Heidegger argues is essential in order 
to have an authentic response.  There is in the system a tension between Dasein’s 
current facticity (loop 1), the constant pull of conformity (loop 2) and any deliberate 
attempt to take action contrary (loop 3) to the other two influences.  An example of 
this tension is the understanding of time as a constant in the earlier discussion 
concerning Einstein’s work and in the emergent character of Dasein in Heidegger’ 
work.   
 
Figure 29 Argyris Double-Loop Learning Model 
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I am not going to explore in any depth the similarities and difference between these 
two models; my intent is to show that Argyris and Heidegger both appear to be 
dealing with the same basic phenomenon notwithstanding they have different 
interpretations.  The significant difference which is not easy to build into the 
depiction of the model is that for Heidegger, Dasein is not an independent, self-
sufficient actor.  There is a suggestion of this in my use of terminology and the use 
of ‘projection’.  Argyris’ model is based on the standard Cartesian separation of 
subject-object or self-world.   
In the Argyris model, the mental model or theory-in-use is what informs people in 
relation to their judgements, planning and ways of implementing and assessing or 
 









































reviewing outcomes of actions and is based on a mixture of knowledge, values and 
beliefs.  (Argyris & Schön, 1974) What is more, according to Argyris few people are 
aware of these models or theories that determine how they behave. (Argyris, 1980)  
When we are called upon to articulate what it is we are doing, we typically, according 
to Argyris, present an espoused theory: 
When someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he 
usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to 
which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, 
the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use. (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 
6-7) 
This distinction between the theory-in-action and espoused theory allows Argyris to 
develop a research methodology that enables inquiries into the congruence 
between behaviour and espoused values. (Argyris, 1980) Argyris’ field is 
organisational effectiveness and involves the study of the inter-relationship between 
the organisation and the individual and between individuals within the organisation 
so as to improve organisational performance.  The implication of this model is that 
the ‘real’ person is not reflected in what the person espouses but in their behaviour.  
The similarities to Heidegger’ view of the ontic phenomenon concerning Dasein are 
obvious enough.  
One example of the application of this Argyris’ model is the concept of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Argyris(Argyris, 1976) gives the example of a teacher assigned a class 
of students, and the teacher believes that it is a class of ‘stupid’ students (theory-in-
use).  The belief is communicated to the students who in turn behave, on 
observation by the teacher, like ‘stupid’ students and so confirms the initial 
judgement.  Argyris gives the example that one way this can occur is for the teacher 
to give a test that contains difficult questions that the students have difficulty with, 
the results confirm the original assessment.  From the student perspective, the same 
mechanism works in that underlying beliefs concerning their ability to learn are 
confirmed by the teacher’s actions.  For Argyris, the teacher has failed to recognise 
the theory-in-use at work which is in contradiction to an espoused theory of good 
practice, etc. which is at odds with the behaviour.  Argyris recognises the difficulty 
in identifying and then changing one’s theory in use(Argyris, 1985) and as part of 
this, he advocates the use of ‘hard data’(Argyris, 1985), critical observation of 
behaviour and so on.   
Interestingly his example appears to be an attempt to explain how group conformity 
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arises.  He is arguing that the students’ own mental models are shaped by the action 
of the group ‘norm’ setter, in this case, the teacher.  The phenomenon of conforming 
one’s behaviour to comply with another’s expectations is known as the Pygmalion 
effect(Fiske & Taylor, 2013)and the influence of the teacher expectation on student 
outcomes is a well-researched phenomenon(Rosenthal, 1997).   
Heidegger’s model applied to the above example accounts for the phenomenon and 
provides the opportunity for even deeper analysis.  The initial level of analysis 
between the stated approach of the teacher and observed behaviour is available as 
in Argyris.  Under the Heideggerian model, it is recognised that the teacher will be 
exhibiting behaviours (concernful and solicitudinous dealings) based on the 
teacher’s existing understanding and receptivity.  For most teachers, this is 
determined, within a range of averageness, as determined by the ‘One’. This would 
include not only the general community but also the culture in which the teacher was 
educated, the local staff room culture and so on.  While the person’s teaching 
practice may be outside the normative range, it will still be influenced by these 
factors, and there will be a continuous ‘pull’ to conform. The origins of the ‘stupid’ 
student view may not just lie within the teacher but the ‘One’.  While it is possible for 
a single person to change, as Argyris is advocating, if the source of the 
understanding lies more in the ‘One’ then this is difficult. A culture change (i.e. 
change the ‘One’) is more likely to be the appropriate strategy.  The Argyris model 
focuses on the independent individual; the Heideggerian model focuses on the 
person as part of a we-world.  In the above example, the emphasis would include 
the ‘One’ that influences the teacher and the ‘One’ that influences the students.  
Heidegger’s approach also provides a basis for investigating the meaning of such 
concepts of teaching, teacher and student.  In relation to the self-fulfilling prophecy 
while there is the possibility of, not deliberately, administering tests to produce the 
confirming results this is not required for a ‘self-fulling’ prophecy hypothesis.  In that 
the teacher’s affective-tuning is based on ‘stupid students’ then the focus of the 
teacher’s attention will be on this aspect of student behaviour in general as it is 
observed in the class, not just based on tests. Even in ordinary everyday tests and 
assignments, attention will be drawn to what ‘matters’ for the teacher which is 
influenced by the affective-tuning of ‘stupid students’.  Consequently, the teacher’s 
attention will be drawn to the deficits of the students’ performance and not the 
positives, which will be either not seen or put aside as not typical.  Every ‘poor’ 
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performance confirms the affective-tuning, it doesn’t require the staging of ‘hard’ 
tests.  
The Pygmalion effect functions within the students to modify their self-understanding 
and expectations (affective-capacities) to reflect the primary representative of the 
‘One’ in the classroom, i.e. the teacher.  Further comparisons against the ‘brainy’ 
kids confirm the status by exception whereas peer evaluation confirms the student 
as part of the mob.  The Dasein-with of ‘teacher of stupid students’ will influence the 
development of the reciprocal Dasein-with of ‘stupid students of the teacher’. 
The difficulty in changing is not simply related to cognition as Argyris suggests.  The 
students will show up as ‘stupid’ students to the teacher because of the sight 
associated with considerateness and forbearance [BT 159/123].  As discussed, 
based on Heidegger’s work while a teacher may make such a change (loop 3 in 
Heidegger’s model) the change would be extremely difficult and effective strategies 
would also require a change to the ‘One’, i.e. organisation culture.   However, there 
is still the issue to clarify the meaning of teacher, student and the nature of 
understanding based on a being-in-the-world; the Argyris model does not address 
this.  In summary, Heidegger’s model would allow for the investigation of outcomes 
of teacher-student interactions at all these various levels whereas Argyris’ model is 
designed for organisational effectiveness, which itself is determined by and within 
broader industry norms(Argyris, 2004).  
I take Argyris’ work in terms of his identification of various ontic phenomena as 
support for Heidegger’s account.  Argyris’ model had far more detail than I have 
provided however I believe I have accurately presented the basic thrust of the 
model.  Albeit additional work would be required, on the face of it Heidegger’s 
‘model’ is not only able to ‘explain’ the phenomenon that Argyris’ model addresses 
but opens up greater lines of inquiry and questioning concerning the basis of 
behaviour and understanding. 
The Heideggerian model that I have presented, I take as the basic model for 
Dasein’s basic mode of dealing with entities in the world. 
Application of Emergent Concepts 
I read Heidegger as working within an emergentists framework and as such within 
a tradition that has an intellectual history extending back over two thousand five 
hundred years and one that is relevant to scholarship today.  Heidegger’s 
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description of being-in-the-world is consistent with this view. 
There are two points that need to be raised. Firstly, in relation to the discussions so 
far, and this was exhibited in the Kant discussion, the self-organising approach was 
confined to the physical entity, the organism.  There was an echo of the previously 
cited approach by Schwidder in Journal of psychosomatic medicine that Heidegger 
refers to in the Zollikon Seminars,  
The individual is to be understood as a complex, dynamic system in an unstable state of 
equilibrium, acting and reacting to changes in the environment and in its own system… [ZS 
199] 
This is a view that reflects, for example, a holistic approach that incorporates ‘the 
whole’ person and makes room for psychosomatic medicine.   However, Heidegger 
rejects it; 
In such a conception being human is not there at all. Everything is switched over to a system 
of processes, to a state of equilibrium of such processes, determined by the environment and 
by a so-called inner [subjectivity]. The relationship between the environment and one's own 
system is not reflected on. [ZS 199] (my underlining) 
His objections highlight two critical differences in Heidegger’s work that are part of 
the innovations that Heidegger has introduced to the emergentists perspective.  
First, he differentiates between the physical processes and the ‘being human’ i.e. 
Dasein.  Second, existing approaches ignore the way “one’s own system” is in 
relationship with the environment, the very heart of Heidegger’s approach.  I take it 
that “one’s own system” is whatever it is that is described by the structure of being-
in-the-world.   These objections are satisfied by understanding Dasein as an 
emergent entity arising from the “relationship between the environment and one's 
own system”, Heidegger’s great breakthrough!   
An aspect in relation to the emergentists account that may arise relates to the 
question; “How?”.  What is the mechanism by which we get from the lower level to 
the upper level?  This takes us right back to the nature of Heidegger’s inquiry itself.  
The how is a causal question based on an understanding of the physical properties, 
the forces acting on them, the nature of the possible interactions and so on.  While 
this is a legitimate line of inquiry, it is irrelevant from the perspective of Heidegger’s 
methodology and ‘good’ science can be achieved using alternative approaches as 
has been illustrated by the cases of Fourier and Einstein and as argued by Peirce.  
In Heidegger’s work, the structures he develops acknowledges that there is a bi-
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directional relationship that goes between the body’s biological systems and Dasein; 
it is just that this is irrelevant for Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein.  Heidegger’s 
methodology, therefore, addresses the fact that at the moment science has no idea 
how this interface occurs, and the puzzle is typified by what is called the ‘the mystery 
of consciousness’225.  Heidegger’s approach is also consistent with Davies’ 
comment that “in practice, the only way that the behaviour of many complex systems 
may be determined is by direct inspection or by simulation” and when it comes to 
predicting the behaviour of an individual in the system “one may not deduce merely 
from the principles that govern a class of systems how a specific individual system 
will in fact behave.” (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii) 
That Dasein is regarded by Heidegger as an emergent entity is clear from his 
descriptions and discussions in various texts, for example, his comments in relation 
to Schwidder referred to above.  But there are other clear indications. That 
everything on the higher level is founded on the stuff of nature is made very clear 
by Heidegger, he states that “everything is founded” on the substantiality “which 
belongs to Things of Nature” [92/63]. I have previously discussed that what 
Heidegger meant by founded was a necessary but not causal relationship, i.e. it is 
emergent.  In the earlier discussions on Dasein and the body I pointed out, for 
example, that Heidegger acknowledged that there are correlates of brain activity 
associated with the experiences of Dasein, however, he denies that these are 
causally sufficient to account for the experiences. To put this in the language of 
emergence, the lower level organic processes are necessary for, the higher level 
lived experiences of Dasein, but those experiences cannot be reduced to the 
organic processes.  
If it is accepted that Dasein is an emergent entity, then a key question that arises is; 
How can Dasein influence the body? The fact that we do not know ‘how’ is irrelevant 
to the consideration of Dasein as an entity.  That the functioning of a Dasein at the 
higher level can influence the body, i.e. the lower level, is self-evident.  Searle’s 
example that when he wants to raise his arm, it goes up(Searle, 1983) is a very 
simple and elegant example of this principle.  
Taking Heidegger’s account as an emergentists description then this can be 
                                            
225 This remains the case notwithstanding substantial work has been done in identifying correlates of neuronal 
activity and Dasein’s functioning and lived experiences. 
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presented as a basic schematic (refer Figure 31).  There is more work to do on 
clarifying these emergent relationships. However, the schematic is sufficient for the 
purposes of this thesis.   
In the model, the lower level is a necessary condition of the higher level, but it does 
not cause the higher level to come into being, and that actions at the higher level 
can result in changes in the lower level.   
This model is consistent with Heidegger’s account and emergent/self-organising 
principles.  It also provides the basis for reconciling apparently divergent views in 
different fields. For example, in the study of depression one account, the minority 
view, depression is seen a ‘social’ phenomenon concerning the person and their 
relationship with the world. (Blazer, 2005) The alternative normative account is 
depression as a disease or some other dysregulation of the biological system as 
indicated by such things as chemical imbalances. (Pescosolido et al., 2010)  Under 
the Heideggerian emergent model, both accounts are combined and simply 
reflecting different aspects of the same phenomenon.  
While the Heideggerian model does not rule out pathological aetiology for conditions 
such as depression it does open up the way of studying the phenomenon as 
 

































something that occurs at both levels. Allowing both aspects in an account of 
depression provides a far richer understanding and avenues for interventions.  It 
may be that the aetiology of a depression can be at either level!   
Summary 
One of the themes that arises periodically in this thesis is that throughout history the 
same phenomena is observed by scholars and that these observations are then 
subject to differing interpretive and theoretical accounts.  The work of Argyris is a 
case in point.  Even the phenomenon of emergence and chaos theory have 
similarities to the descriptive accounts extending back to the earlier Greeks. The 
challenge is to be able to move past the challenges associated with language and 
metaphors used in interpretation in each prior era and bring into view the 
descriptions of the various phenomena themselves and identify possible new 
aspects that have not been considered.  This is what I have attempted to do 
throughout the thesis and is the approach taken in this chapter. 
In this section I have outlined an alternative way of interpreting Heidegger’s work in 
terms of emergence and complex systems, but still within an empiricist framework.  
Taken from this perspective Heidegger’s Dasein analytic is a plausible account of 
Dasein as an emergent entity, as is his concept of the ready-to-hand and world.  It 
is acknowledged that the emergentists position and this would include Heidegger 
on my reading, is still not the normative position in science or philosophy.  All that is 
required in accepting the Heideggerian position is to relinquish the dogmatic stance 
associated with physicalism.  
In the next chapter, I look at some examples of the suitability and possible 




CHAPTER 20: APPLICATION AND RELEVANCE OF DASEIN 
ANALYTIC. 
In Chapter 11 I claim that Heidegger intended his work of the Dasein analytic to be 
used in research in a broad number of fields including history, biology, and 
psychology [ BT 41/20; 71/45]. Based on my interpretation this claim should now be 
able to be explored.  If the Dasein model proves, at least on a preliminary basis, to 
be suitable for such inquiries, then I take this as evidence for Heidegger’s 
‘usefulness’ claim and as evidence for the model itself.  I have chosen two fields 
against which to apply the model, the first associated with historical studies and the 
second with the medical and psychiatric issues associated with neglect and abuse 
in early childhood. I then bring the thesis back to its starting point, the experience of 
shedding life. 
In relation to the historical studies, my approach is to look first at my earlier view of 
historical studies and then at several historical texts with which I am familiar.  This 
section does not present a critical discussion of the underlying theoretical positions 
in these fields, that is a more significant piece of work. It is an initial attempt to 
identify the connection between Heidegger’s work and this field of scholarship and 
indicate that it holds possibilities as a useful interpretative approach. The emphasis 
in this part is on the application of the ‘One’ as the basis for interpreting history and 
contemporary events at the cultural level. 
For the second area, the impact of abuse and neglect on the development of 
children, I use the work of Bruce Perry and a case study he presents in his book 
The Boy Who Was Raised as a Dog and Other Stories from a Child Psychiatrist's 
Notebook (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008).  Heidegger’s thesis is that the individual Dasein 
is determined by the interaction of Dasein and the environment in which it is raised 
and if this is the case then evidence for this should be available in ‘breakdown’ 
cases.  I speculated that such a ‘breakdown’ case would be situations of material 
abuse and neglect in early childhood.  This would be indicative of a deficient or 
abnormal environment during development which in turn should be reflected in the 
behaviour of the person.  The Case study and research considered supports this 
account.  The emphasis also discusses the possible correlative changes in the body, 
particularly the brain, that arises as a result of the early environmental conditions.  
This must be the case if Heidegger’s claim of the applicability of his model to biology 
is to hold.  This correlation is evident in the case studies explored.  
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The final part brings the thesis back to the impact of changes in the environment of 
adults and the experience of shedding life.  Given that I commenced the thesis with 
this discussion I do not dwell on this topic but do extend it in the light of the thesis 
discussions. 
This chapter completes the work on interpreting Heidegger’ Dasein analytic for this 
thesis.  In the next chapter, I apply this interpretation together with aspects of 
Heidegger’s work on death to specifically address the phenomena of ‘shedding life’ 
in the context of the Dasein analytic. 
Section 1: Dasein Model -  History and Culture  
Introduction 
In the discussion to date, I have provided support for the concept that Dasein’s 
cultural heritage will shape its understanding and affective-capacitates (e.g. 
emotions). This will determine the way entities are intelligible for Dasein, how they 
show up as mattering and this, in turn, establishes a certain limit on the range of 
responses available to Dasein. This was most dramatically illustrated in the case of 
honour killings.   
In the following, I look at the relevance of the Dasein analytic to historical studies.  
This is not a detailed critical comparison, and I confine the discussion to accounts 
with which I am familiar.  What emerges is a possible trend recognising the same 
phenomena Heidegger is addressing in historical analysis as well as highlighting 
ways in which an understanding of the Dasein analytic may enhance the nature of 
inquiry in this field.  In summary, it supports the validity and usefulness of the Dasein 
analytic. 
My Early Encounter with History 
At school, I found history interesting, but more from the perspective of the story of 
adventure.  The accounts we read were of great battles, conquest, and exploration, 
of heroic figures transcending impossible obstacles through sheer force of will, 
courage and inspirational leadership.  At least that is what I saw on the pages.   
There was the occasional villain, England’s King John for instance, but even this 
was a story that ended with the triumph of the Magna Carta and all that followed.   
History was the story of the ‘big men’ of history and dates, always the sequence of 
dates! History was an unfolding, almost inevitable progression and with few 
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exceptions, the heroes of this historical narrative were white, British, and male.  This 
history was also reflected in the movies I would see, although by this time the 
English spoken was often with an American accent.  Generally, history was 
portrayed as a clash between good and evil, of ‘man’ against the wilds of nature or 
of the civilised taming the savage.  As I grew older, while still enjoying a 
swashbuckling yarn, this type history seemed thin and intellectually unsatisfying. It’s 
not that I rejected this view, I didn’t. I bought into it, even though I sensed an 
inadequacy of the accounts.  At the time I did not even recognise one of the main 
premises, the superiority of enlightened reason over the primitive and ignorant rule 
of the passions.  I am sure that the journals of professional historians took a more 
critical approach, but this was not reflected in the books, films and even 
documentaries I had access to all those years ago.  
Over the years I retained a casual interest in history, but it was more in the direction 
of the history of science and my heroes, even now, became the conquerors of 
mystery using not the power of force but the power of the intellect.  Without any 
deliberate intent, I shifted from understanding the world in terms of brute power to 
intellectual power with a shift of narrative from exclusively British to one of Western 
European.  I understood the Scientific Revolution and the ideals of the 
Enlightenment as representing the emergence of humankind into a ‘next’ stage of a 
blossoming fulfilment of evolution’s destiny, one that should, for altruistic reasons, 
be shared. 
However, this posed a significant conundrum for me, for while I admired, and still 
do, the achievement of those pioneering scientists, I found aspects of European 
history deeply disturbing.  The brutality, for example, of the ‘conquests’ of the 
Americas and the oppression that inevitably followed together with the propensity, 
exhibited most dramatically throughout the twentieth century, for inflicting mass 
death on each other by various means.  
This was my relationship with history prior to studying Heidegger. I now turn to a 
specific aspect of history that I recently explored from a Heideggerian perspective, 
the response to African-Americans is some parts of the USA in the twentieth century. 
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The Souls of Black Folks226  
Over the years as my sense of social justice and fairness developed I also became 
aware of what seemed to be the hidden dark side of ‘British’ and Australian history, 
the treatment of people perceived to be ‘non-white’, the indigenous peoples of 
Australia and North America and African-Americans for example.  What confronted 
me was both the treatment of the people and that such treatment stood in stark 
contrast to the Enlightenment ideals.  I felt both a sense of deep sorrow for the pain, 
loss and dispossession associated with the treatment but also a sense of betrayal 
as none of this was disclosed in any meaningful way in the historical narratives of 
the culture. Indeed, it flew in the face of the nobility inherent in those accounts.  None 
of the histories I read could account for what happened.  Document yes. Give 
testimony to individual suffering yes.  But provide an adequate account, no. The 
Dasein Analytic helps in both understanding these events and in possible 
intervention strategies for future consideration. 
For centuries a significant proportion of white Europeans held the belief that people 
with 'black' skin did not have souls, were sub-human and effectively no different to 
beasts of the field and so could be treated as such.  They were not 'persons'.  This 
view helped sustain the involvement of European countries in the slave trade over 
the centuries(Cantor, 1963)  until it was abolished by many countries in the 
nineteenth century.227  While the view slowly died out, it lingered. Even at the turn 
of the twentieth century this understanding was held by many in the white 
community within the United States and fed the racial divide, especially in the South.  
One observer recorded the following observations from the 1930's: (Logan, 1985) 
The Negro is still regarded in most places in the South not as an individual but as a thing. 
White Christian ministers have not unoften preached from their sacred pulpits that Negroes 
have no soul and consequently have no right to the privileges which the Constitution [of the 
United States] prescribed only for human beings with souls. Taking the cue from the 
ministers, even the teachers in schools have been found to encourage their pupils to debate 
upon the question as to whether the Negroes are human beings at all.  (Logan, 1985, p. 75) 
(my underlining) 
                                            
226 The heading comes from the title of the book written by the African-American scholar, William Du Bois(Du 
Bois, 2007). 
227 While there had been active abolitionist movements in countries such as England since the eighteenth 
century, England did not abolish the slave trade until 1807 and slavery in 1834 and it took a Civil War in the 
USA before slavery was finally abolished in the Confederate States in 1867. 
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While reading this, even now, I have a sense of abhorrence.  It is from the 
understanding that gives rise to such views that actions follow which can only be 
termed monstrous.   
What is staggering for me is that even after my Grandmother was born, lynchings 
were still occurring, photographed and reported as a matter of course as the photo 
( Picture 2) from a 1916 edition of The Crisis Magazine (anon(Photographer), 1916) 
attests.  Even more confronting is that the last recorded lynching of an African-
American person in the USA was in 1981 (Gold, 2008) when I was still a young man 
enjoying my freedom in Australia!  
One of the insights that Heidegger provides 
to the analysis of such events is that this 
type of killing should not be confused with 
murders of anger or criminal activities.  
Rather they are based on the 
understanding and affective-capacities that 
shapes a particular way of seeing and 
responding to the world, in this case how 
certain communities of whites ‘saw’ and 
responded to African-Americans.  Applying 
Heidegger’s analysis, in seeking to 
‘understand’ what was happening, the 
answer is not to be found in ‘psychological 
aberrations’ of individuals doing the 
lynching, but rather within the immediate 
environment in which they were raised and 
in which they live.  The aim would be to 
investigate what are the many different 
community practices from which these understandings an affective-capacities 
emerge.  Based on the above quote, inquiring into what was preached from the 
pulpit would be an example of community practise to investigate.  It is too easy to 
point the figure at the culprits saying they should have ‘known’ better, this is to ignore 
the pragmatic consequences of the power of the structure of being-in-the-world.  
Just as Samia Sarwar appeared to her family as an object of shame so powerful it 
could only be expunged by her death, so too for many Whites, African-Americans 
 
Picture 2 Lynching of Six African-Americans 
in Lee County Georgia 20 Jan 1916 




appeared as non-human threats needing to be contained or killed.  As difficult as it 
is for a culture raised on Enlightenment ideals, of reason and individual 
accountability there is first and foremost a community accountability. 
I recently revisited a book of essays, The Souls of Black Folks (Du Bois, 2007) by 
the pioneering African-American sociologist and civil rights activist, William Du Bois 
(1868-1963), one of the most influential books in US history(Wilson, 1999).  What 
struck me was the following passage; 
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro 
is a sort of seventh son … a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets 
him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. 
(Du Bois, 2007k. 649-53) 
There was a time when I was puzzled reading such views.  Perhaps the writers were 
making some metaphorical reference, and if this is how people feel is it not just a 
matter of changing one’s thinking?  Looking at this account now, from a 
Heideggerian perspective one sees at play the deep influence of the ‘One’ that 
shapes not only how we see others but ourselves.  There is the ‘One’ of the white 
world, the ‘One’ of the black world both contained within the ‘One’ of the shared 
world; this is captured by Du Bois’ comment of the “peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness”.  Issues of racial divide become complex issues of competing 
understandings of the ‘One’, the dynamics of the reciprocal character of the Dasein-
with relationships and the overlay of inequalities both in terms of resources and 
political power.   
While Dasein can, with difficulty, change its understanding and receptivities to the 
world there are other considerations.  If the Dasein is a black slave on a US cotton 
farm in the eighteenth century, while they may change their understanding and 
receptive-capacities, Dasein is still a slave.  Even though slavery was officially 
ended in the USA on the 6th December 1865 when the 13th Amendment to the 
Constitution was ratified, African-Americans were still being lynched and murdered 
well into the twentieth century. Today, a hundred and fifty years after the end of 
slavery there is still a staggering gap in all wealth indicators between whites and 
blacks in America, with large percentages of blacks seemingly trapped by poverty 
(Jones, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2016).  While the lynchings have stopped 
blacks are still more than 16% more likely to die when “all cause” mortality is 
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considered than whites (Achenbach, 2017).  The cascading nature of the character 
of the inherited-bequeathed nature of the ‘One’ is a mechanism that contributes to 
this ongoing transmission through generations. 
As unpalatable as it may seem the white folk that lynched and murdered the black 
folk did so because they were human, not some incarnation of evil; Just as Samia 
Sarwar was murdered by her mother because her mother was human.  If such 
behaviour arises out of culturally acquired norms then in areas such as the historical 
Deep South of America and in conservative areas of contemporary Pakistan there 
is a significant challenge in bringing about change where the majority hold the 
understandings and receptivities that lead to the killings, even if many disagree with 
the killings themselves. In the USA it took a civil war to make slavery illegal and 
another hundred years for the lynchings to stop.  The problem was recognised in 
the Old Testament, and the solution was not unlike the Civil War solution, the entire 
community, the guilty and the innocent were held accountable for when there were 
transgressions against God’s will.  These included the plagues inflicted on Egypt, 
the great flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the forty-year banishment 
in the wilderness for those escaping Egypt, and enslavement of the Jews by the 
Babylonians. I am not claiming these as historical events, just as reflections of the 
ancient Judaic understanding of collective accountability. Put another way; there is 
a recognition that all the people must accept the consequences as One, for the 
understandings, receptivities and resultant behaviour of the individuals.   While this 
seems to be taken to an extreme in the Old Testament narrative, nonetheless this 
understanding seems to have been present, even if not formally thematised.  
Current Anglo-West views, particularly in America appear to be highly individualistic, 
with little recognition or acceptance of collective responsibility.   
The current adverse situation facing black America is predominately an economic 
one and has its roots in the slave era.  Given the nature of the disparity in economic 
wealth, income, and opportunity there will need to be a significant shift from white 
to black of economic resources to make a material difference across the racial divide 
over the next century.  The only way this can happen is if there is a shift in the ‘One’ 
among the whites to allow such a shift, and secondly a shift in the ‘One’ of the 
African-Americans to capitalise on any change.   Even should there be a sudden 
awareness across the population of the ‘role’ of the One, it is hard to envisage that 
the necessary changes in policy will happen without a considerable social 
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movement behind it, even then it will take at least a generational change.   However, 
the ‘One’ of white folk has shifted considerably in terms of how black folk are viewed, 
and we are a long way from the times black folk were considered soulless.  Freedom 
from structural imposed economic deprivation is yet a possibility. 
While Heidegger provides a structure of Dasein, it is a bare structure. The challenge 
provided by Heidegger’s account is that when undertaking either historical or social 
analysis is to be able to ‘fill in’ the structure relevant to the analysis.  For example, 
to identify the main influential characteristics of the ‘One’ and the mechanisms by 
which by which way which meaning for a ‘new’ Dasein is developed.  As was 
indicated in the case of some white folk raised in the South of the USA, part of this 
would relate to the beliefs held in relation to the ‘souls’ of black folk and the 
messages delivered from the pulpit.  In the case of “honour killings” in, say Pakistan, 
this would require a similar approach. Once the beliefs and the associated 
mechanisms have been identified then target change can be commenced.  
However, the enormity and difficulty of such a task should not be underestimated. 
For example, to change the ‘hearts and minds’ of the established ‘One’ that accepts 
‘honour killing’ may not be possible in the short term.  In this case severe penalties 
and sufficient enforcement mechanisms may be necessary to support education, 
women’s refuges, etc in order to shift practice.  But it all starts from an initial 
Heideggerian analysis of the structure of the ‘One’. 
Another contemporary situation is the ‘radicalisation’ of a few young Muslim men in 
Western countries which occurs to such an extent that they align themselves with 
groups such as Isis and then commit ‘acts of terror’ in the community in which they 
lived.  If exploring this from a Heideggerian perspective, the inquiry must consider 
the immediate community, the environment, into which these young men have 
grown up.  What practices were they exposed to, what understanding and modes of 
affective-capacities were silently passed on to them, how where they taught.  Is it a 
case of DuBois’ “double-consciousness” whereby there is the “pull” of the ‘One’ 
associated with the broader community process the actions of exclusion by that 
same ‘One’?  
If meaning is not just denied in the broader community, but the person themselves 
is rejected, then, at least for some, meaning will be found in other ways that allow 
the sense of denial and rejection to be appeased.    
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As Heidegger has stated, Dasein ‘is and has to be’, it is not possible to stop the 
dynamic nature of being-in-the-world.  Dasein must find meaning in a way that is 
intelligible to Dasein.  If there is no place for a meaningful existence among the ‘One’ 
of the new culture, indeed if there is rejection, then Dasein will seek such meaning 
where it can.  This is not a Muslim phenomenon it is a human phenomenon and 
plays itself out in other communities, for example, the street gangs of major cities in 
America.   Looked at in this light, we all, as part of the ‘One’ have a shared a mutual 
accountability for providing a welcoming space in the ‘One’ and share accountability 
for the consequences of shutting off such spaces.   This is the type of analysis 
becomes possible when we understand ourselves as Dasein. 
Waking Up from the Enlightenment 
I have gotten a little ahead of myself.  As a child of the Enlightenment, I embraced 
the spirit captured by the French motto, liberté, égalité, fraternité and the view that 
we are all the same.  We are all rational creatures who given access to sufficient 
and valid information will make the ‘logical’ right decision.  Since rationality is 
objective and not subjective, this is the basis for agreement, cooperation and mutual 
progress.  Underlying this view was two central assumptions, that everybody ‘sees’ 
the same world and that everyone has the capacity to transcend emotion, to make 
dispassionate decisions.  The journey from this way of thinking to now has taken 
around thirty years.  There are several streams feeding the change arising from 
books and personal experience weaving together.  I will stay with the books and 
refer to just a few.   
The first book that started to nudge me in a different direction was a book on 
marketing, I no longer remember the book itself, but it argued that while we are all 
capable of making rational decisions nearly all of us, most of the time, succumb to 
emotional decision-making and then justify the decision.  In hindsight, this fits the 
Heideggerian account.  The cultural view I inherited was that such emotional based 
decision making while it can be exploited by marketing and sales is something that 
needs to be overcome in rational decision making.  Further, who we are is 
essentially rational and that we must overcome our lower, ‘baser’ self to which the 
emotions belonged, not only to make the right decisions but to become a good 
person.  While I took this ‘rational’ account into my early career, what I could never 
reconcile was the range of very positive emotions including the acts of generosity 
and compassion that motivated many people’s decisions, and often they seemed 
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far from rational.  That marketing book created the first serious doubt that I held a 
wrong worldview. Slowly as the doubt grew stronger, I suspected that the marketers 
had a better understanding of being human than did those in the rationalist camp. 
Around the turn of the century, I read Guns, Germs and Steel (Diamond, 1998) Jared 
Diamond’s historical account of the differential development of cultures located in 
various parts of the globe.  Diamond explores why certain Eurasian civilizations rose 
to become powerful and exercise a dominance over peoples in other continents.  
His conclusion that it is not that they were genetically different, more intelligent or 
had superior cultures but that the origins of the success traced back to the luck of 
geography.  He argues that the vast east-west orientation of suitable arable land in 
Eurasia meant that as crops and animals were domesticated, they could spread 
across multiple regions with similar climate zones, something not possible in Africa 
or the Americas.  As various diseases developed and spread because of living in 
higher density populations and in close proximity to animals the surviving 
populations developed an immunity to these diseases.  Stable food supplies and 
exchanges of ideas between different groups leads to an escalation of tools and 
knowledge and eventually to the development of steel and guns.  That various 
civilisations embarked on conquests was common, there was an inherent will to 
power in these endeavours. However, according to Diamond, it was the combination 
of guns, germs and steel that facilitated Western conquests, giving the necessary 
quantum of force motivated by the will to power.  The force of the west being 
geographically determined.    
This line of argument opened a different way of thinking.  In that, we can’t determine 
where we are born it is thus the luck of circumstance that plays a significant part in 
life, not just at the level of civilization, but even at the local community level. Luck in 
the genetic lottery, the family lottery and geography all play an influential part in the 
success one has.  Born into a professional family in an affluent area with low 
unemployment or into an impoverished area with high unemployment while not 
predictive for any one individual, certainly has a bearing for many.  There is nothing 
rational about luck! 
I was brought up in a world where success was measured by achievement, and this 
meant, in the Western Protestant culture of which I was a part, that if I was 
successful and the success was a result of my effort, the product of my doing. 
Similarly, lack of success or failure was ultimately a matter of individual 
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responsibility.  If a person was born into a poor neighbourhood, they could always 
better themselves, and the culture is full of ‘rags to riches’ stories to demonstrate 
this point.  Conversely, the poor who stay poor do so because they are ‘too lazy’ or 
do not have the drive necessary to change.  This analysis is still prevalent, and if 
listening to talkback radio or conservative politicians on these topics it is soon plainly 
visible.   
While I was not stuck in this thinking by the time I read Diamond, the sheer 
magnitude of the impact of the ‘luck of geography’ did impact me.  I understood 
Diamond’s thesis to be saying that the luck of geography leads to ease of food 
production, increased disease immunity, advances in technology which combined 
with a ‘will to power’ resulted in a superior ability to implement and execute the 
activities of conquests.  If the luck of geography had favoured Africa, then the history 
of the dominance of the White West over the last five hundred years would be 
different. 
This account sounded plausible until I read the history of the Ming Dynasty 
expeditions that set sail on seven different occasions, under Admiral Zheng He, the 
first leaving in 1405 the last in 1431(Menzies, 2003; The Editors of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2016b). The expeditions travelled throughout South-East Asia, India, Sri 
Lanka, countries around the Persia, and East Coast of Africa, including Egypt, 
Somalia and Kenya.  On the initial voyage, there were over sixty main ships and a 
total crew in excess of twenty-seven thousand men, greater than many of the ports 
and cities visited. The larger ships  
… had as many as nine masts and luxurious cabins with balconies, while his armada included 
troop and horse transports, patrol boats, warships, and tankers holding fresh water. (Lent & 
Capra(forward), 2017, p. 27) 
By contrast, when Christopher Columbus set sail from Spain in 1492 (87 years after 
the first Chinese expedition) he had three small ships, each of which “could have fit 
ten times” into one of Zheng’s larger ships.  The technological difference between 
China and Europe at the time was considerable.  The expeditions ceased with a 
change of Emperor, the fleet dismantled, and China never engaged in such outward 
engagements with the world for a further five hundred years.  Reading the account 
of these Chinese expeditions raised some critical questions.  The actions of the 
Chinese contradicted the Diamond thesis, why had they Chinese not embarked on 
conquest?  The achievements of the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution are 
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certainly profound but given the context of this earlier flourishing in China, they are 
not unique.  The puzzle for me was why it had stopped.  
One strand of historical analysis assumes, as I had, that human nature is human 
nature.  This approach is taken by the historian Ian Morris in his 2010 book, Why 
the West Rules – For Now (Morris, 2010).  Morris argues that conquest is driven by 
avarice, necessity, brute force, and strategic geographical advantage and that 
“culture, values, and beliefs were unimportant” (p. 28) as material factors in the 
historical analysis.  This was in accord with the Diamond thesis.  That human nature 
is human nature was a main tenant of the Enlightenment, view still held by many.  If 
the West went on a rampage of conquest, it is not only because it could but because 
it is human nature to do so.  The West was exhibiting normal human behaviour and 
had it had not gone on five hundred years of conquest and domination some other 
civilisation would have!  To hold otherwise would be to accept that the West itself is 
a civilisation with a deep vein of violence pulsing through it that is absent from other 
cultures, at least to the same extent. While Morris’ account moves a little beyond 
that of Diamond’s having outlined his thesis he does not, just as Diamond fails to 
do, adequately address why China did not go on expeditions of conquest given the 
significant advantage of technology and resources at its disposal at the time.   
I have still not resolved this question; however, I have moved away from the 
Diamond and Morris thesis that to pursue conquest is innate human nature.  I 
suspect there is enough evidence in historical and anthropological studies to 
demonstrate either view.  A Heideggerian line of inquiry would be to examine the 
cultural practices of the West over the five hundred years.  In that practices can 
disclose both the understanding of the entity (including both the ready-to-hand and 
other Dasein) and the affective-capacities associated with those actions. i.e. the 
mode of mattering, this would disclose to the West how it understood Others228.  In 
that this would reflect the understanding and affective-capacities of the culture itself 
or at least the ‘ruling elite’ it would reflect back to West an understanding of ‘who it 
is’.  
It was around this time that my thinking had been strongly influenced by Heidegger’s 
work and this no doubt changed the nature of the books that drew my attention, and 
                                            
228 This is consistent with the previous discussions and Heidegger’s comments that Dasein can find itself in its 
what it does. 
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this leads me to the next book. 
Dominique Moïsi, a French political scientist, has taken a radically different 
approach to his analysis of world affairs.  He takes the stance that emotions matter 
in trying to understand behaviour in terms of geopolitics.  In his book, The 
Geopolitics of Emotion (Moïsi, 2009) he argues that trying to make sense of 
decisions on a rational basis from one’s own perspective is not productive.  It is, 
says Moïsi, possible to discern an overarching driving emotion that characterises 
cultural regions and if this is factored into the political analysis, then greater insights 
are gained from the actions and motivations of the other.  Moïsi attempts to map 
cultural regions in terms of three basic emotions, hope which characterises the 
Asian world, humiliation for the Arab-Islamic world and fear for the Western world 
and he has chosen these three because of their association with confidence.  This 
is how he explains it;  
If one wanted to summarize these three emotions with three formulas, one would say that 
hope is “I want to do it, I can do it, and I will do it”; humiliation is “I can never do it” and may 
lead to “I might as well try to destroy you since I cannot join you”; and fear is “Oh, my God, 
the world has become such a dangerous place; how can I be protected from it?”  (Moïsi, 
2009k. 171)  
Moïsi believes that notwithstanding  
 … we live in an information age, we do not understand the Other any better than we did in 
the past, in fact just the opposite, we are inundated by images and data that are obscuring 
rather illuminating our vision of the world.  (Moïsi, 2009k. 2625)  
As the world increases in complexity the threads of integration and interdependence 
associated with globalisation become far too difficult to grasp and the how or why of 
one’s local living environment being affected by the actions of distant Others is 
simply unintelligible, and uncontrollable.   It is in these circumstances argues Moïsi 
that when countries are trying to navigate this new globalised, integrated world, that 
we need to recognise and understand the driving nature of emotions, both in our 
own culture and in the culture of others.  In this way, in our dealings and exchanges 
we are better placed to consider that which is concerning and motivating the other 
and from this position be better placed to have more mutually beneficial interactions. 
This is his recipe for a more optimistic future.   In Heideggerian terms, Moïsi is 
arguing that the ‘One’ of the Other’ culture will ‘see’ and understanding the world as 
disclosed to it in terms of its affective-capacities, and he has ventured to provide an 
analysis as to which of these he believes is currently dominant.  
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Regardless of Moïsi’s analytical stance, his fundamental starting point is radically 
different.  His premise that understanding emotions and what is driving them is 
crucial, even at the geopolitical level.  What he is claiming is that different people 
see, understand, and respond to the world differently based on the current dominant 
emotional characteristics of the ‘One’, its culture.   This is very different from the 
Enlightenment stance that everybody is the same and rational debate is the way 
forward.   His position reflects the Heideggerian model on two counts firstly that one 
can attribute affective-capacities at the level of national psyches (the ’One’) and 
secondly nations will respond based on their particular affective-capacities of the 
‘One’.  This type of analysis applied to the USA following the 9/11 attack would, I 
believe, provide an interesting case study of this approach and disclose the nature 
of the affective-attunements of the USA towards Others and in so doing disclose an 
understanding of the ‘One’ of the USA. 
The last account I want to look at is the 2017 book by Jeremy Lent, The Patterning 
Instinct: A Cultural History of Humanity’s Search for Meaning, (Lent & 
Capra(forward), 2017).  Lent looks at history through the lens of culture, discounting 
the assumption that human nature is human nature and moving beyond Moïsi’s 
focus on emotions.  Lent’s thesis is that there is no common intrinsic human nature 
informing cultural responses, rather humans develop an understanding of the world 
based on what he calls “cognitive patterns” by which they go about as 
 ….  humans living their day-to-day existence are continually affected by what goes on around 
them, and the consequent actions they take are continually affecting whatever is around 
them. It's a perpetual, bidirectional feedback loop.  (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 20)  
Lent draws on contemporary research in evolutional biology exploring the 
relationship between species and their environments. This approach Is not only in 
the sense that species evolved to be ‘fit’ for an environment with particular 
characteristics, but that the species becomes an essential part of the environment 
itself, shaping it and thriving in its particular niche.  It was this thinking that animals 
not only survive as part of an eco-system but bring about changes in the eco-system 
itself that was behind the reintroduction of wolves into the Yellowstone National Park 
in 1995.  The impact has been astonishing, resulting in a cascade of effects within 
the eco-system including an increase in beaver populations, changes in vegetation, 
alterations in elk herd behaviour which in turn has a positive impact on other parts 
of the ecosystem and so on.  (Staff Reporter, 2011)  
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Many evolutionary biologists believe, according to Lent, that a similar thing happens 
with humans, except that the niches are initially constructed at a cognitive level, and 
based on collective agreement on how the environment should be manipulated. 
From these cognitive niches, cultures emerge 
 … as a set of shared symbols and practices that ties a group together and is passed down 
from one generation to the next.  (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 21)  
In that human societies develop in specific geographic areas, different collective 
niches emerge, and then cultures develop in which people have different roles.  As 
new ways of doing things are developed, which may be in response to changes in 
the environment, Lent argues that these create feedback loops which change other 
practices, change the livelihoods available for people and hence change the cultural 
environment in which people live.   
Lent draws on, much as I have, contemporary understandings of complexity and 
self-organising systems.  He describes two levels, the tangible system and the 
cognitive system.  The tangible systems being everything that can be  
seen and touched: a society's tools; its physical infrastructure; and its agriculture, terrain, and 
climate, to name just some of its components. (p. 26)  
Whereas the cognitive system  
 …. can't be touched but exists in the cognitive network of the society's culture: its language, 
myths, core metaphors, know-how, hierarchy of values, and worldview. (p. 26)  
These systems are coupled together and influence each other with feedback loops 
and consequently shape the characteristics and direction of society itself.  A young 
child grows up into a culture, ‘learns’ the necessary cognitive patterns and in so 
doing becomes part of the culture. Lent summaries the theme of his book as follows: 
The book is based on a simple but compelling theme: culture shapes values, and those 
values shape history. (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 28) 
Which is a shorthand description of aspects of Heidegger’s view of the ‘One’.  
Having laid out this framework, Lent sets himself the task of researching what he 
calls the “cognitive history” of cultures by way of identifying the patterns that create 
the reality for each culture, the feedback loops that sustain them and how they 
change over time.  He then applies this to identifying the Western pattern which 
results in a split cosmos (perfect heaven versus imperfect world) and split human 
(perfect soul versus imperfect body) compared to the Chinese understanding of a 
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“harmonic web of life” in which there is an integrated cosmology and how this 
influences a view of the world and subsequently behaviour.   
Lent’s main aim seems to be to introduce his ideas of the ‘patterning instinct’ and 
his methodology of ‘cognitive history’.  While there are many aspects that fit within 
a Heideggerian analysis Lent still fits within a cognitivist framework.  The role of 
emotion that is recognised as the main determinant of behaviour in Moïsi’s work is 
absent as is the emergent nature of Dasein itself.   
While Lent does not specifically address areas of geopolitics (Moïsi) or the rise of 
civilisations (Diamond) it is possible to see a clear progression from the older 
documenting of events which I encountered in my early education, through to 
looking at wider influences such as geography (Diamond), to expand this to 
incorporate geography plus theories of innate human nature(Morris), to recognising 
the role of emotions as a driver for State action and the discounting of innate human 
nature (Moïsi) to incorporating many streams of contemporary scholarship such as 
cognition, psychology, ecology and complex systems to develop a theory of culture 
development and change (Lent). 
Summary 
While this is only an indicative and selective survey of approaches to understanding 
historical events based on my own encounters one can see movement towards 
making history intelligible based on a more complex understanding of human 
existence.   Scholars such as Du Bois started to provide accounts from voices not 
often heard in traditional approaches to history, and when looked from a 
Heideggerian perspective it is possible to see the phenomenon of the ‘One’ reflected 
in his comments and as the force maintaining practices such as slavery, ‘black’ 
lynchings and even the experiences of oppressed minorities.  Heidegger’s work can 
then be applied to the analysis of the tensions between differing conceptions of the 
‘One’ in the culture and the understandings and receptivities that underlie the 
behaviours that maintain the practices.  In that there is often a dominant 
interpretation of the ‘One’ there can first be an analysis of the practices supporting 
that dominance, and then a deeper analysis of the presuppositions undergirding the 
beliefs (understandings) and the nature of the receptive-capacities being applied.  
These then can be articulated, challenged, debated and so on and in so doing open 
the possibility of change.  Simple debating at the level of community practice will not 
get very far. This basic approach is relevant to both historical and social analysis. 
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In more recent times one can see scholars interpreting histories and contemporary 
cultures by applying the similar phenomenon that underpins Heidegger’s 
phenomenon of world (e.g. patterns and cultures) and of intentional action (e.g. role 
of emotions).  These changes reflect, in my view a gradual shift, in the understanding 
of being human.  With these changes I am not surprised that we find scholars 
identifying and incorporating these observable phenomena, perhaps what is 
surprising is that they were ignored for so long. 
What we are observing, I suspect is a movement from a reductionist account of 
history based on Enlightenment presuppositions of what it is to be human to a richer 
and more complex view.   However, scholars are moving forward without first 
clarifying the nature of the entity they are dealing with, i.e. Dasein.  While Lent has 
done an admirable job in developing his model and it is the closest that I have yet 
seen to the Dasein analytic it still falls short of the sophistication that Heidegger has 
applied to the task.    
Given the direction these studies are moving a comprehensive Heideggerian model 
set out in an accessible way would greatly assist scholars such as Moïsi and Lent 
by providing an account of the person based on a study of Dasein itself and not one 
thrown together, based on intuition, theories and hidden presuppositions. 
Nonetheless this movement in historical scholarship, in that it is applying observable 
phenomenon associated with Dasein in a manner consistent with Heidegger’s 
findings I take as confirmation of Heidegger’s work.  While I believe there is support 
in the work of scholars of history for Heidegger’s work, this is certainly a debatable 
view.  There is no historian of which I am aware of that is using Heidegger’s body of 
knowledge as a comprehensive framework, and Lent appears to come the closest.   
I suspect the same would be true if areas such as anthropology were reviewed.    
Section 2: Dasein Model: Impoverished Environments  
Introduction 
One of the key points of this thesis is that Dasein and Dasein’s environment are 
inseparable and that for Dasein to have a ‘healthy’ existence, then the environment 
in the initial stages of the Dasein’s development of its understanding and receptivity 
must be considered.   
Heidegger uses the breakdown case of anxiety/depression, described in an earlier 
 
647 
chapter, to bring to light the phenomenon of world.  In this section, I will discuss 
breakdown cases from the work of Dr Bruce Perry, a clinical psychiatrist and 
neuroscientist who works with young children subjected to severe abuse or neglect, 
to illustrate the link between the early development of the young Dasein the 
environment.  My rationale for doing this is that it is exemplar cases outside the 
average everydayness of the ‘One’ that can highlight the being-in-the-world 
structure by observing changes in the emergent Dasein as ‘variations’ against the 
norm.  Perry’s work also indicates the emergent nature of Dasein by identifying 
variations in normal neural development associated with the cases.  I take Perry’s 
work as support for Heidegger’s model of being-in-the-world as a process that 
relates Dasein to its world and the founded relationship between the present-at-
hand, the neural networks, and Dasein. Further, I take Heidegger’s work as a basis 
to help understand what is happening to Dasein as a result of early abuse and 
neglect. 
Bruce Perry’s Background 
From the USA, Bruce Perry is a clinical psychiatrist and neuroscientist who has 
pioneered new ways of working and treating children who have been subject to 
significant trauma.  Prior to the early 1980's, there was little attention paid to the 
impact of trauma on adults and even less to effect of trauma on children. (Dyregrov 
& Yule, 2006) The strongly held view was that children are resilient and will bounce 
back on their own accord without specialist interventions. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008)  
Thanks, in large part to the work of Perry, this resilience model is now understood 
to be wrong, and it is recognised that abuse and neglect can so impair the 
development of the child as to have lifelong adverse impacts. 
My interest in Perry's work is because it provides strong support for my interpretation 
of Heidegger's descriptive account of Dasein, that the person develops out of a 
dynamic interaction between the developing Dasein and their environment and once 
developed is the basis from which the person understands their world and 
themselves.  From a Heideggerian perspective, the child resilience theory is false 
because it is based on a wrong understanding of what it is to be a person, as 
constituted by the being-in-the-world structure.   Being-in-the-world is a dynamic 
system that operates regardless of the environment to establish understanding and 
affective-capacities and once established tends to maintain itself.  There is no 
automatic self-correction to bring the development back on course to a 
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predetermined model, no ‘springing back’ to some pre-existing self.   This does not 
mean that change is precluded, just that it takes specific and deliberate 
interventions.  This is also Perry’s thesis.  
Perry had noted in his early research as a psychiatrist and neuroscientist that animal 
studies had shown that even a modest amount of stress during the infancy of an 
animal could result in a permanent impact in the architecture and chemistry of the 
brain.  These changes seemed to correlate with differences in observed behaviour.  
This learning carried through to his work as a child psychiatrist working with 'troubled 
children'.    
Many of his patients had experienced significant trauma such as severe neglect, 
physical abuse, rape or witnessing horrific violence against or murder of their 
mothers and it was clear that these kids were not "bouncing back".  What he found 
was that the medical treatment for these children focussed on the symptoms, and 
the trauma was generally ignored as irrelevant to addressing those symptoms. 
(Perry & Szalavitz, 2008) Perry shifted his focus to what I would call a Dasein model, 
focusing primarily on the person as part of their environment and not the deficits of 
the body. 
The impact of trauma was only formally recognised in 1980 when Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) was recognized and added to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  Prior to this, 
PTSD was largely seen as affecting a limited number of soldiers exposed to the 
horrors of war and even then the soldiers were typically labelled as "shell-shocked". 
Much of the public and many health professionals even questioned the validity of 
PTSD at the time. 
As Perry started to work with 'troubled children' in the early 1990s, he noted that 
many of the symptoms reported by the children were like those of PTSD.  Since 
then his research, and that of others, has now shown that the impact of trauma "is 
actually far greater on children than it is on adults.”  (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 2)  
The scale of the problem in the USA is immense, and estimates have been made 
that as many as eight million children in the USA "suffer from serious, diagnosable, 
trauma-related psychiatric problems."  (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 3)  
From a Heideggerian perspective if very young Dasein are exposed to an 
environment in which there is trauma and abuse then there is a likelihood that this 
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will impact on their developing understanding and their affective-capacities which in 
turn should be manifested in the observable ways in which they respond to the 
world, and this is what Perry’s case studies describe.  In that Heidegger’s account 
is a description of the being of Dasein, there is nothing remarkable about this.  
Perry’s thesis is relatively simple to state:  Childhood trauma, including both active 
maltreatment and benign neglect, will have adverse impacts on the developing brain 
which in turn contributes to lifelong mental health problems, adversely affecting their 
quality of life and impacting, in turn, the lives of those around them and this is evident 
in the case study I have chosen from Perry’s 2008 book.  It should be noted from 
this account that Perry draws a direct connection between brain health, mental 
health and quality of experienced life, there is no thematic analysis of Dasein as 
such.  This is the space that Heidegger’s work has the potential to fill. 
The case study(Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, pp. 81-98) I have chosen is the story of a 
young woman, Virginia and her daughter Laura and describes the cycle of neglect 
and damage that these two-people experienced, neglect that was never deliberate.  
I was initially going to provide smaller extracts of a couple case studies, but this did 
not give the sense of the flow of time, of the history and various encounters of the 
people concerned.  While I have heavily edited the story of Virginia and Laura and 
except where I have inserted Perry’s name, it is Perry’s work; I see no sense in 
rewording for the sake of it, albeit when I have edited out passages, I have altered 
the wording to ensure a sense of flow. When this has been done, I have 
endeavoured to do so without changing the meaning of work.  Notwithstanding this, 
the case study is a little longer than I would have hoped, but to edit it further is to 
cut out key actors and their role in this story and the examples of being-in-the-world. 
After the case study, I am not going to do a detailed analysis to draw out all the 
connections to the Dasein analytic; I think they are clear enough. What I will do is 
suggest three questions to have in mind while reading the case study:  Firstly, look 
at the different scenes from the perspective of each actor and ask this simple 
question: What does the action of this person or organisation say about their 
understanding of the person they are dealing with? Secondly, ask: What are the 
affective-capacities (mood, emotions, motivations, what matters, etc.) that are at 
play in the scene?  The third point relates to Heidegger’s claim that  
… everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most 
hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically not 
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inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive- 
perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232] 
This fits with my claim that Heidegger is applying an ‘emergentists’ position.  The 
structure of being-in-the-world, the structure of our existence, is based on integration 
with the environment and within the context of Dasein’s bodiliness, it is ‘shaped’ by 
that structure. This means that the body is a servant of existence!  For Heidegger 
there is no predetermined model for a particular Dasein, the process just plays out.  
This being the case then the third question to ask is: In what ways does the physical 
behaviour of the body reflect the understanding that is emerging from the meshing 
with the environment? 
Case Study: Virginia and Laura  
Four-year-old Laura had been brought into the special gastrointestinal unit of Texas 
hospital weighing just 26 pounds.  By the time Perry saw her, a month later, she had 
no weight gain despite being tube fed on a high calorie supplement.  
Laura had a long medical history reflected in the four-foot high stack of medical files 
containing details of a vast number of medical tests and treatments, thousands of 
pages of reports from endocrinologists, gastroenterologists, nutritionists, consulting 
physicians and other specialists, test results for bloodwork, chromosome tests, 
hormone levels, and biopsies, the results of invasive tests from scopes passed down 
her throat to examine her stomach and scopes inserted rectally to examine her 
bowels, the results of an exploratory laparoscopy where doctors scrutinise her 
internal organs and even the biopsy results from a snippet of the small intestine.  No 
abnormalities were found that indicated a cause for the failure to put on weight 
Laura’s history of failure to gain weight together with the lack of obvious causal 
factors had led some earlier doctors to believe they had discovered a case of 
"intestinal epilepsy".  More recently a psychologist, specialising in eating disorders 
had believed he had found the first documented instance of "infantile anorexia". He 
had requested a consult from Perry because of his experience with academic 
publishing and was sure this was a publishable case.   
Reviewing her history for his first meeting with Laura, Perry discovered that the four-
year-old had had 20 previous admissions, attended six speciality clinics and had 
been seen by a host of specialists who had all contributed to the substantial medical 
file.  Entering her room Perry saw Laura, feeding tube in place, sitting quietly staring 
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at a plate of food.  Virginia, her 22-year-old mother, sat about 5 feet from the child 
not interacting with Laura.  Perry later learnt Virginia had been discouraged from 
interacting with Laura during mealtimes by the eating disorder psychologist.  This, 
apparently, was to stop Laura from manipulating her mother around food and meals.  
The theory being that people with anorexia enjoy the attention they got when they 
don't eat and used it to control other family members.  Denying them this reward 
was supposed to aid recovery.  Perry simply saw a despondent, skinny little kid and 
disengaged mother. 
The mother, Virginia, was a child of the foster care system. Abandoned at birth by a 
drug-addicted mother, father unknown. At the time, it was common for infants and 
toddlers to be moved within the child welfare system every six months to prevent 
attachment to any particular caregiver, and this had happened to Virginia.  It has 
since been understood that an infant’s early attachment to a small number of 
consistent caregivers is critical to the emotional health and even physical 
development. 
Perry states that from the neurobiological research it is now known that the brain 
develops in a use dependent manner.  The various neural systems that are used 
become more dominant while those not used grow less, shrink229.  However, in this 
development, there may be critical windows where if appropriate stimulation and 
development have been missed the system may never reach its potential.230 The 
conclusion is obvious, as a child grows the array of systems in the brain require 
stimulation if they are to develop appropriately. 
Unlike the areas for language and sight, Perry advises that we don’t know if there is 
a fixed sensitive period for the development of such things as normal attachment.  
However, research suggests this may be the case as children not allowed to develop 
permanent relationships with one or two primary caregivers during first three years 
have lasting effects on their ability to relate normally and affectionately to others.   
Perry believes that this is what happened to Virginia.  After five years of transient 
and fragmented caregiving, she finally had a stable home with foster parents who 
                                            
229 This suggests that there is an initial framework already in place for development which is worth exploring. 
230 Pioneering experiments by David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel in the 1960’s showed that in newborn kittens if 
one eyelid was sutured shut for the first 3 months of life, they then remained blind in that eye for life. Macroscopic 
observations of the visual cortex showed that critical areas in the pathway for the eye that had been closed had 
shrunk, while in eye left open they had grown larger.  They also found that suturing closed the eye of an adult 
cat for a year resulted in no structural changes.  (Hubel & Wiesel, 2004) 
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were loving, attentive and provided a humane script for normal behaviour, together 
with the essential moral guidance and good manners to function socially.  They 
taught her stealing was wrong, that drugs are bad for you and to work hard at school 
and Virginia followed these directions.   
The State refused permission for the foster family to adopt her and when she turned 
18, having graduated from high school, the State was no longer responsible.  The 
authorities instructed Virginia to leave her foster parents and threatened the foster 
parents that if they had further contact with Virginia, they could no longer be allowed 
to foster children.  Virginia lost the only parents she had really known.  
Virginia went to live in a halfway house located in a low-income area set up for 
children "ageing out" of foster care.  Isolated from the only family she had known, in 
a strange environment, facing an uncertain future, Virginia sought affection, fell 
pregnant, was left by her ‘partner’, becoming a single Mum.   
Virginia wanted Laura, to love her and to do the right things by her as her foster 
parents taught her.  She sought prenatal care, enrolled in a good program for high-
risk mothers but as soon as Laura was born she no longer qualified for the program 
and was on her own again.   
From his interviews with and observations of Virginia, Perry learnt she had no idea 
how to interact with the baby.  There was no "maternal instinct" evident.  Virginia 
had the knowledge of the basics and did them.  She fed Laura, kept her clean, 
dressed her and so on, but emotionally she was unaware, lost.  No one had thought 
to advise her, to instruct her how to provide the loving, physical interaction that 
infants need.  Virginia just didn't feel compelled to do them on her own, and she got 
no pleasure from them.  
Virginia was parenting in an emotionally disconnected way.  She spent little time 
holding her baby, fed her propped up with a bottle not cuddled, didn't rock her, didn't 
sing to her, there was no frivolous kissing, staring into her eyes, the playing with 
toes and fingers or any of the other silly but hugely important things.  All these 
interactions are what people with a typical childhood history do instinctively in their 
interactions with babies.  
Virginia’s approach was to do what she thought was right, not because she felt it in 
her heart and when Virginia got frustrated she either harshly disciplined Laura or 
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ignored her.  Virginia simply didn't feel the contentment and joy from the positive 
caregiving interactions that normally help parents overcome the difficult emotional 
and physical challenges of child-rearing. 
Without the physical and emotional signals that all mammals need to stimulate 
growth, Laura stopped gaining weight. Perry tells us that this phenomenon has been 
known for centuries and is commonly described as ‘failure to thrive’231.  It refers to 
babies who albeit born healthy with no sign of disease or abnormalities fail to grow 
and put on weight, generally as a result of emotional neglect.  He reports that in the 
past it has most commonly been reported in connection with young children raised 
in institutions where the care provided was insufficient and that in the 1940s a third 
of children in some institutional settings were dying before the age of 2.  ‘Failure to 
thrive’ can thus be deadly. He notes the more recent cases of orphans from Eastern 
European countries, and I assume he is referring to Romania232, where the surviving 
adults exhibit severe behaviour problems and have difficulty maintaining 
relationships with those who should be closest to them. 
Virginia genuinely cared for Laura, first seeking medical attention for her just weeks 
after her birth.  Laura was correctly diagnosed with ‘failure to thrive’, admitted to 
hospital, stabilised and on discharge Virginia was given nutritional advice but not 
advice on mothering. No-one explained the diagnosis to her.  Ongoing social work 
contact was suggested but never put in place, and the issue of neglect was ignored 
by the medical team, largely because many physicians find "psychological" or social 
aspects of medical problems less interesting and less important than the primary 
"physiological" issues.  Additionally, Virginia didn't seem like a neglectful mother; an 
uncaring mother wouldn’t seek interventions for help 
Perry describes the apparent mundane interactions that occur as a child is growing 
up. A toddler falls and knocks their knee looks to Mum, she looks back. If she doesn't 
look worried, the toddler quickly moves on not crying but if the toddler baby sees a 
look of concern the crying starts.  This is how we learn.  Repetition entrenches the 
learning. 
A class of nerve cells in the brain known as "mirror" neurons233, Perry reports, 
                                            
231 For research literature examples refer (Block & Krebs, 2005; Cole & Lanham, 2011) 
232 Findings of research among Romanian orphans cared for in orphanages under the communist regime 
confirm this.  I briefly comment on this later in the section. 
233 Mirror neurons were discovered just over twenty years ago in the brains of macaque monkeys and have 
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responds in synchrony with the behaviours of others, and this capacity for mutual 
regulation provides another basis for attachment.  When a baby smiles the mirror 
neurons in the mother's brain, usually respond with a set of patterns that are almost 
identical to those that occur when the mother actually smiles.  This mirroring at the 
neuronal level typically leads the mother to respond with a physical smile of her own.  
It's not hard to see how empathy and the capacity to respond to relationships would 
originate here as mother and child synchronise and reinforce each other.  
When a baby’s smiles are ignored, if the baby is repeatedly left to cry alone, not fed, 
fed roughly without tenderness, or not held, then the positive associations between 
human contact and safety, predictability and pleasure may not develop 
People are not interchangeable.  As a baby Virginia began to bond with one person, 
she feels comfortable with a certain smell, rhythm and smile but is abandoned before 
a deep connection is established. The process repeats.  The beginnings of 
familiarity, the beginnings of a connection and then separation.  There is never 
enough time to consolidate the connection with any individual person.  These early 
attachments between a baby and the first primary caregivers are not trivial. 
Virginia knew that she should "love" her baby when she was born.  But she didn't 
feel that love the way most people do. Virginia was unable to express it through 
physical contact, and for Laura the lack of stimulation was devastating.  Her body 
responded with hormonal dysregulation which impeded normal growth despite 
receiving more than adequate nutrition.   Laura didn't need to purge or exercise to 
avoid gaining weight, the lack of physical stimulation had programmed her body to 
do so.  Without love children literally don't grow.  Laura wasn't anorexic. Laura just 
wasn't receiving the physical nurturing her body needed to know that she was 
wanted, that it was safe to grow. 
At one stage Virginia told Perry that if it would help Laura, then he should take her 
from Virginia.  Virginia loved her baby so much she was willing to let go of her if 
that's what it took.   With Virginia’s consent, Perry contacted Mama P, a foster 
                                            
since been discovered in other primates including humans. Observations of brain activity reveal that there is a 
class of neurons that fire both when an animal (including a human) performs an action and when the action is 
not being performed but observed being performed by another animal.  The research is suggestive, but not 
clear, that these neurons are associated with the matching of observed actions and are part of the learning 
process in social animals based on observed imitation.  (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Oztop, 
Kawato, & Arbib, 2013)  Should it be found that mirror neurons have this role in action learning then this would 
support Heidegger’s claims about the function of the ‘One’. 
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mother, who agreed to take Virginia and Laura and to show Virginia how to be a 
mother to Laura.  Perry’s program had access to private funds to allow this to occur 
which the foster care system was too inflexible to permit.  
Mama P was a large, powerful woman who moved with confidence and strength, 
wore large brightly coloured muumuus, with a scarf tied around her neck.  She was 
one of nature's natural mothers.  She embraced, loved, and nurtured children back 
to health who had been battered by the world.  Mama had discovered long before 
Perry and his team that many young victims of abuse and neglect needed physical 
stimulation, like being rocked and gently held, a type of comfort seemingly 
appropriate for much younger children.  Mama knew you don't interact with children 
based on their age but based on their need. To respond to what they may have 
missed during sensitive periods of development. Almost all the children sent to her 
had a tremendous need to be held, touched, and loved. 
Perry’s paediatric colleagues were concerned for Laura given her weight and state 
of health.  When Virginia and Laura moved to Mama P's, there was close monitoring 
of what Laura consumed.  For the first month, Laura consumed the exact same 
number of calories she had in the prior month in the hospital, where her weight 
barely maintained at 26 pounds.  In the first month at Mama P’s Laura gained 10 
pounds, growing from 26 to 36 pounds. An increase of 35% on the exact same 
number of calories that previously was insufficient to prevent weight loss. 
Virginia learnt from Mama P what Laura needed and how to provide it. Before Mama 
P meals were a robotic chore, often with conflict, and constantly changing in 
response to the dietary instructions and advice given by different doctors at different 
hospitals.  The advice, aimed at being helpful, just added to the confusion and 
helped to hollow out the experience of eating for Laura.  This combined with 
Virginia’s lack of understanding of a child's needs, swinging from being affectionate, 
to being tough and punitive, to simply ignoring her daughter had all contributed. 
Mama P’s warmth, humour and hugs also allowed Virginia to get some of the 
mothering she had missed, and in watching how Mama P responded to her other 
children, Virginia learnt to notice Laura's cues.  Virginia could better read when 
Laura was hungry, when she wanted to play, or when she needed a nap.  Laura had 
been stuck in the terrible twos, but now she began to mature emotionally and 




Virginia and Laura lived with Mama P for about a year and when she left Virginia 
moved into Mama P's neighbourhood, the two women staying in close touch having 
become tight friends. Laura became a bright little girl and like her mother a person 
with a powerful moral compass, strong positive values and at the same time a 
tendency to be emotionally distant.   
When Virginia had the second child, she knew how to care for him appropriately 
from the start, and the growing baby suffered from none of the growth problems that 
Laura experienced.  Virginia went on to college and both her children are doing well 
at school, they have friends an invested church community and Mama P down the 
street. 
Laura and Virginia still bear the scars from their early childhood.  Perry observed 
that if you secretly observe either mother or daughter, you might observe their facial 
expressions as vacant or even sad.  On becoming aware of your presence, they 
would put on a social persona and respond appropriately to you.  But if you pay 
close attention to your "gut" you may sense something awkward or unnatural in their 
interactions.  Both Virginia and Laura can mimic many of the normal social 
interactive cues, but neither feels naturally pulled to be social, to spontaneously 
smile or to express warm nurturing physical behaviours. 
On a “higher” cognitive level both mother and daughter are very good people who 
have learned to use moral rules and strong belief systems to tame their fears and 
desires.  But in the relational social communication systems of their brain, the source 
of emotional connection to others, there are shadows of disruptive nurturing of the 
early childhood.  The nature and timing of our development experiences shape us. 
Like people who learn a foreign language late in life Virginia and Laura would never 
speak the language of love without an accent.  Perry observes that  
The brain is an historical organ.  It stores our personal narrative. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 
83) 
Dasein and Its Environment 
While Heidegger does not specifically address the phenomena associated with child 
development, the growing up in the culture, it is clear from the earlier discussions 
that he holds that it is from our social environment that our understanding and our 
affective-capacities are shaped.  The example of the Japanese versus American 
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babies and the African child discussed in Chapter 16 were examples, and the 
outcome of this development is evident in the different structure of affective-
capacities in the different cultures.  
Heidegger rarely provides the fine grain detail of the structure he is describing; it is 
enough to provide the structure itself with broad examples and then it is up to other 
scholars to fill in that detail.  Like an outline in a colouring-in book, we have to 
complete the detail and add the colour, guided by and consistent with the outline 
provided. This is typically how advances in scholarship work and he is not, as he 
tells us doing anthropology. 
The primary operation of the ‘One’ during development is not found by looking at 
the most obvious practices and behaviours of the culture, albeit they play their part, 
it is in the small everyday things, being nursed and cuddled, singing of nursery 
rhymes, playing in trees, the small corrections to non-conforming behaviour, being 
tickled, laughing together, being responded to when in need, with warmth and love.  
All of these reflect a certain average, everydayness that the culture acquired over 
the generations, that is reflected in the understanding and affective-capacities of the 
people that are the ‘One’, and in turn reflected in their child-rearing practices.   These 
are the things Perry observes are normally present, but these were also among the 
things that were missing from Virginia’s parenting,  
She didn’t spend much time holding her baby; she fed the little one propped up with a bottle, 
not nuzzled close to her bosom. She didn’t rock her, didn’t sing to her, didn’t coo or stare into 
her eyes or count her perfect tiny toes over and over again or do any of the other silly but 
hugely important things that people with ordinary childhoods instinctively do when caring for 
a baby. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, pp. 87-8) 
To repeat what Heidegger tells us, 
Then everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most 
hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically not 
inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-
perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232] 
For Heidegger, we are engaged in our existence, not as a thinking organ mounted 
on a body, but the entire unity of the body functions (what he calls bodiliness) in a 
meaningful dialogue with its surroundings, learning, understanding and responding.  
In the very early stages of a baby’s development that dialogue is not the language 
of words, it is touch, smell, sound, sight and these communicate warmth, love, 
nurturing, belonging and in so doing the foundations of the baby’s understanding 
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and affective-capacities are laid down.  As Heidegger suggests we interact with our 
environment with all our senses, our full capacity to “receive-perceive the 
significance of what it encounters”.   These early interactions are all part of the way 
Dasein acquires a sense of meaning for itself in the context of its environment.  
How this happens is still unknown, but one thing is clear, our environment matters, 
and its imprint will be left on us.  This is what we see first with Virginia, then Laura 
and then the change in the young son. 
The case study is filled with examples of understanding and receptiveness. Virginia 
understands her children, but her affective-capacities are deficient in relation to the 
baby.  Laura shows up as mattering in the manner in which Virginia looks after her, 
feeding, being changed and taken to the doctors when needed. But Laura does not 
show up for Virginia as mattering in terms of someone to cuddle, nurse and play.  
Because this sight, ‘considerateness’, is deficient the possibilities of these types of 
solicitudinous dealings are not disclosed to Virginia.  Virginia’s possibilities for ways 
of being, her existence, are shaped by these deficient modes, which impact the way 
she can be a mother, which in turn impact on baby Laura.  I suspect that Virginia 
and the older Laura, know they are missing something, and this accounts for Perry’s 
comment that when you secretly observe either mother or daughter “you might find 
her facial expressions as vacant, or even sad”  (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 98) 
In the case study, there is the sense the understanding and affective-attunements 
of Perry, Mama P and Virginia’s foster parents towards Virginia and Laura is of a 
different character to the other medical professionals and the child welfare system. 
Perry has a more detailed and formalised understanding of what it is to be a person 
than, say Mama P but the understandings are the same nonetheless.  It is 
responding to the person as Dasein and not the person as a physical entity, 
something to be fixed or kept from physical harm.   As soon as the person as body 
becomes the primary understanding the true nature of being human is lost, 
Heidegger is clear about this; 
Of course, during its lifetime the bodily [nature] of Da-sein already admits to being seen as a 
material, inanimate object and as a kind of complicated machine. Of course, for someone 
who sees it this way, the essential, unfolding character of bodily [nature] has already 
disappeared from view forever. Perplexed helplessness regarding all essential phenomena 
of the bodily [nature] is the result of such an inadequate view. [ZS 232] 
This “perplexed helplessness” is what is exhibited in the deficient understanding of 
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the medical professionals who, when faced with the absence of any physical cause 
for Laura’s condition grasped at implausible diagnoses such as "intestinal epilepsy" 
or the first documented instance of "infantile anorexia". 
This case study thrusts before us, broadly speaking, two interpretative stances in 
terms of what it is to be a person, a human being.  The first is the material 
reductionist account; the second is as a highly adaptive entity that responds to and 
integrates itself into and as part of the very environment in which it exists. The 
traditional medical understanding and response typify the first, the 
Heideggerian/Perry understanding the second. If interpretative stances should be 
assessed by the power of their ability to respond effectively the second, certainly in 
terms of the circumstances reflected in this case study, stands out as the most 
powerful, and yet it is still largely ignored.   
Nowhere does Heidegger deny that the body can break down and require fixing, he 
does not exclude material causes for problems.   We just need to have a far more 
complex and sophisticated understanding of what the body is and how it serves the 
unity of what it is to be a Dasein.  It is time to move on from Descartes’s clockwork 
understanding.  
I am not going to explore this case study any further, albeit it is a rich field for 
exploring. My aim was to illustrate Heidegger’s view of Dasein as being-in-the-world 
and how this can be seen in break-down cases, and this case study achieves this 
without the need, in my view, of further ‘pointing out’ of the links back to the points I 
have been raising in the thesis. 
Dasein, its body and the brain 
Part of my thesis is that Dasein’s existence can be thought of in terms of emergence 
and this model incorporates the body.  Heidegger refers to the way in which the 
body responds to Dasein’s existence, as our bodiliness.  For this to be the case, the 
physical body itself must somehow change, within a certain range, to allow for the 
variations in bodiliness that are evident in the ways of being of Dasein. As discussed 
earlier Heidegger makes this same point in relation to the development of body 
organs [FCM, ZS].  My point here is simply an application of the same principle.  
These changes in the body are consistent with the model of emergence and the 
effect of downward feedback.  
In thinking through this, there is clearly a number of levels of biological processes 
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much as is evident in Heidegger’s inquiries.  For example, the process of 
receptiveness which results in the development of a range of affective-capacities 
which in turn are ‘activated’ as specific affective-attunements in encounters with 
entities. These disclose to us how things matter to us in particular situations and in 
turn reveal the possibilities open to us in the ways we can respond. That this can 
vary depending on our acquired facticity was well illustrated by Virginia’s responses 
to Laura.   Then, of course, there is the process of understanding what the entity is, 
the lived experience of the encounter as it unfolds, and so on. The structure of this 
encounter has been laid out in detail in this thesis as being-in-the-world.     
How this happens as a result of the complex functioning of the many systems of the 
brain and body integrated as a unity is not known by science.  There has been 
significant progress in terms of identifying regions of the brain involved in differing 
activities such as sight, hearing, the movement of varying body parts and so on.  
There has also been progress in mapping out some activities in terms of the 
sequence or flow of activity from one region of the brain to another as part of the 
process.   But how this translates it the experiences of being Dasein is still as big a 
mystery as ever. 
The scale of the task is immense.  What we know is that the brain is currently thought 
to have approximately 100 billion neurons or nerve cells typically consisting of a cell 
body, dendrites and axions. Dendrites are projections from the neuron and are 
involved with receiving signals from other neurons.  Each neuron has one axon 
which is a cell fibre carrying signals away from the neuron. The overall length of a 
neuron with its axon ranges from a millimetre to over a metre in length. The 
interconnection between neurons is via a structure called a synapse and the mode 
of communication in the synapse from one cell to another is via chemical 
neurotransmitters of which there are more than 100 known types (e.g. dopamine, 
serotonin).  The chemical signal at the synapse triggers the electrical signal to the 
neuron body which is called a neuron ‘firing’.   Each synapse may have up to 1,000 
molecular-scale switches that are triggered when the appropriated chemical signal 
is received.  Each neuron only has one ‘output’ axon, but may have up to 10,000 
dendritic projections and there are an estimated 1,000 trillion synaptic connections 
passing and receiving signals between neurons.  In addition to the neuronal cells in 
the brain, there are also glial cells of different types of which there may be up to 10 
times more in number than neurons.  While originally thought to provide a support 
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and maintenance role for the neuronal based system they are now thought to play 
a more active role in communication and plasticity. This is a simplified description, 
but it gives an indication of the immense complexity.  To give an idea it is estimated 
there are around 100 billion stars in the Milky Way Galaxy, the number of synaptic 
interconnections in one human brain is estimated at around 10,000 that number. 
Following a review of the research literature associated with brain development Kolb 
and Gibb(Kolb & Gibb, 2011) describe the brain development process of going 
through a number of stages (neurogenesis, maturation and synaptogenesis), 
including a significant growth in neurons and the establishment of the 
interconnections followed by a period of pruning where the neural connections not 
used frequently are literally ‘pruned’. This is followed by a period of myelin formation 
which is basically a coating around the neural pathways that are most commonly 
used to strengthen and make the communication more efficient along those 
pathways.   This process is referred to as ‘plasticity’, and while there is never the 
same intensity or extent of activity in the brain as in this early growth phase, there 
is now evidence of the growth of new neurons (neurogenesis) in some areas of the 
brain in adults (Bonfanti, 2016), and new neuronal connections (synaptogenesis) 
continue to form throughout life (Bherer, Erickson, & Liu-Ambrose, 2013).  The are 
some areas of the brain that continually reorganization structurally and functionally 
in response to its environment (Cai, Chan, Yan, & Peng, 2014) but why some areas 
seem to resist subsequent development after the critical early period is unknown.  
Kolb and Gibb report that there is research evidence that the development and 
function of the brain, 
….  is influenced by different environmental events such as sensory stimuli, psychoactive 
drugs, gonadal hormones, parental-child relationships, peer relationships, early stress, 
intestinal flora, and diet.  (Kolb & Gibb, 2011, p. 265)  (my underlining) 
And their conclusion is that, 
The development of the brain reflects more than the simple unfolding of a genetic blueprint 
but rather reflects a complex dance of genetic and experiential factors that shape the 
emerging brain. Understanding the dance provides insight into both normal and abnormal 
development.  (Kolb & Gibb, 2011, p. 265) (my underlining) 
While the basic layout out of each person’s brain may be similar the neuronal 
structure, the nature of the interconnections, which pathways are stronger, which 
are weaker which have been pruned will vary from person to person.  The emergent 
existential nature of Dasein is reflected in the architecture of the brain.  We are 
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unique, and this uniqueness is reflected in our brain structure.  This is reflected in 
the case study of Virginia and Laura. 
Heidegger understands that if we are going to investigate Dasein from a biological 
perspective, then we must first understand the “existential analytic of Dasein” [BT 
71/45].  It is Dasein in its bodiliness that is thrown up by evolution as part of the 
larger ‘environment’ and as such how can the biology of Dasein be understood if 
Dasein’s way of being in the environment is not first understood?  This is the crux 
of Heidegger’s argument from Chapter 11, where I argue that he intends his work 
to be used by the social and biological sciences. 
Having provided a brief introduction of the functioning of the brain and the results 
from research that the developing brain is shaped by its environment, I now want to 
come back to Perry’s work and other research evidence that supports the case that 
not only does abuse and neglect in early childhood impact the emergent Dasein but 
that it has empirically observable effects on the brain structure.  I use this as 
evidence for supporting my claim concerning the emergent nature of Dasein and the 
founded relationship with the body.  
Environments, the Emergent Dasein and Underlying Brain Structures.  
Perry’s thesis is that trauma, including both active maltreatment and benign neglect, 
experienced by children will result in adverse impacts on the developing brain which 
in turn contributes to lifelong mental health problems adversely affecting their life 
and the lives of those around them.  In the following, I provide evidence from 
empirical research supports Perry’s thesis., i.e. that adverse lived experiences such 
as abuse and neglect at childhood adversely affect the developing brain.  
In 2014, Read, Fosse, Moskowitz and Perry publish a review of 125 papers 
published since 2001(Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014). The review focused 
on papers relevant to the traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, 
 which provides a partial explanation of the link between trauma and psychosis, attempts to 
integrate biological and psychological processes. (Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014, 
p. 66) 
This model proposes that early childhood trauma results in developmental changes 
to the brain structure when compared to normal children (the biological), that these 
changes are evidenced in changes in the psychological processes which in turn 
impact on the experienced quality of life.  The review found “both indirect support 
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for and direct confirmation” for the model (p. 66). The authors point out that not every 
abused or neglected child ends up with abnormalities in brain development and 
resultant adverse impacts in life and there is much more work to be done in 
understanding the differences in outcomes.  An earlier review of the neuroscience 
literature concluded that there is a general consensus as to the relationship between 
abuse and neglect in early childhood and more widespread effects on brain 
development and functioning arising out of deficits in stimulation, interaction and 
learning opportunities(Twardosz & Lutzker, 2010).  Anda, et al. reported a striking 
convergence of findings from the neurosciences with those from a large 
epidemiologic study looking at the long-term effects of the cumulative exposure of 
adverse childhood experiences on the developing brain(Anda et al., 2006). The 
study found a correlation between adverse childhood experiences and impairment 
in multiple brain structures and functions(Anda et al., 2006).  Hanson, et al. reported 
on a study using comparative research examining the properties of white matter and 
neurocognitive performance in children who suffered early neglect and those raised 
in typical environments.  They concluded that for the children suffering early neglect 
there was material evidence that the white matter microstructure was adversely 
affected, and that neurocognitive performance was impaired(Hanson et al., 2013). 
In other research, the impact of childhood abuse and neglect has been found to 
impact on the child’s cognitive development(Mills et al., 2011).  
The above is just a small selection of both primary research reports and reviews that 
are finding a link between early childhood neglect, alternations in normal brain 
developments, psychological performance and quality of life outcomes.  The aim of 
this section of the thesis is not to do a comprehensive review, but to establish a 
sufficient case in the context of my emergence model.  Perhaps the most dramatic 
example of the impact of impoverished and neglectful environments of children’s 
development and the brain is found among the survivors of the Romanian 
orphanages. This was as a result of a disastrous social experiment that ended with 
the overthrow and execution of the country’s dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu, in 1989. 
At its peak, there were 170,000 children in the orphanages.  Because of the 
importance of this research, I will briefly discuss some aspects before concluding 
this section.   Marshall describes the living environment in which most of the orphans 
were placed;  
Most grew up in a stunningly blank and unresponsive environment. Caregivers came and 
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went in three shifts, and a single staffer might watch over 10 to 15 children. Infants spent 
time staring at the walls and ceiling, and a child might come in contact with 17 different 
caregivers in a single week.  (Marshall, 2014, p. 752)  
Marshall cites one professor in paediatrics as calling it an “Experiment in zero 
parenting” (p. 752).  In 2007 Nelson (Nelson et al., 2007) reported on findings from 
an ongoing randomized controlled trial involving the Romanian orphans.  Following 
the fall of the Ceauşescu regime young children in institutional care were randomly 
assigned to foster care or left in the institution. A third comparative group of children 
raised by their biological families was established.  All the children were assessed 
at various times over a number of years, with the same battery of tests.  The children 
in the intuition were initially assessed prior to random allocation to foster care.  
Nelson reports three main findings; 
First: Children reared in institutions showed greatly diminished intellectual 
performance (borderline mental retardation) relative to children reared in their 
families of origin.  
Second: As a group, children randomly assigned to foster care experienced 
significant gains in cognitive function.  
Third: The findings suggest that there may be a sensitive period spanning the first 
2 years of life within which the onset of foster care exerts a maximal effect on 
cognitive development. However, a closer reading of the analyses suggested a 
more parsimonious conclusion: That the younger a child is when placed in foster 
care, the better the outcome.(Nelson et al., 2007, p. 1940) 
Marshall reports on more recent comments by Nelson, who has concluded that, 
based on these ongoing studies, “that early life without parenting can be “more 
disastrous for brain development” than living with an abusive caregiver”  (Marshall, 
2014, p. 752)  A report by Sheridan, et al. using magnetic resonance imaging on 
Romanian children aged 8 to 11, found that the children raised in an institution had 
significantly less brain tissue, especially grey matter, than those who had never lived 
in an institution, while those placed in foster care showed a smaller deficit.  
(Sheridan, Fox, Zeanah, McLaughlin, & Nelson, 2012) . In 2017 Sonuga-Burke et 
al. reported findings concerning the impact on individuals who, from soon after birth, 
up to 43 months lived in the severely deprived environments of the Romanian 
orphanages and had subsequently been adopted in the UK(Sonuga-Barke et al., 
2017).  They found that UK adoptees who had spent more than 6 months in the 
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orphanages, compared to a UK control group,  
 … had early onset and persistently higher rates of symptoms for autism spectrum disorder, 
disinhibited social engagement, and inattention and overactivity compared with both the UK 
adoptees control group and the less deprived Romanian adoptees group. (Sonuga-Barke et 
al., 2017, p. 1544) 
While a fifth of the group who had spent more than 6 months in an orphanage did 
not exhibit signs of a problem, most had one or more problems at significantly higher 
rates than the control group extended into young adulthood. Which was reflected in 
lower educational attainment, higher unemployment, higher utilisation of mental 
health services, relationship problems and inappropriate social engagements with 
strangers (disinhibited social engagement) (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017).  The 
researchers concluded that,  
 … extended early deprivation was associated with long-term deleterious effects on wellbeing 
that seem insusceptible to years of nurturance and support in adoptive families. (Sonuga-
Barke et al., 2017, p. 1539) 
The strong conclusion from this section is that environments matter in determining 
the constitution of Dasein, and it is how we understand this that is important.  In the 
next part, this research is interpreted within a Heideggerian framework. 
Interpreting Abuse and Neglect within A Heideggerian Framework 
There is now a significant body of research, including the work of Perry and the 
studies of the Romanian orphans, that environments matter to the growing Dasein 
in a profound way.  Chapter 16 discussed how the structural aspect of Dasein that 
Heidegger called the ‘One’234 takes up the averageness of understanding and the 
receptivities exhibited in the culture. This is the basis of my claim that the same 
newborn raised in different cultures will result in different Daseins!  That this does 
not imply a bland uniformity of understandings and receptivities but rather the 
typical, average, young Dasein will encounter other typical, average Daseins 
exhibiting the practices associated with the cultural norms. This is what is taken up.  
Applied more broadly I take this as describing a structure of the young Dasein that 
will, based on its capacity to receive-perceive, take up and “fill-in” as its own primary 
understandings and receptive-capacities from whatever is initially encountered in its 
                                            
234 The ‘One’ is both the name of an existentiale of Dasein, i.e. part of its constitutive structure [BT 167/129] as 
well as the name for the average understanding and receptiveness Dasein encounters among other Dasein 
which in turn is reflected in the averageness of the dealings exhibited by the others. It is this encountered 
averageness of dealings that I refer to as cultural practices or simply culture. 
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environment for this purpose.  In doing so, this structural process makes no, indeed 
has no basis for, making judgements as what to take up and what to leave. 
In that Dasein is an emergent entity, what needs to be resisted is the belief that ‘little 
Laura’ was born ‘little Laura’ and that the environment then caused Laura’s 
developmental path to go astray somehow.  As has been argued, firstly, if little Laura 
were born in Sweden she would be little Astrid. This is not just a change in name, 
but a different Dasein. Secondly, unless there was a biological abnormality, little 
Laura’s development process is not deficient, it is doing what it should. Laura and 
the Romanian orphans became the Dasein they should, based on the environments 
in which they were raised.  Newborns are not the potential ‘mini’ version of an adult 
self, that, all going well, will be actualised.  It is this model that allows for a ‘resilience’ 
view of the child that imagines the child somehow springing back ‘on course’ to 
fulfilling the predetermined potential.  Any ‘resilience’ that is evident arises from a 
change in environments.  However, even here the research is suggesting that there 
may be critical windows in which the initial understandings and receptivities are 
‘filled in’. This then becomes the basis by which Dasein’s world matters to it, 
establishing an iterative or reciprocating dynamic between the Dasein and world that 
determines the trajectory of future development.  This results in, as Perry presents 
in the case of Virginia and Laura and as evident in the Romanian orphans, parts of 
the structure that is determinative of the of Dasein being stabilised and perhaps 
‘locked’ in at an early stage for the remainder of their life.  
Heidegger does not claim to identify the biological and psychological processes 
involved with the dynamic structure that constitutes Dasein.  However, Heidegger is 
clear that the structural processes of Dasein are not mystical, they are founded on 
the body; it is a naturalistic account of being Dasein.  As discussed in Chapter 11, 
Heidegger’s stance is that the empirical, philosophical research he has undertaken 
in establishing describing the ontological structure of Dasein must precede the work 
of psychology and biology.  The claim I make in this section is that the phenomenon 
that Perry and others are describing, and researching is the phenomenon of Dasein 
as described by Heidegger.  In piecing together the relationship between the young 
Dasein, deficient environments, resultant brain development and psychological 
processes and lifelong impacts on the experienced quality of life, there is no need 
for a specific traumagenic neurodevelopmental model. All that is required is an 
understanding and application of the structure of ‘being-in-the-world’.  This model is 
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a little more complex than the traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, but it has 
the virtue of being applicable to all Dasein, and it is neutral concerning the ‘quality’ 
of the environment.  It is just that the emergent outcomes vary based on the 
environmental ‘inputs’.  
The conclusion then is that there are biological processes associated with the 
primordial ‘being-in-the-world’ dynamic structure that is involved with ‘sensing’ 
(Dasein’s capacity to receive-perceive) the early living environment.  The 
understanding and affective-capacities that arise from this ‘sensing’ of the 
environment are reflected in the developing structures of the young brain.  These 
emerging structures of understanding and affective-capacities are thus constituting 
the meaning of Dasein and its world; it is the basis on which the ‘there’ of Dasein is 
then held open.   What is important to grasp is that it is not the brain itself or brain 
activity that is of primary concern, it is what the biological processes are doing. 
However, science, certainly at the moment, cannot identify not describe the specific 
biological processes at the organic level whereby our lived experience translates to 
biological activity and then to physical structural change and vice versa.  However, 
that such activity is occurring is now beyond doubt.  Perry has accepted this and 
using it to better help young ‘damaged’ Daseins.  Perry states(Perry, 2009) that his 
research program is to identify the regions of the brain associated with and 
necessary for good social functioning and are at risk of maldevelopment through 
neglect and abuse.  The aim is to assess and to monitor the changes following 
targeted interventions using various therapeutic, enrichment and educational 
activities.  
The approach Perry is taking is to use his traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, 
developed from his empirical observations, and then based on the model evaluate 
changes in brain activity and brain structure correlated with observed changes in 
the behaviour of Dasein arising from therapeutic interventions.  However, Perry’s 
ontology concerning Dasein is reflective of the traditional approach, and this 
requires him to develop a model that specifically addresses situations of neglect and 
abuse.  My claim is that the Heideggerian ontological structure of Dasein is 
consistent with Perry’s findings and as such is applicable to all Dasein’s irrespective 
of the environment.  Put another way; there is no need for a specific traumagenic 
neurodevelopmental model, what Perry is observing is the ontological structure of 
Dasein operating as it is should.  A model based on ‘being-in-the-world’ is not only 
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consistent with Perry’s findings, but it is also universal in application and has a 
greater ‘explanatory’ power than the existing model, and on this basis, I would argue 
should be preferred.  
Summary 
Following Heidegger, it is my claim that Dasein can be understood as an emergent 
entity that is constituted, to a significant degree, by its primordial ontological 
processes operating in the context of the environments into which it has been born 
and raised.  This places Dasein into a different relationship to its environment and 
its body than does the existing traditional ontological model allow.  This was 
demonstrated most dramatically by Perry’s account of the body of the young Laura 
failing to thrive as a direct consequence of the environment in which it found itself.  
In summary, environments matter to Dasein in a profound way, they shape who we 
are, and this is reflected in our underlying biological structures and processes.  
Based on the research I have been discussing this is now beyond doubt.  All that is 
required is an appropriate account of the structure of Dasein and the how a Dasein 
comes into being based on this structure.  Such an account is based on Heidegger’s 
empirically based philosophical research and is present by Heidegger in Being and 
Time. 
This concludes the discussion on this section.  
Section 3: Adult Dasein and Changed in the Environment 
Introduction 
In the previous section, based on the structure of being-in-the-world, I have 
established that the environment counts in terms of our development and ongoing 
quality of life.  This suggests that the environment may be important in our ongoing 
life and I now want to explore this aspect from the perceptive of Heidegger’s 
account.   
Heidegger’s thesis is that we grow up in a particular environment, that it is this 
environment that shapes our understanding of our self, and that it is in this 
environment we encounter the possibilities necessary for the lived experiences that 
make manifest our understanding of self.  It is these encounters that make our life 
meaningful.  In the following, I again use the method of breakdown cases to explore 
this.  Two circumstances are considered where adults are forced by circumstances 
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into environments that no longer provide possibilities, or provide only significantly 
reduced possibilities, for meaningful encounters. The two circumstances are 
unemployment and moving into a nursing home.  If the Heideggerian account of 
being human is correct, then this should be reflected in adverse psychological 
experiences.  If, as indicated by the case of Laura, my emergent interpretation of 
Heidegger is correct, then there is also a possibility that this will be reflected in 
adverse indicators in the bodily aspect of Dasein, i.e. increased morbidities.  The 
research evidence that is discussed is strongly suggestive that psychological and 
bodily distress does arise out of adverse changes to Dasein’s environment. 
Unemployment 
One of the central aspects of Heidegger’s description of Dasein is that in the normal 
course of things Dasein carries on with its existence within its familiar environment. 
This is the environment in which Dasein encounters the possibilities for engaging 
(concernful dealings) with things that are meaningful to how Dasein understands 
itself.  If Dasein’s environment changes such that significant possibilities are no 
longer available, then we would expect there to be adverse consequences.  This is 
what we find reported in the research around unemployment. 
In 2011 Roelfs, Shor, Davidson, & Schwartz reported on a systematic review and 
meta-analysis of unemployment and all-cause mortality in the USA. The review 
included 42 studies providing data on more than 20 million people(Roelfs, Shor, 
Davidson, & Schwartz, 2011). The conclusion was sobering 
This study shows that unemployment was associated with a substantially increased risk of 
death among broad segments of the population. (p. 12) 
The mortality risk was higher for people in early or mid-career and was such that the 
authors believed it to be consistent with a causal association.   A 10-year cohort 
study(Mustard et al., 2013) in Canada covering more than 1.5 million people was 
published in 2013 concluded  
… consistent with results from other long-term duration cohort studies, unemployed men and 
women in this cohort had an elevated risk of mortality for accidents and violence as well as 
for chronic diseases. (p. 1)  
In an earlier UK study(Morris, Cook, & Shaper, 1994) of just over 6 thousand men 
aged 40-59 who had been continuously employed for more the 5 years before the 
study found that  
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.. men who experienced unemployment in the five years after initial screening were twice as 
likely to die during the following 5.5 years as men who remained continuously employed.  (p. 
1135) (my underlining) 
In New Zealand unemployment has been associated with a two to threefold increase 
in suicide(Blakely, Collings, & Atkinson, 2003).  There have also been findings of a 
causal relationship between late-life involuntary job loss and morbidity (a decline 
physical functioning and mental health) (Gallo, Bradley, Siegel, & Kasl, 2000).   
The studies on the mortality and morbidity effects of early retirement are not clear 
as many studies do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary retirements 
and health versus non-health related retirements(van der Heide, van Rijn, Robroek, 
Burdorf, & Proper, 2013).  However, the 1994 study by Morris, Cook, & Shaper did 
not distinguish between involuntary retirement and unemployment, and the 
conclusion was that both were detrimental to health.  Along these lines, a study 
based in Austria reported that involuntary early retirements cause a significant 
increase in the risk of premature death(Kuhn, Wuellrich, & Zweimüller, 2010).  A 
2005 report of a study of petrochemical workers found that early retirement at 55 
increased the risk of mortality by 37% compared to workers retiring at 65 (Tsai, 
Wendt, Donnelly, de Jong, & Ahmed, 2005). 
There is a substantial number of studies that go into detail as to the increased risks 
associated with various morbidities and unemployment. However, what I have 
present is sufficient to indicate that the change to one’s meaning given environments 
arising from unemployment can not only make you ill it can kill you.  There is, 
perhaps, no greater impact on the body than that leading to death! 
Understood in terms of Dasein as structural connected to its world we would have 
expected to see adverse signs either psychologically or physically as a result of 
involuntary unemployment and retirements and this is the case.  The mechanisms 
by which this occurs are irrelevant.  What is more to the point is that that the 
connection is accepted in the research literature.  However, what is missing is a 
theoretical model that accounts for this phenomenon in a way that is consistent with 
an understanding of being a person.  Again, I would argue that the understanding 
what it is to be a person on the basis of being-in-the-world provides such a 
framework.  It would also form the basis of the necessary detailed research 
concerning those people who do and do not fall ill as a result of unemployment to 
identify differences in the characterises of these groups of Dasein.  The criteria for 
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such a comparison would be based on both understanding and affective-capacities 
as well as the patterns of ongoing involvements. 
Nursing Homes 
At the beginning of the thesis, I included a short autobiographical account by Marion 
Miller of her journey into a nursing home in which she concluded  
… I hate to think beyond each day. … there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes 
to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place. (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7) 
When I listen to what Marion is saying I hear her talking about the living environment 
she has entered, and from which she will not leave.  While she had increasing frailty, 
which had limited the things she could do I get the clear sense that she still had a 
life in her home which provided her with sufficient possibilities for her to be Marion.  
That changed after the fall, the broken hip and then the entry to the nursing home 
which required her to give up her home, access to friends, her books, her pink lustre 
china collection, and her privacy.  While the nursing home was intelligible to her, it 
contained none of the things that offered Marion the possibility of meaningful 
involvements that would make manifest who she is as Marion.  It was this loss of 
possibilities that I take Marion to be referring to when she said, “You just shed life, 
you do ...” (Miller, 2003, p. 36).  Given her age and her circumstance, she could see 
no hope for returning to a meaningful existence, and she reflects that had she known 
what it was going to be like she would most probably have killed herself. In such a 
situation I take Marion’s comments to indicate that she accepts her meaningful 
existence as Marion had already ended, and death was a more palatable alternative 
to living a meaningless existence. 
In the introduction, I gave an overview of my earlier research on the experiences of 
older people relocating into a nursing home and include Lieberman’s comments 
from his 1969 review of the relocation literature that the, 
... effects of institutionalization on the psychological wellbeing and physical integrity of aged 
adults had been a question of humanitarian interest since the late nineteenth century and 
of scientific inquiry for 30 years.  (Lieberman, 1969, p. 330) (my bolding) 
The summary from the 1990 review by Danermark and Ekström was also cited;  
... there is good reason for assuming that relocation under certain circumstances and for 
certain groups does lead to ill health and to an increase in mortality.  (Danemark & 
Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) (Danemark & Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) (Danemark & Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) 
(Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 44)(my bolding) 
  
672 
While the review that I completed in 2012 focused on the qualitative rather than 
quantitative research associated with relocation the conclusion was equally 
concerning; 
While the clinical and personal care aspects of the services in nursing homes235 appears 
satisfactory there is a failure to recognise the significant psychological and emotional issues 
faced by older people as they relocate and struggle to adapt to new environments, develop 
new relationships, learn a new set of rules to survive, create a sense of place, establish new 
identities and create new meaning for their lives. The review indicates there is little in the way 
of support for these life transition processes and many people fail to make a successful 
transition.  (Richards, 2011, p. 4)  
The failure was captured for me by a quote from one of the research participants 
included in the review and to which I have referred several times; 
Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was 
like for her to be at the facility. She cried out, “They don’t know the meaning of me! They 
don’t know the meaning of me.” Her comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new 
neighborhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38) 
Marion and Regina express the human face of the failure of nursing homes.  When 
we build the nursing homes and run them the way we do, it’s in such a manner that 
we do not know the meaning of the people we bring in and care for, we shed life 
from them, and that is not just painful it causes significant damage and I believe, as 
do others, it also brings death to some. 
In the introduction, I discussed research that was strongly suggestive of the 
association between morbidity and mortality and moving into the nursing home, and 
I have already addressed this in detail in the previous systematic review. In Chapter 
18, I discussed Heidegger’s view that he regards anxiety/depression as a 
breakdown case disclosing Dasein’s structure was briefly discussed.   In the next 
part, I look at depression within the context of nursing homes from this Heideggerian 
perspective.    
Depression among residents of nursing homes 
Depression is a significant illness and one of the leading causes of disability across 
the globe.  (Baxter et al., 2014; Ferrari et al., 2013; Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation, 2013) The World Health Organisation summaries the impact of 
depression as being 
                                            
235 The abbreviation LTCF (long term care facility) was in the original quote.  This has been changed to nursing 
home for consistency. 
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… characterised by sadness, loss of interest or pleasure, feelings of guilt or low self-worth, 
disturbed sleep or appetite, feelings of tiredness, and poor concentration ... can be long-
lasting or recurrent, substantially impairing an individual's ability to function at work or school 
or cope with daily life. At its most severe, depression can lead to suicide. (World Health 
Organisation, 2016a) 
The concern regarding the prevalence and seriousness of depression is such that 
in October 2016 the WHO launched a one-year campaign to improve awareness of 
depression and encourage people to seek help. (World Health Organisation, 2016b) 
Heidegger regards any affective-attunement as related to the mode of being of a 
Dasein and indicative of the structure being-in-the-world for that Dasein.  He regards 
depression as indicative of a breakdown in the person’s being-in-the-world, as 
indicative of the absence of meaningful possibilities showing up in the world upon 
which Dasein can project itself.  This would relate to a breakdown in the receptivity 
aspect of the intentional structure.  From this perspective, absent any organic 
genesis, depression is indicative of something ‘missing’ in the environment and not 
something ‘wrong’ in Dasein. As was commented in relation to the impact of abuse 
and neglect on young children, the outcome is a consequence of the proper 
functioning of Dasein’s constitutive structures, not an abnormality within Dasein.  
From this perspective, the global prevalence of depression is telling us that there is 
something seriously wrong with the world Dasein is creating for itself!  While I agree 
with this, this thesis is focused on people in nursing homes. I am arguing, that there 
is a problem with the nursing home environment and the research on depression as 
I will show, read from a Heideggerian perspective, supports this claim. 
Prevalence of Depression in Nursing Homes 
As at 30th June 2012, 52.1% of people living in a nursing home in Australia had a 
diagnosis of depression(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013). However 
26% of the total population had no assessment noted, and given that the 
assessment is not mandatory, together with research indicating high rates of failure 
to diagnose depression in nursing homes correctly (Brühl, Luijendijk, & Muller, 2007; 
Snowdon & Fleming, 2008; Watson, Zimmerman, Cohen, & Dominik, 2009) the 
actual prevalence rate is most likely well passed 60%.  
McCabe et.al. has found that staff are not clear in how best to respond to people 
with depression in nursing homes (McCabe, Davison, Mellor, & George, 2008) 
Davison et al. found that many aged care staff held false beliefs that depression is 
both a natural and expected phenomenon among nursing home residents (Davison, 
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McCabe, Mellor, Karantzas, & George, 2009). This being the case then part of the 
explanation of the under-reporting is that depression is simply not ‘seen’ by the staff.  
It has become part their normalised perception of what it is to be a nursing home 
resident.  
Depression is regarded by many researchers as a common mental disorder among 
older people living in nursing homes (Drageset, Eide, & Ranhoff, 2011; Katz, Lesher, 
Kleban, Jethanandani, & Parmelee, 1989; Lin, Wang, & Huang, 2007; Meeks & 
Looney, 2011) and there is evidence that this is a global phenomenon among 
residents of nursing homes.  In the USA Gaboda reported that among 5,455 facilities 
across eight states, 51.8% of people living in a nursing home had a diagnosis of 
depression (Gaboda, Lucas, Siegel, Kalay, & Crystal, 2011). This confirmed an 
earlier nationwide survey in the USA that found 54.4% of long-term nursing home 
residents had depression diagnosed during the first year(Hoover et al., 2010).  A 
Taiwanese study reported that 81·8% of residents living in nursing homes were 
identified as being depressed(Lin, Wang, & Huang, 2007).  Not all research findings 
disclose prevalence rates as high as these, for example, a small study in Australia 
Snowdon found depression rates of 40% among high care residents and 25% 
among low care residents (Snowdon & Fleming, 2008). The discrepancy between 
high and low care facilities may indicate that the level of acuity among residents may 
be a factor.   
The rates of depression in nursing homes are higher than found among older people 
in the community.  Djernes reviewed 122 research reports and found a high degree 
of variability in the reported levels of depression among community-living older 
adults with rates varying from 1% to 49%(Djernes, 2006).  Reported variances have 
mainly been attributed to differences in methodological approaches including the 
choice of the diagnostic tool used, and population and sampling approaches 
(Beekman, Copeland, & Prince, 1999; Henderson et al., 1993; Pirkis et al., 2009).  
Despite this variance, studies of community as opposed to nursing home residing 
older adults generally report lower prevalence rates of depression(Fiske, Wetherell, 
& Gatz, 2009), with community rates tending to be between 10-15% (Haralambous 
et al., 2009) which is significantly lower than the reported prevalence rates in nursing 
homes.  This is consistent with a survey of older community-dwelling patients from 
general practice from across Australia which reported a prevalence rate of 8.2% 
(Pirkis et al., 2009), and findings from rural India of 9.3% (Chauhan, Kokiwar, 
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Shridevi, & Katkuri, 2016) and in urban Turkey of 18.5% (Yaka, Keskinoglu, Ucku, 
Yener, & Tunca, 2014).  
Notwithstanding that there has been evidence of improvement in diagnosing 
depression the research indicates that under detection and under treatment rates in 
nursing home facilities have been reported for almost thirty years,  with rates varying 
from 20% to as high as 50% (Bagley et al., 2000; Cohen, Hyland, & Kimhy, 2003; 
Davison et al., 2007; Gruber-Baldini et al., 2005; Phillips & Henderson, 1991; 
Rovner et al., 1991; Shah, Schoenbachler, Streim, & Meeks, 2012; Snowdon & 
Fleming, 2008; Szczerbińska, Hirdes, & Życzkowska, 2012; Teresi, Abrams, 
Holmes, Ramirez, & Eimicke, 2001; Thakur, Blazer, & others, 2008). Underreporting 
and undertreatment have been identified as of particular concern for people with 
cognitive impairment or dementia(Davison et al., 2012; Leontjevas et al., 2013; 
Simning & Simons, 2016).  
Drug Interventions Largely Ineffective and No Evidence of Alternatives 
Aside from the reports of under-diagnosis and under-treatment of depression 
amongst Australian nursing home residents the dominant mode of treatment of 
depression in nursing homes is through the prescription of antidepressants (Shah, 
Schoenbachler, Streim, & Meeks, 2012; Snowdon, 2010).  This is problematic as 
there is increasing, and significant evidence that such interventions are limited in 
their efficacy.  In his report on Depression in Nursing Homes (Snowdon, 2010) 
Snowdon mentioned his knowledge of ten small trials of fewer than 500 participants 
in nursing homes (no details provided) where the results showed the 
antidepressants had little advantage over placebos. This is consistent with other 
research. 
In 2010 Fournier, et al. reported (Fournier et al., 2010) on a meta-analysis of 
randomised placebo controlled trials published over the period from 1980 through 
to early 2009.  The analysis of the 6 studies that met the study criteria, concluded;  
The magnitude of benefit of antidepressant medication compared with placebo increases 
with severity of depression symptoms and may be minimal or nonexistent, on average, in 
patients with mild or moderate symptoms. For patients with very severe depression, the 
benefit of medications over placebo is substantial.(p. 47) 
The study confirmed the findings of earlier similar studies (Khan, Leventhal, Khan, 
& Brown, 2002; Kirsch et al., 2008).  These results have also been supported in 
research specifically looking at the efficacy of antidepressants in older populations 
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(Calati et al., 2013; Nelson, Delucchi, & Schneider, 2013).  To compound the 
problem, there is evidence that a significant percentage of people are receiving 
medication at less than the recommended doses reducing the possibility of any 
benefit that may be provided (Brown, Lapane, & Luisi, 2002; Davison et al., 2012).  
The concluding remarks in the Fournier, et al. study included a strong 
recommendation to provide advice to clinicians and prospective patient about the 
limitations of antidepressant medications (ADMs); 
Pending findings contrary to those reported here and those obtained by Kirsch et al and Khan 
et al, efforts should be made to clarify to clinicians and prospective patients that whereas 
ADM can have a substantial effect with more severe depressions, there is little evidence to 
suggest that they produce specific pharmacological benefit for the majority of patients with 
less severe acute depressions.  (Fournier et al., 2010, p. 52) (my underlining) 
Despite the strong evidence as to the lack of benefit of pharmacological 
interventions for depression, except in severe cases, there is little evidence of any 
other forms of interventions implemented in a considered and systematic manner 
occurring in nursing homes.  (Franck, Molyneux, & Parkinson, 2016; Meeks & 
Looney, 2011; Simning & Simons, 2016; Snowdon, 2010; Stargatt et al., 2016) 
Correlation Depression, Mortality and Morbidity 
As indicated earlier depression is a serious condition that is associated with the 
experience of helplessness, self-deprecation, tiredness, inability to cope with and 
withdrawal from activities associated with work, recreation or daily living and so on.  
There is also a growing literature that indicates that the presence of depression is 
positively associated with premature mortality in general (Appleton et al., 2014; 
Katon, 2011; Lépine & Briley, 2011; Stek et al., 2005; Zivin et al., 2012) and 
increased mortality in conjunction with other conditions such as cardiovascular 
disease (Adams et al., 2012; Elderon & Whooley, 2013; Kerber & Rubenfire, 2012), 
and stroke (Ellis, 2010; House, Knapp, Bamford, & Vail, 2001; Towfighi, Valle, 
Markovic, & Ovbiagele, 2013) as well as increased risk of morbidity in general 
(Katon, 2011; Lépine & Briley, 2011) and specific serious illness such as 
cardiovascular disease (Carney & Freedland, 2008; Kerber & Rubenfire, 2012; 
Peters et al., 2010), and stroke (Chang-Quan et al., 2010).  
In that I take depression as an affective-attunement indicative of a deficient mode 
of involvement with Dasein’s world then there is substantial evidence linking this 
aspect of the being-in-the-world structure with increased morbidities and mortalities.  
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I do not exclude the possibility that significant illnesses may of themselves trigger 
depression, however, in that the emergent model I am proposing links Dasein’s 
bodiliness and Dasein’s experienced existence, the reduction in the meaningfulness 
of the environment would help to explain the increases in morbidity and mortality.  
This link was clearly evident for Laura as discussed in the earlier case study and 
was evident in the research on involuntary unemployment. 
Correlation Depression and Quality of Life 
The presence of depression has also been associated with reductions in quality of 
life of older people(Bakar & Asilar, 2015; Beekman et al., 2002; Hasche, Morrow-
Howell, & Proctor, 2010; Lin et al., 2014; Naumann & Byrne, 2004; Sivertsen, 
Bjørkløf, Engedal, Selbæk, & Helvik, 2015).  While the association of depression 
with quality of life has been researched there have been relatively few large 
population studies that attempt to assess the impact of not just diagnosed major 
depression but also what is often termed subsyndromal depression236 (i.e. mild and 
moderate); one such study is based on the Denmark Suburban General Population 
Study(Ellervik, Kvetny, Christensen, Vestergaard, & Bech, 2014).  
In the study, Ellervik, et.al. used the Major Depression Index (MDI) to assess 
depression and the WHO-Five Well-Being Index237 (WHO-5) to assess wellbeing of 
14,787 respondents. The results were that the WHO-5 score fell from an average 
wellbeing score of 70 (out of 100) for people with no depression, to a wellbeing score 
of 30 with mild depression, 24.5 with moderate depression and 16.0 with severe 
depression. These scores were presented as a graph (Ellervik, Kvetny, Christensen, 
Vestergaard, & Bech, 2014) which is represented below (Figure 32). 
As can be seen from the graph what is notable is the drop-in wellbeing from no 
depression to mild depression. This reflects a drop of 40 points (70 down to 30) or 
57.1%.  The drop from mild to moderate is a further 5.5 points (7.9% from starting 
score) and from moderate to severe another 8.5 points (12.1% from starting score).   
The Danish study was in the general population, however, the clear decline in well-
being associated with depression in unequivocal.  Of importance to note is that mild 
depression has the most dramatic effect on the reported quality of life as measured  
                                            
236 Subsyndromal depression is the term used to indicate that the assessment for depression does not meet 
the criteria for a diagnosis of major depression. 





by the WHO-5.  Confirming the studies already discussed, the report did not find 
that the use of pharmacology improved the reported level of well-being.  An earlier 
cross-sectional study (Chachamovich, Fleck, Laidlaw, & Power, 2008) covering 
4,316 respondents across 20 countries and five continents looked at older adults 
and the impact of both clinical and subsyndromal depression on quality of life.  The 
study found that even relatively minor levels of depression are associated with a 
significant decrease in quality of life reflecting the findings of the large Danish 
general population study. It was depression and not the presence of other physical 
morbidities that accounted for nearly all the decline in the quality of life in this study. 
Is Depression a Disease? 
Typically, the literature on depression suggests that it is the depression itself that 
causes the decline in quality of life and the increased risk of morbidity and mortality.  
This is based on a disease model of depression, i.e. there is something wrong within 
the person, and this is causing the depression which subsequently flows through to 
 
(WHO-5) scores within the three ICD-10 depression categories of severity (none, 
mild, moderate and severe) in the total group of respondents (n = 14,787).  
Figure 32 Mean WHO-Five Well-Being Index vs ICD-10 depression severity 
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the other adverse impacts on their life. Fix the depression (the disease), and you 
improve the quality of life and health outcomes.   
The literature overwhelmingly describes depression as a mental or psychiatric 
illness(Blazer, 2003; Davison et al., 2016; Fava & Sonino, 2005; Grabowski, 
Aschbrenner, Rome, & Bartels, 2010; Henshaw, Freedman-Doan, & Michigan, 
2009; Palazidou, 2012) or a disorder, i.e. a depressive disorder (Davison, McCabe, 
Knight, & Mellor, 2012; Polyakova et al., 2014; Thakur, Blazer, & others, 2008), and 
at other times it is not characterised and simply referred to as 'depression' 
(Drageset, Eide, & Ranhoff, 2011; Stroud, Steiner, & Iwuagwu, 2008).  This disease 
model is reflected in the almost exclusive use of anti-depressant medications as the 
preferred mode of intervention.  
This disease model is the normative view held by the psychiatric profession(Blazer, 
2005) however, as had been seen elsewhere in this thesis, the normative view is 
under attack by a small but growing number of psychiatrists.  It is rare to get a 
succinct and clear insight into scholarly debates of this type, but one such occasion 
was provided by a televised debate in the late 1990s on the topic "Is Depression a 
Disease?"  (Szasz, S et al., 1998) when six scholars and practitioners argued their 
position, three on each side of the debate.   The normative view can be summed up 
by the comment of Donald Klein, then Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia 
University 
... depression, clinical depression, is not unhappiness, it is an illness that is open to 
medication and can be medicated well.  (Szasz, S et al., 1998) (my underlining) 
The more recent research on the effectiveness of medication brings into question 
Klein’s assertions, but that is not the focus of this debate.  What is important is the 
view put forward arguing for a different understanding of depression.  Thomas 
Szasz, Professor Psychiatry Emeritus, at State University of New York, argued that 
depression is not a disease; 
A disease scientifically is defined as a biological abnormality that affects living tissues. Trees 
can be diseased, plants, animals, and humans. A real disease is typhoid fever, we call it a 
literal disease. Spring fever sounds like a disease but it is not a disease. The whale is a real 
animal, but it is not a fish, it is a metaphorical fish. So when we say depression is not a 
disease, we do not minimize the human phenomenon suffering. It exists like the whale exists 
but it is not a disease. Point number two: treatment has got nothing to do with disease. None 
of us object to psychiatry between consenting adults … (Szasz, S et al., 1998) 
Arguing a view that is similar to my interpretation of Heidegger and the emergent 
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model of Dasein, Ron Leifer, a practicing psychiatrist and campaigner against the 
disease model, argued that there are people who because of genetics or 
temperament may be predisposed to depression in certain circumstance but that 
this does not mean that the genetics or temperament caused the depression. 
It means that people have a different physiological and genetic equipment to deal with life.  
(Szasz, S et al., 1998) 
To put this in Heideggerian terms, people are born with different factualities, but 
these, together with the environment result in the facticity of Dasein, i.e. Dasein’s 
understandings and affective-capacities.  Leifer then gives an example of the inter-
relationship between the experiences of life and the changes in the body, 
Let me give you an example, it's the last second in a basketball game, my team scores a 
goal, I get very happy and excited, the catecholamines238   in my blood go up. Am I excited 
because of my catecholamines or am I excited because my team won the game? I think the 
analogy is exact, people become depressed because life doesn't go their way. Their 
serotonin level goes down.   (Szasz, S et al., 1998)  
One version of the disease model is that depression is as a result of a chemical 
imbalance. Leo and Lacasse report that this is a common perception,  
In the world of American popular culture, the current view of mental illness depicts someone 
walking down the street, and everything is fine, life is good. Then all of a sudden, out of the 
blue, a chemical imbalance emerges. At the root of every twisted thought lurks a twisted 
molecule—so the thinking goes. (Leo & Lacasse, 2008, p. 25) 
However, they argue against this and claim there is no empirical evidence to support 
the view, 
... there is not a single peer-reviewed article that can accurately be cited to directly support 
claims of serotonin deficiency in any mental disorder. Based on our dialogue with the 
mainstream media, there appears to be no reason to alter this claim. (Leo & Lacasse, 2008, 
p. 45) 
Dan Blazer, Professor of Psychiatry Emeritus at Duke University School of 
Medicine, is also an opponent of the disease model and argues in a manner that 
could well be straight out of a Heideggerian philosophy text,  
Once psychiatrists construct major depression as a specific disease, that construction 
shapes and limits their explorations of its origins. In addition, when they make major 
depression a medical disease, they limit the range of interventions for treating and preventing 
                                            
238 Catecholamines are a group of neurotransmitters that include epinephrine (adrenaline), norepinephrine 
and dopamine.  When released they have an impact on the sympathetic nervous system, for example as 




depression.  (Blazer, 2005, p. 35)  
From a Heideggerian perspective once the inter-relational concepts are established 
that form the understanding of depression as a disease, then when we see a person 
exhibiting the appropriate symptoms our understanding interprets what we are 
seeing as a ‘depressed person who has a disease called depression’.  Based on 
understanding, and based on our affective-attunement what matters to us is to ‘treat’ 
them and the range of possibilities that show up as modes of treatment is already 
determined by our understanding.  
Blazer argues that; 
Depression is, if nothing else, an emotion.  An infirmed study of emotion is a key link between 
body and mind and society … The empirical study of emotion buffer the tendency of the 
biological science to reductionism and the social sciences towards social construction.  
(Blazer, 2005, p. 16)  
Blazer argues for a return of social psychiatry, not to replace, but complement 
current approaches.  His view is that we are influenced by our interactions with our 
social environment and that depression is an emotion (i.e. and affective-capacity 
expressed as an affective-attunement) that indicates that there is a breakdown in 
the healthy, normal relationship between our self and our social environment.  In 
that emotions have a biological basis then the depression will not only manifest as 
an expressed emotion but will be accompanied by physiological changes, and it is 
the unity of this complex relationship that needs to be better understood and should 
be the basis of interventions. 
Blazer’s account parallels that of Heidegger.  Depression is not a disease it is an 
affective-attunement arising out of a breakdown between the person and their 
environment.  It is the underlying ontological structural process of Dasein operating 
as it does and in this case, is responding to change in the environment.  Everything 
is working just fine in Dasein; it is the environment! 
Summary experience of Adult Daseins Moving into Nursing Homes. 
Research such as that based on the Danish Population Study suggests that even 
mild or subsyndromal levels of depression are correlated with significant declines in 
quality of life.  If the approach is taken that depression is a disease and that this 
causes the decline in quality of life, then the genesis of the ‘problem’ is centred in 
the person.  Not only is the emphasis then placed on fixing the person by addressing 
the disease within, but it precludes alternative accounts.  
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If we approach depression as an emotion (an effective-attunement) as is suggested 
by Heidegger and psychiatrists such as Balzer, then an alternative interpretation is 
that people are experiencing some problem with their environment which in turn 
results in the experience of the emotion of depression.  In that emotions are 
biologically based this does not preclude a medical based intervention to alleviate 
the depression, but it places the primary focus on the interplay of the person and 
their environment.  While, in some cases, it may be that the person’s understanding 
and affective-capacities towards their environment is what should be addressed, 
where there are significant numbers of people suffering from the same environment 
then the more likely issue is the environment itself.  This is my claim in relation to 
nursing homes. 
It is acknowledged, that different people have different innate coping mechanisms 
(factuality), and have developed different understandings and affective-attunements 
(facticity) with respect to the environment.  Consequently, variations in the 
environment will result in differing responses among a population of Daseins.  Some 
Daseins will have the affective-capacity to deal with significant changes in the 
environment while others will be adversely impacted by what may appear to be 
minor changes, albeit they are significant to the person.  In either case, the structural 
aspects of Dasein respond as they should. The flow-through of the physiological 
changes will reflect the depth of the emotional experience and have cascading 
impacts on the rest of the body.  Such cascading effects are well documented in 
relation to the adverse effects of stress on the body.  (Fishta & Backé, 2015; Glaser 
& Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005; Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Sandi & 
Haller, 2015; Sapolsky, 2004; Yashin et al., 2016) and I have already addressed the 
morbidity and mortality risks associated with depression. 
The evidence from the research literature indicates that there are significant 
psychological distress and increased risk of mortality and morbidity for people 
entering into a nursing home.   Almost thirty years ago Danermark and Ekström had 
concluded that  
 ….. more than three decades of research in this field demonstrates with great clarity that 
there is very little new knowledge to be acquired from a continued atheoretical gathering of 
data with the aid of quantitative methods. (Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 36) 
The quantitative research at the time was inconclusive and could not reach a 
consensus as to contributing factors, and they called for the development of a theory 
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that could be used to shape future research.  The situation had remained unchanged 
until prior to this research, and I am not aware of any ‘theoretical’ model that could 
be used that fulfilled their requirement.  My claim is that the Heideggerian Dasein 
analytic, i.e. Dasein understood as ‘being-in-the-world’ provides such a model and 
the general approach is supported, in broad terms, by psychiatrists such as Blazer, 
Szasz and Leifer.   
As at 30th June 2016, there were just under 200,000 older Australians in nursing 
homes (Australian Government, 2016) and conservatively this would suggest that 
at least 120,000 (60%) are experiencing depression and associated with this a 
significant decline in their quality of life, with many at increased risk of morbidity and 
mortality.  Current treatments, where implemented, are almost exclusively based on 
pharmacological interventions, antidepressant medications, which are largely 
ineffective, and there is little evidence of any systematic use of alternative 
approaches. 
In that depression is an affective-attunement reflecting the deficiencies of the 
environment for Dasein, the current approaches to the design and running of nursing 
homes have failed the people they serve in that they have not addressed the 
significant issues identified in this thesis.  The Heideggerian model provides the 
basis for an alternative approach based on an alternative account of being a person, 
one based on empirical, philosophical research and supported by a range of ontic 
research. 
Illness and Disability Not Necessarily an Indication of Loss of Meaning. 
Before moving on, I want to address a point concerning older people and illness. 
That a person has a chronic illness or disability is not indicative that they also have 
depression.  However, neither is it indicative of ‘unsuccessful aging’.  In a report 
from one study (Montross et al., 2006) the older adult participants living in the 
community overwhelmingly (92%) regarded themselves as aging successfully.  But 
of the participants, only 5% met the criteria for successful aging, e.g. absence from 
disease, freedom from disability and active engagement with life.  These are criteria 
established as part of the successful aging model established by Rowe and Kahn 
(Rowe & Kahn, 1997) who define successful ageing as 
… including three main components: low probability of disease and disease-related disability, 
high cognitive and physical functional capacity, and active engagement with life.  (Rowe & 
Kahn, 1997) (p. 433) 
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If we consider Marion, prior to her fall, against the Rowe and Kahn criteria, I suspect 
she would ‘fail’ and yet like the participants of the Montross study I suspect she 
would have rated herself as aging successfully.  There is something else at play and 
I suspect it is the role of meaning in the lives of people and meaning can overcome 
physical frailties.  This is an area that is worth investigating at a later date in the light 
of a Heideggerian model. 
Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have taken Heidegger’s existential Dasein analytic and illustrated 
how it has real-world applications in terms of research and practice. 
The Dasein analytic is the only comprehensive descriptive account of the person 
and is consistent with a range of research approaches in the fields of history, child 
development, depression research and aged care. 
It is my claim that this model has greater descriptive power and applicability for 
research involving people than current approaches and that this has been illustrated 
in this chapter. 
More importantly for this thesis, it provides an approach that makes intelligible the 
adverse experiences of the majority of people living in nursing homes, in excess of 
120,000 people, and provides the basis for changes in research and practice that 




CHAPTER 21: SHEDDING LIFE 
Introduction 
The thesis has progressively disclosed and described Dasein’s constitutive 
structure.  The structure is dynamic, establishing meaning for Dasein (in effect 
constituting Dasein) in terms of its understanding of world (worldhood).  Based on 
this understanding, possibilities show up in Dasein’s world as having the potential 
for Dasein’s ability-to-be who it is.  Dasein then chooses from those possibilities the 
dealings most appropriate for it at the time, and it is these dealings that form the 
basis of Dasein ongoing, meaningful existence.  This structural process is hidden 
from Dasein and not under Dasein’s control, this is the nature of the constitutive 
structure, of the ontological.  What shows up for Dasein as mattering, as offering 
possibilities for being, is part of this dynamic structure, what Heidegger calls being-
in-the-world; Figure 33 is one way of representing this structure.  
Based on this interpretation, the claim was made that when there is a material 
change in a Dasein’s environment, there is a risk of those possibilities essential for 
Dasein’s on-going meaningful existence being absent.   This absence of possibilities 
results in what I have termed ‘shedding life’, i.e. an actual decline in the experience 
of a meaningful existence resulting from an absence of possibilities.  It is further 
argued that a move to a nursing home results in the absence, for many Dasein, of 
such possibilities.  This is why, I argue, that the reports of what I have collectively 
 
















termed ‘shedding life’ in the early chapters, are so common in nursing homes.  As 
this is a phenomenon associated with the ontological structure of Dasein, it is also 
a significant risk associated with occurrences such as involuntary unemployment as 
discussed in the last chapter.  In that chapter, it was also argued that the structure 
is grounded in the biological processes of Dasein’s bodiliness and that the 
consequences of a loss of meaningfulness is manifested in increased risk of 
psychological distress and increased morbidities and mortality.  In summary, being-
meaningless makes you sick and increases the risk of death.  
Heidegger’s thesis in Being and Time is that ultimately temporality is the most 
fundamental structure that determines everything, i.e. this is the meaning of the 
question of being from the perspective of fundamental ontology hence the title of the 
book. In the published section of Being and Time, he addresses temporality as the 
most primordial meaning of being for Dasein, but he never completes the project by 
publishing an analysis in relation to other regional ontologies, e.g. Nature.  This is 
not a concern for the thesis.   
In Division II of Being and Time Heidegger carries out an analysis of the structure 
of Dasein from yet another perspective.  The basic structure disclosed in Division I 
remains unchanged. However, in Division II, he explores what Dasein needs to do 
in order to address the pull of the ‘One’, i.e. our falling, as the basis of our 
understanding and receptive-capacities (which in turn disclose possibilities).  This 
relates to Heidegger’s concept of authenticity briefly mentioned in the thesis.  The 
analysis takes place over three complex chapters where Heidegger introduces his 
accounts of guilt, conscience, and death; none of which can be understood by 
reference to the typical usage of these terms.  I am not going to deal with 
Heidegger’s account of authenticity; however, there are aspects of Heidegger’s 
account of Dasein’s death that are useful for this thesis as they relate to the previous 
discussions concerning possibilities. 
It should be clear by now that the dynamic nature of the structure of Dasein has a 
temporal aspect and this is important in terms of Heidegger’s analysis of death.  As 
Dasein, our understanding and affective-capacities are the basis from which (past) 
we project forward (future) onto possibilities that show up for us and from which we 
make choices about what to do now (present).  This movement is a continuous one, 
and all three temporal perspectives are important.  However, in that the past has 
already established the basis of a meaningful projection, and that we are always 
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already in the present it is the showing up of possibilities, i.e. the future, that 
energises this movement.  Death is associated with the ending of this dynamic 
movement, i.e. the cessation of possibilities. This is what I discuss in this chapter. 
The discussion on death completes the analysis of ‘shedding life’ from a 
Heideggerian perspective, grounding the phenomenon in the very structure of 
Dasein.  On the completion of this account, I then propose a preliminary method for 
mapping ‘shedding life’, what Heidegger calls demising. This method is then applied 
to the circumstances surrounding Marion Miller’s move into a nursing home. 
Having provided the completed account of the meaning of shedding life I raise 
another related but urgent concern that follows on from this work.  This concern 
raises the prospect that as one’s life becomes being-meaningless in the context of 
the present environment, that it is, in turn, diminishing the experienced 
meaningfulness of the entire historical life.  This is based on two concepts, firstly 
that Dasein’s experienced life incorporates a continuity from the past into the 
present, it is not compartmentalised. As such any loss of meaning now relates to 
the entire temporal aspect of Dasein. Secondly, there is emerging research from the 
field of behavioural economics that suggests evaluations of prior events (in this case 
a Dasein’s life) is heavily influenced by current experiences.  If this is the case then 
the harm done to Dasein is not just the loss of meaning in currently lived 
experiences, but a loss of meaning for Dasein’s existence, as a whole.  This would 
amount to inflicting significant damage on Dasein.  This line of inquiry is not pursued 
but raised as a pointer towards future research. 
The aim of this thesis is to disclose the meaning of shedding life and not to explore 
the existing ontological structure (being) of a nursing home or the flawed nature of 
the nursing home that provides the conditions for ‘shedding life’.  While such an 
analysis is now possible based on the work done, it would involve a detailed 
research project that is outside the scope of the thesis.  However, it is possible to 
make some preliminary observations, and this is what is provided in the final section 
of the chapter. As part of this, I put forward the thesis that the nursing home model 
is based on a somatological contract, notwithstanding that the character of the 
contract is not readily evident.  This contract works for acute care hospitals despite 
the wrong understanding of Dasein. However, when the basic hospital-based model 
of care, even though modified, is applied to nursing homes, the wrong 
understanding of Dasein reveals the seriously flawed nature of this model for 
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nursing homes and the breaking of the somatological contract.  The conclusion is 
that there needs to be another basis for the relationship that is established between 
a nursing home and the people it serves. 
Section 1: Heidegger’s Account of Death 
In his definition of death Heidegger gives priority to the future, in that it is the 
absence of any possibilities for being Dasein;  
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost ability-to-be. This is a possibility in 
which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of 
no-longer being-able-to-be-there. …  
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. [BT 294/251] (my underlining) 
Heidegger’s account of death is subject to considerable debate in the literature and 
Dreyfus gives an account(Dreyfus, 2005) of the various interpretations in his forward 
to Carole White’s book Time and Death, Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude (White & 
Dreyfus(Forward), 2005).  By way of summary, these include death as the end of 
human life, death as the closing off of one line of possibilities by choosing an 
alternative, death as world-collapse at either the individual or cultural level and 
finally death as a structural aspect of Dasein that compliments the world disclosing 
aspect of the structure.  Heidegger’s concept of dying varies in each of these 
alternatives and relates to how death is conceptualised. My interpretation falls into 
what I would term the structural interpretation, one that is favoured by 
Dreyfus(Dreyfus, 2005).  However, whereas Dreyfus appears to interpret it primarily 
at the ontic level associated with an individual’s potential loss of identity, my 
approach is to interpret Heidegger’s account of death using the three levels 
previously discussed, i.e. the primordial structural process, the structural process 
associated with a particular Dasein and the ontic manifestation of the structure.  If 
this approach is then overlayed with my emergent interpretation of Dasein, i.e. it is 
founded on the biological processes, then virtually all other interpretations can be 
accommodated; they each become an interpretation of death viewed from just one 
perspective.  It is not my intent to survey in any detail these various positions as 
they are adequately described by Dreyfus.  Nor is it my intent to provide a detailed 
analysis of Heidegger’s discussion; while informative, it is an extensive task and not 
germane to the thesis.  Rather I will simply present my interpretation of Heidegger’s 
key concepts and then quickly move on to shedding life.  
 
689 
Death, as Heidegger defines it, is not like any conception that is commonly held.  It 
is not something that ever occurs; it is not an event, it is always just a possibility, i.e. 
“the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”.  Recalling my emergent 
model for Dasein, in that there is the entity, Dasein, and that there is the entity upon 
which Dasein is founded, the body. The nature of founded relationships, as 
discussed in Chapter 13, is such that Dasein is dependent on the body for its 
existence; however, it is not determined ontologically by the body understood as 
present-at-hand.  The end of life in the body will result in the end of Dasein, but just 
because the two events may occur at the same time, this does not mean they are 
one and the same event. This would be to thrust Dasein back as being understood 
as the body.   
Heidegger thus has two separate terms to denote the separate ‘end of’ these 
entities.  Firstly, in relation to the body, like any other thing that is alive, it can ‘perish’, 
… Dasein's going-out-of-the-world in the sense of dying must be distinguished from the 
going-out-of-the-world of that which merely has life. In our terminology the ending of anything 
that is alive, is denoted as "perishing".  [BT 284-5/240-41] 
Further on Heidegger repeats this and then moves on to Dasein itself, 
The ending of that which lives we have called 'perishing'. Dasein too 'has' its death, of the 
kind appropriate to anything that lives; and it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as 
codetermined by its primordial kind of being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end 
… though on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this 
intermediate phenomenon as its "demise".[BT 291/247] 
Dasein’s existence is grounded in the structure of care, and it is this that thrust’s 
Dasein into its ‘there’, its understanding of what is meaningful in the world.  In that 
Dasein is constituted, the possibility of it ‘ending’ is constantly present and this is 
what I take Heidegger to be referring to as the certain peculiarity in “death’s 
certainty” and this is “that it is possible at any moment. [BT 302/258] This is a 
statement concerning our mortality, our finitude, something from which we cannot 
escape.   
Heidegger’s argument is that the constant possibility of death, essentially the end of 
our meaningful existence, is something that the ‘One’ constantly covers up in 
various ways. In that, we take over the way of being of the ‘One’ we too typically do 
not accept the possibility of death in anything other than a cursory way, if at all.  
Heidegger argues that if we fully accept our mortality and learn to live with the 
possibility of no more possibilities, then this will help us live a more authentic life, a 
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life on our own terms and not dictated by the ‘One’.   
In his discussion Heidegger recognises that it is impossible for an entity such as 
Dasein to embrace itself in terms of something completed, something finished, and 
in this sense, can never embrace its ‘whole’ life; we are, until death, work in 
progress.  This is another essential difference between the characteristic of being 
human, and being something ready-to-hand, which must be complete for it to be 
useful.  However, by accepting death (as a possibility), then Dasein can bring the 
whole into view and on this basis, live a ‘whole’ life.  Regardless of our 
acknowledgement, death, as a possibility is always present and the way we deal 
with it, either accepting it or covering up, is what Heidegger calls ‘dying’. 
Let the term "dying" stand for that way of being in which Dasein is towards its death. [BT 
291/247] 
In that most of us share in the concealment of death as part of the ‘One’ it is easy 
to dismiss Heidegger’s claims.  However, there is substantial research to support 
this phenomenon, and one study by the American anthropologist Ernest Becker is 
presented in his book, The Denial of Death (Becker, 2014). Becker’s thesis is that a 
basic motivation for human behaviour is our need to control our anxiety concerning 
death, to deny the terror of death, and that this is so overwhelming that we conspire 
to keep the fear unconscious. 
The irony of man’s condition is that the deepest need is to be free of the anxiety of death and 
annihilation; but it is life itself which awakens it, and so we must shrink from being fully alive. 
(Becker, 2014k. 1491-2) 
While Becker’s language is more dramatic than Heidegger’s, it is a very similar line 
of argument based on the same phenomenon; albeit without Heidegger’s ontological 
analysis. 
Moving on from Heidegger’s discussion on how to deal with the phenomenon, what 
I want to address is firstly his distinction between ‘perishing’ of the body and ‘demise’ 
of Dasein and secondly to consider ‘death’ from the perspective of the Dasein 
analytic, as an approach pointed out by Heidegger, i.e. when considering the 
manner  
… in which the 'end' enters into Dasein's average everydayness. … we must fully envisage 
those structures of everydayness which we have earlier set forth. [BT 293/248] 
Just as Heidegger argues that the Dasein analytic comes “before any psychology 
or anthropology, and certainly before any biology” [BT 71/45] he makes the same 
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comment regarding demise, 
Medical and biological investigation into "demising" can obtain results which may even 
become significant ontologically if the basic orientation for an existential Interpretation of 
death has been made secure. [BT 291/247] 
Furthermore, in relation to the body,  
The existential Interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of 
life. [BT 291/247] 
Further still in relation to other fields of study, 
 … it is also the foundation for any investigation of death which is biographical or 
historiological, ethnological or psychological. [BT 291/247] 
These are, again, very clear indications the Heidegger expects his work on the 
Dasein analytic239 to be applied in these fields.  This is the basis on which I am 
approaching my ‘emergent’ model of Dasein. 
It should be noted that Heidegger refers to “demising” in the above quote concerning 
“medical and biological investigations” and not “perishing”.  I take this to mean that 
when these professions are investigating any phenomena associated with a person 
“no-longer being-able-to-be-there” then they should be guided by Dasein’s 
ontological structure; how the dying of the body impacts on Dasein. This would lend 
support to Blazer’s approach to depression and his urging for the adoption of social 
psychiatry as part of the therapeutic mix. 
In terms of understanding such phenomena as death, dying, demise and perishing 
Heidegger then argues we must do so on the basis of Dasein’s structure.  However, 
in relation to death and demise, he never clarifies how these are to be fully 
interpreted, e.g. what conditions would bring about the “possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein”, which would then also apply to the ontic occurrence of 
demise or demising.  This is because Heidegger is undertaking a ‘high level’ 
interpretation for the purposes of ontology and not doing a detailed anthropology.  It 
is in this space opened up by Heidegger that aspects of my interpretation fit.  
Section 2: Demise – Shedding life 
To refer to Dasein as “being-able-to-be-there” is another way of saying that Dasein 
                                            
239 I make the point that he is not referring to his work as a social science methodology, albeit this does not 
preclude others from applying it in this manner. 
  
692 
is in its environment, Dasein is living a life that is meaningful to it, this is reflected in 
the above diagram (Figure 27).   
In demise Dasein is “no-longer being-able-to-be-there” and I take any circumstance 
that brings about this condition as the cause of Dasein’s demise.   Heidegger is 
rarely ‘black and white’ so although he speaks of demise, he also acknowledges 
that there is a ‘demising’.  A parallel situation would be that the body can be 
“perishing” but that the interventions of doctors can address this and bring the body 
back to good health or they may fail, and the body ‘perishes’.  Similarly, there are 
conditions in which Dasein is ‘demising’, which I take to be any progressive decline 
in Dasein’s “being-able-to-be-there”, and there may be interventions that bring 
Dasein back to its average everydayness or Dasein eventually ‘demises’ or 
experiences the ‘there’ in a very impoverished way.  I take shedding life as another 
term for demising. 
Taking for granted that ‘answer’ as to the conditions for demising lies in the structure 
then looking at it from the perspective of a Dasein in its average everydayness we 
need to look at the structure itself to see what changes would lead to demising.  This 
is the approach I take in the following cases which are only presented as an 
indicative not exhaustive account:  
Changes in World and Environment: 
In that Dasein assigns itself to meaningful involvements within its world. A collapse 
in that world results in the cessation of possibilities.   
This arises when the world that Dasein had as its environment no longer exists.  As 
such the ready-to-hand in the world lose their meaning for Dasein, and the 
consequence is that possibilities for involvement by Dasein have gone.  In that 
Dasein’s complete world may comprise regional worlds (work, home, community 
involvement, and so on) a world collapse may apply to one or all of these.    
A very local collapse may occur if the local shop in which a Dasein works closes 
down.  This may result in ‘demising’ for a short period until a new meaningful job is 
found.  Of course, the Dasein may also have the view that a new job is imminent, in 
which case the possibilities of such a new job remain open on its horizon, within the 
context of the larger public world 
The collapse may be on a larger scale.  For example, the car manufacturing industry 
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closes across the country, and there is no more possibility of meaningful 
involvement in this world of motor vehicle manufacturing.  If this is the world in which 
a Dasein found its meaning, then the shutting down of this world will have a 
significant impact on a Dasein; the possibility of retraining as an aged care worker 
may not be the answer!  In that Dasein is a world discloser (this is the primordial 
level of the structure), it may be that the Dasein discloses a new world that is 
meaningful to it; there is no certainty in this.  If this happens, it may very well be in 
aged care in which case Dasein has a new understanding of itself, a new identity in 
Dreyfus’ interpretation.  In both the cases, the world collapse is occurring within the 
same culture, the same larger public world. 
The world collapse may be on a large scale still and involve the collapse of a culture. 
For example, when Western European countries invaded North America and 
following the subsequent devastating Indian wars of the nineteenth century, the 
possibility of ever living as a Crow (or any other group) in the context of the Crow 
‘world’ disappeared forever.  In his book Radical Hope, Jonathan Lear cites a 
passage from the Author’s note at the end of the biography of Plenty-Coups by 
Frank Linderman 
Plenty Coups refused to speak of his life after the passing of the buffalo, so that his story 
seems to have been broken off, leaving many years unaccounted for. "I have not told you 
half of what happened when I was young," he said, when urged to go on. "I can think back 
and tell you much more of war and horse-stealing. But when the buffalo went away the hearts 
of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing 
happened. There was little singing anywhere. Besides," he added sorrowfully, "you know that 
part of my life as well as I do. You saw what happened to us when the buffalo went away."   
(Linderman, 1962, p. 311) (Lear, 2006, p. 2) 
Plenty-Coups was the last war Chief of the Crow nation and the last person to be 
honoured within the Crow nation with the tile Chief.  The telling phrase in the above 
passage for Lear is “After this nothing happened”.  Lear interprets this as a 
recognition by Plenty-Coups (c.1848-1932), as a recognition that history as the 
Crow had understood it had ended.  The defining Crow cultural practices centred 
around a semi-nomadic lifestyle on the great Plains of Central North America and 
their relationship with the buffalo herds and their adversarial relationship with other 
Plains tribes.  This determined the rhythms of life for the Crow, the ways in which 
life stages were identified and celebrated, roles defined and so on.  All this was lost 
when the access to this world was lost, and the Crow confined to an ‘Indian 
Reservation’, the buffalo all but exterminated and the concept of warrior, as it was 
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understood, made meaningless.  In other words, virtually all the significant cultural 
practices that ‘formed’ and sustained the Crow world stopped, the worlding thus 
stopped and the world collapsed. 
In Heidegger’s language, the meaningful world of the Crow was no more, and the 
being-meaningful as a Crow was no longer intelligible in the way once understood.  
Lear’s account is of a remarkable leader, Plenty-Coups, who accepted this reality 
and spent the majority of his adult life working tirelessly to work out a new way in 
which the Crow could once again have meaning as Crow, but in a world that was 
being shaped by Europeans.  
The case of the Crow, illustrate that just as individual Dasein are adversely impacted 
by world collapse, so too are communities 
of people.  The difficulty facing many 
indigenous people around the world, 
including Australia is the same as that 
which Plenty-Coups recognised. History 
has ended (world collapse) and the 
challenge is to find a way forward that 
retains meaning as a distinct people from 
that of the dominant culture while at the 
same time through re-interpreting a new 
world (a new disclosure) in such a way 
that this distinctive meaning is possible.  
Dasein and its world must but be co-
determined if the being-meaningful 
sought for is to be achieved.  This is a 
formidable challenge in a world that is 
dominated by the ‘Other’, and in which the 
ontological understanding of Dasein is 
based on Western concepts of the present-at-hand.  
In summary, world collapses can occur at every level of world.  In each case, such 
a collapse results in the removal of possibilities for Dasein’s ability-to-be. In some 
cases, a person may move from one collapsed world (e.g. shop closure) to another 
but undertake the same type of role, and in this case, the disruption would be 
minimal.  The case of a collapse of an entire industry may mean that the person is 
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unable to continue in the same way and has to “reinvent” themselves elsewhere, 
turning an aspect of the larger public world into a new environment.   In more 
dramatic cases there may be a collapse in the possibilities associated with the entire 
culture continuing in the same meaningful way, as in the case of the Crow.  
In each case and in varying degrees, Dasein is required to become familiar with a 
‘new environment’, acquiring new affective-capacities appropriate for the new 
environment and re-assigning itself to involvements in ways that are meaningful to 
Dasein’s understanding of itself.  This is quite an ask!  This process is essentially 
one of world disclosing such that the Dasein can have meaning within the world. 
Removal from the World 
A similar phenomenon to world collapse is the removal of Dasein from the world 
which offers possibilities for being-meaningful.  
Elite athletes have reported experiencing mental health issues after retiring from 
sport(Watanabe, 2017) and I have already given examples of changes in the 
environment associated with unemployment and moving into a nursing home.  
Situations of demise would also be facing people who are placed in immigration 
detention centres. That this is the case has been widely publicised in reports 
concerning people seeking refuge in Australia from oppression in their home 
countries only to find themselves in offshore detention centres.  Reported mental 
health issues include anxiety, depression, PTSD, self-harm and suicidal ideation are 
at significantly higher rates than in the Australian community (Australian Human 
Rights Commission, 2013; Newman, Procter, & Dudley, 2011) and suicide rates in 
detention centres are up to 10 times the rate in the Australian population (Steel et 
al., 2004). 
An example where removal from an environment may result in unexpected adverse 
outcomes was discussed earlier in relation to the honour killings which take place 
among a very small minority of conservative Muslim families who have migrated to 
Western countries.  The tragedy unfolds as the parents, and their young daughters 
are living in the same house but in different worlds. 
Another instance involving separation from the meaning-giving possibilities of a 
world was associated with the European slavers who raided African countries and 
removed people from Africa and transport them to various other countries to work 
as slave labour.  In addition to the sickness and death arising from maltreatment, it 
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has long been recognised that the act of dislocation and slavery were themselves 
causes of sickness and death (Kenny, 2015).  Just as the collapse of world has 
continued to impact on generations of indigenous people so too has the removal 
from world due to the slave trade, and some researchers and authors are now 
exploring the legacy of slavery in the USA on the health of contemporary African-
Americans(Cross Jr, 1998). This is expressed in Williams book, Black Pain.  
… we are socially and economically haunted by the horrors of slavery, but my response to 
Janet and others who share her feelings is a simple one: Your great-great-grandmother was 
a slave; you not. But this still leaves two very important questions; Why do so many of us feel 
like slaves? And who – or what – are we slaves to?  (Williams, 2009, p. 239)  
Williams’ questions cannot be answered in any causal manner.  But if Heidegger is 
correct the answer lies somewhere in the ‘One’, the hidden meaning of being-black 
and being-white in the USA and the collective sense of understanding and receptive-
capacities that are shaped by that meaning.  There is no simple answer as the ‘One’ 
of being-black is associated with the Dasein-with of the ‘One’ of being-white.  In 
Heidegger’s work, the past is not merely the past of a particular Dasein; it cascades 
down through the generations as what he calls the traditions [BT], shaping 
understandings and receptive capacities and projecting onto the disclosed 
possibilities that arise.  While things change, it takes a long time and as Heidegger 
noted in relation to something as fundamental as conceptualising what things are 
we have been locked into one dominant mode for over two thousand years.  Change 
requires recognising the temporal nature of Dasein, exploring the characteristics of 
Dasein’s meaning as reflected in understanding and receptivity that are currently 
present and taking deliberate steps to change; again, a formidable task. 
Changes to Dasein’s Ability to Access World 
The previous examples related to changes in the world and environment.  Similarly, 
there may be changes relating to Dasein such that Dasein may experience a 
permanent decline in health or physical ability that prevents it accessing aspects of 
its world.  When Havi Carel contracted LAM, she was confined to the ground floor 
of her home, and the world of the upstairs was closed off to her.  In relation to Marion 
Miller, she tells how her frailty gradually increased so that she could no longer walk 
to the end of the street, then no further than the letterbox until eventually she was 
confined to her house.  For Havi, there were sufficient other meaningful 
involvements that presented as possibilities, so her existence still continued as she 
understood it.  For Marion, before she moved to the nursing home, she accepted 
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her decline in physical abilities and implemented changes so as to continue doing 
the things that were meaningful to her, she was still able to be a householder, 
collector of pink lustre china, advisor to her political friends and so on.  These were 
all significant, meaningful involvements for Marion.   She clearly recognised the 
restrictions in her life and perhaps wished it was otherwise, but her life still had 
meaning, and this was sufficient.  This changed when she entered the nursing 
home.   
There are also situations whereby Dasein’s basic understanding and affective-
capacities are impacted by disease, for example, dementia.  In such circumstances 
people lose a range of understandings, their affective-capacities change, and they 
may lose their ability to assign themselves in any meaningful way.   
Changes to Relationships  
Possibilities for Dasein’s being-meaningful also arise from specific relationships with 
other Daseins that are not associated with vocationally type roles, etc.    
A loss of a spouse, child or close friend may have a significant impact on being-
possible as part of that relationship. Based on this, and the discussions to date the 
expected findings would be an increased risk of morbidity and mortality associated 
with such a loss.  This was the reported findings from a study of over 300,000 elderly 
couples that concluded that the “death of a spouse, for whatever reason, is a 
significant threat to health and poses a substantial risk of death by whatever cause.”   
(Elwert & Christakis, 2008, p. 2097) Another study investigating the consequences 
of the death of a child concluded that there is “evidence of lasting negative 
consequences of child death on bereaved parents'” health related quality of life 
(Song, Floyd, Seltzer, Greenberg, & Hong, 2010, p. 11) Outcomes for people in both 
of these studies were not consistent nor predictable at the individual level, there are 
too many other variables that are influencing a person’s health outcome and source 
of meaning. However, in terms of the overall impact the results are consistent with 
what the being-in-the-world model is suggesting and consistent with findings in other 
circumstances in which possibilities for being-meaningful have diminished. 
Demising – Time and Space 
The degree of ‘demising’ experienced by the person will vary with the degree of 
diminution of possibilities within Dasein’s ‘there’, the affective-capacities for the 
Dasein to cope with the changes and as well as to seek out new possibilities in new 
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worlds.  In the above examples, there was an immediacy of time that was evident in 
relation to Dasein’s relationship to possibilities for being-meaningful; this does not 
need to be the case. The main requirement is that for Dasein, the possibility of there 
being possibilities remains opens.  This was powerfully written about in the classic 
account of hope in the concentration camp by the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, 
Man’s Search for Meaning(Frankl, 1984).  Frankl was interned into Auschwitz during 
World War II and wrote the book in 1949 as part of his development of what he terms 
Logotherapy (logo understood as meaning).  There are clear similarities between 
Frankl’s and Heidegger’s work regarding the importance of the future, and I will 
illustrate this with just a few examples from Frankl’s book; 
We can only live by looking at the future: 
Any attempt at fighting the camp's psychopathological influence on the prisoner by 
psychotherapeutic or psycho-hygienic methods had to aim at giving him inner strength by 
pointing out to him a future goal to which he could look forward. Instinctively some of the 
prisoners attempted to find one on their own. It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live 
by looking to the future— sub specie aeternitatis.  And this is his salvation in the most difficult 
moments of his existence, although he sometimes has to force his mind to the task.  (Frankl, 
1984, pp. 93-4) (my underlining) 
This passage needs no comment, the relevance of linking the now to a future 
possibility is clear. 
There were possibilities for meaningfulness even in the concentration camp:  
Naturally only a few people were capable of reaching great spiritual heights. But a few were 
given the chance to attain human greatness even through their apparent worldly failure and 
death, an accomplishment which in ordinary circumstances they would never have achieved. 
…  most men in a concentration camp believed that the real opportunities of life had passed. 
Yet, in reality, there was an opportunity and a challenge. One could make a victory of those 
experiences, turning life into an inner triumph, or one could ignore the challenge and simply 
vegetate, as did a majority of the prisoners.  (Frankl, 1984, p. 93) (my underlining) 
This takes an extraordinary effort to overcome one’s own affective-attunement and 
understanding and find meaning in such a place.  In this, I am reminded of Paul, a 
retired chemist and university lecturer, who on moving into the nursing home set 
about to find a way to be useful. The nursing home library had been dormant for 
some time, and so he took it over, rearranged the books, set up a recording system 
and commenced as librarian, sourcing books from wherever he could. From a few 
users at the beginning, he ended up with a significant user group and a delivery 
service to those who could not come to the library. 
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Doom follows the loss of faith in the future  
The prisoner who had lost faith in the future—his future —was doomed. With his loss of belief 
in the future, he also lost his spiritual hold; he let himself decline and became subject to 
mental and physical decay. Usually this happened quite suddenly, in the form of a crisis, the 
symptoms of which were familiar to the experienced camp inmate. We all feared this 
moment—not for ourselves, which would have been pointless, but for our friends. Usually it 
began with the prisoner refusing one morning to get dressed and wash or to go out on the 
parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any effect. He just lay there, hardly 
moving. If this crisis was brought about by an illness, he refused to be taken to the sick-bay 
or to do anything to help himself. He simply gave up. There he remained, lying in his own 
excreta, and nothing bothered him any more.  (Frankl, 1984, p. 95)  (My underlining) 
While death was capricious in the concentration camps, Frankl witnessed time and 
time again that those who could find no possibilities for being who they are either 
amidst the horror of the camp or by focusing on reuniting with their families or 
extracting retribution for what had happened, died.  While survival in the camps was 
far from guaranteed it, was seeing possibilities in the future, in a word hope, that 
sustained people. From Frankl’s perspective, it was the loss of hope, of possibilities, 
saw them die.  
Every prisoner would have experienced a ‘demising’ or shedding life as I am defining 
it. However, it was the power of the ‘there’ that when it was held open, even in the 
in the slimmest of possibilities of a future, by hope, that many survived.  It was these 
accounts of the power of meaning that prompted Frankl to develop his Logotherapy.  
These quote passages do not suggest that Frankl had the same ontological 
understanding as Heidegger, but he certainly had aspects of the same phenomenon 
in view.  The recognition of similarities between Heidegger’s work and Frankl’s is 
not new (Lantz, 2000)  and Frankl regarded Heidegger as a friend, having a framed 
letter from him on the wall of his study among his other mementoes (Scully, 1995). 
The challenge facing those who have suffered a total collapse of their cultural world 
is that there is no hope of returning to the past, the future must be recast in the 
disclosure of a new world that offers the possibility for sustained being-meaningful.  
The challenge for those entering a nursing home is not in a distant future but finding 
meaning in the current environment.  However, Frankl indicated, this is an option 
that few take up and in my experience, those who follow Paul’s path are few. I also 
suspect that part of Paul’s sense of meaning was in being-useful.  Marion had not 
only moved into a nursing home that offered little possibility of being-Marion and 
further, her frailty made her not only dependent on others, but her eyesight 
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continued to decline to the point where she struggled to read and write, two abilities 
that were important to her.  For Marion, there was virtually no possibility of 
‘reinventing’ herself in the immediacy of the present, and there was no future.  
Marion was confronting the reality of the impossibility of any further possibility of 
being-Marion; as Marion, she had all but died. 
This completes the section on demising. In the next section a preliminary way of 
mapping ‘shedding life’ is proposed followed by an application of the mapping using 
Marion Miller’s circumstance.  
Section 3: Mapping ‘Demising’ or ‘Shedding life.’ 
While possibilities show up all the time for involvements in various activities some, 
as discussed are related to more crucial aspects of our sense of meaning, while 
others are what I have termed secondary or supplementary.  The possibilities that I 
want to address are those associated with meaning, those that constitute a primary 
for-the-sake-of-which (F-S-W).  For example, that a person can drive does not mean 
that a car will show up as offering possibilities for driving as part of defining meaning 
for the person. It may be important in support of being, for example, a football coach, 
or parent and so on.  If the various F-S-Ws associated with the car no longer apply 
then the car does not show up as a possibility for driving, there is no reason to drive.  
We can represent the small complex of important for-the-sakes-of-which (F-S-W) in 
a ‘daisy’ diagram (Figure 34) which is adapted from the earlier diagrams presented 
as models for Dasein. Each ‘leaf’ on the ‘daisy diagram represents a meaningful F-
S-W domain that is evident in the person’s life.  Each petal represents the projecting 
onto possibilities that show up in the environment and then the taking of up some of 
those possibilities by way of dealings; this temporal aspect is indicated by the 
direction of the arrow. 
The number of domains will vary and accordingly so will the petals. Some people 
may have only a few; for example, an elite athlete may be dedicated to their sport 
spending most of their time training, planning for future events, monitoring their diet, 
attending to other activities around their sport and so on, and even if in a relationship 
the dominant and most important aspect is being an ‘elite sports person’.   In this 
case, there may only be two or three primary F-S-W petals and the petal 
representing being-a-sportsperson may be considerably larger than the others.  In 
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this case, the risk is that the one way of being is so pervasive and important that 
when possibilities for being an ‘elite sports person’ are no longer there, the 
‘demising’ of Dasein is quite significant.   
 
Other Daseins may have an existence with a number of important ways of being, 
e.g. being a mum, being a doctor, being a wife, being an amateur ‘chef’ and so on.  
If there is a change in some aspects of their life, there may be sufficient other 
meaningful ways of being to keep the Dasein’s ‘there’ open and possibilities for 
being-meaningful still show up.  An event that results in a ‘demising’ of one aspect 
of life may thus be buffered by other ways of being-meaningful.  This does not mean 
that people with a ‘balanced life’ are thereby always protected as there is always the 
possibility of a significant ‘demising’ event associated with aspects of their life that 
have long-lasting consequences, for example, a tragic loss of a child may have this 
effect. 
Having outlined the concept, I will now apply it to Marion Miller. 
Mapping Marion Miller’s Life in Terms of Ways of Being 
In the following, I use Marion Miller’s autobiographical account to identify her 
important ways of being or ‘for-the-sakes-of-which’ and then prepare an 
environmental map (Table 7). I have identified three-time periods over which to do 
 




















the assessment, before the onset of frailty that impeded her mobility, after the onset 
of frailty but before the fall that initiated her move into a nursing home and finally 
after the move into the nursing home.  This is an indicative example only, and in an 
actual situation, there would be methods established to identify and confirmed the 
assessments. 
The colour shadings indicate an assessment of the available possibilities in her 
environment available for her ability-to-be.  I then transfer the mapping onto a series 
of ‘daisy’ diagrams to give a visual depiction of the changes in her life240.   
On the Environment Mapping I have used the colour shading to indicate as follows: 
• Darker gold to indicate that in the domain of a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ the 
environment still held possibilities for involvement.   
• Light gold indicates that there has been a decline in possibilities, but some 
degree of involvement is still possible.   
• White squares indicate an absence of possible involvements, but there is no 
indication of a sense of loss or harm. 
                                            
240 This work on mapping is only a preliminary and indicative illustration of this approach and it will require 
further refinement. I have not attempted, at this stage, to place any weighting or priority on particular ways of 
being, this is an important aspect that will need to be addressed as part of the development.  The weighting 
could be represented by variations in petal size. I have not done this in this example. 
REF BEFORE FRAILTY BEFORE NURSING 
HOME 
NURSING HOME 
1 Activist (letter writer) Yes Still writes letters – to facility 
manager – comments edited 
in reports of meetings 
2 Collector pink lustre china Yes No – given away 
3 Politically aware Yes No – no access to valued 
radio program 
4 Reader & book collector Yes – difficulty reading No – gave away books, 
going blind 
5 Gardener Yes – via employee No – sold home 
6 Advisor & social groups Yes – phone and home visits No - access problems in 
evening 
7 Home owner Yes – assisted by employee No – sold home – no space 
8 Vegetarian Yes – had shopper and 
home help 
No – nursing home couldn’t 
provide diet 
9 Independent, self-
sufficient person, loss of 
mobility 
Yes – directs care & 
environment, had choice, 
difficulty walking 
No – dependent, loss of 
control over environment, 
confined to wheel chair, loss 
of choice & privacy 
Table 7 Marion Miller: Environmental Mapping of Possibilities-to-be 
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• Light red indicates that the environment is harmful, or in this case that the
absence of possibilities caused by the environment is resulting in a sense of loss
or grief.
• Dark red indicates that the environment is toxic or harmful in the domain.
In Marion’s case, even though her frailty had increased long before the fall resulting 
in her inability to walk down the road or to the letterbox, she was still in control and 
engaged in what is meaningful to her, in part because she had the ability and 
resources to engage a personal shopper and housekeeper.  In the table I have not 
included Marion’s children and grandchildren as while she acknowledges them, they 
do not play a significant part in her narrative.  
After Marion fell she battled on at home, but the pain and difficulty in walking had 
resulted in her going to the hospital where she received the diagnosis.  The 
prosthesis in one of her hips had gone through the pelvic bone, and with 
osteoporosis, the doctors had advised there was no hope of any effective medical 
repair.   Without adequate support at home, she made the decision to move to the 
nursing home.  The above mapping under the column ‘before nursing home’ does 
not account for the aftermath of the fall as this was the event that led to the move 
into a nursing home.  
There is no substantial difference before and after frailty, and so the ‘Daisy’ 

























diagrams (Figure 35 and Figure 36) are only provided for the second two columns.  
The black arrows indicate that meaningful possibilities are showing up in the 
environment for Marion in relationship to the F-S-W and she has involvements with 
them (dealings). 
The absent ‘petals’ (the second Daisy diagram) indicate where there are aspects of 
Marion’s way of being that are no longer of material significance and Marion, even 
if reluctantly, has let them go.   
The red ‘petals’ indicate where the environment is either toxic and harmful to 
Marion’s existence or has contributed to the absence of possibilities for Marion’s 
way of being, possibilities which she still longs for.   
While the nursing home may be providing good care for Marion in a physical sense, 
it has completely failed to ‘see’ Marion and care for her in terms of what it means to 
be Marion.  The objective of the nursing home should be to stop as many ‘petals’ 
turning red, minimise the loss of ‘petals’ and to keep as many as possible as ‘gold’ 
as possible. If possible, there should also be an attempt to ‘add’ petals.  Person-
centred care, to live up to its name, is not one that focuses primarily on the physical 
care of the body, albeit this is important, it is one that focuses on the person in terms 
of supporting their personhood, which I interpret as their being-meaningful; from a 
 






Heideggerian perspective that is a completely different thing. 
If the above were ‘animated’ to reflect Marion being-Marion, then in the first diagram 
the arrows would be moving steadily around the petals to indicate the dynamic 
nature of being. Once the diagrams are understood and interpreted the dire 
consequences, Marion is facing in terms of her existence as Marion is evident. 
Frankl provides more support for the role of meaning in supporting Dasein and the 
possible implications of the absence of meaning, death.  This supports the 
description at the beginning of the thesis of older people in nursing homes ‘facing 
the wall’ and dying.  As in Heidegger’s work, for Frankl one’s environment is not 
confined to the here and now.  As I have discussed, possibilities for being are a 
future aspect of the being-in-the-world structure, and while the future may be 
moments or a few days ahead, the possibilities it offers may also be in some 
indefinite but still possible time in the future.  The possibility of possibilities remains. 
This reinforces Heidegger’s notion of death as the absolute possibility of no more 
possibilities, which includes the longer-term future. 
Marion has confronted her death; there is for Marion the absolute possibility of no 
more possibilities.  However, this does mean that just because one recognises that 
death is a possibility a person may want to die, this is to misunderstand Heidegger’s 
work.  Heidegger’s intent is that people should embrace their mortality (their finitude) 
so as to make the most out of their life, to make decisions that enhance their own 
sense of being.  Marion, however, is confronted with two situations, the perishing of 
her body and her demising as Dasein.  Given her age and the rapidly perishing state 
of her body Marion accepts that the body will neither recover and probably stop 
functioning altogether in the near future.  Given that a functioning body is the 
founded necessity for Dasein itself, she recognises that this means that as a person 
there is no hope, she dies with the perishing of her body.  Secondly, Marion 
recognises that her life now, as Marion, has experienced a significant decline, she 
has experienced what she calls the shedding of life.  Marion is unable to encounter 
possibilities in her environment that she can take up as an expression of who she 
is.  The ‘perishing’ of her life is, in her view, irreversible and to such an extent that 
Marion meaningful existence as Marion has all but completed its demise!  Faced 
with both the prospect of a body that is about to perish, a life that is all but completed 
its demise and no hope for a change in circumstance Marion makes the decision 
that she wants to die. Marion has been an independent person all her life and made 
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a deliberate decision as to the direction and purpose of her life.  Making the decision 
to die is her final act of being Marion. This final act of being Marion is however denied 
to her as she is in a nursing home. 
The response to a decline in possibilities within one’s environment can be met with 
the affective-attunement of depression and with depression an increased risk of 
morbidity and mortality.  Based on the evidence this is the most typical response; 
however, Heidegger indicates that it is possible to overcome this. The message from 
Frankl is similar. However, the response to a decline in possibilities in the 
environment is extremely difficult and all but impossible for many people, especially 
faced with the efficiency of the nursing home focussed on the care of the body.  
There is, however, no evidence that Marion was depressed.  She wanted to be 
Marion to the very end, and her last act of being-meaningful would have been death 
on her terms. 
It is hard to assess if actions by the nursing home focused on an authentic model of 
person-centred care for Marion would have made a difference.  I suspect that at the 
very least it would have extended the period of time in which Marion experienced 
the being-meaningful as Marion, even if not in the full flowering of her younger years.  
The rest is outside the control of the nursing home; but is this not what should be 
expected from an industry that presents itself as providing quality of life, not just 
quality of care. 
The thesis is a Heideggerian inquiry into the meaning of shedding life. The 
conclusion of that inquiry is that shedding life is a demising of Dasein’s existence 
understood as a decline in the possibilities of being possible. 
Section 4: Life evaluation 
Heidegger’s philosophical research in Being and Time lays out the constitutive 
structure Dasein in its average everydayness.  This is the mode in which Dasein 
finds itself most of the time as it goes about the activities of its life as things show 
up as mattering.  This basic structure is very broad, applying to something as simple 
as walking through a door on the way somewhere, to the subtle shifts in the chisel 
when carving, to taking up a doctoral research program.  Experiencing a meaningful-
life requires the possibility of continuing in all those activities that matter to Dasein’s 
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understanding of itself241.  All this has been well covered.   
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the shedding of life from an ontological 
perspective, to explore if there is a constitutive structural aspect to being-Dasein 
that can explain the phenomenon of ‘shedding life’.  The findings are that this is the 
case.  In the thesis I do not explore Marion Miller’s circumstances from the 
perspective of quality of life or well-being, the aim was to go deeper than this 
approach. However, I now want to briefly touch on this area with the aim of raising 
another area of deep concern, the risk of a loss of meaning for one’s whole temporal 
or historical existence.  
The area of subjective well-being is one that has relevance to understanding the 
experiences of people living in a nursing home. It is a complex area and must 
distinguish between two different concepts, emotional well-being and life evaluation 
(Diener, 2009; Graham, 2012; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  Emotional wellbeing, 
which is also referred to as hedonic well-being or experienced happiness, is the 
emotional quality of a person’s everyday experience and relates to the occurrence 
and intensity of experiences such “joy, fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, and 
affection that make one’s life pleasant or unpleasant” (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  
Life evaluation relates to the thoughts and reflections one has in relation to their life 
and is typically in response to questions such as “How satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole?”  The reason that it is essential to separate these concepts is that 
emotional well-being and life evaluation have different correlates, notwithstanding 
there is overlap in contributing factors. For example, contributions to higher income 
are correlated to positive life evaluation, even for those already on high income, 
whereas there is little improvement in emotional wellbeing once annual incomes 
reach approximately US$75,000 (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). 
The research in this field is predominately based on investigating psychological 
phenomena, and there is, as yet, no meta-theory providing a framework for the 
investigations; this is the same circumstance that was observed earlier in relation to 
the quantitative research investigating the effects of a relocation to a nursing 
home242.  In the case of Marion Miller, while she does not specifically address the 
questions, one could reasonably surmise that at the time she wrote her 
                                            
241 This refers to the average circumstances facing Dasein and not to meanings of self that have arisen out of, 
for example, neglect and abuse. 
242 Refer Chapter 1. 
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autobiographical account that her thoughts concerning her life-evaluation were 
rather low, as indicated by her desire to end her life and her view that institutional 
living was not a good place to live. Furthermore, I suspect that her experienced 
hedonic wellbeing had also declined. 
The study of emotional wellbeing and life evaluation are both oriented to the present. 
However, there is a third aspect, and that is one’s whole of life evaluation not 
considered as a snapshot of the present but over the whole history of one’s life.  The 
orientation to the ‘present’ in the research reflects the bias towards an 
understanding of Dasein as existing in a succession of moments of ‘nows’ which 
reflects the understanding as something present-at-hand.  However, Heidegger 
views Dasein as something that is unfolding and can never be experienced as 
‘complete’ by Dasein as this unfolding continues until death. This unfolding is 
temporal as has been discussed, and it incorporates the past.  This would suggest 
that if there is a negative evaluation by Dasein of its life now, this will reflect on its 
entire life because they are part of the same unfolding; i.e. it is the same entity.  
While this temporal view of life evaluation is not one that is well researched there is 
some indication that this is what happens. 
In 2001 Diener, Wirtz and Oishi reported on the results of three studies(Diener, 
Wirtz, & Oishi, 2001) exploring how the ending of a person’s life influenced the 
desirability of that life.  The studies examined whether or not the phenomena of 
duration-neglect and the peak-end-rule would apply in situations governing the 
evaluations of entire lives rather than specific events.  I will first explain the concepts 
of duration-neglect and the peak-end-rule and then address the life evaluation study. 
The following describes a study that illustrates the two phenomena. 
Participants were required to hold their entire hand, up to their wrist, in painfully cold 
water until invited to removed it, at which time they were given a warm towel. The 
participants recorded the ongoing level of pain experienced while the hand was in 
the cold water using the arrows on a computer keyboard. Each participant went 
through two trials. The first trial was a 60-second immersion at 14o Celsius which 
the participants reported as painful but tolerable. The second trial lasted 90 seconds. 
For the first 60 seconds of this, the water temperature was identical to the first trial.  
For the last 30 seconds the experimenter opened a valve permitting warmer water 
to enter the bowl, increasing the temperature by just 1oC, just sufficient for the 
participants to recognise a slight reduction in pain intensity.  In other words, the two 
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trials were identical for the first 60 seconds. 
The participants were advised that there would be three trials, each separated by 
seven minutes.  Seven minutes after the second event, they were given the choice 
of selecting between repeating the shorter (first) or, the longer (second) trial for the 
third and final immersion.  The aim of the study was to record this decision and so 
once given there was no third immersion. This was the conclusion; 
Fully 80% of the participants who reported that their pain diminished during the final phase 
of the longer episode opted to repeat it, thereby declaring themselves willing to suffer 30 
seconds of needless pain in the anticipated third trial.  (Kahneman, 2012, p. 382) (my 
underlining) 
The peak-end rule describes the phenomenon that we tend to rate or judge the 
outcome of an event based on the average experience at its peak experience and 
the experience at the end.  In this case, the duration of each event was ignored 
(duration neglect) and in that the peak experience was the same, it was the end 
experienced that influenced the decision. When considered rationally, the decision 
by the 80% to repeat trial 2 does not make sense; it results in a greater duration of 
experienced pain.  What this line of investigation is pursuing is the basis by which 
we actually make decisions and not the assumed model of decision making.  In this 
case, if people are making a decision, in the main, to engage in trial 3 on the basis 
of experiencing the least amount of pain, i.e. what matters to them, then a rational 
evaluation of the two prior trials does not support the judgement made by the vast 
majority of people.  Exploring possible reasons for this type of phenomena is not the 
objective of the research, what this research is doing is identifying and describing 
the ontic phenomenon associated with judgement and decision making.    
The experience being considered may be either positive or negative, e.g. painful or 
pleasurable and a review of the literature around the peak-end rule reported that the 
rule “appears to be good at explaining how people construct retrospective hedonic 
evaluations in studies examining its effect over a short retention interval” (Geng, 
Chen, Lam, & Zheng, 2013, p. 225). However, the review concluded that after a 
lengthy period following the event people might use a different mechanism to form 
a hedonic evaluation, most probably due to the decline in intensity of the 
recollections concerning the events.  In that one’s life is, from a Heideggerian 
perspective a single unfolding, in other words, it is not an event we can leave behind, 
as it is always in the throw of happening, this would suggest that the peak-end rule 
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and the associated phenomenon of duration neglect may be relevant.  This brings 
us back to the research report by Diener, Wirtz and Oishi. 
The study used a brief description of a fictional person, Jen, who was extremely 
happy throughout her life in all aspects of her life, enjoying work, the company of 
friends, taking vacations, and so on.  Jen’s life ends tragically in a car accident; in 
one scenario at 30 years and in the other at 60 years. These two basic scenarios 
were then varied by adding 5 additional years. The years, however, while pleasant, 
are less so than before.  The study participants saw different combinations of 
scenarios and were then asked two questions, “Taking her life as a whole, how 
desirable do you think Jen’s life was?” and “How much total happiness or 
unhappiness would you say that Jen experienced in her life?”.  For the participants 
that only saw the doubling of Jen’s life (30 to 60 years) the increased life made no 
difference to the desirability of the life or the assessment of the experienced 
happiness.  This is the duration effect. The quantity of the experienced happiness 
of Jen’s life is not considered. There was no discernible difference between the peak 
and the end in each case and as such Jen’s whole temporal period of life was 
assessed on the basis of a typical slice of that life.  However, for those participants 
assessing Jen’s life from the perspective of 30 and 35 or 60 and 65, the adding of 5 
years additional “slightly happy” years resulted in a significant reduction in both the 
desirability of the life and the happiness attributed to the life.  These assessments 
held for both participants who were young psychology students and for older friends 
and parents of the students recruited to complete the study.  The conclusion is that 
in the evaluation of an entire life, the ends as well as the peaks matter (Diener, Wirtz, 
& Oishi, 2001). 
These studies are taking place in the field that is, misleadingly, named behavioural 
economics which is investigating the way people actually make intuitive decisions 
and judgements. The classical model of economics proposes humans as rational, 
informed and considered decision makers and the work in behavioural economics 
is a serious challenge to this model. It was for this reason that Kahneman’s work 
and its application to the field of economics lead to him being awarded the 2002 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences243.  The research in this field is based 
on what ‘shows up’ in terms of our immediate intuitive judgement or assessment; 
                                            




this is equivalent to Heidegger’s average everydayness.  The theory that is being 
proposed by Kahneman and others is that people have two modes of making 
judgments and decision making which Kahneman calls system 1 and system 2.  
Roughly speaking the two systems can be understood as following: 
System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary 
control. 
System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration. (Kahneman, 2012, pp. 20-1) 
Kahneman argues that our normal mode of function is System 1 and that System 2 
only kicks in when faced with a more difficult or complex task; the field of behavioural 
economics is primarily concerned with System 1. While there is only a rough 
equivalence between Heidegger’s mode of average everydayness and System 1, it 
is close enough to recognise the same phenomenon is being considered.  From a 
Heideggerian view of Dasein, this is an area that needs further development as part 
of filling out a full ‘anthropology’ and the findings in the field is a valuable resource 
in this regard. 
The relationship between system 2 and Heidegger’s work is more problematic.  Only 
some connections are evident albeit Heidegger recognises Dasein’s ability to use 
other modes of cognition and adopt more authentic modes of being.  Heidegger’s 
descriptions of the structure of Dasein in terms of its ontological levels and the ontic 
manifestations is more nuanced than the current approach being used in 
behavioural economics.  This simply indicates an opportunity of considering the 
findings of the science based research in the light of Heidegger’s philosophical 
research and determine if there is a fit.  My intuition is that there is; however, that is 
another project. 
What is relevant to this thesis is the reading of the research in terms of life evaluation 
back into Heidegger’s work.  When this is done there is some reason to be 
concerned and peruse further research. The work on system 1 and the phenomena 
of the peak-end rule and duration neglect are presenting as a genuine phenomenon 
associated with Dasein’s mode of being and it is able to be read, with little if any 
contrivance, as consistent with Heidegger’s broad framework.  If anything, the 
results of the work can be used, as mentioned, to ‘fill out’ a more detailed descriptive 
account of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.  If this is the case, then the entry into a 
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nursing home not only has a risk of contributing to the ‘shedding of life’ in terms of 
Dasein being-meaningful, there is also a risk that Dasein’s entire temporal existence 
is diminished in terms of meaningfulness; this is the peak-end rule and duration 
effect at work.   If this happens then Dasein’s demise is total; the loss of a meaningful 
future, resulting in a decline in being-meaningful in the present, and the loss of 
meaning associated with the past.  If this is the case, then the move to a nursing 
home is potentially even more damaging than just the ‘shedding of life’.   
Given the aging of the population and the increasing numbers entering nursing 
homes the impact on Dasein’s meaningfulness, not just in the present, but its whole 
temporal or historical existence needs to be researched as a matter of urgency.  
Dasein is not some present-at-hand object, it is its existence, and if the 
meaningfulness of that existence is diminished, then this is diminishing of Dasein 
itself, i.e. a diminishing of the person.  This is not trivial; the diminishing should be 
understood as a form of destruction.  In this Wolfensberger’s dramatic language that 
nursing homes are one of the forms of “death making”  (Wolfensberger, 1992, 1994) 
in our society may not be far off the mark.  
Should this be the case, for even a moderate percentage of the nursing home 
population then strategies are required to help address this loss of meaning.  
Kahneman suggests that we can make a deliberate shift to System 2 when making 
particular judgements(Kahneman, 2012) and Heidegger, as already discussed, 
indicates something similar.   However, it is not as easy as this, for example, a 
person may have had an unpleasant life and the last couple of years were very 
happy resulting in the person having a positive sense of subjective wellbeing both 
in terms of life evaluation and experience hedonic well-being.  They then enter a 
nursing home and experience a decline in subjective well-being. A ‘rational’ whole 
of life evaluation in this instance may well be entirely unproductive.  In other words, 
people are complex.  It may well be that the only ‘safe’ way to proceed is one that 
genuinely focuses on the person and driven by compassion and a desire for their 
wellbeing, in this model the challenge is how to create the possibility of ‘ends’ for 
older people that are positive and meaningful. 
Given the significant evidence that loss of meaning and the manifestations of 
depression are commonplace in nursing homes, this is an area worth researching.  
In view of the inevitable perishing of Dasein’s body, it may be that our ‘modern’ 
culture needs to find a way of moving towards the death of Dasein in a new way, 
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one that holds on to meaning. 
Section 5: The Nursing-home  
In that, a nursing home can be considered a world it is also something ready-to-
hand [BT 141/106, 143/109] it has thus been brought into being in a broader in-
order-to structure for the sake-of some understanding of Dasein.  When reading in 
the area of the history of aged care, particularly that aspect dealing with the frailest, 
it is easy to see that the model adopted for the ‘care’ of the frail elderly was based 
on an already existing and successful model, that of the acute care hospital 
(Bengtson, Gans, Putney, & Silverstein, 2008; Moody, 2010; Thane, 2005; Thomas, 
1996). In other words what brought nursing homes into being was the same 
compassionate desire to care for any person who was sick or injured, and it seems 
more than reasonable that we should take the same basic model, the hospital, and 
apply it to the care of the elderly.   
The main focus of this thesis is the understanding of the ‘shedding life’, and this is 
not the place for a full inquiry into the origins and fatal flaw inherent in the nursing 
home as currently conceived.  However, in that the inquiry of shedding life 
commenced in the context of a nursing home the following is put forward as a 
tentative account of the structural flaw.  Researching and describing how nursing 
homes came into being, the being of a nursing home and the consequences of the 
wrong ontology on which they are based is a substantial body of work that would be 
worth pursuing at a later date.  
One way of looking at the difference between typical health care, hospitals and 
nursing homes is through what I call the somatological contract244.  This approach 
brings into view the fatal flaw of the nursing home. 
There is a somatological contract that exists between the 'patient' and the medical 
or care provider.  The somatological contract implies that if the 'patient' follows the 
instructions of the provider for a given period of time, then health will be 'restored'.  
In minor cases, a person may take a prescribed medicine, refrain from particular 
                                            
244 I have coined the term somatological to emphasise that the nature of the relationship between doctor and 
patient is the body. The term soma, from the Greek somatikos 'meaning of the body' is understood in the 
scholarly tradition as relating to the body as distinct from the soul, spirit or mind.  I had considered using the 
term psychological contract, but this is a specialised term in the literature referring to the relationship between 
employer and employee and social contract similarly has a prior well-established meaning, in this case in relation 
to political theory.   
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activities for a period, i.e. modify their life activities, and in return re-gain the ability 
to take up the possibilities associated with the living of their life.  In these cases, the 
‘health’ impediment to living that life is minor, and at times it is only by way of risk.  
In more significant cases the person enters a hospital, complies with the institutional 
regime of the hospital and submits to the interventions required, in other words, 
there is to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the injury or illness, the 
suspension of living one's life.  During this period the possibility of being possible for 
the patient is projected further out into the future than is typically the case, e.g. to a 
point beyond the hospital discharge date.  During this period, however, the being-
possible for the doctors, nurses and staff are brought into the present as being-
meaningful because the ‘patient’ defers other modes of meaning and assumes, for 
a short time, the Dasein-with of ‘a patient’.  At risk of being overly simplistic, the 
somatological contract provides a way of doctors, nurses and so forth being-
possible and being-meaningful by offering sick or injured Daseins a return to being-
meaningful in the future.  Crudely put, the health system is the basis for the ongoing 
possibility of being-meaningful by attending to the breakdown of Dasein’s bodiliness 
which puts the possibility of being-meaningful at risk.  For a visit to the doctor at the 
local clinic or even for significant surgery at the hospital the somatological contract 
generally works for all concerned.  From the perspective of a Dasein entering a 
hospital this can be represented in the following diagram (Figure 37).  
In this case, the collapsing of the understanding of Dasein into that of the body 
makes, for the most part, little difference.  However, for many people, for example, 
when it comes to the chronic conditions associated with ageing the hospital can do 
no more, and so the person is transferred to a nursing home. The same basic health 
care model is applied with a simple shift in emphasis from a focus on repairing the 
body, primarily, to just tending to the body.  The person, however, must put whatever 
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life they had in the world 'on hold' forever, there is no prospect of getting back in the 
world, only death.  This can be seen in the diagram below (Figure 38). 
Because of the collapsing of the understanding of Dasein into the body, the health 
system can understand itself as providing good quality care to the body and thus 
fulfilling its part of its somatological contractual obligation.  However, the hidden 
nature of the somatological contract is that it is never ultimately about the care of 
the body, it is about being able to get on with one’s life.    
In the case of the nursing home, this somatological contract is broken.  The failure 
is evident not only in the case of Marion Miller but in the results of more than half a 
century of quantitative and qualitative research and the current levels of untreated 
depression in nursing homes.  The current state of the health discipline does not 
know how to deal with this failure, largely because it is blind to it and holds on to the 
view that it has honoured its contract.  In so doing it fails to recognise that treating 
the body was never the basis of the somatological contract, it was the promise of 
getting on with one’s life.  
The various breakdowns of the body that leads to people moving into a nursing 
home are real and urgent. For the most part, if left unattended the person’s existence 
will deteriorate along with that of the body.  There is no easy answer.  One thing, 
however, is clear, and that is the current model of nursing homes that are based 
primarily on the medical model and the tending to the body is insufficient.  There is 
a need for good quality care, but there is also need to find a way that supports a 
person being-meaningful in spite the frailty of their body and as they approach the 
inevitable perishing of that body.  It is time for a new understanding of what it is to 
be a person applied to the design and delivery of all aged care services and with 
 























that new understanding a new contract formed. Until that time we are left with what 
are, perhaps, Marion Miller’s final words as a social activist; 
I never thought this would happen to me. If I’d known in time I would have done something 
about it. I hate to think beyond each day. And though there are worse places, the fact is that 
when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place. (Miller, 2003, p. 
37) 
Just as surely as history ended for the Crow when access to a world that held the 
possibilities for being-meaningful was denied, so to history, understood as the 
unfolding of the being-meaningful came to an end for Marion when she entered the 
nursing home. 
This ends the inquiry into the meaning of ‘shedding life’. The next section articulates 






CHAPTER 22: FINAL CHAPTER 
Important to the understanding ‘shedding life’ and how it occurs is the concept of 
the individual Dasein as an emergent entity and I want to briefly revisit this topic 
before making some concluding remarks that summarise the work undertaken.  
Following these the thesis findings and theory are then stated, the main limitation 
identified and discussed and the primary recommendation for future research 
identified.   
While the primary purpose of the following section is to emphasise the idea of the 
emergent character of the human person it also provides a very limited summary of 
the basic concept of shedding life as a disruption to one’s living-environment.  
However, I do not attempt to summarise the main line of argument developed from 
the thesis here, that was provided in Chapter 2 which presented a detailed summary 
of my interpretation of Heidegger’s work.  The decision was taken, it may be 
recalled, to provide a combined summary and introduction at the beginning of the 
thesis because of the radical nature of Heidegger’s work.  The aim of this approach 
was to provide a preliminary ‘sense of the whole’ thesis to provide an overarching 
context in which to place the individual chapters.  There is thus a certain circularity 
involved in the structure of this thesis, in that the end is folded back into the 
beginning. 
The Person (Dasein) as an Emergent Entity 
Shedding life, understood as a decline in the possibility of being engaged in the 
meaningful involvements that characterise one’s self-understanding is only 
intelligible in the context of the dynamic structural character of the person Heidegger 
names as being-in-the-world.  A person’s ability-to-be a person as we understand 
the notion of a human person arises from the interaction between this structure and 
the world into which it is born.  In effect what this means is that the human person, 
as a species, is extremely adaptable, being able to gain an understanding of itself 
and its world regardless of the diverse environments into which an individual person 
may be born.  Whether it be an isolated village in Amazon jungle, the northern 
beaches of Sydney, the war-torn area of Syria or the West Bank of Paris a person 
will develop meaning for itself in the context of its environment.  The human person, 
or Dasein, on my reading of Heidegger, is thus an emergent entity that will be 
defined by distinctive patterns of understanding and receptivities and contingent on 
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the circumstance of its birth and upbringing.  While a human person may exhibit a 
certain degree of adaptability after it has grown into a culture, the evidence from the 
work of Perry and others suggests that there is a definite limit on the adaptability.  
By and large, then, the world in which a person develops a self-understanding is 
primarily the one that provides the possibilities for its ongoing existence.  It must be 
remembered that it is not just anything in the world that is relevant to the person, but 
only that aspect which Heidegger calls the living environment.  The living 
environment refers to the unity of potential involvements offered by the useful things 
and people that are meaningful for who the person is.  This is disclosed by way of 
the structure Heidegger calls worldhood. 
This process of becoming the individual person we experience our self to be is not 
mystical; it is a natural phenomenon associated with the structural processes of the 
human person founded on the biology of the body.  However, the biology is not 
causally sufficient in and of itself to constitute the individual human person.  That 
the biology is necessary but not sufficient is captured in Heidegger’s comments 
concerning our memory and recall; 
However, with all these statements, the phenomena of memory and recalling are not touched 
on. All these [chemical-physical] things are merely conditions for the emergence of the 
phenomenon. They are not causes, and surely not memory itself. [ZS 202] 
Heidegger thus rejects the notion that the body is causally sufficient in and of itself 
to determine the individual human, rather it is the structural process that arises from 
the body, binding person to its world.  This biological process occurs in such a way 
as to shape the development of the body itself as part of this constituting of the 
individual person.  It is as though the development of the person is not completed 
until after it has encountered its living environment.  This is the logical inference of 
the work of Bruce Perry and others concerning the research of abused and 
neglected children discussed in Chapter 20.  In the chapter I argued that there is no 
need for a special theoretical model to explain what is happening to account for the 
adverse effects of being raised in deficient or malignant environments.  Rather it is 
the natural biological structures (the biological equivalent to the philosophical 
terminology of ontological structures) that are operating as they should.  There is no 
good or bad living environment from the perspective of the biological functioning, it 
utilises whatever is available.  Recalling that the research in this field is finding that 
the brain develops in response to the encounters with the environment, this can be 
reframed from a Heideggerian perspective:  The ontological processes of any 
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human person, constitute each individual through its interactions with the 
environment, and this constitution is reflected in the shaping of the physical 
structures of the body (e.g. brain) upon which the ongoing life of the person is 
expressed.  In other words, there are fundamental aspects of who we are that are 
indelibly shaped by our early environment, and this was seen in the case study of 
Virginia and Laura as well as the research involving the Romanian orphans.  From 
a biological perspective this would indicate the final development that determines 
the individual human person requires a living environment, the body is insufficient 
in and of itself.   Heidegger takes this point and extends it even further arguing that 
as a human species all our various defining biological structures have developed in 
response to the way of being human. This view is stated in a passage from the 
Zollikon Seminars; 
But the decisive point in our context is our insight into the immediate emergence of all of our 
so-called material, bodily nature from the physically intangible capacities for receiving-
perceiving and for comporting oneself, in which our Da-sein in its unfolding essence consists. 
This insight allows us to grasp easily how immediately and how limitlessly all bodily nature 
belongs to the [human] way of existing and how it is, and remains, in this mode of being 
[Seinsart]. Therefore, this insight may also be called the fundamental philosophy of all 
psychosomatic medicine. [ZS 234] 
There is implicit in this account of both the notion of emergence as well as what is 
termed ‘downward causality’ and his claim that the basic insight he refers to “may 
also be called the fundamental philosophy of all psychosomatic medicine” strongly 
reinforces this position.  The insight Heidegger presents is of a complex relationship 
between the biological processes of the body constitutive of the person, the physical 
biological structures of the body upon which those processes are founded, the 
environment and the emergent character of the individual person.  Heidegger is 
setting a direction for research that has yet to be explored from the perspective he 
is laying out.  What is important for this thesis is only that part of his insight applicable 
to the emergent nature of the individual person.  
There are three important implications for understanding the person as an emergent 
entity.  The first is obvious, that the person is contingent on the character of the 
world into which it is born and as a consequence, at least to a certain degree, is 
constrained in its self-understanding (i.e. who it is) which is made manifest when 
taking up the possibilities for living a meaningful life in that world.  Secondly, that a 
person’s understanding and receptiveness is structural, i.e. it determinative of the 
person, and as such not accessible to the person’s cognition and volition as 
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something that can switch on and off at a whim.  Entities in the world show up for a 
human person as offering meaningful possibilities for living or they don’t; this is not 
person’s decision.  This does not preclude the possibility of the person ‘shaping’ the 
future direction of what will be meaningful; this requires that the person work with 
the structure using their cognition and volition.  Thirdly, if a human person is 
wrenched from its living environment and placed into a radically different one, then 
the possibility of the person living a meaningful life, is diminished because the 
possibilities of being engaged in things that matter to the person simply will not show 
up.  Because this is a structural process it will be difficult for Dasein to overcome 
and because the structural process is founded on biological processes, such a 
dislocation will be manifested in the body.  This manifestation may be as the felt 
experience of shedding life as in the case of Marion Miller, or the experience of 
hopelessness, depression and so on.  While the mechanisms are not known the link 
between these events and the increased risk of a significant decline in well-being 
together with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality is now generally accepted 
in this field of research (discussed in Chapter 1).  Put another way, being-
meaningless, with no perceived hope of change, puts Dasein at risk of being 
unhappy, depressed, sick, and dying, i.e. shedding life.  While Heidegger provides 
a structural analysis of this phenomenon, the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl 
came to the same conclusion from his observations and experiences imprisoned in 
the German concentration camps of World War II (discussed in Chapter 21).  It is 
my claim that these three implications of the emergent nature of Dasein account for 
the phenomenon of shedding life observed in nursing homes by researchers, 
reformers and the accounts of residents such as Marion Miller. 
There are other emergent entities described in Being and Time, i.e. world and the 
ready-to-hand.  That these entities are emergent is not clear from this way this 
section of the thesis is written, albeit it is evident if one reads them from this 
perspective.   This arose because my view of Dasein as an emergent entity did not 
develop until late in the thesis process and so was not applied to world and the 
ready-to-hand.  In hindsight, it is now obvious that you cannot have Dasein as an 
emergent entity and not have world and the ready-to-hand as emergent entities. 
This does not detract from the analysis provided nor the conclusions concerning the 
aim of the thesis inquiry.   
In Heidegger’s analysis of world and worldhood, it is easy to miss this emergent 
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character and it only became evident for me when I understood the implication of 
his shifts from a description of world as an entity to the description of Dasein’s 
involvement with the world on the basis of worldhood.  When analysing Dasein’s 
engagement with the world, Heidegger reaches a sudden and abrupt conclusion 
that “the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the 
worldhood of the world.” [BT 119/86].   Heidegger then very quickly moves on, and 
I have yet to find anywhere in his work where he develops and makes clear the 
dynamic relationship between worldhood as part of the structure of Dasein as an 
entity and as determinative of the separate entity world into which Dasein is born 
and raised.  In that Dasein’s worldhood is initially drawn from world there is thus a 
mutually sustaining structural relationship between Dasein and its world.  
Heidegger’s observations concerning this are not unique and the reflexive nature of 
the relationship between people and their environments has been observed by 
others. For example, it is referred to by Winston Churchill when he remarked, on 
introducing the debate on the rebuilding of the House of Commons, destroyed in 
World War II by German bombing, "We shape our buildings, and afterwards our 
buildings shape us." (Churchill(Prime Minister), 1943).  This, of course, is the pre-
ontological understanding of the phenomenon without the structural analysis 
provided by Heidegger.  
Applying this insight to Heidegger’s work, worlds emerge out of the practices of the 
people that are ‘in the world’ and in turn each ‘new’ individual person emerges from 
the worlds into which they have been born and raised, as discussed above.  The 
result of this is that, once established, worlds tend to be self-organising and 
maintained through the dynamic collective cultural practices of the people in that 
world, what Heidegger calls the ‘One’ (refer Chapter 16).  This concept, that human 
societies need no central controlling body, that it self-organises on the basis of 
interactions between the individual world members is now widely acknowledged as 
a common strategy accounting for various behaviours observed in other biological 
species(Davies, 2006a; Eldredge, Pievani, Serrelli, & Tëmkin, 2016; Feltz, 
Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006).  This should not be unexpected.  In that the human 
Dasein is a species that has evolved as a part of nature, it is reasonable to assume 
that Dasein will exhibit evolutionary derived mechanisms similar to those found 
elsewhere in Nature, which by and large, determine its mode of receptivity and 
response to its environment.  This is the very point Heidegger is referring to in the 
above quoted passage from the Zollikon Seminars.  It is out of its species defining 
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mode of understanding, receptivity and behaviour that, collectively, Dasein is the 
structural basis for world and accounts for any specific ready-to-hand entities in a 
world coming into being (emerging) and pass away.245  
Based on Heidegger’s account, at the individual ontic level the material form which 
an entity takes (typically a design and manufacturing process), is a response to the 
underlying relational structure.   As such it is the relational structure that determines 
what an entity is.  This was evident in the discussions of entities such as the hammer 
in the earlier chapters.  This is also the same principle discussed above and in 
Chapter 8 in relation to the animal organ.  It is the failure to see the structure of the 
world and focus on the material form that Heidegger attributes to the tradition’s 
mistaken understanding of being.  Another important aspect of this approach is seen 
in Heidegger’s method of inquiry.  In that what determines the material is the 
underlying ontological structure, it is access to the structure that is important in 
understanding what an entity is, and not the material form.  This is why, even though 
the biological structure of the person is not currently accessible Heidegger can 
basically ignore it (discussed in Chapter’s 8 and 9).  The common theme in all of 
this is emergence. 
Heidegger does not name himself as an emergentist246, and this adds to the difficulty 
in understanding his approach.  Even though Being and Time is clearly written 
against a materialist position, unless one has a sound and comprehensive grasp of 
the philosophical tradition, as Heidegger did, it is highly improbable that the family 
resemblance between Heidegger’s approach and that other emergentists would be 
identified in his writing.  Even then, the way Heidegger writes it is difficult to identify 
this perspective which may account for the absence of any discussion on 
emergence in the main commentaries on Being and Time.   
                                            
245 The summary of Heidegger’s work, presented in Chapter 2, was written after the completion of this chapter.  
In the summary I present Heidegger’s work from the perspective of an emergent relational system and provide 
a discussion of this coming into being (emergence) and passing away of the ready-to-hand entities.  Additionally, 
I introduce, in a cursory manner, the links between my interpretation of Heidegger and contemporary chaos and 
complexity theory, of which emergence is a part. 
246 My interpretation of Heidegger as an emergentists came about as a result of my reading of his lectures on 
the Greeks. This initial view was not particularly well-formed and is still developing and consequently a detailed 
interpretation of Heidegger’s work in the context of am emergentists framework is not reflected in the thesis.  
From this perspective it is also possible to identify a connection between Husserl’s work on mereology and 
emergentist concepts.  At the time I was not aware of any other writings that have developed this theme. 
However, I have recently identified a discussion linking Heidegger’s account with an emergentist perspective in 
McDonough’s book on Being and Time(McDonough, 2006).  McDonough’s approach is from a philosophical 
perspective and does not pursue the concept in any specific detail, whereas the initial origins of my perspective 
is from the work in science and the broader field of chaos and complexity theory. 
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One of the reasons for the lack of a clearer articulation of emergence in Being and 
Time may lie in the fact that Heidegger eschewed the idea of ‘worldviews’ or 
perspectives in his research work; it is contrary to his strict empiricist stance.  As 
soon as one adopts a particular position (worldview) it is already framing the way 
observations are interpreted, i.e. worldviews carry with them embedded 
presuppositions.  Heidegger’s approach is to make his observations, undertake the 
logical analysis and only take into consideration previously demonstrated results in 
arriving at his final interpretive descriptions.  While this is acknowledged and 
accepted as part of his method, it should not have precluded, in my view, Heidegger 
from making his perspective a little more transparent in Being and Time, just as he 
does concerning the positions he argues against.  There is no doubt that one can 
glean from various lecture courses, as I have indicated, Heidegger’s position.  
However, this work is contained in lecture courses, and at the time of the publication 
of Being and Time, there was no plan to publish these courses.  Heidegger’s 
reasons for not making his overall approach clearer in Being and Time will probably 
never be known, just as his failure to adequately describe the use of prior work in 
such areas as intentionality and categorial intuition (refer Chapter 12 & 13) will 
remain a puzzle.  Unfortunately, even for professional philosopher, Being and Time, 
as a standalone account of Heidegger’s research, is almost impenetrable.  I think 
this point is well made in the thesis, and it accounts for why it takes so much work 
to extract from his work a understanding of his project as a logically consistent unity. 
While the concept of emergentism is not new, in that it goes back to the Greeks, for 
most of the Western tradition it has, by and large, been ignored and it is only 
relatively recently that it has been the subject of renewed interest.  By way of a 
reminder the three main characteristics that define this approach are firstly, that 
things in nature arise as a result of the workings of nature itself, secondly, that what 
emerges has characteristics that cannot be explained by reference to the material 
parts, and thirdly, that things emerge which are other than physical, e.g. emotions, 
culture and so on247.  All these are present in Heidegger’s work.  The recent 
publication of numerous books in the last decade specifically dealing with 
emergence is a reflection of the growing interest248 and the opening lines of the 
                                            
247 This third point is based on the strong emergentist claim.  
248 I have accessed just a small range of the available books (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Cahoone, 2013; 
Clayton & Davies, 2006; Eldredge, Pievani, Serrelli, & Tëmkin, 2016; English, 2017; Feltz, Crommelinck, & 
Goujon, 2006; Humphreys, 2016; Wimsatt, 2007)   
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preface from a book of readings on emergence edited by Bedau and Humphreys 
sums up the current position;  
Thirty years ago emergence was largely ignored in philosophy and science. Its ethos ran 
counter to the reductionist views of the time, and it seemed to invoke mystical and 
unexplainable levels of reality. Things have changed. Emergence is now one of the liveliest 
areas of research in both science and philosophy. (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008, p. ix) 
However, notwithstanding the growing interest in emergence as a field of interest 
this should not be taken to suggest it reflects the mainstream view, it has a long way 
to go for this to be the case.  Interpreting Heidegger’s account of the human person 
as an emergent entity thus suffers from a twofold burden, firstly it sits within the 
minority account of entities, i.e. it is not a materialist account, and secondly, it is not 
a common interpretation of Heidegger.  
The account of Heidegger’s work in this thesis provides a cohesive and accessible 
framework for making sense of the human person as a part of its world.  The thesis 
is breaking new ground by taking an emergent understanding of Dasein and 
applying and demonstrating how it is applicable, as Heidegger intended, to a range 
of scientific fields (refer Chapter 11).  More specifically, albeit the genesis of the 
thesis lies in the phenomenon of shedding life within a nursing home, it has been 
demonstrated that this is a structural phenomenon with far wider applicability. The 
nursing home is but one circumstance in which shedding life is likely to occur.  
Penultimate Remarks 
The primary approach I have taken is to accept Heidegger’s statement that Division 
I of Being and Time is an account of describing the ontological structure of the 
human person (Dasein) in our average everydayness.  From this perspective, I took 
the view that if the various phenomena he is observing and describing can be 
brought into view it should be possible to ‘experience’ or at least reflect on similar 
experiences associated with the phenomena.  If I could do this, then it would provide 
phenomenal support for the interpretation.  This was the basis of the methodology 
that I developed.  Based on this approach, at various stages thought experiments 
and illustrative examples from other fields are used to help shift the thesis from 
merely a descriptive account of Heidegger’s work to one that presented 
opportunities for ‘testing’ the various phenomena.  These included the exercises 
developed as part of Chapter 13 to bring to the fore the key claim that when we see 
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something ‘as’ something that our understanding is projecting meaning. (This is the 
important lesson Heidegger takes from Husserl’s work on categorial intuition).  In 
Chapter 16 on culture and Dasein-with, I developed the case study around Jesse 
and Frank James as a way to see how even people show up differently based on 
our projected understanding.  Additionally, scattered throughout the thesis are 
smaller examples that I have drawn upon from my own life.  I have carefully 
investigated the important concepts of intentionality and categorial intuition that 
Heidegger adapts and builds on, but which lay outside of Being and Time and then 
carefully followed Heidegger’s strict empiricist approach as he analyses and 
discloses the structures of the ready-to-hand, world and Dasein. On this basis, I 
believe that my interpretation of the Dasein analytic is not only consistent with 
Heidegger’s but also now reflects my own understanding.  I now stand beside 
Heidegger holding the same phenomenon in ‘view’, notwithstanding that my view is 
not as yet as sharp and well defined as that of Heidegger’s! 
My view was, however, that even though the interpretation of Dasein may be 
reasonable Heidegger’s claim as to the broad applicability of his Dasein analytic to 
the various sciences (Refer Chapter 11) needs to be ‘tested’.  If this held up, then 
the ‘model’ that Heidegger is describing has, potentially more explanatory power 
than the current materialist model, based on the person as a physically based, 
rational, self-sufficient agent in the world.  This ‘testing’ was undertaken in Chapter 
20.  I readily acknowledge that what I have undertaken in this chapter is more by 
way of a rough ‘proof of concept’ and certainly needs far more robust follow-up.  
However, I am satisfied that Dasein’s analytic lived up to Heidegger’s expectations 
to the extent that it was ‘tested’.  In the area of history, it revealed that taking one’s 
own value judgements or contemporary cultural understanding of being human to a 
period of history does not disclose the conditions that lead to those particular 
defining characteristics of that period of history, e.g. the black lynchings in the US 
post-emancipation.  Rather taking a perspective of the ‘One’ and researching the 
embedded cultural practices, both societal and local, is more likely to reveal the 
conditions that lead to the culturally sanctioned murders.  Only in this way can 
understanding be disclosed that reveals the basis by which African Americans 
showed up as ‘lynchable’, or Pakistani daughters showed up as needing to be killed.  
This is a different approach to understanding history.  Additionally, several 
approaches to history were also reviewed and the conclusion reached was that, at 
least in some quarters, there is a move to understand the ‘Other’ based on 
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receptivities and not theories based on humans as rational, self-interested decision-
making agents.  From a Heideggerian perspective, it was argued that these 
approaches are more likely to disclose the world of the ‘Other’ in a more intelligible 
way and provide the basis for appropriate actions based on those disclosures. 
Case studies in the area of child development were also examined from the 
perspective of children raised in abusive or neglectful environments.  The 
application of the Dasein analytic was consistent with the findings; however, there 
was an unexpected finding.  Perry has developed what he calls the traumagenic 
neurodevelopmental model to help explain what happens to very young children 
exposed to deficient environments.  My conclusion was that a separate model for 
child development is not necessary249.  The dynamic structure of Dasein’s being is, 
even in these cases, performing as it should.  Dasein is gaining an understanding 
of being-meaningful in its environment, even if that environment is suboptimal for 
‘normal’ development.  From a policy and research perspective, this shifts the focus 
from the “traumagenic neurodevelopmental” which is the consequence, to a focus 
on the environment which is the primary contributing factor.  The clear message of 
this work was that environments matter. 
The area of depression in nursing homes was also discussed and evidence provided 
that even at mild levels depression is associated with a significant decline in 
wellbeing.  Evidence was also discussed that depression was associated with 
significant increases in the risk of morbidities and mortalities.  This evidence is 
consistent with the emergent model of Dasein and its founded relationship with the 
body. Two opposing models of depression were discussed, the disease and the 
social or environmental model.  While initially in favour of the social model, by 
applying the Dasein analytic it was possible to reconcile both within the one model. 
In that Dasein is linked to its environment suggests that changes in the environment 
are associated with the onset of depression, however, that Dasein is founded on the 
body means that this should show up as a change in the body, this is the origins of 
the ‘chemical imbalance’ disease theory.  There are, however, other aspects to 
consider, for example, an injury may bring on the conditions for depression to 
‘dampen’ one’s desire to be involved and thus assist healing.  This is speculative 
                                            
249 Perry’s work has been of significant value.  This claim is not to invalidate the Perry model, but simply to 




but is suggestive that loss of access to an environment can arise from a break down 
in the body itself.  The research on the effectiveness of medication is revealing in 
that it suggests that it is only of minimal benefit and only then in more severe cases.  
This further suggests that the far more influential factor is associated with a sense 
of being-meaningful.  The model provided by the Dasein analytic opens up avenues 
for researching this field that hitherto have not been robustly explored. 
There were other examples used throughout the thesis, for example, a case of 
honour killing in Pakistan which was explored from the perspective of the power of 
the ‘One’ and the circumstances of the Crow people facing the daunting task of 
disclosing a new world in which being-meaningful as a Crow was intelligible.  While 
these cases were used to explore particular aspects of Dasein’s structure, applied 
more generally the Dasein analytic helps to disclose a new way of understanding 
these situations.  
In Chapter 3 I set out the methodology for the thesis which I labelled a discursive 
Heideggerian inquiry.  It had two stages, firstly to acquire an understanding of the 
structure of Dasein using Heidegger as a guide, and secondly to apply that 
understanding so as to disclose the meaning of ‘shedding life’, which was revealed 
as the decline in the possibility of being-possible or being-meaningful.  These two 
aspects are clearly evident both in the thesis and in summary in the above 
discussion. As part of this methodology, Heidegger’s three parts of the 
phenomenological method were also followed.  There was a turn away from the 
physical presence of the entity towards its way of being (reduction), the identification 
of ways of thinking that impeded access to an understanding of being (destruction), 
these were, when identified, marked with ɸ, and finally, new understandings were 
developed (construction) which are presented in the thesis.  The discursive 
character of the thesis is reflected in the extent of the work undertaken to investigate, 
disclose and report on all material aspects associated with the inquiry, even, for 
example, to frequently pursuing alternative German translations to ensure that a 
proper grasp was achieved of Heidegger’s descriptive accounts. 
From work done in accordance with the thesis methodology, I have reached the 
view that the Dasein analytic is both a reasonable and a plausible account of what 
it is to be a human person.  Based on this account and informed by Heidegger’s 




The thesis aim was to reach an understanding of shedding life and from that to 
articulate a theory to account for this phenomenon.  A formal response to the first 
part  is that shedding life is a demising of Dasein’s existence understood as a decline 
in the possibilities of being possible. The articulation of a theory is presented in the 
next section. 
Theory of Life-Environment Disruption 
In Chapter 1 the basic elements that must be addressed by a theory to account for 
shedding-life associated with a relocation to a nursing home were set out as follows: 
• takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,  
• that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way, 
such that, 
• a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a 
disruption to the self; and finally  
• posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the 
life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both 
psychologically and somatically.  
These points were drawn from observations of the phenomena as reported in the 
literature, my own experience and from what Heidegger calls a pre-ontological 
understanding.  Such an understanding reflects an intuitive insight into the problem 
but is not based on a detailed understanding of the structure of the person, i.e. based 
on an understanding of what a person is, in other words an ontological understating.  
While it would be possible to posit a theory to account for shedding-life without a 
proper ontological understanding this would lead to the possibility of the theory being 
inadequate and wrongly grounded.  This has been explored and discussed 
throughout the thesis.  That seventy years of research has failed to explain the 
phenomenon of shedding-life is an example of the problems involved in moving from 
observed phenomena to research, to explanation if the work is not adequately 
grounded. 
Heidegger’s approach is both deceptively simple and remarkably hard to grasp at 
the same time.  It is hard in that it is founded on an approach that is outside the 
typical way our culture formalises its understanding what things are.  It is easy, at 
least conceptually, in that once one looks at things from the different perspective 
described by Heidegger it is a matter of trusting one’s empirical observations and 
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ability to think things through in a logical manner.  This is evident concerning the 
phenomenon of shedding-life.  The answer has been in front of us all the time, in 
the form of the various reports and accounts associated with people’s life 
environments changing.  Because the dominant thinking in the culture understands 
people as self-sufficient entities, the problem is framed as not being in the 
environment but in the person, as most likely psychological and related to a person’s 
failure to adapt.  This is often reflected in the responsibility for problem being situated 
with the person and reflected in comments typically heard in nursing homes such as 
“If only Mum (or Dad) would get out of their room.”   
Based on Heidegger’s research the basic structure of the person can be abstracted 
to a model of how the person understands, perceives and responds to its 
environment.  This was shown in Figure 33 at the beginning of Chapter 21.  This 
figure puts in pictorial form the concept that one’s meaningful life is experienced in 
the ongoing flow of making choices to be engage with people (on the basis of 
solicitude) and with useful things (on the basis of concernful dealings) that are 
understood as being significant (i.e. they matter) to the person.  If the things that are 
significant in a person’s life are removed, then there is a cascading effect as 
represented in Figure 39.  Once the possibilities are removed then meaningful 
choices no longer show up, and this removes the possibility of meaningful activities.   
However, this is not going to be experienced by the person as a ‘crossing out’ or a 
removal, but simply as a nothing meaningful.  There will be an absence in terms of 
choice and so nothing worth (i.e. nothing meaningful) being engaged with.  This is 
































The things that the person encounters in the world will still have a certain 
intelligibility, it’s just nothing shows up as worth engaging with.   The diagrams 
represents an extreme case, but it is easy to imagine a phased situation in which 
most things holding meaning gradually disappear. 
Heidegger accepts that a person can take conscious steps to change their 
relationship with the world such that a new sense of meaningful existence can be 
developed.  This possibility for deliberate change is part of his analysis associated 
with a person gaining a genuine insight into who they are and living an authentic life.  
This part of his work is covered in Division 2 of Being and Time and is outside the 
scope of the thesis.  This task is, however not easy.  Within psychology there are 
now widely accepted therapeutic approaches based on Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT)250 that are designed to help people ‘adjust’ in a positive manner to 
the living environment primarily by addressing how people ‘think’ and ‘feel’ about 
things.   Even if CBT could be used to help adjust to the nursing home environment, 
there are a number of challenges. Firstly, it requires the assistance of trained 
therapists, secondly it can take many months in dealing with issues such as 
depression and thirdly in the case of a nursing home the question is, “Adjust to 
what?”.  In the community CBT may be able to help a person reorientate to the world 
in a positive way in terms of recognising meaningful involvements, but, from the 
perspective of a ‘resident’ what would meaningful involvements look like in a nursing 
home?  Given the extensive rates of depression evident among older people in 
nursing homes (estimated as in excess of 60%, refer discussion Chapter 20), Even 
if it were possible to make the sterile life environment of the nursing home show up 
as meaningful for older people, it is hardly feasible to have mass CBT interventions 
to address the problem.  
Heidegger’s research addresses the first three points of a required theory, and this 
is summarised in the above diagrams.  The last point, the connection, between 
disruption to the life-environment and an increased risk in morbidities and mortality 
is not based on the ontological structure of Dasein, but rather the link between 
Dasein and its body.  As discussed in the thesis this link is not well understood and 
while Heidegger accepts the link he does not explore it in any detail.  The connection 
between a disruption to the living environment and the body was discussed from a 
                                            
250 From a Heideggerian perspective I take CBT as operating at the structural level of the person, not the 
psychological content of the person’s mind. 
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number of perspectives all of which are sufficient to posit the association sufficient 
for the development of a theory, satisfying the final point.   A theory to account for 
shedding-life can now be articulated: 
The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption states that if a person’s access to the 
activities which constitute their meaningful existence is disrupted then, they are at 
risk of increased psychological and somatic illness and death.  The source, 
character and duration of the disruption will have differing impacts on the risk for 
each individual person contingent on what constitutes a meaningful life for the 
person. 
The theory of life-environment disruption is grounded in the ontological structure of 
the person which is its fundamental strength.  In terms of its applicability as a theory 
within the human sciences its general structure satisfies the basic criteria for a 
theory:  it has explanatory power, it has logical consistency with observed empirical 
observations, it has the potential for general predictive powers, it provides a means 
to identify factors which can be controlled to influence outcomes, and it is 
verifiable/testable.  The explanatory aspects and the logical consistency with the 
observed phenomenon has been demonstrated within the thesis.   Because of the 
variability of life-environments and of people’s self-understanding more work is 
required in order to refine the predictive capacity of the theory.  One approach would 
be to identify circumstance of radical adverse changes in environments and monitor 
the incidents of harm arising before, during and after living in that environment, e.g.  
in relation to immigration detention centres.  Other opportunities for research exist 
by conducting longitudinal studies of older people in terms of their accessibility to 
meaningful involvements as their physical frailty increases and as they move 
through different phases of aged care support services.  The testing of the theory in 
terms of the association between meaningful involvements and morbidities can be 
carried out in a number of ways.  For example, one approach would be to provide 
interventions that change the character of meaningful involvements for participants 
within an existing nursing home and monitor the outcomes for people.  A practical 
and useful approach will probably be in the development of an individual screening 
tool that identifies the potential risks of moving into a new living environment.  This 
was behind the idea of the example of environmental mapping, and the Daisy 
Diagram applied to the Marion Miller case study (Chapter 21). 
Like most nascent theories with potentially broad applicability it is recognised that 
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further work needs to be done to refine and test the theory in its various applications.  
Notwithstanding this the theory is the first significant response to the call made by 
Danermark and Ekström back in 1990(Danermark & Ekström, 1990) (discussed in 
Chapter 1) for a theory that could be used to help break out of the cul-de-sac the 
research field has found itself.   This call was one of the main provocations for 
undertaking this thesis.   
In that the development of a theory to account for the phenomenon of shedding life 
was the primary goal of the thesis, the Theory of Life-Environment Disruption 
satisfies that goal. 
Thesis Limitations 
The primary limitation of the thesis is the possible misinterpretation of Heidegger’s 
work and a misunderstanding of the structure of Dasein.  This was addressed by an 
approach that used Heidegger’s work not as the primary entity to be interpreted but 
as a guide to my understanding of Dasein.  At each critical step, Heidegger’s 
descriptions were clarified and tested against my own experience and analysis.  By 
the end of the thesis, there was no material discrepancy between Heidegger’s 
descriptions and my own understanding, as far as I am aware.  However, there is 
always room for error.  As a check I also applied the results of the Dasein structural 
analysis in a number of situations, the analysis was not only consistent with the 
situations examined but provided new insights.  In that the only main alternative to 
the ‘model’ provided by the Dasein analytic is one based on a materialist account, 
my conclusion is that even if not entirely definitive it is a significant advance on the 
existing model, demonstrates theoretical parsimony and has broad applicability in 
terms of its explanatory capacity.   
Future Research & Policy Implications 
Throughout the thesis, I have identified future research possibilities in a diverse 
range of areas arising out of the Dasein analytic, and so I will not repeat them here. 
While the Theory of Life-Environment Disruption as an account of the phenomenon 
of shedding-life has broad applicability the genesis of the thesis arose out of a 
specific concern in relation to nursing homes and it is to this focus I return. 
The conclusion of the thesis is that nursing homes are designed and run on a flawed 
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understanding of being human. This is reflected in the misapplication of the medical 
model somatological contract, suited mainly for primary and acute health care 
(Chapter 21).  The relational nature of person means that in a significant number of 
cases the move to a nursing home as they are currently typically run will result in 
shedding life which will be manifested in an increase in morbidities and mortalities, 
most commonly depression.  A consequence, while nursing homes strive to provide 
good quality care of the body, they are ultimately failing in this goal as a result of the 
iatrogenic effect of the living environment provided by the nursing home.  Shedding 
life will also be experienced as a loss of meaning in terms of one’s life and a decline 
in experienced wellbeing and if the aim of nursing homes is to enhance a person’s 
quality of life, then they are failing in this area as well.   
The failure is a substantial one.  The most current figures available indicate that in 
OECD countries there are currently in excess of 7,000,000 older people in nursing 
home (OECD.Stat, 2018; Wilson, Brow, & Playfair, 2017).  Based on the available 
Australian and USA figures there is a prevalence rate of depression well in excess 
of 50% among older people living in nursing homes251.  We don’t know how much 
of this depression is addressable by changing the living environment.  We don’t 
know what the correlation rates are between depression and mortality and other 
morbidities in nursing homes, yet we do know that such correlations are reported in 
the literature for other populations.  We don’t know the correlation between a decline 
in reported wellbeing and depression in nursing homes, but where reported in other 
populations we know it is significant.  We do know that depression is 
underdiagnosed and undertreated in nursing homes.  Using depression as a crude 
proxy for shedding life the numbers of people experiencing harm in nursing homes 
worldwide is staggering.  If, as the Theory of Life-Environment Disruption, suggests 
that these depression levels are associated with a disruption in the life environment, 
then it points to a way to first better understand the phenomenon, but also to respond 
to it.  This is the most immediate policy and practice implication of the theory.  As 
Lieberman indicated over forty years ago it is a matter of “humanitarian interest” 
(Lieberman, 1969, p. 330). 
While maintaining the necessary health care, new ways need to be found in 
providing meaning for people as they understand themselves, notwithstanding the 
                                            
251 This paragraph is a summary of the discussion presented in Chapter 21. 
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perishing of the body.  This is a challenging and demanding task if the community 
is to respond in a compassionate manner that takes seriously the concept of the 
wellbeing of the person.  The alternative is to continue unchanged and risk seriously 
damaging the very person that nursing homes have been established to serve. 




APPENDIX 1: MY BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
 
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of my aged care background and 
motivation for the thesis.  The overview commences from the point that I enter the 
domain of nursing homes, with my appointment to Adelaide Central Mission in 1988.   
Before this, I was a Chartered Accountant working in both public practice and for 
commercial organisations. As the aim is to provide context, it is not a historical 
account but rather of the sort one may find in an interview.  
Adelaide Central Mission 
Adelaide Central Mission252 (ACM) is one of the largest social service organisations 
in Australia and part of the Uniting Church. When I joined it had around 700 paid 
staff and five hundred volunteers, ran over forty community programmes including 
counselling services (e.g. family counselling, Lifeline), services for people who were 
homeless, disability programmes and, of relevance for this thesis, both residential 
and community aged care services. My initial appointment was as the Corporate 
Services Manager, and two years later I was appointed Chief Executive Officer.  
The economic and political environment was at the start of the rational economic 
reform process, and associated with this, numerous challenges arose as the State 
and Federal Governments moved rapidly to a contracting and compliance mode of 
funding for social services253 moving away from the traditional grant or block funding 
models.  It was during this period that Australia saw the first of a new wave of major 
reforms in the aged care sector with changes in funding towards a uniform approach 
across Australian with significant increases in quality compliance obligations.  
The late 1970s and 1980s had seen a significant push for reform in the delivery of 
services for people with disabilities resulting in the progressive move from large 
scale intuitions to, predominantly, a group home model based in the community.  
The rationale for the reforms was that institutions were causing the people with 
disability significant harm and denying them a chance of experiencing a reasonable 
                                            
252 Now known as Uniting Communities (refer http://www.unitingcommunities.org/). 
253 The approach was to establish quasi markets for the delivery of social services and together with this was 
the policy of separating the functions of service funding, service purchasing (on the government side) and 
service provision (on the community side) typically known as the purchaser-provider split, i.e. to set up 
‘customers’ and ‘suppliers’. 
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quality of life as part of the community.  One of the intellectual forces behind the 
reforms was Wolf Wolfensberger (1934-2011) an American academic psychologist 
who was also lobbying strongly for reform in the nursing home industry.  In the mid-
1980s ACM did not have residential services for people with disabilities, but the 
rationale behind the reforms in the disability sector did not escape the attention of 
the Senior Executive responsible for ACM's nursing homes, Tim Horsnell. ACM had 
traditional style nursing homes based on an institutional model with multi-bed wards, 
reflective of the era.  Tim saw the applicability of the issues raised concerning people 
with disabilities to the people living in nursing homes and became the initial driving 
force for reform within ACM. 
ACM was steeped in the tradition of Methodist social justice but was not without its 
blind spots. However, on realising the inherent injustice of the nursing home model, 
with the full support of the Mission Superintendent, Rev Ivor Bailey, and the board 
Tim lead a significant reform program.   The reform process had two main thrusts 
firstly changing the built environment and secondly establishing community-based 
aged care programmes to keep people out of nursing homes in the first place.  Brian 
Kidd, a Melbourne architect, had pioneered group home building designs for people 
with disabilities and he was engaged to assist in designing and building a new style 
of nursing home.  Kidd's approach was to design and construct nursing homes that 
had the look and feel of residential homes and were enabling in design, supporting 
rather than exacerbating the frailties of a person.  While ACM had an initial attempt 
at a new style nursing home, the breakthrough experiment was a small cluster of 
three self-contained homes, each of just eight bedrooms with ensuite, kitchen, 
dining room, lounge room and a separate room for private family meetings and 
meals. From the street, they were indistinguishable from other suburban homes.  
They were opened in 1988, not long after I joined ACM.  This was a radical change 
to the institutional looking, large scale designs of traditional nursing homes built for 
the efficiency of service delivery and not for living a life.  Simply put the design 
prioritised the understood needs of the people who were to live there, and only then 
were the corporate functional and efficiency requirements considered. The 
pervading ethos was to provide an environment that focused on enabling the person 
to live as normal a life as possible. This inversion of priority was revolutionary. 
ACM was among the first in Australia to place a priority on providing community-
based in-home care services to older people and designed several innovative 
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programmes, negotiating funding to trial these new forms of service delivery254.  The 
idea was simple, supporting people in their own home was a far better option for 
most people than living in an institution.  The initiatives were driven by a deep sense 
of social justice that permeated ACM at the time, and this meant not just becoming 
aware of the adverse circumstances of people created by social and community 
structures but once aware working to address them.  This is encapsulated in a paper 
by Horsnell and Fopp delivered at a conference at the time.  Many people then, and 
still do, encourage, older people with frailties to enter a nursing home, but as 
Horsnell and Fopp observe;  
Moving to a residential community is tantamount to shedding belongings which form an 
integral part of one’s life. The process of growing old can be likened to the layers of an onion 
which are slowly but surely peeled; every time another move is made fewer cherished 
possessions can be taken.  A lifetime, and the reminders of it, become flotsam and jetsam. 
.... A lifetime is squeezed into a small unit or contracted to a room number, or a quasi-patient 
or a potential patient. 
... Fitting into residential services requires adapting to a new regimen, organizational 
timetables must be adhered to, staff become custodians, privacy is intruded upon, rules are 
made by others, and friends and family are less accessible. Consequently, at least for some, 
horizons diminish, residents become less active and more isolated. … Such is the intensity 
of their estrangement from the community, that … they appear to suffocate in their security 
… (Horsnell & Fopp, 1988, pp. 30-1) 
The similarities to what Horsnell and Fopp were describing from the late 1980s to 
the experience described by Marion Miller in 2003 are painfully obvious. The 
intervening years, the ongoing reforms, the shift into a new century have all 
occurred, and one has to wonder if there has been any fundamental change in mind 
set or just a surface change in building design to make them more attractive, more 
marketable.  However, that is getting ahead of things.  
ACM funded the rebuilding program mainly from its own funds.  The new nursing 
homes were innovative both in terms of architectural and interior design, moving 
away from traditional medical ward models to facilities that were designed to present 
more with the look and feel of a large home both internally and from the street.  The 
philosophy was predicated based on creating a home in which people lived and 
were supported rather than a building which gave every indication of one where 
patients, sick people, were treated and looked after.  There was a strong view that 
                                            
254 A brief account of this is contained in Horsnell and Fopp's 1988 article Housing for the Elderly: Confronting 
Some Planning Issues (Horsnell & Fopp, 1988)  
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how people felt about themselves and responded could be influenced by the built 
environment and we wanted the environment to create the sense of a person living 
in their home, not a patient in a medical institution.  The approach also valued and 
held in high regard appropriate nursing and personal care; it was just that this should 
not be the dominant focus of an environment.  I coined the term 'prosthetic services' 
to indicate that care services should help you get on with your life but in in doing so 
the services should be provided as invisibly and with as little impediment to one’s 
life as possible; not dissimilar to the aims of any prosthetic device.  The new facilities 
ACM built were a radical innovation not just by Australian standards but 
internationally, and both Kidd and Horsnell spoke at conferences both nationally and 
internationally concerning the innovative designs and the thinking behind it255.   
ACM also invested in changing its service approach based on Wolfensberger's work 
in disability services known as Social Role Valorization256, then called 
Normalisation.  When I joined ACM, I quickly embraced the social justice 
perspective, and when Horsnell left not long after my appointment, I took over as 
the main driver for continuing the reform.  This took the form of new building projects 
incorporating learnings from the earlier work, significantly expanding the community 
services, moving day care and therapy services from the aged care site to various 
locations within the community and re-engineering older and developing newer 
forms of social support for older people to help maintain them in their existing 
homes.  The driving ethos was that just because an older person was frail or had 
developed a chronic condition should not mean that they had to surrender living a 
meaningful life.  In other words, the focus was always how to design care services 
around maintaining the person's sense of quality of life rather than first prioritising 
the quality of care, with little attention to the quality of life.  It is an approach I still 
maintain.  
The role of CEO demanded a heavy time commitment. The Government economic 
reform agenda was rolling out, and with more than forty programs we were 
                                            
255 Horsnell and Kidd were invited to and gave an address at the International Conference on Housing and 
Servicing for the Ageing, held in Jerusalem, Israel, in 1987 titled A Story from Down Under: Nursing-homes or 
Nursing Hospital? - Changing the Image of Nursing-homes. 
256 It was previously called Normalisation to reflect delivering services based on the norms of the culture.  
However, the name was often mistaken to be referring to treating people with disabilities as normal, i.e. like full 
able body people.  Wolfensberger recognised that to do so would be to entrench societal practices rather than 
changing them to enable and support people with disabilities.  He made the change to Social Role Valorization 




continually facing the challenge of tendering or re-tendering for services, addressing 
new contractual compliance requirements, ensuring that we maintained effective 
relationships with the Government and so on.  ACM had a strong public advocacy 
role that accompanied its social justice view of the world, and this work often fell to 
the CEO, and with a new climate of lower taxes, cost cutting to community and 
welfare support services, and so forth this aspect of the role became more 
demanding.  Sadly, I became more remote from the day to day running of the aged 
care service, albeit not losing the zeal for ensuring the reform process continued.  
Reform was never the responsibility of just one person, and there was a brilliant 
team of managers at ACM full of enthusiasm and keen to push boundaries all 
equally driven by a sense of social justice and the desire to support people live their 
life as well as possible.   Despite the challenges, it was an exciting time, in addition 
to service provision and we were able to significantly increase monetary resources 
through various initiatives which freed up our ability to innovate in a wide range of 
areas, not just aged care.  The period, however, took its toll and after a decade as 
CEO, in 2000, it was time to step down.  
Reflections 
Notwithstanding my deep concern for improving the lives of people, I came to realise 
that the understanding that underlaid that concern was inadequate.  Additionally, 
my approach to running the nursing homes, while innovative for its time was still 
tainted by a managerial mindset with too much focus on operational indicators, 
financial performance, and meeting compliance standards. These aspects are 
crucial, fail them, and ACM would cease operating, but the need to implement these 
changes took their toll regarding culture change.  
While I was driven by my sense of social justice and the injustices I perceived, which 
were real enough, my understanding of what it was like to experience living in an 
aged care facility was, if I am honest, impoverished.  I also became troubled by what 
became the apparent limitations of an architectural approach. The designs 
themselves were successful, more so than we had hoped with people reporting 
feeling more 'at home' in them and with the frequency of family visits increasing.  As 
one family member noted, it is easier to visit because they don't feel as guilty about 
having their parent in a nursing home.  While we paid much attention to the 
architecture, the interior design, awareness raising among staff, getting rid of 
institutional markers such as rigid uniforms and so forth we did not pay sufficient 
 
741 
attention, mainly out of ignorance, to the sustainability of the culture, to the 
embedded mundane practices that sustain and define any culture regardless of the 
changes in appearances.  As some of the original senior staff left and with staff 
turnover, the replacement staff brought with them the ‘external’ cultural mindset. 
More rapidly than I would have imagined, the insidious creeping return of an 
"institutional" mindset occurred, just in a fancy new building.  There was even a 
strong push to bring back uniforms, complete with the necessary differentiation to 
identifying nursing 'rank' and role.   It became apparent to me that permanently 
changing the traditional institutional nature of nursing homes would require more 
than changes to architectural design, more than raising staff awareness, more than 
the introduction of 'respectful dialogue', 'autonomy', 'choice' and so forth, concepts 
which seem to be superficial in their application within aged care. The more I 
reflected, the more I understood that the reform process had to go much deeper.     
Strathcare 
I was appointed as CEO of Strathcare, a smaller Tasmanian Uniting Church aged 
care organisation in 2001.  Operating solely in the aged care domain enabled me to 
have a single focus and be a lot closer to the people.  My conviction remained that 
architecture counted as did the possibility of such things as meaningful engagement, 
independence and choice but these were tempered by a sense of unease that they 
were not sufficient nor properly understood.  It was this deeper understanding that I 
pursued at Strathcare, and over the next couple of years, my life changed forever 
as I acquired and lost not residents but friends living in the facilities.  With the 
generous help of a few people, I gained a deeper insight into the experience of living 
in a nursing home. 
The pressures on a CEO and senior managers in a medium size aged care facility 
was just as relentless as in ACM.  A new round of reforms was announced in the 
late 1990s introducing more demanding monitoring, and compliance requirements 
as well as new building certification requirements.  The introduction of these reforms 
was still having an impact when I started with Strathcare.  Additionally, during this 
period the Government announced further changes to funding257, which proposed a 
radically changing in the way nursing homes were to be funded.  Not surprisingly 
                                            
257 The funding system is referred to as ACFI which stands for Aged Care Funding Instrument. It was 
subsequently introduced and still provides the framework for funding today. 
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this was causing the sector considerately concern.   At the time, I was President of 
the non-profit peak body of aged care providers in Tasmania258 and involved in the 
consultations with Government.  Strathcare ran four mainly high care nursing homes 
and as such had limited access to capital funds via resident bonds (effectively 
refundable loans) which could only be charged to people moving into a low care 
facility259.  The organisation had two relatively modern facilities, one designed, 
coincidentally, by Brian Kidd and a large older facility for which a new building 
programme had commenced.  Sadly, the newly commenced building program was 
a return to a large institutional design, long corridors with a primary focus on the 
efficiency of services, its one redeeming focus was the emphasis of single rooms 
with ensuites. 
Before I arrived, a couple of the existing managers had already embraced the idea 
of reforming the way aged care was delivered in their facilities and had commenced 
introducing changes, and I am sure that our initial conversations were just as much 
a combination of relief and excitement for them as it was for me.  Following some 
discussions, the team started to introduce some wonderful innovative work pushing 
the boundaries of our understanding and the way we worked with people living in 
the facilities. 
The changed approach revolved around key principles we developed, for example, 
one simple principle was to reimagine the boundaries of each facility as porous such 
that it invited a flow of activity between the broader community and the community 
within.  We discussed this with as many residents and family members as we could 
and encouraged them to come up with ideas.  The residents’ committee at one 
facility, Strathglen, suggested allowing the facilities meeting areas to be used by the 
adult education organization that ran short vocational and recreational based 
courses.  This was done, and several courses were run within the facility and 
attended by both community members and people living there!  Another innovation 
at this facility was the recording of an hour long public radio program by people living 
in the facility with the help of a volunteer that was aired each week on a local public 
radio station. This continued until the University of Tasmania lobbied to take over 
the public radio license and once successful they declined to continue the program.  
                                            
258 Aged & Community Services Tasmania. 
259 It was to be more than a decade before the Government introduced bonds into high care nursing homes. 
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Following an earlier successful community arts project that I had established at 
Strathglen, I worked to set up a much larger and broader community arts program 
centred at Strathaven.  This eventually involved the active involvement of over three 
hundred people coming from Strathcare, other aged care organizations and older 
people and volunteers from across the community.   On the surface, the project was 
aimed at supporting the existing or easily acquirable skills of people, knitting!   This, 
however, was not the typical knitting of scarves, squares or beanies.   At a deeper 
level, the aim was to open the space between nursing home and community in a 
way involving cooperation and participation between the people living at Strathcare 
and others and in so doing create a project driven by the residents that would be 
seen as having high value by the community at large.  The result was the 
development of The Knitting Room (albeit it should be the Knitting house!) which 
was the creation of an art installation from hand knitted craft work.  The following 
photographs are some samples of the knitted art work from the exhibition at the 
Moonah Art Centre. 
On completion, after two years of work, the installation went on public display at the 
Moonah Arts Centre in May 2006 breaking all attendance records at the time for an 
art exhibition at the Centre with over 12,000 visitors during the four-week display 
period.  Many of the pieces were then featured on ABC television in their short 
promotional pieces for a few weeks, and the ABC flew a container full of the art 
works to display at their Sydney Ultimo ABC offices as part of their fifty-year 
celebrations260.   
Throughout the project the impact on the lives of people involved was palpable, 
and one could often observe changes in demeanour, dress, the conversations and 
a sense of achievement in being part of creating something special.  One morning 
I walked into Strathaven and near the door sat an elegant lady, dressed to the 
nines.  She simply said that she was interviewed by a journalist about the Knitting 
Room the day before, had her photo and story in the paper and she was ready for 
autographs.  Her face was lit up with a wide smile of delight and fun! 
  
                                            
260 A basic overview of the project is available, and photographs can be accessed at 
http://www.unitingagewell.org/Pages/The-Knitting-Room.aspx and http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-
bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/tasmania/stories/s1212449.htm.  The descriptions, 





Photograph 11 Knitting Room photograph collage 1 




Photograph 12 Knitting Room photograph collage 2 




The entire project was achieved with minimal funding, an incredible team of 
volunteers and support from many staff.  The project aimed to create a space where 
people living in the 
facilities were in 
control, the nursing 
home boundaries 
collapsed, to focus 







celebration.  I appointed Robin Carney as the project coordinator to work with our 
team.  Robyn, an arts graduate, quickly grasped the ethos behind the project and 
saw the participants as people co-creating the installation, not as ‘frail old people in 
need of care’.  Robin was an outstanding leader, and helped to provide an open, 
inviting, and supportive environment in which everybody’s contribution was 
welcomed and valued that the project was so successful.  This and other projects 
went on to win several national awards which further enhanced the esteem of the 
people living in the Strathcare community.  It must be remembered that these were 
‘high care’ aged care facilities. 
I mention the Knitting Room project because it contains many of the elements that 
we were developing as part of a new and, for the time, progressive service model 
within nursing homes.  Our general approach was based on a concept of well-being 
and focused on overcoming the psychosocial aspects of living in a nursing home as 
understood by motivated practitioners in conversation with Strathcare community 
members. I recognised, however, that to both improve and sustain what we were 
doing it had to be based on a firm theoretical underpinning that seemed to be absent 
from the sector.  Attempts to identify an existing model failed, partly due to our 
inexperience in searching the literature, partly due to time and resource pressures 
but mainly, I now believe, because few such models existed.  Discussions with 
 




others in the industry also proved futile, and we were sometimes derided as 
misguided.  On more than one occasion I was castigated for not understanding that 
older people in residential care need good clinical care not a 'social model', an 
attitude that still lingers on today, albeit not as dominant261.  In conversation with 
and with plenty of feedback from residents and staff I developed and wrote the 
Strathcare Quality of Life Model (Richards, 2002) that took into account our 
collective experience as well as the ideas of key reformers such as Wolf 
Wolfensberger, Brian Kidd and to a lesser extent Tom Kitwood. The model was kept 
relatively simple and became a framework to inform and develop all aspects of our 
work.  A copy of the main schematic developed as part of the model is presented in 
Appendix 2 so as to give an idea of the scope of what was being considered.  The 
model had five domains; opportunities to be and do, mutually supportive 
relationships, uplifting and enabling environments, exercise of choice and control 
and enabling support teams. 
While always committed to the necessity of good nursing care I was, and even more 
so now, am committed to the understanding that while good nursing care is a 
necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition for a person to experience quality 
of life, a sense of well-being while living in a nursing home.   To put it another way, 
if nursing care is not done well it is a thief of well-being but done well it does not in 
itself deliver a sense of well-being, something else is at play.  As such ensuring good 
nursing practice is not sufficient to fulfil our duty of care to people who move into a 
nursing home, a place designed, constructed, furnished, equipped, staffed, 
organised and controlled by the operators of the facility.  Consideration must be 
given as to how the built environment and the service delivery impact on quality of 
life and this has been the constant concern that drives my work.   
While there was a lot right about the Knitting Room project and even today it is an 
exemplar of what can be achieved, when I reflected back on the project it seemed 
to fit 'on top' of what was happening in the nursing home itself.  While it was impactful 
in the lives of many, there was certainly a large group for whom it had no tangible 
benefit.  While many of the staff embraced the project, many others were annoyed 
that it interrupted ‘their work’ and who viewed the assistance required by people to 
                                            
261 One of the innovations has been the introduction of the Eden Alternative into Australia. The Better Practice 
Conferences run by the Australian Standards and Accreditation Agency also regularly focus speakers talking 
about quality of life and wellbeing initiatives.   All this had made the sector more receptive to these ideas. 
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attend the various knitting sessions as not part of their work!  The challenge has 
always been to understand what worked, what didn’t, why and how can we embed 
the learnings. 
The Knitting Room was not the only project, albeit it was the biggest, and one of the 
key learnings concerned the temporal aspects of the activities.  In addition to the 
activities themselves, we identified that there was a need to engage people with a 
sense of expectation for the future that drew people forward and to create a way to 
remember, a means of the recalling the past through stories of events captured in 
various forms to facilitate recall and dialogue with others.  We aimed to create a 
meaningful present structured by the anticipation and expectation of the future and 
enriched by the past that flowed back into the present.  This sounds a little too 
abstract.  Practically it was about giving people something meaningful to them to 
plan, work and look forward to and then experience. Then to provide simple ways 
to record and share what had happened. This last step was useful for helping people 
share the experiences with family and friends, to be able to have something 
‘interesting and meaningful’ to share about their life in the nursing home.  
The approach recognised that for most people days are typically filled with the 
mundane routine of getting on with life.  That life is then punctuated with variability 
and surprise at the small level arising out of the broad environment in which they 
move.  There are also the cyclical events of either community nature, such as 
Easter, Melbourne Cups, Christmas Day, or the private events such as birthdays, 
holidays and so on.  In a nursing home, most of this is stripped away, albeit cyclical 
events are typically arranged for people262.  There is mainly a dull, mundane routine 
over which the person has little control and is barely a participant.  The environment 
itself is so predictable it offers very few opportunities of spontaneous encounter or 
surprise, and events as vehicles for engagement with family and friends are all but 
absent.  There are the lifestyle programs, but these are, with few exceptions, 
underfunded, understaffed and restricted to offering limited opportunities for people 
to engage in activities that reflect who they are as people.  The model we were 
slowly developing was to try to mimic the rhythm of events and activities within the 
broader culture.  To structure the year by way of the main cyclical events, between 
these to have ad hoc events, dinners, and outings and so on.  Over the top of this, 
                                            
262 The approach taken at Strathcare for these events was not to roll them out for people to attend but to actively involve as 
many people as possible in the planning and preparation. 
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the idea was then to have a project of a major focus such as the Knitting Room.  
Rather than these activities being fully planned, developed and delivered by staff for 
people, as much as possible the ideas and decisions were made by the people in 
the nursing home community, working days held for planning and preparation, family 
member encouraged to attend and so on.  The lifestyle team worked to get to know 
the interests of people and wherever possible encouraging and facilitating 
opportunities around those interests.  This is a little idealistic in the description, and 
there were often significant gaps between intent and fulfilment. 
Working within the constraints of 'running' a nursing home as such, encouraging 
staff deeply entrenched in a medical culture to think differently and to support what 
was happening was hard work for all those committed to change.  There was always 
that battle against the imperative of the day to day reality of nursing home life. Not 
the reality of life of the people living in the nursing home community, but the 'other 
life', that of the institution itself.  What sustained us were the small victories, and 
when it worked well, the impact on people's lives was stunning.  We had many 
'successes' during this period with many people showing and expressing the delight 
and satisfaction in their life experiences as a direct result of the initiatives introduced 
by the team. Some that come to mind include:  
• A lady suffering from dementia who never spoke and found her voice and smile 
again in the form of song.   
• The man who had not stepped outside one of our facilities for several years 
rediscovering the joy of having a dog, Lady. He eventually took Lady on regular 
walks to the shops about a kilometre away.   
• The crabby, angry man who regularly abused our staff discovering a new life as 
a radio host, and became quite the charmer! 
• A remarkable man, confined to a wheel chair as a result of a vehicle accident, 
who became the nursing home 'postman', chair of the residents’ committee and 
a community leader. 
• The lady, with quadriplegia, who re-commenced painting, as a mouth painter, 
and made a number of trips to the local school to work with children.   
While it is often the more dramatic changes that stand out, there were others whose 
life seem to reflect a sense of well-being that was related to their changed living 
environment.  For example, the community members of one home organised and 
painted the common room, painted a mural on a drab concrete retaining wall and 
other projects. Again, I would point out that this was a high care facility.  A little later 
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they initiated some fundraising to buy and install a large fish tank in an area of the 
facility that was a little gloomy to brighten it up for the people living in that section, a 
wonderful act of compassion and generosity.  These examples reflected the change 
in approach of giving as much ‘ownership’ and control of the living environment to 
the people living in those environments as possible. 
Notwithstanding the excitement of the changes, the planning and organising, the 
witnessing of the smiles, laughter and the new conversations, the way many people 
were reclaiming their lives, we were conscious that for many we were not hitting the 
mark.  This was brought home to me in a conversation I will never forget.   In the 
evening twilight, leaning against the handrail of a covered walkway at Strathaven I 
was chatting with Ilse263.  She was a beautiful woman in her early eighties who 
always reminded me of a retired school teacher from the film The Prime of Miss 
Jean Brodie.  She stopped talking, turned and looked soulfully into my face with her 
soft blue eyes.  Speaking in a soft voice, she confided that she was so lonely that 
she just wanted to die.  From my experience, I had learnt that a CEO typically only 
hears good news as they walk through a facility engaging in casual chit chat.  In 
these exchanges typically everything is going 'all right', the staff are always 
'wonderful' but perhaps something could be done about some of the meals!  To hear 
an honest answer, you need to get to know a few people, spend time and talk with 
them in a genuine way.  Occasionally you get a connection, people will trust you, 
and more occasionally still they will tell you how it is for them, how it really is.  This 
was one of those occasions.  It was a moment of vulnerability shared between two 
people, but it is a moment that lives with me and grounds me. 
The reality was we were only touching the surface.  Many of the people entering into 
the facilities did not thrive, did not enjoy an improved sense of well-being, and this 
still bothers me deeply.  Wasn't the very rationale for the existence of a nursing 
home to enable people to have a life in which a sense of well-being could be 
experienced?  There are people who not only failed to thrive but do not even survive. 
Some people declined, and their deaths appeared more to be related to their lack 
of desire to live than their frailty or chronic conditions.  Work in a nursing home for 
a length of time and observe what is happening and it is almost impossible to miss 
the phenomena of the 'light going out’ of peoples' eyes not long before they decline 
                                            
263 Name has been changed. 
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and die. This for me has become a significant question: Why do the lights go out?  
In discussing this with colleagues over the years, the common 'folk psychology' 
answer is that they simply have no reason to live anymore or they have 'lost' the will 
to live.  For me, this is not an answer that provides any form of understanding from 
which a better response can be developed. 
A few years later Strathcare was merged, into a single large, multi-state organization 
ostensibly as part of the church’s drive to improve efficiency and better manage risk. 
In a word, Strathcare was corporatized.  Throughout the previous years the Board, 
led by Mr Noel Kerrison, was incredibly supportive and engaged while still providing 
the scrutiny and oversight one expects of proper Board Governance.  This board 
was to be disbanded.  The Board had played an important part in what was 
happening, and Kerrison had been a wonderfully supportive and encouraging 
chairperson as well as an insightful and effective leader.  An example of the courage 
and leadership of the board was seen in the way they dealt with a new building 
project that was underway when I arrived. I explained my concerns with Kerrison 
and following broader discussions with Board members it was decided to bring the 
architect, Brain Kidd across to Tasmania to discuss his approach and possible new 
ways of continuing the project.  This occurred, and Kidd ran a daylong seminar for 
the board, key managers and various members of resident committees.  Not long 
after, based on the new insights gained from the seminar, the Board paused the 
project and commissioned a new architect, with Kidd as a consultant, to continue 
the project in a manner that incorporated more contemporary thinking.  The courage 
and leadership exhibited by the Board in acknowledging that they had got it wrong 
in commissioning an institutional design nursing home and implementing a radical 
and major change in direction is one that is rarely seen in Governing bodies.  
The discussions leading up to the merger were all about the Church and its need to 
manage, and little consideration was given as to what was working well, the people 
and what was being discarded at the local level.  The loss of the board and the 
introduction of a layer of corporate managers (in another State) providing oversight 
to ensure compliance within the uniformity of organisational policies and procedures 
meant that the freedom to experiment, to innovate, to be spontaneous and to take 
risks was over.  
Not long after I took up another role as CEO of a medium sized aged care 
organisation in regional NSW and while there were successes other pre-existing 
  
752 
local factors intervened, and it was not possible to establish a team with the same 
enthusiasm for change and innovation that existed at Strathcare.  The next few 
years helped consolidate some of the learnings but did not progress them. 
Reflection 
Over the years while there have been reforms in the nursing home sector I retain a 
sense that something is still not right, that something is missing. A deeper 
understanding of what was happening in the lives of people in nursing homes was 
a necessary.  One thing is very obvious; the answer is not in compliance.  
Compliance is not hard; it is basic good administrative practice. The teams I have 
worked with have always passed every Government compliance requirement and 
have been awarded National best practise awards. I have also led successful 'turn 
around' projects assisting other organisations facing sanctions because of 
compliance failures in the running of their nursing homes.  My steadfast conclusion 
is that compliance requirements form a necessary part of the process to establish 
minimum levels of service delivery, especially around clinical services, personal 
care and administrative and financial integrity.  However, compliance adds little to 
ensure that nursing home practices deliver possibilities for well-being. Something 
else is required. 
Back in Adelaide 
We returned to South Australia in 2010. My wife, then working as a Director of Care 
in aged care, generously and very supportively, encouraged me to undertake 
research at Adelaide University through the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) to gain a 
better understanding as to why people, moving into a nursing home, often have such 
adverse experiences.  Since then, interspersed with consulting and work 
placements in aged care to earn money, that is what I have been doing.  First, the 
required research based Masters and now the PhD. 




APPENDIX 2: QUALITY OF LIFE MODEL 
Schematics of Quality of Life Model referred to on Appendix 1. 
The main diagram (Figure 42) tried to capture the comprehensive nature of 
Strathcare’s service planning approach. It was used in planning meetings, staff 
training and in planning changes to the service.  It was also referred to when 
considering the service support requirements for individual people living within the 
facilities. 
The Quality of Life Model was broken down into five domains, these were presented 
in a simplified form of the main schematic (Figure 41).  This diagram was used in 
training, included in handbooks, and place on posters in staff rooms.  
Figure 41 Quality of Life Schematic 1 
© RICHARDS 2003, 2018
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APPENDIX 3: FINDING HEIDEGGER 
This account provides some ‘behind the scenes’ background to what appears in the 
main chapters of the thesis, recounting some of my experiences in finding 
Heidegger.  Here there is no attempt to explain any of Heidegger’s concepts.  It is 
an account of the struggle to come to terms with Heidegger’s work, of how I initially 
undertook the task as a cognitive exercise, as just another learning challenge, only 
to fail abysmally.  Essentially, I had to change the basic framework within which I 
learn in order for Heidegger’s work to be intelligible and this section describes some 
of what was involved. 
The choice of Heidegger's philosophical research occurred more by accident than 
design.  I wanted the work I was to undertake to be overtly philosophically grounded 
to provide a rigorous intellectual base.  During the extensive reading involved in the 
earlier systematic review, I had, for the first time come across phenomenology as a 
social science research methodology and this seemed to offer the possibility of that 
intellectual base.  Broadly speaking phenomenology as a research methodology 
has two main schools, that based on the phenomenology of the philosopher 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and that of the philosopher Martin Heidegger who 
developed his own approach to phenomenology based on Husserl’s earlier work in 
the area [MWP, HCT, BPP].  Notwithstanding Husserl was the founder of what is 
now known as the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg, 1994), I naively leant 
towards the work of Heidegger primarily due to a few descriptions I had read in the 
research literature concerning Heidegger's conception of the person as being-in-
the-world.   My intuition was that the ‘shedding of life’ was somehow to do with the 
relationship between the person and their environment, their world, and it was purely 
on this basis that I leant towards Heidegger’s work.  This understanding proved to 
be both right and wrong.  Wrong in that this conception of a person living in their 
world is not strictly what Heidegger is referring to by the term being-in-the-world, but 
right in that it refers to a structural phenomenon far more profound in its relevancy 
than I could have imagined.  
This 'choice' of Heidegger was confirmed as I read a little wider and came to 
characterise Husserl as committed to the Cartesian notion of the independent, self-
sufficient rational self as a distinct entity from the world of independent and self-
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sufficient objects.  For me this posited a view that the problem of relocation, 
therefore, lay with the person and their failure to ‘adapt’, this didn’t feel right.  For 
Heidegger, there is no notion of this radical independence, and although I initially 
(and wrongly) understood being-in-the-world in terms of some sort of co-
dependency or interdependency. My initial view was that it was this co-dependency 
that was somehow breaking down, not dissimilar to polluted air causing health 
problems!  My initial conception of Heidegger’s work turned out to be just another 
variant of the Cartesian understanding.  Being-in-the-world was to disclose an 
understanding of ‘shedding life’ far more relevant and dramatic than I could have 
conceived at this point.   
I did look for other philosophers and found none at the time that held out the same 
promise as Heidegger's work in terms of offering an understanding of what it is to 
be a person actively engaged with their world.  Later ((reference not available)) 
((reference not available))I did come across the book Making the Social World: The 
Structure of Human Civilisation(Searle, 2010) by the American analytic philosopher 
John Searle.  While the book has merit in terms of my project, it seemed to be 
anchored in a Cartesian perspective in terms of the separateness of self and world, 
and it lacked a sufficient analysis of the nature of the interconnectedness of the 
person and their world for my purposes. 
Cannot Access Heidegger as a Materialist 
As part of my journey, what I discovered was that at heart I was both a Cartesian in 
the sense of holding to the subject-object divide and a materialist264. I was a typical 
product of my culture seeing things in terms of independent, self-sufficient entities.  
I suspect that even though I felt a resonance with some of things Heidegger was 
describing I was always, even if unconsciously, recasting it within a Cartesian 
worldview.  Because of this there was always part of Heidegger’s account that 
remained elusive. 
While I accepted a notion of interdependency between self and social environment 
I failed to grasp that the very notion of interdependency denotes two entities coming 
together in some symbiotic relationship.  I also did not understand, as part of this, 
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that Heidegger was not inquiring into Dasein, his name of us265, as an entity in any 
way that I had come to understand such an inquiry.  His basis of inquiry was into the 
entity understood in terms of its way of being, and for several years I did not fully 
appreciate the significance of this, nor exactly what he meant.  Further, an 
understanding of ‘world’ as Heidegger used it was not initially within the possibility 
of my comprehension, so alien is the concept.  It was only slowly that I commenced 
to distinguish between Heidegger’s use of world as an entity, world as that projected 
by Dasein, the concept of worldhood and the fundamental difference between an 
environment (a domestic world) and a public.  
By way of example there are many places where Heidegger talks about the nature 
of Dasein, and when I initially read this it was with my old understanding that was 
projected onto the words, for example in his famous Letter on Humanism published 
in 1947, 
Are we really on the right track toward the essence of the human being as long as we set him 
off as one living creature among others ... We can proceed in that way; we can in such fashion 
locate the human being among entities as one entity among others. We will thereby always 
be able to state something correct about the human being.  But we must be clear on this 
point, that when we do this we abandon the human being to the essential realm of 
animalitas even if we do not equate him with beasts ... even when anima (soul) is posited as 
animus sive mens [spirit or mind], and this in turn is later posited as subject, person, or spirit.  
[LH 227] (my bolding) 
I felt a resonance with the sentiment of these passages, but I did not grasp the 
importance of what Heidegger was getting at for a long time.  While we can separate 
living things from inanimate things, animals from plants, bacteria and other living 
things and even posit humankind as 'a more evolved' species of animal with mind 
or indeed spirit, as soon as we take this line of thought we are conceiving the human 
person as an entity whose being is substance, i.e. it is a materialist or physicalist 
account of things. This approach is the normative approach in contemporary 
scholarship and is certainly the case in the nursing home.  It is also the position from 
which I continually tried to understand Heidegger’s work … and it is wrong266.  
As Heidegger notes this approach will tell us some things about the human being, 
                                            
265 While it is correct of describe Dasein as his name for us, what this means is problematic. He has different 
conception of ‘us’ than is typically understood. I specifically address the puzzles concerning Dasein in Chapters 
4, 8 and 9. 
266 ɸ  
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about the nature of the human body for example, but the price we pay is to "abandon 
the human being" as such, i.e. an understanding of the person of Dasein, the very 
thing I was seeking.  
It was not until I was reading some work concerning the American pragmatist 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) that I was able to reframe Heidegger’s 
approach for myself.  Peirce speaks about understanding gravity and argued that, 
even though we don’t know what gravity is, all we really need to understand are the 
aspects that have “practical bearings” (Peirce, 1955, k. 743).  From this I was able 
to relinquish the hold of the necessity to envisage the material aspects of Dasein 
and with this some of the puzzles associated with understanding Heidegger’s work 
dissolved.  Not long after reading Peirce’s comments the structure of being-in-the-
world started to come more clearly into focus and with it the idea that ‘shedding life’ 
has a structural and not a psychological basis.  The relevance of Peirce’s work is 
discussed later in this appendix and in Chapter 9. 
Learning You Can’t Just Learn Heidegger 
My initial approach was based on the view that I had 'to learn' what Heidegger was 
on about and then 'apply it'.  This approach assumed that my basic understanding 
framework of things was sound and that it merely needed to be extended, more 
finely differentiated, the gaps filled in and so forth, within that framework267.  This 
approach is captured by Thomas Kuhn's (1922-1996) notion of normal science 
which advances within an existing paradigm as opposed to what he calls a scientific 
revolution which requires a complete paradigm change(Kuhn(Author) & 
Hacking(Introduction), 2012).  What I had not considered was that what I was 
embarking on was a paradigm change, a complete shift in the way I understood 
what it was to be a person and the nature of worlds. 
As I struggled with Heidegger's work, I came to recognise that what I was identifying 
was that the conceptual model based on physicalism, the framework or paradigm 
that informs me, and the culture more generally, as to what it is to be a person does 
not work in the context of a nursing home.  We have continually failed to recognise 
the nature of the problem within nursing homes and the underlying cause because 
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we are stuck within the current paradigm which determines how the current situation 
is interpreted.  
Consequently, the change in understanding that I required was not one of tinkering 
and an increase in knowledge within the pre-existing conceptual framework, it was 
acknowledging that Heidegger’s work is a radical new framework for understanding 
and then engaging in a deliberate process of change.  At times it felt like replacing 
the hull on a boat while still at sea!  However, it is only by changing the paradigm 
that new possibilities exist for scientific questioning and for fundamental changes in 
approach.  To be able to address the phenomenon of ‘shedding of life’ what is 
required is a radically new way of understanding the person and this is what 
Heidegger offers. For me, this prospect was what guided the thesis journey. 
I later discovered that decades prior to Kuhn, Heidegger had the same view. The 
following passage is an indication of this and is from his course on the Basic 
Concepts of Ancient Philosophy given in the Summer Semester 1926 at Marburg 
University, as Heidegger was completing Being and Time,   
Science is not the mere acquisition of cognitions [facts], the piling-up of material; on the 
contrary, new possibilities of questioning constitute the proper development of science itself. 
[BCAP 30] (my gloss) 
The new possibilities Heidegger is referring to only arise as the result of the opening 
of a new 'self-world' for a particular scientific community involved.  Kuhn's notion of 
normal science is roughly similar to Heidegger's "mere acquisition of cognitions" and 
his notion of scientific revolution I relate to Heidegger's opening up "new 
possibilities", i.e. a new way of understanding.   In Being and Time, Heidegger puts 
it this way, 
The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more 
or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached 
is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises 
the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves 
that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. [BT 29/9] 
The similarities between this account of how science progresses and that of Kuhn's, 
given almost forty years later is striking. 
Being able to make such a fundamental change is not easy, as Kuhn points out in 
his book by reference to a quote by Max Planck,  
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... a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see 
the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up 
that is familiar with it. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 151) 
Clearly, my difficulty in first recognising the need to change and then bringing about 
that change is not something unique, but the passage does indicate the difficulty 
associated with such an endeavour.  What started to become clear is that if 
paradigm changes are this challenging then it is going to be a demanding task to 
help facilitate change within a sector.  It is not going to be a simple matter of ‘rolling 
out’ some new insight within the existing paradigm concerning 'shedding life'!    
The difficulty of changing one’s way of ‘seeing’ things, of understanding differently, 
should never be underestimated but when it comes to Heidegger, there is the added 
difficulty of the work itself.  When I first attempted to read Being and Time, I found it 
impenetrable.  I put it aside and started reading the introductory texts and articles to 
his work and soon discovered that among professional philosophers Heidegger's 
Being and Time is viewed as a notoriously difficult book to understand(Dreyfus & 
Wrathall, 2005; Gorner, 2007) that the difficulty of comprehending it is 
legendary(Kisiel, 1995) and not helped by its tortuous style(Guignon, 1986).  For the 
novice, non-philosopher this difficulty is compounded in that Heidegger does not 
write for beginners in philosophy and assumes his readers have a reasonable level 
of understanding of philosophy and the history of Western thought(Polt, 1999). I was 
not a professional philosopher, did not even have a basic education in philosophy 
and nor had I any grounding in the history of Western thought.  Additionally, I did 
not read German and so when I needed to consult the German text it was a laborious 
undertaking.  As Faulconer noted, it is perhaps the nature of Being and Time that 
accounts for the fact that there is little consensus among Heideggerian scholars on 
many aspects of his work or how to deal with it(Faulconer & Wrathall, 2000). None 
of this I knew when I plunged into the project!  Perhaps just as well.  
The Failed Attempts at Understanding Heidegger’s Work 
The aim of this section is to provide some background detail of the journey to the 
point that the methodology and main work started to be documented in its final form. 
It provides background context to what appears in the thesis as well as forming part 
of the report of the thesis project as a whole. 
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When I commenced work on the thesis, I had a general understanding of the 
phenomenon and the approach I was going to take. The concept of ‘shedding life’ 
and the general direction were thus in place very early on. However, this is a long 
way from where I needed to be, and the extent of the distance almost became an 
insurmountable obstacle in itself in the early stages.  It was akin to the late 
eighteenth century white settlers in NSW setting their ambition to discover what lay 
inland to the west (the focus) knowing that to fulfil that ambition they had to find a 
way through the formidable, and seemingly impenetrable, Blue Mountains (the 
direction/way). As is common in such endeavours there were a number of failed 
attempts before a successful crossing was actually achieved.268 
My initial efforts at understanding Heidegger’s work all failed.  My first reading of 
Being and Time was a failure from the start. I stopped after a relatively short time 
realising that I was reading the words but did not have a clue what Heidegger was 
on about. I found it too impenetrable.  As I had ‘discovered’ Heidegger in the context 
of social science research literature, I turned to the texts269 in this field to gain a 
better understanding of phenomenology, Heidegger’s declared method, before 
tackling Being and Time again. This failed. It took me a while to fully appreciate that 
there was a disconnect between the aims of social science phenomenological 
research and my thesis.  By and large, the social science research does not deal 
explicitly with the various aspects of the structure of Dasein as disclosed In 
Heidegger’s work and they gave me no material insights as to an understanding of 
the person from a Heideggerian perspective270. Having gone back and scanned 
                                            
268 The crossing of the Blue Mountains was eventually made in 1813 by an expedition led by Gregory Blaxland, 
William Lawson and William Wentworth.  
269 I read widely in this area both journal articles and texts. I have not included references to the various journal 
articles as there were too many.  References to the main texts that I acquired and read are included.(Benner, 
1994, 2001; Crotty, 1996, 1998; Finlay, 2011; Giorgi, 1985, 2009; Lewis & Staehler, 2010; Moustakas, 1994; 
Packer & Addison, 1989; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; Svenaeus, 2000; Toombs, 2001; Van Manen, 1990, 
2005, 2014) 
270 Phenomenological qualitative research claiming to be Heideggerian has been subject to sporadic criticism 
over the last twenty years as not properly reflecting Heidegger’s work (Crotty, 1996; Johnson, 2000; Norlyk & 
Harder, 2010; Paley, 1998; Petrovskaya, 2014a). This debate has never been resolved, primary because the 
criticisms are never responded to in a meaningful way, and the research practices go on oblivious of the 
concerns of the critics. Part of the difficulty is that Heidegger’s work is complex and, apart from Crotty’s work, 
most of the criticisms have been undertaken in article form which is too restrictive to provide a proper basis for 
argument. While I have some sympathy for both sides of the debate, I believe there are grounds of arguing that 
even among the critics there is an inadequate understanding of Heidegger’s work. Perusing this is outside this 
thesis, but it does indicate that there is a need for a presentation of Heidegger’s work that is accessible to social 
science researchers that eliminates the need for the philosophical background that Heidegger assumes, and 
presents it in a more contemporary language. 
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some of this literature again, I now find myself in significant disagreement with the 
way being-in-the-world is presented in many of these books. 
Still influenced by the ‘phenomenology’ label and determined to find a way ‘into’ 
Heidegger’s work I shifted my reading to the philosophical literature associated 
phenomenology with the aim of gaining a better understanding of this field and 
Heidegger’s place within it (Cerbone, 2006; Moran & Mooney, 2002; Moran, 2000; 
Smith & Smith, 1995; Sokolowski, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994). This too failed as I 
found the texts to be too broad and general to provide meaningful insights into 
Heidegger’s work. While the texts referred to Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
made use of his terminology in referring to his approach nowhere could I find an 
account of what many of these terms actually meant.  They seem mainly to repeat 
the Heideggerian language as if everyone could understand it.   
My next approach was to take a step further back and read more generally about 
philosophy to understand the context in which Heidegger was working. What was 
helpful was reading several works on the history of Western thought as these did 
start to shift my understanding of what philosophy was about. (Garvey & 
Strangroom, 2012; Kenny, 2010; Magee, 2010; Trombley, 2011) While these works 
did not specifically address Heidegger’s work or phenomenology they did provide 
an invaluable context for understanding Being and Time.  I started to reframe 
Heidegger not as a phenomenologist but as a philosopher working within the 
philosophic tradition, and when, eventually, I started to come to terms with Being 
and Time, many of his references to the tradition made at least some sense. What 
I came to realise is that I had entered into the project with a particular understanding 
of phenomenology based on the social science literature271.  Once I understood 
enough to cast off this view, new ways of understanding started to open up. I 
eventually came to understand Heidegger as a strict empiricist (Chapter 10), and 
his phenomenology as something radically different to what is presented in social 
science.  
Reading Being and Time was still, however, a stumbling block and so I commenced 
reading philosophical commentaries on Being and Time (Blattner, 2006; Dreyfus, 
1991; Gorner, 2007; Mulhall, 2005; Polt, 1999; Wrathall, 2006). This helped but also 




had its limitations in terms of providing any real insight into Heidegger’s concepts. 
Like the phenomenology texts, the commentaries often just repeated Heidegger’s 
terms, trying to put it in a more accessible language. However, there is typically little 
in the way of illustrative examples to shed light on the phenomenon that Heidegger 
is describing.  In some cases where descriptive accounts of the phenomenon were 
provided, I simply failed to get the connection with Heidegger’s text. For example, 
in the opening section of Mulhall’s introductory text on Being and Time(Mulhall, 
2005)  he quotes a passage from a novel, The Spire, by William Golding that 
includes imagery such as “a cloud of angels flashing in the sunlight” and “It was 
there beyond the wall, bursting up with cloud and scatter, laying hold of the earth 
and the air, a fountain, a marvel, an apple tree”(p.2). He then relates this to a 
“distinctive mode of existence or being”(p.2). This approach lost me. It gave me no 
insight into Heidegger’s understanding of being nor of the structure of Dasein.  While 
I can now see what Mulhall is getting at, I still struggle to understand how it is a good 
entrée for an introductory text on Heidegger’s work. For me, Heidegger’s hammer 
is a far better starting point. I suspect that the writers of many introductory texts 
cannot recall the struggle to understand Heidegger and often do not see they are 
using approaches that carry with them the understanding they now have.  While, for 
the most part, I enjoyed reading them, and I certainly found them to be the most 
useful of the texts I read, they were still exasperating.  Nowhere could I, for example, 
find an account of what Heidegger was actually doing! This sounds odd, but 
nowhere could I locate a clear account that takes the time to set out what Heidegger 
means by even the most fundamental terms, being and Dasein, nor what he means 
by a ‘structure’ and nowhere is there a setting out of his methods. All this is possible. 
Perhaps the various scholars have a clear idea of these very basic issues and do 
not consider them worth mentioning.  However, when I read these various texts now 
I grasp what they are discussing and presenting, but rather than being a guide I read 
them as alternative interpretations.  
Some Help from Hubert Dreyfus 
It was around this time that I started listening to lectures on Heidegger’s Being and 
Time given by Hubert Dreyfus (1929-2017) as part of a University 
course(Dreyfus(lecturer), 2007). It was these lectures more than anything else that 
gave me an initial foothold into the world of Heidegger. Sometime during this period, 
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with help from Dreyfus, I commenced another attempt at reading Being and Time. It 
was a very slow process, frequently stopping to research background concepts, 
stopping to go back to the German to clarify translations, thinking up thought 
experiments to test my understanding of the phenomena Heidegger was describing, 
etc. I have now read all the relevant sections of Being and Time at least five times 
and am still continually surprised at what I missed in the prior readings. Thankfully, 
however, the number of surprises is diminishing, and I read most sections with a 
flow that was inconceivable several years ago. 
While the texts on the history of Western thought I had read proved useful it became 
apparent that there were specific aspects of the tradition that were relevant to 
understanding the context of Heidegger’s research and that understanding these 
would be useful. These related to philosophical stances he was arguing against and 
philosophical accounts that seemed to have informed and influenced Heidegger in 
a positive way. As a consequence I supplemented my work with a small selection 
of readings that seemed to me to be most relevant to understanding Being and Time, 
namely Descartes (Descartes & Gaukoger(editor), 2004; Descartes, 2007, 2012), 
Aristotle (Aristotle, 2014e) and the Pre-Socratics Greek philosophers 
(Burnett(author) & Böer(editor), 2014; Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007).   The reading 
of the Greek philosophers ultimately proved crucial to my interpretation of 
Heidegger, and the summary of this work is set out in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Placing Heidegger Within the Tradition 
In the first few readings of Being and Time, I also read and found helpful texts on 
the philosophy of mind (Chalmers, 2002; J. Kim, 2011; Searle, 2004, 2010) and 
philosophy of science (Goldman, 2006a, 2006b; Kasser, 2006). The works on the 
philosophy of mind helped to gain a better understanding of the crucial ‘mind-world’ 
problem, representationalism and the subject-object division, all variants of the 
philosophical stance Heidegger is constantly attacking.  Without this reading, I am 
not sure I would have come to appreciate what Heidegger was attacking, and as 
such not sure I would have ever appreciated his position.  What was clear from the 
readings was that my own initial stance was reflected in normative accounts of 
representationalism and subject-object divide and while I have made significant 
progress in transforming this way of thinking it is something with which I still 
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wrestle.272 The works on the philosophy of science helped in clarifying the debate 
over scientific knowledge as the experience of reality versus knowledge of the reality 
itself. This last point may seem at odds with the thesis, but it shed considerable light 
on the difference between an inquiry into an entity and an inquiry into the being of 
the entity, something that had been puzzling me for much of the thesis work.   
Other readings which proved useful were in the area of behavioural economics 
(Ariely, 2009; Chabris & Simons, 2010; Kahneman, 2012) as this field of psychology 
is starting to deal with and provide research reports on phenomena associated with 
human behaviour similar to phenomena referred to by Heidegger.  In many ways, 
the work in behavioural economics is also attacking the normative account of being 
a person, and while the field is still focused on ‘ontic’ phenomenon, there are 
similarities with Heidegger’s account. I briefly touch on this in the final chapters of 
the thesis.   
I also read texts dealing with the links between consciousness, identity, biology and 
neuroscience (Cairns-Smith, 1996; Damasio, 2006, 2012; Greenfield, 2015; Noë, 
2009; Siegel, 2009). These assisted in providing a broader context in which to 
understand Heidegger’s research and his discussion concerning Dasein, the mind 
and body and would prove useful in developing the idea of Dasein as an emergence 
entity which I present later in the thesis.   
Another area that proved particularly useful were texts associated with the emotions 
and various other affective dispositions.  (Appiah, 2011; Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 
2014; Lutz, 2011; Nussbaum, 2001; Smith, 2015) This area was particularly useful 
as they shed light on an extremely important yet neglected area in Heidegger’s work, 
the structure of receptivity and Dasein’s affective-attunements. It is only in the last 
couple of decades that the role of emotions, etc., are starting to receive more 
research attention.  While the Western tradition has long been suspicious of 
emotions, contemporary research is starting to reveal that they play an important 
part in shaping our understanding of the world and prioritizing our thoughts, goals 
and actions (Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014), the very point Heidegger was making 
in Being and Time ninety years ago! When Heidegger was initially writing there was 
little work done in any of these fields, and although there is still no cohesive 




framework within which much of this research work is undertaken, from a broad 
perspective one can discern a commonality in the phenomenon they are addressing 
in terms of ‘being human’ and, not surprisingly then, linkages to Heidegger’s work.  
Same Phenomena Different Account 
I came to this research largely from a pragmatic administrative and social justice 
background, and I was not familiar with either philosophy or the technical aspects 
of the social sciences.  What slowly dawned on me as I engaged in this broader 
reading is that, by and large, many other disciplines are often dealing with the same 
presenting phenomena as addressed by Heidegger.  It was that the mode of inquiry 
and theoretical explanation varied according to the dictates of the discipline. This 
proved to be an invaluable insight.  With few exceptions, in Being and Time 
Heidegger’s description of phenomena is rather scant, and it is often hard to grasp 
the actual phenomenon he is talking about and in reading more widely, I was better 
able to recognise far more of the phenomenon to which Heidegger was referring. I 
have come to the view that Heidegger’s ontological account of the person is one 
that provides an overarching framework for many fields of science researching 
various aspects of the person, just as Heidegger had envisaged [BT]. 
Aim: Understanding the Phenomena Not Heidegger 
At the end of the day it may be possible to make sense of Heidegger’s work without 
direct reference to this contextual knowledge, I just never found that route. It is easy 
to get bogged down in the pursuit of ‘Heidegger’, but I was always clear that it was 
not ‘Heidegger’ I was after.  I was pursuing an understanding of the structure of 
Dasein itself as the basis that this would then provide a way to determine the 
meaning of ‘shedding life’. All my work had an iterative sense, always coming back 
to the phenomenon to test if I could ‘see’ it, to see if it had ‘disclosed’ itself to me. 
All my efforts were to this end. The broader reading not only helped in identifying 
the various phenomena but aided in keeping my endeavours to understand 
Heidegger within this broader context and to rescue me from becoming just another 
Heideggerian acolyte.  
It should be clear that this thesis is not about exploring and presenting the ‘subjective 
experiences’ of shedding life based on the analysis of accounts provided by a range 
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of informants. This would have left the thesis in the realm of social science 
phenomenology.  I was trying to move beyond the various quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches to the “relocation problem” because after more than 
seventy years of research it simply just kept telling us there is a problem.  I wanted 
to find the basis of the problem.  It is because of this one of my fundamental 
premises was to take Heidegger at face value, that Being and Time is a research 
report that sets out the ontological structure of Dasein.  My intuition was that if this 
is the structure of our existence, of our experienced life, then this was the best place 
to look in order to understand ‘shedding life’.  Hence the dogged determination to 
understand what Heidegger was describing, i.e. the structure he calls being-in-the-
world. 
Changing the Approach  
Once I had sufficient background knowledge and insights gained from Dreyfus’ 
course I changed my approach.  Rather than having the main focus on the text I 
envisaged myself standing next to Heidegger trying to ‘listen’ to his descriptions of 
what he was ‘seeing’ and pointing out. A little like the game of pointing out images 
in the clouds.  Around this time, I also shifted my reading.  I virtually stopped reading 
the secondary sources, and in other fields altogether, I was determined to 
understand Heidegger on his terms, from his words.  I sourced copies of Heidegger’s 
published courses and other works and started cross-referencing his various 
accounts of the phenomena mentioned in Being and Time with references in these 
other texts.   This helped, for occasionally in the lectures he provides more 
information and useful illustrative examples that are given in Being and Time.   
I came to understand that a successful encounter with Heidegger does not concern 
debates over interpretive stances on what he presents, it concerns interpretations 
of the phenomena itself.  To ‘disclose’ the phenomenon for oneself, to grasp it for 
oneself, that is the goal and as such, in the end, it is always a personal journey.  
Only once this is done are we in a position to debate with Heidegger concerning his 
interpretations of the phenomenon. Engaging in the debates between philosophers 
over what Heidegger meant without a grounding in the phenomena, is for my 
purposes, pointless.  In some of his lecture courses, Heidegger makes this same 
point, that proper philosophy is not about learning the ideas of others simply to be 
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able to repeat and critique them.  It is about learning to ‘see’ the world philosophically 
and for Heidegger that means being able to investigate entities with respect to their 
being, particularly Dasein[BPP].  
Reading the Philosopher’s that Influenced Heidegger 
While reading Heidegger’s various descriptive accounts of Dasein’s structure 
helped, and certainly Heidegger’s language was starting to become more familiar, 
there was still a sense that I hadn’t grasped sufficiently well what Heidegger was 
trying to tell me.  It was reading Heidegger’s work more widely that I started to 
recognise that there was some important work that he had taken over and 
developed from Husserl and Brentano that is hard to discern in Being and Time, but 
is critical for a proper understanding of the work.  There are the Brentano and 
Husserlian concepts of intentionality which refers, in their work, to the directedness 
of our mind towards things.  In Being and Time it is incorporated as concern and 
solicitude at one level of Dasein structure, but more importantly, it is reflected in the 
basic structure of being-in, which is comprised of understanding and receptivity; I 
discuss the background to intentionality in Chapter 12. There is Husserl’s categorial 
intuition which refers to the idea that there are two parts to perception, the first is the 
simple visual aspect of the object and the second is the meaning of what the object 
is.  This is an important phenomenon, and I explore it in detail in Chapter 13 and 
provide examples as an aid to experiencing the phenomenon.  This concept is taken 
over by Heidegger and is incorporated into the sight we have that applies to entities 
ready-to-hand which he calls circumspection, the sight related to people is 
considerateness and forbearance, and the sight relating to the whole of existence 
he calls transparency.  Essentially it is the phenomena in which things show up 
differently once we have an understanding of them.  Husserl’s mereology or the 
study of parts and wholes incorporates the concept that it is the whole that 
determines the parts and I discuss this in Chapter 13.  It was as a result of 
Heidegger’s work with Husserl that he goes back to the early Greeks, perhaps 
having recognised similar concepts, and then undertakes a number of new 
interpretations of their work[MWP].  I discuss Heidegger’s interpretation of the early 
Greeks in Chapter 7. It was in exploring Husserl’s work on mereology, and 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greeks that eventually lead me to understand 
Heidegger’s work from an emergence perspective.  This developed slowly in the 
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later stages of the thesis, and I present an interpretation of Heidegger’s work on this 
basis, and the related complex systems theories, in Chapter 19.   
A Stumble at the Last Hurdle 
As can be seen from the above, coming to understand Heidegger’s work has been 
somewhat tortuous.  Just when I thought I had everything sorted, had most of the 
thesis written when I was writing up some details on perhaps the two most import 
concepts in Being and Time, i.e. being and Dasein.  I had gone through all my notes, 
assembled all the various passages from Heidegger’s work and was well into the 
writing when it struck me I still didn’t have a clear grasp on these concepts. I had 
become so familiar with the terms that the familiarity had hidden the fact that I still 
did not have a good handle on the concepts. In relation to being, while I could recite 
Heidegger’s formal indication and various characteristics, as I was writing the 
section I realised that Heidegger seemed to be using the term ‘being’ in a number 
of conflicting ways.  What I had come to learn in relation to Heidegger was that if 
there is an apparent conflict, then there is probably something wrong with my 
understanding. Given the importance of being this had to be resolved.  This is what 
sent me back to reconsider the concept of being and lead me to reading Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Greeks mentioned above.  I experienced the same thing in 
relation to Dasein. 
The main objective of Heidegger’s inquiry is the meaning of being, not entities.  
However, because being "is always the being of an entity" (BT 29/9) he can only 
approach being via an entity and the entity he chooses is Dasein. His basic strategy 
is to determine the being of Dasein and then move on, how he was to do this is not 
important here. It was the work on the being of Dasein that was important for the 
thesis.  The problem that arose in relation to Dasein was the sudden realisation that 
Heidegger does not deal specifically with Dasein as an entity in Being and Time!  
While he refers to Dasein over two and half thousand times in Being and Time, 
makes general comments about Dasein (e.g. BT 27/7, 28/8, 32/12) and at the 
beginning of the book he is clear that Dasein is the entity that is the subject of his 
inquiry (e.g. BT 34/13) he never actually tells us the ‘what it is’ of Dasein. You will 
never find a description of Dasein the entity, just of Dasein’s way of being. 
That Heidegger makes no material claims about Dasein as an entity at all in Being 
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and Time is stated explicitly in the 1928 lecture course Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic given at Freiburg University, 
...  the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation 
of its factual existence; I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, nor 
am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. Rather. I am saying: If 
Dasein in fact exists, then its existence has the structure of being-in-the-world, i.e., 
Dasein is, in its essence, being-in-the-world, whether or not it in fact exists. (MFL 169) (my 
bolding) 
This was the passage, read while I was writing what I thought was part of the final 
section of the thesis on Dasein, that made me realise I had no grasp on Heidegger’s 
conception of Dasein at all; I was flabbergasted. This sent me back to rethink what 
Heidegger was doing.  The answer came almost by accident. I was reading about 
the founder of American Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). He was 
a mathematician and scientist who, as part of his work, was studying the effects of 
gravity. In relation to this work he commented; 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5) 
Peirce had no idea what gravity is, and he didn’t need to know!  We can investigate 
and take into account the effects of gravity by consideration of the whole of its 
practical effects, no more is necessary.  When I go out the back and throw a ball, I 
know it will have a certain trajectory because of gravity. I don’t know the ‘what’ of 
gravity, but I know how to take account of its practical bearings.  If I do this all the 
time with gravity, all I need to do is apply the same concept to Dasein.  I re-read the 
various ‘what Dasein is not’ passages and recognised that my problem was I had 
been hanging out to find a physical conception of Dasein despite Heidegger’s 
warnings273.  I suspended all that and allowed myself to think about Dasein only in 
terms of its ‘practical bearings’.   In Heideggerian speak this means focussing on 
Dasein only in terms of its ‘way of being’.  It suddenly dawned on me that Heidegger 
has no interest in what Dasein is made from, this is a matter for the positive 
sciences, what he is concerned with is what Dasein is. This is akin to investigating 
what hammer is by having the physical aspect hidden but having access to what it 
does, the way it is used.  This then led me to specifically address the question of 




how to investigate Dasein on this basis, which in turn led to insights concerning 
Heidegger’s methods. 
The work undertaken in relation to clarifying being and Dasein is set in Chapters 4 
to 9.  Chapter 4 sets out the problem of being and Dasein, Chapter 5 examines 
being in terms of Heidegger’s stated project and Chapters 6 and 7 discussed 
aspects of the Greek tradition which leads to a clarification of Heidegger’s concept 
of being.  Against the background of the discussion of being Chapter 8 clarifies how 
to understand Dasein and Chapter 9 addresses the approach of investigating 
Dasein. 
Science researches entities, and as such the entity is already understood as an 
entity before the project commences. It cannot be otherwise, as the nature of the 
entity, as understood, will direct the nature of the enquiry.  This is, in effect what 
Heidegger says in the following passage; 
Positive sciences are those for which what they deal with, what can become their object and 
their theme, already lies there. Numbers are already there, spatial relations exist, nature is 
at hand, language is present, and so is literature. All this is positurn, it lies there. It is an entity; 
everything uncovered in science is an entity. Positive sciences are sciences of entities. 
[BCAP 5] 
For Heidegger, any entity can only properly be understood in terms of its being which 
is why he believes that philosophy’s investigation and interpretation of the being of 
an entity must precede the work of the positive sciences [BT 77/52, BCAP 6].  In 
relation to the thesis, we can only understand the person if we understand its ‘way 
of being’ and it is the structure of this being that Heidegger describes in Being and 
Time.   
The Dawn Finally Breaks 
What was frustrating is that I had been dancing around this understanding for well 
over two years and it took the final challenges in clarifying being and Dasein for this 
to ‘feel’ right.  
What I had been seeking was a new way of understanding, a new paradigm.  The 
point is that there is no way to instruct a person, no method, that if followed, results 
in this new understanding.  Further, understanding of complex things rarely happens 
in a flash but rather as Wittgenstein notes  
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Light dawns gradually over the whole. (Wittgenstein, 1975, No. 141) 
What Wittgenstein failed to mention was that as the light dawns, the morning fog 
must also dissipate. And so, it was for me; understanding arose in a manner that 
was patchy and uneven as the dawn light revealed some parts, leaving others in 
darkness, shadows or concealed in the fog. As the sun rose further the darkness 




APPENDIX 4: MEANING OF WORDS 
 
The following are the words present in Chapter 13 
 
crepuscular:  Of or like twilight 
tmesis:  Separation of the parts of a compound word by one or more intervening 
words (e.g. funda-bloody-mentally)  
nebbish: A person regarded as weak willed or timid. 
schwa: A central vowel in an unstressed syllable in English, e.g. ‘a’ is sofa or ‘u’ in 
circus 
zeugma: The use of a word to modify or govern two or more words is ways that are 
deliberately inappropriate or different, e.g. To wage war and peace. 
paralipsis: A rhetorical device in which an idea is emphasised on the pretence it is 
too obvious to discuss, e.g. The plan has many drawbacks, not to mention the cost. 
oenophile:  One who appreciates or enjoys wine. 
 




APPENDIX 5: HUSSERL AND THE GESTALTISTS 
Prior to the research I was aware of the Gestaltists and at least some of their claims 
and was under the impression that they were the originators of their foundational 
ideas. However, while the Gestaltists clearly developed and extended the work 
around the relationship of whole and parts it is Husserl who made many of the 
important discoveries and developed the concept in the contemporary form, and it 
is Husserl's work that influence Heidegger.  
It was Heidegger who alerted me to the Husserl - Gestalt Psychology link,  one that 
I could not find in some of the main texts dealing with the history of 
phenomenology(Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994) nor is it mentioned in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on gestalt psychology (The Editors of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2016a), nor the equivalent Wikipedia Encyclopedia entry (Gestalt 
psychology. ) where Husserl's developments are seen as simply being a "similar 
concepts", i.e. independent.   
The claim by Heidegger concerning Husserl’s priority is in the 1925 course History 
of the Concept of Time,  
I can in a single act of perception simply see a flock of birds or a row of trees. Such given wholes are 
self-contained. The unity of a row, a swarm, a flock of wild ducks is not based upon a prior act of 
counting. It is an intuitive unity which gives the whole simply. It is figural. Husserl saw the figural quite 
early in his mathematical investigations. It has now also entered psychology under the name of Gestalt. 
This discovery forms the basis for a new psychology, Gestalt psychology. It has already become a 
world view. [HCT p. 66] 
There is strong circumstantial evidence to support Heidegger’s claim, particularly 
since Husserl’s work in Logical Investigations was published (1900 and 1901) before 
the Gestaltists were founded (circa 1912).   
The term Gestalt derives from the German meaning 'shape, form, figure, 
appearance', etc and gives itself to the school of psychology founded in Germany 
by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967), and Kurt Koffka 
(1886-1941) in 1912.  These early experimental psychologists were initially 
interested in how it was that we managed to gain meaning from visual perception 
and their basic idea was that the mind tends to self-organise into wholes, not by the 
aggregations and assembly of the parts but that in some way the whole had a 
distinct existence to parts. Additionally, that it is within the whole that the part, as 
part of the whole, gains it meaning. (Koffka, 2005).  The similarity to Husserl’s work 
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as presented in Chapter 13 of the thesis, particularly in relation to categorial intuition 
and mereology can be seen in even this brief account. 
There is a direct and close connection between Husserl and the Gestaltists and I 
have no doubt they were familiar with Husserl's work.  All three of the founding 
Gestaltists were students of the psychologist and philosopher Carl Stumpf who, 
earlier, was Husserl's habitation supervisor and then a senior colleague at the 
University of Halle for several years.(Spiegelberg, 1994) 
In an apocryphal story it is Stumpf who is reported to have physically removed the 
transcript of Logical Investigations, from Husserl's desk and sent it to the printers to 
rescue it from yet more editing by Husserl.  (Moran, 2000)  Husserl dedicates this 
seminal work to Stumpf in recognition of their friendship and philosophical 
contributions to the work.  
Given the above I think there are strong claims for Husserl being recognised as the 
originator of key aspects of Gestalt psychology.  An article on this topic would be an 
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